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Existing redistributive policy settings tend to magnify the impact of demographic 
and structural economic change on young people, including children, while 
providing more protection for older citizens. It can no longer be assumed that 
today’s young people will be relatively better off across their lives in terms of 
economic resources and opportunities than their grandparents. The thesis 
investigates the extent of this problem, public attitudes towards it, and the factors 
that might explain these attitudes. Fieldwork undertaken for the thesis aimed to 
determine whether young adult and senior Australians perceived current policy 
settings differently, how they formed their views and whether there was any 
support for policy reform.  
 
The fieldwork took a mixed methods approach comprising a survey and interviews 
with a sample of 55 participants across two age groups (18-24-year-olds and 60-70-
year-olds). There were commonalities between the two groups, with both showing 
high levels of support for the welfare state and redistribution of income based on a 
strong commitment to egalitarianism, though tempered by endorsement of means-
testing and other forms of conditionality. The fieldwork results aligned with prior 
research on the complexity of attitudes towards redistributive policy in highly 
meritocratic societies, with participants sometimes struggling to reconcile different 
values that were important to them. The key differences between the young adult 
and senior participants lay in how they resolved these tensions. The young adults 
were more likely to prioritise the values of freedom, individualism and personal 
rights. They were also more tolerant of market outcomes. Senior participants were 
more likely to prioritise equality, collectivism and responsibilities and they tended 
to expect more from government.  
 
Neither the young adults nor the seniors felt particularly strongly about reforming 
redistributive policy in the interests of fairness across age groups and sustainability 
into the future. The seniors were relatively sympathetic to the issues faced by 
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young people, but factors mitigating against their active support for change 
included a relatively short-term outlook, a view that older people had earned the 
right to benefits in ways that young people had not and a tendency by some to 
associate need with a failure of individual responsibility. The young participants 
took a pragmatic view of the existing economic order, recognising the ways that it 
produced inequality but not holding any agents accountable or seeing any 
possibility of change. Their prioritisation of individual autonomy, relativistic 
approach to personal choice and comfort with consumption and market-oriented 
norms meant they didn’t actively seek any alternatives to existing redistributive 
policy settings. The tendency of the young participants to acquiesce to the existing 
economic order despite perceiving it as unfair was an unexpected finding. A range 
of possible explanatory factors are considered, including how conditions of relative 
prosperity and the neo-liberal norms prevalent in Australia over the last three 
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Some of these terms have multiple and/or contested meanings. This list is intended 
only to provide the general meaning assigned to the terms in this thesis. Italicised 
terms in the definitions have their own definitions, or closely associated definitions. 
 
Advanced industrial democracy: A democratic country which has moved into a 
post-industrial phase where the service sector produces more wealth than the 
manufacturing sector; also referred to as post-industrial society. The term is usually 
taken to refer to a group of developed countries which includes the United States, 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, Western European and 
Scandinavian countries, Japan and South Korea. 
Aged dependency ratio: Ratio of people in a population who are of working age 
(15-64) compared to those aged 65+. The dependency ratio refers to the ratio of 
people aged 15-64 to those aged under 15 and 65+. 
Age group: A group of people who fall within a particular age range at a set point in 
time, e.g. those aged 60-70 in 2016. Also referred to as an age cohort (cf. birth 
cohort). 
Age Pension: A means-tested Australian Government income support payment 
made to eligible retirees in Australia, funded through a pay-as-you-go system. 
Annuity: A regular payment, made periodically (such as monthly or annually), also 
described as an income stream.  
Ascriptive: Refers to characteristics that are hereditary or otherwise largely beyond 
an individual’s control, such as gender, race, sexual orientation, ethnicity, age or 
social class at birth. 
Australian Election Study: Survey series, commencing in 1987, timed to coincide 
with Australian federal elections, providing data on the political attitudes and 
behaviour of the Australian electorate over time and the salience of political issues 
for the recent election result. 
Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA): A biennial survey, commencing in 
2003, of around 4000 Australian adults randomly selected from the electoral roll, 
which includes 130 core questions on social issues and a series of specific modules 
(including the International Social Survey Programme module).  
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Baby Boomer: Generational label, used predominantly in popular culture and 
media, referring to a member of the 1946-1964 birth cohort. Those born 1946-1955 
and those born 1956-1964 can be seen as two sub-sets of the cohort. 
Bequest ethic: Placing a high value on the desirability (and morality) of leaving a 
material legacy to heirs on one’s death. 
Billion: Equal to one thousand million. 
Birth cohort: A group of people born within a particular span of time, e.g. those 
born between 1940 and 1950 (cf. age group). 
Bounded inequality: A distributive pattern which combines principles of merit and 
need by permitting maximisation of income after everyone has passed a threshold 
income standard. 
Capital gains tax (CGT): Tax on the profit realised from selling assets such as 
property.  
Carer Payment: A means-tested Australian Government income support payment 
made to eligible people who are caring for someone who is impaired or frail (the 
Carer Allowance is a non-means-tested payment set at a much lower level that 
supplements the Carer Payment but is not intended as income support). 
Cognitive mobilisation: Associated with Ronald Inglehart, a process by which post-
industrial publics achieve higher levels of education and information access, 
facilitating more effective political participation. 
Collectivism: Philosophical approach which promotes the importance of the social 
group and its interests, often over the interests of individuals. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI): A measure of how the market value of consumer goods 
and services has changed over a period of time, usually due to inflation. 
Contractarianism: Philosophical approach that sees the legitimacy of the state’s 
authority over individuals as resting on the consent of those individuals to a (usually 
hypothetical) social or political contract.  
Decommodification: Process by which individuals become protected from market 
forces and associated risks through social welfare programs, associated with Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen’s The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). 
Defined benefit: Describes a pension fund which provides a payment that is not 
based on what has been paid in, but on some other measure such as the 
beneficiary’s final salary before retirement. 
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Deindustrialisation: Socioeconomic change process involving the reduction of 
industrial and manufacturing activity, usually associated with a rise in service sector 
activity. 
Demographic transition: The shift to lower mortality and fertility rates experienced 
by countries as they industrialise. 
Deservingness: Normative judgement about the degree to which a welfare 
beneficiary has ‘earned’ the right to receive benefits. 
Disability Support Pension: Abbreviated as ‘DSP’, a means-tested Australian 
Government income support payment made to eligible people who are unable to 
work due to physical or mental incapacity. 
Discount rate: Rate by which economists reduce the attributed value of goods in 
the future, usually incorporating uncertainty, lower marginal utility due to increased 
future living standards and a preference for immediate over delayed consumption.  
Duty-based norms: Conventional forms of political participation associated with 
being a good citizen, such as voting and serving on juries. 
Economic growth: The increase in the market value of goods and services an 
economy produces over time, usually adjusted for inflation and expressed as the 
annual percentage change in Gross Domestic Product. 
Estate tax: Tax payable on the whole estate of a deceased person.  
Eurobarometer: Survey series on issues related to European citizenship, 
commencing in 1973, comprising of face-to-face interviews with around 1000 
citizens in each of the European Union member states and conducted several times 
per year. A number of more in-depth, thematic surveys are also undertaken on an 
ad hoc basis. 
European Social Survey: Biennial cross-national survey on social attitudes, 
commencing in 2001, conducted via face-to-face interviews with European citizens 
in over 30 nations.  
Framing: The presentation of a concept or proposition in a way which suggests a 
particular meaning or interpretation. 
Funded pension: Pension paid out of a ring-fenced pool established for the purpose 
and managed by the state, an employer or a commercial enterprise. The pension is 
paid from the amount contributed by the beneficiary into the fund, plus any 
investment returns and minus any administration costs. 
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Future orientation: A concern for or interest in possible conditions in the future, 
including how they might be affected by current actions and decisions. 
Generational accounting: Framework for capturing all future government liabilities 
by specifying the lifetime tax burden of different birth cohorts based on particular 
policy settings. 
Generational consciousness: A cohesive identity and self-awareness developed by a 
group of people born at a similar time as a result of shared historical experience. 
Generativity: Term used by psychoanalyst Erik Erikson to describe a concern for 
establishing and guiding succeeding birth cohorts and characterising a particular 
psycho-social phase of adulthood.  
Gerontocracy: Polity in which leadership is dominated by senior citizens. 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC): Economic crisis that peaked in 2008, precipitated by a 
collapse of markets and the bursting of a housing bubble in the US, with flow-on 
effects for markets across the world.  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): The final market value of all goods and services 
produced by an economy in a particular period (such as a year). 
Heuristic: A cognitive shortcut or rule of thumb that helps people make sense of 
excess information when forming judgements and making decisions. 
Income stream: A regular payment, made periodically (such as monthly or 
annually), also described as an annuity. 
Income support: Payments made by governments to people whose own income is 
insufficient to achieve an acceptable standard of living, usually because they are 
unable to work or cannot find a job; includes pensions for the aged, disabled and 
unemployed. 
Indexation: The adjustment of payments by a price index to compensate for 
inflation. 
Indirect reciprocity: Receiving benefits from one party in exchange for providing 
benefits to a third party. 
Individualism: Philosophical approach which promotes personal autonomy and the 
interests of the individual, often over the interests of the social group or the state. 




In-kind benefits: Transfers in a non-monetary form, such as the provision of 
services. 
Institution: A relatively stable structure or mechanism that constrains individual 
behaviour and fulfils specified social purposes. 
Intergenerational justice: Fairness between the members of different birth cohorts. 
Intergenerational Reports: Periodic reports prepared by the Australian Treasury 
(and some state governments) at least every 5 years which extrapolate the costs of 
existing policy settings in areas affected by demographic change over a period of 
40-50 years. 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP): An annual program of cross-national 
surveys on various topics of interest to social scientists, commencing in 1984 and 
now involving 45 member countries including Australia. 
Inter vivos: Refers to the transfer of assets or wealth in the form of a gift or loan 
during the lifetime of the benefactor. 
Justice: Fairness, here in relation to the distribution of goods (i.e. distributive rather 
than retributive justice).  
Just world hypothesis: The assertion that there is a moral balance in the world or 
society such that people’s actions generally result in fair and appropriate 
consequences.  
Laundering: The tendency for people to express opinions based on what they think 
will make them appear in the best light to others rather than on what they really 
believe.  
Liberal regime: From Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (1990), one of the three main types of welfare regime, characterised by 
minimal state intervention, residualist benefit programs and low levels of 
decommodification.  
Lifecourse: The total time period an individual is alive, from birth to death. 
Life expectancy: Statistical measure of the average time a person is expected to live 
(based on their year of birth, current age and gender). 
Living standard: The level of material goods, wealth and comfort, from basic 
necessities to luxuries, available to an individual or group; also referred to as 
standard of living. 
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Loss aversion: Tendency for people to prefer to avoid a loss than make an 
equivalent gain. 
Lump sum: Payment taken as a single one-off sum, rather than as an annuity or 
income stream; often used in reference to superannuation benefits. 
Materialist: Tendency to attach high importance to material needs and desires - 
protection, shelter and nourishment under conditions of scarcity, and consumer 
goods in conditions of prosperity.  
Means-tested: Describes benefits and payments that are only granted to people 
who can demonstrate need, usually because their income and/or wealth falls below 
a specified level. 
Medicare levy: Levy of up to 2% on incomes over the tax-free threshold, paid in 
addition to personal income tax, to fund Australia’s public health system. 
Meritocracy: Philosophical approach and principle for structuring society that 
advocates power, status and/or material reward being allocated through the 
demonstration of talent and ability. 
Millennials: Generational label, used predominantly in popular culture and media, 
usually referring to a member of the 1980-1996 birth cohort; also described as 
Generation Y. 
Modernisation: Theoretical approach originating with Max Weber which explains 
how societies transition from pre-industrial structures and practices to modernity, 
characterised by increasing levels of education, urbanisation, material prosperity 
and, on some formulations, democratisation. 
Moral hazard: Occurs when someone is more likely to act in a certain way because 
someone else bears at least some of the costs of those actions. 
Mutual obligation requirements: Conditions attached to the receipt of selected 
income support payments in Australia, such as undertaking job search activities, 
retraining or work-for-the-dole programs. 
Negative gearing: A form of financial leveraging where investors borrow money to 
purchase property, expecting to make short-term losses which they can deduct 
from their taxable income, on the assumption that they will accrue long-run 
benefits in the form of capital gains.  
Neo-liberalism: Ideology emphasising individualism and personal responsibility, and 
favouring free market, laissez-faire policy settings, including privatisation, 
deregulation, free trade and limited government; influential particularly in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand from the 1980s. 
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Newstart Allowance: A means-tested Australian Government income support 
payment made to eligible people who are unemployed and seeking work. Newstart 
Allowance was renamed ‘Jobseeker Payment’ in March 2020. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): 
Intergovernmental organisation, founded in 1961 and comprising 35 member 
countries, with the purpose of promoting the global market economy and trade. 
Parenting Payment: A means-tested Australian Government income support 
payment made to eligible people (single and partnered) who are caring for children 
under 8. 
Party identification: Extent to which an individual is loyal to a political party and/or 
in sympathy with what it represents. 
Path dependence: The tendency of decision-making in the present to be 
constrained by decisions made in the past, even if circumstances have changed. 
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension: Public pension paid out of general tax revenue. 
There is no relationship between the amount of tax the beneficiary has paid and the 
pension they receive. 
Pension: An income support payment made to a person who is unable to work or 
has reached a designated age that makes them eligible for benefits regardless of 
capacity to work. 
Political efficacy: The capacity of an individual or group to influence political 
processes, and have the government respond to their preferences. 
Political engagement: The extent to which an individual is interested in and aware 
of political issues and/or undertakes forms of political participation. 
Political participation: Electoral and non-electoral activities undertaken with the 
aim of expressing political preferences and/or exerting influence over political 
processes. 
Population ageing: Demographic phenomenon involving an increase in a country’s 
median age, usually due to a combination of increasing life expectancy (or declining 
mortality rate) and declining fertility rate. 
Post-industrial: Refers to a phase of social and economic development where the 
services sector has begun to produce more wealth than the manufacturing sector. 
Postmaterialist: Tendency to prioritise individual autonomy and self-expression 
over materialist values; associated with the work of Ronald Inglehart. 
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Poverty: Inability to achieve a basic minimum standard of living due to scarce 
material resources, defined as income falling below the poverty line. 
Poverty line: A percentage of median household income in the relevant country 
(usually either 50% or 60%). 
Precariat: A group of people who occupy insecure labour market positions, usually 
low-paid and low-status, which do not offer strong occupational identity, career 
prospects or benefits. 
Preservation age: The age at which an individual becomes eligible to access their 
superannuation funds (currently ranges from 56-60 in Australia depending on when 
the individual was born). 
Private transfers: Financial and in-kind support provided by citizens to other 
citizens (usually within families). 
Productivity: The average efficiency of production processes in a country or 
organisation, expressed as output per unit of input (labour productivity is a subset 
of total productivity). 
Public opinion: An aggregate measure of attitudes across a large group of citizens 
who are representative of a population (either societal-wide or defined more 
narrowly). 
Public transfers: Financial and in-kind support provided by the state to citizens. 
Rational choice: A theoretical approach to social and economic behaviour based on 
individuals making reasoned assessments of their interests and acting accordingly. 
Reciprocity: Exchange of benefits between two parties for mutual advantage. 
Recommodification: Process by which individuals become more exposed to market 
forces and associated risks; reverse of decommodification. 
Redistributive policy: Economic and social policies, notably tax and welfare 
programs, that shift resources between different groups in society. 
Reflexivity: A feedback loop; the capacity of individuals to reflect and adjust or 
adapt accordingly. 
Residualist: Describes a welfare program which is means-tested or otherwise 
targeted at particular groups, usually the neediest. 
Risk society: Term associated with sociologists Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, 
referring to the way risk is generated and managed in post-industrial society. 
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Safety net: Provision, usually via a welfare state program, for people at risk of 
falling below a minimum standard of living such as the poverty line to receive 
benefits. 
Self-interest: An individual’s aim to maximise his or her own personal utility or 
advantage, usually pursued without regard for the interests of other individuals, 
groups or society as a whole. 
Seniors and Pensioners Tax Offset (SAPTO): Tax concession that reduces the 
personal income tax paid by Australians who have reached the Age Pension 
eligibility age (regardless of whether they qualify for the Age Pension).  
Social capital: Tangible and intangible goods, including reciprocity, trust and 
cooperation, that arise from social networks. Traditional social capital is more likely 
to be ‘bonding’ (based on ascriptive group membership, emphasising conformity 
and restraint of individual impulses) while newer forms are ‘bridging’ (based on 
more generalised trust, flexible and supportive of individual choice).  
Social inclusion: The ability of less advantaged individuals or groups to access the 
same range of opportunities and resources available to others, and thereby 
participate fully in the economic, social and political life of their communities. 
Sovereign wealth fund: Monetary or other resources set aside and held in trust, 
along with any investment returns, for use at a future time. 
Stratification: The categorisation of the members of society into a hierarchy 
according to a specified criterion – usually socioeconomic status, but sometimes 
age.  
Strong reciprocity: Tendency to support redistribution conditional on fairness of 
process and the deservingness of people who will benefit.  
Superannuation: Name given to Australia’s system of compulsory funded 
retirement pensions introduced in 1992 (often abbreviated as ‘super’). 
Tax-and-transfer: A mechanism for effecting redistribution, involving taxing people 
who have more and using the revenue to grant payments or other benefits to those 
who have less. 
Tax break: Treatment of direct benefits (such as welfare state payments) as non-
taxable income. 
Tax expenditure: Program providing benefits to particular individuals or groups 
through the tax system rather than as direct payments (e.g. through tax rebates or 
concessional tax rates on certain forms of income). Sometimes benefits in this 
category may also be referred to as tax breaks. 
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Third Age: Term adopted by historian Peter Laslett to denote a period of personally 
fulfilling older age after retirement but before frailty sets in. 
Universalist: Describes a welfare program which is not means-tested and provides 
the same benefits to all citizens, or all citizens in a particular category (such as those 
aged over 65). 
Utility: The satisfaction an individual will receive from consuming a good or service, 
which will determine the strength of their preference for that good or service. 
Value: A relatively stable, fundamental conviction which informs an individual’s 
attitudes and behaviour. 
Value orientation: A constellation of values which can be loosely grouped together 
because they are related in some way, and/or tend to be positively correlated. 
Wealth tax: A tax levied on the total value of someone’s assets, including all 
investments but with liabilities deducted; sometimes called a capital tax or net 
worth tax. 
Wealth transfer tax: A tax levied on the passing of assets from one person to 
another, usually in the form of an inheritance tax or estate tax. 
Welfare: Used to describe a range of social programs, policies or benefits associated 
with the welfare state; may also be used interchangeably with wellbeing to refer to 
the general condition of an individual or group. 
Welfare program: Policy, group of policies, benefit scheme, payment or other 
activity associated with the welfare state. 
Welfare regime: The welfare state in combination with the two other pillars of 
social protection, risk management and resource distribution – the market and the 
family. 
Welfare state: A collection of public programs, policies and institutions designed to 
ensure all individuals in society can achieve minimum living standards and levels of 
wellbeing, usually through redistribution of resources.  
World Values Survey: International research exercise conducted by the non-
commercial, non-governmental World Values Survey Association since 1981 that 
surveys people in almost 100 countries on their values and beliefs.  
Youth Allowance: A means-tested Australian Government income support payment 
made to eligible young people (aged 16-24) who are in full-time study or vocational 








This policy and reverence of age makes the world bitter to the best of our times; keeps our fortunes 
from us till our oldness cannot relish them. 
 Shakespeare, King Lear (1606) 
 
 
This thesis investigates redistributive policy in Australia from the perspective of 
fairness across age groups and sustainability over the coming decades. 
Redistributive policy comprises economic and social policies, notably tax and 
welfare programs, that shift resources between different groups in society. Its 
primary purpose is ostensibly to partially smooth out inequalities, but in some cases 
it works to reinforce them. The thesis analyses the current redistributive policy 
context and the impacts of demographic, economic and policy change over time. It 
considers reasons why specific policy settings persist despite them disadvantaging 
particular groups in society, shifting the costs of current consumption onto future 
taxpayers, and likely being unsustainable in the longer term.  
 
A detailed review and synthesis of prior research on how people form their 
attitudes towards redistributive policy is conducted. The relevance of influences 
such as age, self-interest, psychological biases, social norms, contextual factors and 
underlying value orientations is reviewed. The alignment of public opinion with 
policy and young people’s relatively weaker influence on policymaking are 
considered to address the issue of whether there might be support for 
redistributive policy reform if young people had greater political efficacy. The role 
of public support (or lack thereof) for policy reform in this area is under-researched, 
particularly from a qualitative perspective. The thesis addresses this gap by 
reporting on fieldwork undertaken to explore the attitudes of young Australians and 
seniors towards Australian Government redistributive policies. The fieldwork aimed 
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to identify any differences in policy attitudes, and the factors shaping them, 
between the young adults and the seniors. It was particularly interested in the 
extent to which each group supported reform of existing policy settings, especially 
the young adults who were less likely to benefit from current policies than the 
seniors. 
 
The synthesis of prior research on how people form their views on redistributive 
policy, together with the analysis of the results of the fieldwork conducted for this 
thesis, have resonance beyond the intergenerational context, shedding light on 
attitudes towards inequality in general. The thesis also generates insight into how 
the political thinking of young people in advanced industrial democracies differs 
from that of older people, which has implications for future policymaking and 
democratic practice more broadly. 
 
Children and young adults are not conventionally viewed as a minority or 
marginalised group. However, power and resources have historically been withheld 
from younger members of society, with the justification that the young will 
eventually grow older and take their turn at claiming the entitlements of age. In 
modern welfare states, seniors (to a much greater extent than children) benefit 
from the redistribution of resources away from working-age members of the 
population. The basis of this ‘intergenerational bargain’ is that when they grow old 
younger people will have access to the same benefits they have funded for their 
predecessors.  
 
The thesis examines whether this remains a reasonable assumption under changing 
economic and demographic circumstances. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, 
advanced industrial democracies such as Australia are experiencing population 
ageing which is predicted to continue for several more decades before likely 
stabilising at a point where an unprecedented proportion of the population is aged 
over 65. While different countries are progressing along this trajectory at different 
rates, and minor fluctuations in birth rates and immigration rates affect how quickly 
ageing progresses, the general trend is clear and ageing effects over the next few 
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decades are already locked in. Ageing populations mean reduced productivity and 
tax receipts for governments, at the same time as demands for spending on 
pensions, aged care and health care skyrocket. 
 
Chapter 2 also outlines how advanced industrial nations have also been 
experiencing a process of structural economic change characterised by 
deindustrialisation, increasing automation, slower rises in productivity, reduced 
growth, stagnant wages and the rise of a precariat class trapped in poorly paid, 
insecure jobs with few prospects for advancement. In countries such as Australia, 
the US and the UK, the adoption of neo-liberal policies from the 1980s has 
weakened the social safety net just as risk has become increasingly individualised. 
Some groups, notably those who are older and better-off, have been at least partly 
shielded from these changes while others bear the brunt of exposure to new social 
risks. Government redistributive policy is the primary mechanism through which 
some are protected while others are left exposed. 
 
As will be outlined, today’s children and young adults are on some very basic 
measures worse-off on average than their parents and grandparents were at their 
age. They are also likely to be relatively worse-off as working age taxpayers and as 
seniors than their predecessors at the same ages. Young adults in advanced 
industrial democracies are currently among the groups most exposed to structural 
economic change and the resulting risk, limiting their chances of securing good jobs, 
buying houses and raising families. Children from low-income and single-parent 
families are also exposed and experience poverty rates significantly higher than for 
the rest of the population in Australia. This is occurring at a time when the average 
wealth levels of older Australians are increasing, as is the proportion of welfare 
benefits they receive. 
 
The relative disadvantage today’s children and young adults are currently 
experiencing may not be recompensed in the future as might once have been 
expected. It cannot be assumed that economic growth will continue at the rate 
experienced over the last half-century and keep delivering ever-increasing living 
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standards. As discussed in Chapter 2, private resource transfers (gifts or bequests) 
from older people to succeeding generations are unlikely to compensate for 
inequities as they tend to significantly benefit only a small number of people and 
exacerbate wealth concentration. 
 
Chapter 2 also explains that young people are likely to carry a higher tax burden 
than past generations during their working lives as there will be relatively fewer of 
them and they will need to fund the care and support of a growing proportion of 
older people. They will also have to pay the mitigation and adaptation costs of 
environmental damage caused by the resource consumption of those who came 
before them. By the time today’s young people are themselves old, it is unlikely 
they will be able to access the same benefits that today’s seniors take for granted as 
these benefits will not be sustainable under the new economic and demographic 
conditions. Today’s young people will have foregone higher wages during their 
working lives in order to fund their own retirements via compulsory 
superannuation, at the same time as paying for the pensions of their grandparents. 
They will have to work longer (both the superannuation preservation age and the 
Age Pension eligibility age have recently been increased) and will be more likely to 
be renting during retirement rather than living in their own homes. 
 
Structural economic change and the ageing of populations in advanced industrial 
democracies mean existing redistributive policy approaches suited to past 
conditions are in need of reform in the interests of sustainability and fairness across 
age groups and birth cohorts. It will be argued that instead of ameliorating the 
impact of demographic and economic shifts on vulnerable groups, Australian 
Government redistributive policy exacerbates the negative effects they experience. 
Chapter 3 explains why taking an intergenerational perspective is a useful approach 
to analysing the redistributive policy context and reveals the ways in which it can 
reinforce inequalities. The chapter goes on to consider how age influences both 
political participation and attitudes towards redistributive policy. It analyses the 
degree to which public attitudes actually affect policymaking, and whether they 
should affect policymaking. The long-standing debate over the extent of voter 
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knowledge and competence is reviewed. The salience of public attitudes depends 
on the extent to which they are an actual and legitimate influence on policy 
development and change. Similarly, the importance of any attitudinal differences 
between age groups depends on the extent to which different age groups have 
different opportunities to have their political voices heard.  
 
Chapter 4 presents a detailed analysis of some useful frameworks for understanding 
the formation of policy attitudes and people’s thinking about redistributive policy in 
particular. This sets the scene for an analysis, in later chapters, of the factors 
underlying the policy attitudes of participants in the fieldwork undertaken for the 
thesis. Various concepts which inform attitudes towards redistributive policy, 
including reciprocity, meritocracy and deservingness, are discussed. Attitude 
formation is found to be a complex and multi-faceted process, shaped by factors 
such as self-interest, emotion, habituation and institutional context. The influence 
of normative beliefs and values on policy attitudes is considered in detail. A 
framework that integrates several influential value typologies is presented as a tool 
for better understanding the nuances of people’s political thinking in a rapidly 
changing world.  
 
The fieldwork conducted for the thesis sought to establish whether age is an 
influence on attitudes towards Australian Government redistributive policy. It did so 
by comparing the views of a group of young Australians aged 18 to 24 and a group 
of seniors aged 60 to 70. The fieldwork also explored the factors underlying the 
policy attitudes of the participants. Chapter 5 outlines the mixed-methods approach 
used in the fieldwork and describes why particular methods were chosen, notably 
interviews to gather rich qualitative data on why people think the way they do 
about redistributive policy. Methodological issues, participant sampling and the 
data analysis approach taken are considered.  
 
The results of the survey and interviews conducted as part of the fieldwork are 
outlined in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses the fieldwork results in more detail, 
analysing the extent of, and basis for, attitudinal differences found between the 
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young and senior participants. The results are considered in relation to the various 
explanatory frameworks outlined in Chapter 4, with a particular focus on the 
normative beliefs and values influencing participants’ policy attitudes and producing 
differences between the two age groups. Chapter 8 considers the significance and 
implications of the fieldwork results from various perspectives, including why the 
political thinking of young adults may be informed by different value sets to that of 
their elders and the chances of policy reform.  
 
Reforming policies that contribute to intergenerational inequality raises particular 
obstacles. There are a host of uncertainties associated with predicting how policies 
will play out over long periods of time, and it is difficult to smooth out inequalities 
that have a temporal dimension. The electorally-driven short-termism built into 
democracy can make it harder to effectively manage issues with long-range impacts 
(see, for example, Peterson 2004, p.206; Sasaki 2004, pp.211-14; Tremmel 2006, 
pp.187-89; Wolfe 2008; Gardiner 2011, p.34; Emmott 2017, p.54). Policy reform in 
the interests of young people is made less likely by their declining relative numbers 
and their lower levels of engagement in traditional forms of political participation 
such as voting. Policymakers prioritise the preferences of those most likely to get 
them reelected, and older adults are more likely to engage in political participation 
to promote their own economic interests than younger people.  
 
The fieldwork undertaken for the thesis uncovered an additional, unexpected 
barrier to policy reform in the interests of fairness across age groups and 
sustainability into the future: the young participants’ disinclination to seek any 
change to the economic status quo or advocate for their own interests. This finding 
is considered in the context of the range of influences on the formation of attitudes 





The redistributive policy context 
 
 
The subject of an egalitarian principle is not the distribution of particular rewards to individuals at 
some time, but the prospective quality of their lives as a whole, from birth to death. 
   
Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (1991) 
 
 
This chapter outlines the current redistributive policy context in Australia and how it 
affects different age groups differently. The constructs of age group and birth 
cohort are compared, and the impact of economic, demographic and policy change 
over time, considered. Key elements of the Australian welfare state, tax system and 
retirement income system, including the Age Pension, superannuation and benefits 
for homeowners, are discussed. The issue of how private resource transfers such as 
bequests interact with public redistribution is also considered. 
 
Age is a key factor that helps determine who benefits from redistributive policy. 
When policies and broader socio-economic conditions change over time, particular 
birth cohorts can be disadvantaged and find their life chances compromised 
compared to those of people born at other times. In these circumstances, growing 
older is no guarantee of being able to access the same benefits and opportunities 
that have been available to others. As will be outlined, today’s young people are 
disproportionately affected by the costs of population ageing and structural 
economic shifts and are likely to be at a relative disadvantage in terms of economic 
opportunities across their lifetimes compared to their grandparents. Rather than 
ameliorating the impact of this ‘demographic bad luck’, redistributive policies in 
Australia and other advanced industrial societies tend to magnify it. 
 
The primary purpose of redistributive policy is to funnel resources away from 
working-age members of the population and towards people who are dependents 
due to their youth or age (children and retirees). Working-age people who are 
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unemployed, single parents, studying, caring for others or disabled receive income 
support. However, those over retirement age reap the lion’s share of benefits and 
contribute comparatively little in the form of tax. Income support for working-age 
people is conditional on incapacity to work or a demonstration of actively seeking 
work. People become entitled to the Age Pension, however, simply by virtue of 
reaching a certain age, regardless of whether they have the capacity to work or 
not.1 
 
Figure 1 compares the amounts spent by the Australian Government each year on 
income support for seniors, people with disability, jobseekers, carers, (single) 
parents and students. Projected expenditures in 2022-23 are also included. Figure 2 
compares the overall amount the Australian Government spends on social security 
and welfare for the aged, veterans, people with disability, families with children and 
the unemployed. These figures include not only income support, but also other 
benefits such as aged care provision, the National Disability Insurance Scheme 
(NDIS), Family Tax Benefit, Childcare Subsidy and paid parental leave.2 
 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of income support expenditure in 2018-19 and projected in 2022-23 
(Source: Australian Government 2019) 
 
1 In Australia’s highly means-tested welfare system, income and assets are also taken into account 
when determining eligibility for any form of income support. 
2 Carers’ costs are included in the figures for people with disability. 












Figure 2: Comparison of social security and welfare expenditure in 2018-19 and projected 
in 2022-23 (Source: Australian Government 2019) 
 
As these graphs illustrate, seniors tend to benefit heavily from redistributive policy. 
While pension eligibility has been in decline from a peak of 90% of seniors in the 
late 1970s, many Australians still see it as an automatic right for everyone over 65 
on the basis of having paid taxes during their working lives (Hamilton & Hamilton, 
2006, p.xi, 13, 29; Borowski & Olsberg 2007). As will be discussed, the findings of 
the fieldwork conducted for the thesis were consistent with the ‘pension as 
entitlement’ view. 
 
This view is based on an erroneous understanding of how Australia’s tax-and-
transfer system works. Australia’s mean-tested Age Pension is a pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) pension scheme, funded by general tax revenue and paid on the basis of 
need. Under PAYG schemes there is no relationship between contributions and 
benefits. In contrast, funded pension schemes involve ring-fenced funds to which 
retirees have contributed during their working lives. However, PAYG pensions are 
sometimes seen as akin to funded pension schemes, with monies paid in not 
irretrievably lost to taxpayers but held in pseudo-trust until their retirement 
(Thomson 1991, pp.14-17). In reality, Australian retirees have their pensions funded 
by today’s working age people, on the basis that those retirees funded the pensions 
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of older cohorts in prior decades. This ‘retirement bargain’ relies on assumptions 
about policy stability and economic and demographic conditions that no longer 
hold, as will be discussed in section 2.2. First, the difference between age group and 
birth cohort will be considered. 
 
2.1 Age vs birth cohort 
 
When considering the effects of redistributive policy on different age groups, two 
different but related factors are relevant: age group (which changes over time) and 
birth cohort (which remains stable). Being born in the right place at the right time 
can make a significant difference to people’s life chances. It is to be expected that at 
any one point in time, older people in a society will be better off economically than 
younger people because the former have had more time to accumulate wealth. 
However, issues of fairness and equity become more acute when there is reason to 
expect that younger people will be worse off across their lives as a whole, either 
economically and/or in terms of life opportunities, than their parents or 
grandparents were. This calls into question fundamental assumptions about 
progress and material improvement that underpin capitalism and the broader 
modernisation project that has been underway in advanced industrial democracies 
for several centuries. Deeper issues still are raised when those with power act to 
benefit themselves now with full knowledge that their successors - their children 
and grandchildren - will bear the costs of those actions. 
 
Comparing the circumstances of people born at different times invariably raises the 
contested idea of generation. The idea that birth cohorts have distinctive 
characteristics has resonance for many people and generational labels such as ‘Baby 
Boomers’, ‘Generation X’ and ‘Millennials’ (‘or Generation Y’)3 have endured in 
popular usage (Andres & Wyn 2010, pp.32-33). However, ‘generation’ is ill-defined 
(Alwin & McCammon 2007): a generation has no specific start or end point, groups 
 
3 The youngest generation, born in the early part of the twenty-first century, has been dubbed 
‘Generation TGYH’ (Thank God You’re Here) in recognition of the role this cohort will play in 
supporting an ageing population (Churchill, Denny & Jackson 2014). 
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of people born at the same time are highly heterogeneous, and the lived experience 
of being part of a particular cohort is unavoidably subjective. The concept of 
generation has been described as dated, over-simplified and exaggerated 
(Purhonen 2016); akin to a search for a new gran narrative after the exhaustion of 
past ideologies (Bristow 2016, p.91). As Judith Bessant notes, ‘generation’, like 
other categories, inevitably suffers from both essentialism and fuzziness (2014, 
pp.87, 102-107).  
 
Nevertheless, the sociological construct of birth cohort may retain some 
explanatory usefulness. Karl Mannheim’s 1928 essay ‘The Problem of Generations’ 
captures the idea that people born around the same time are exposed to similar 
social and historical influences and experiences, and that the conditions of youth 
leave an imprint that lasts a lifetime: “Early impressions tend to coalesce into a 
natural view of the world. All later experiences then tend to receive their meaning 
from this original set” (Mannheim 1952, p.298). Whether the shared experience of 
youth gives rise to a sense of solidarity or ‘generational consciousness’ with the 
potential to drive political and social change is another matter (for discussion, see 
Mannheim 1952; Wohl 1979, pp.152-55, 210-17; Eyerman & Turner 1998; Corsten 
1999; Edmunds & Turner 2005). 
 
Both birth cohort and age group have the potential to affect an individual’s values 
and attitudes, as well as their life circumstances. Social stratification based on age is 
widespread, and widely accepted, in industrialised societies (see Ryder 1965, p.846; 
Chudacoff 1989, pp.3-4; Pilcher 1995, p.1, 25, 150). It has a significant influence on 
opportunities and experiences, access to power and resources, and the way people 
perceive themselves and others (Pilcher 1995, p.25; McAdams, Hart & Maruna 
1998; Hagestad & Uhlenberg 2005). Age stratification effectively operates as a form 
of social control, usually aimed at preserving existing power structures and privilege 
allocations (Abrams 1970, p.182; Kohli 2007). This may manifest as older people 
strategically excluding younger groups from access to economic and cultural capital, 
thereby delaying the inevitable handing over of power for as long as possible 




Younger people may be induced to cooperate by the promise that their turn will 
come (Abrams 1970, p.182; Scott 1990, p.82). However, for some birth cohorts their 
turn never arrives and they have a harder path through life than others. Historical, 
economic and political circumstances, including wars, recessions and disease 
epidemics, impact on people differently depending on when they were born. 
Changes to a society’s age structure affect the proportion of non-productive citizens 
who must be supported by working-age cohorts at any one time. Public policy does 
not remain constant either. The progressive expansion of Australia’s compulsory 
superannuation system since the early 1990s is a case in point. 
 
In his 1980 book Birth and Fortune, economist Richard Easterlin postulated a link 
between an individual’s birth cohort and his or her lifelong economic prospects.4 In 
particular, the economic conditions prevailing when people are young and 
transitioning from education to work can have lasting psychological and practical 
effects (Chauvel 2009; Andres & Wyn 2010; Cuervo & Wyn 2016). One study found 
that graduating from college during a recession meant a higher likelihood of 
reduced earnings for many years (Oreopoulos, Von Wachter & Heisz 2012). Coming 
of age at a time of poor employment and economic prospects has also been linked 
with long-term reduced levels of political engagement (Chauvel & Smits 2015). 
 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, Ronald Inglehart’s postmaterialism 
paradigm suggests that the different circumstances experienced at key times in 
individuals’ lives can shape their political values, attitudes and behaviour. However, 
it is notoriously difficult to disentangle birth cohort and age group effects. A true 
test of birth cohort effects, or the stability of attitudes and behaviour across the life 
span, would require a longitudinal panel design with cohort-sequential and time-
 
4 Easterlin originally theorised that being part of a large cohort was disadvantageous due to labour 
market competition, but subsequent empirical work found limited evidence of this (see, for example, 
Ermisch 1988; Wright 1991). Large cohorts have a significant advantage which can offset greater 
labour market competition - the ability to dominate political and cultural agendas through the 
exercise of economic and electoral power. In later work Easterlin and colleagues found that taking 
advantage of the right economic conditions at the right time had enabled the large US Baby Boomer 
generation to build unprecedented levels of wealth (Easterlin, Schaeffer & Macunovich 1993). 
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sequential elements built in (see Rudolph & Zacher 2017, p.123; Grasso et al. 2019). 
The small-scale longitudinal studies which have been conducted, and studies which 
compare survey data for different cohorts over time, tend to lend some support to 
the hypothesis that people are particularly affected by circumstances during their 
youth or ‘formative years’, and that political predispositions tend to crystallise with 
age (Alwin, Cohen & Newcomb 1991; Konty & Dunham 1997; Sears & Valentino 
1997; Van den Broek 1999; Sears & Funk 1999; Jennings 2002; Jennings 2007; Prior 
2010; Bartels & Jackman 2014; Grasso 2014; Rekker 2016).5 The stability of 
individuals’ political thinking over the lifecourse generally relates to symbolic or 
fundamental values; specific policy settings tend to be in place for limited 
timeframes and attitudes towards them cannot be measured over long periods 
(Alwin, Cohen & Newcomb 1991, p.20). 
 
There are significant limitations to the birth cohort effect. Period effects (the 
influence of contemporary conditions on people’s thinking at any point in time) 
impact on all age groups and it is likely that there will be at least some ongoing 
evolution of people’s socio-political orientations in response to key life events and 
transitions (Alwin, Cohen & Newcomb 1991). Theories of on-line (rather than 
memory-based) opinion formation assume people are constantly updating their 
attitudes as new information reaches them (see, for example, Kumlin 2004, pp.65-
70), although this can result in continuous reinforcement of views already held 
rather than radical reassessment. Institutional theories of opinion formation 
suggest there will be some ongoing political learning in adulthood, influenced by 
people’s exposure to relevant institutional settings. Analysis of American National 
Election Studies data has found evidence of both birth cohort and age group effects 
on political participation (Erkulwater 2012).  
 
Older people tend to be more conservative (both ideologically and in terms of 
attitude stability), which is usually attributed to age effects on personality and 
 
5 Studies on collective memory, which investigate the recall of key historical events by older adults, 
also suggest that events occurring during a person’s adolescence and young adulthood leave the 
most lasting imprints (for example, Schuman & Rodgers 2004; Schuman & Corning 2012). 
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cognitive style (see, for example, Cornelis et al. 2009; Tilley & Evans 2014). 
Becoming more conservative with age can reinforce the birth cohort effect. By the 
the time people are elderly, they are still carrying with them values and attitudes 
suited to conditions prevailing over half a century earlier. There is some suggestion 
that the experience of neo-liberal policy settings may contribute to a certain 
economic conservatism among young people in countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand, the UK and the US. British research has found evidence of cohort effects 
on political values, with generations who came of age from the Thatcher era 
onwards having more right-wing, neo-liberal and conservative views than older 
generations (Grasso et al. 2019). 
 
The fieldwork conducted for the thesis sought to explore in part how young 
people’s political thinking is affected by their experience of contemporary social and 
economic conditions, and whether a ‘generational consciousness’ may develop as a 
result. Judith Bessant (2014, ch.4) argues that the generation born from the late 
1970s (the Millennials) experienced a set of sufficiently distinctive conditions to be 
considered a social and political generation in Mannheim’s sense (see also Bessant, 
Farthing & Watts 2017, ch.2). Bessant identifies three key shifts - the neoliberal 
policy turn, the rise of digital media and globalisation – which have resulted in 
greater dependency on others by young adults, reduced returns on investment in 
education, increasing social and economic disadvantage for young people, and a 
reshaping of identity and relationships by digital technology. Notably, she also 
argues that a distinctive characteristic of this group of young people is that many 
have embraced “an individualist neoliberal political sensibility” (Bessant 2014, p. 
112). However, while young people may understand themselves in terms of 
individual choice and the type of self-making project described by Anthony Giddens 
(1991), they simultaneously challenge aspects of neoliberal policy and the prevailing 
doxa (Bessant, Farthing & Watts 2017, pp.135-37). 
 
The remainder of this chapter examines some of the structural changes in advanced 
industrial societies that are shaping the conditions experienced by young people, 
and how government policy is responding to these changes. Chapter 3 will review 
39 
 
how current conditions may influence the political attitudes and behaviours of 
young people, and the ways in which they differ from those of older citizens.  
 
2.2 Demographic and economic change 
 
The provision of welfare and social support for older citizens is based on a 
‘generational bargain’ between birth cohorts. Retirees have a right to support based 
on the contribution they made to supporting their predecessors. Working age 
taxpayers support today’s retirees on the expectation that they will receive the 
same benefits when they are older. This expectation is no longer reasonable due to 
demographic and economic shifts, particularly population ageing and 
deindustrialisation, associated with the ongoing trajectory of modernisation. 
 
As societies modernise (industrialise), they pass through a demographic transition. 
With improving medical care, education and material conditions, death rates fall, 
then after a short time lag, fertility also falls. The lag creates a population bulge - a 
large generation which generates a ‘demographic dividend’ of increased 
productivity during its working years (Bloom & Williamson 1998; Bloom, Canning & 
Sevilla 2003). Ideally some of the fruits of the high productivity period should be 
invested for the lower-productivity future, including the health and ageing costs of 
the boom cohort (Goodin 1999). Improved material conditions also make it more 
likely that the bulge cohort (and subsequent cohorts6) will live longer, even as there 
are fewer young people to support them in their old age. The overall age structure 
of society shifts upwards over the decades following the demographic transition. 
 
Most advanced industrial nations have already passed through their demographic 
dividend periods when the ratio of net-producing to net-consuming citizens was 
 
6 There are worrying indicators that life expectancy increases in many advanced industrial 
democracies, notably the US and the UK but including Australia, have slowed significantly since the 
turn of the century (Office for National Statistics 2018). There are likely to be multiple factors in play, 
possibly including increasing pressure on health care systems. In the US, where mortality rates have 
worsened among some younger age groups (including babies), factors related to social deprivation 
such as obesity, drug use, suicide and poverty have been linked to increasing mortality (see, for 
example, BBC News 2016). 
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highest, largely in the 1990s (Mason & Lee 2011, p.14). Over the next few decades, 
the age structures of these countries will continue to shift upwards before 
stabilising at a point where a much larger proportion of the population is dependent 
on a much smaller proportion of productive workers. Advanced industrial nations 
can consider mitigating the effects of ageing by trying to increase fertility and 
immigration rates (usually from industrialising countries with younger population 
structures), but both strategies tend to have only limited impacts on productivity, 
insufficient to avoid the need for major policy reform (Kudrna, Tran & Woodland 
2015, p.106).7 
 
Australia’s demographic challenges are less pressing than in many developed 
nations (CEPAR 2018a, p.1). Fertility and immigration rates have remained relatively 
high and Australia has already introduced a number of policy measures to limit the 
fiscal impact of population ageing, including tighter means-testing of the Age 
Pension8 and the introduction of compulsory superannuation. Australia’s aged 
dependency ratio and spending on age pensions are comparatively low by OECD 
standards, and labour force participation by older people has been improving 
(Chomik & Piggott 2012, pp.4-8; CEPAR 2018a, p.24). However, as Figure 3 shows, 
the aged dependency ratio is increasing rapidly: in 1975 there were 7.3 people of 
working age for every person aged over 65 but this figure is expected to fall to 2.7 
by 2055 (Commonwealth of Australia 2015, p.viii). Fiscal pressures arise not just 
from a higher proportion of older dependents requiring support and care 
(demanding increased spending by government), but simultaneously from a lower 
proportion of tax-paying workers (putting downward pressure on both productivity 
and government revenue). 
 
 
7 Increased immigration is usually not politically feasible at a scale sufficient to mitigate population 
ageing (see Peterson 1999, p.144). Attempting to influence fertility levels through policy settings also 
tends to be relatively ineffective (see Schleutker 2014). 
8 The income and assets tests for the Age Pension are subject to ongoing adjustment, most recently 
in 2017 when the assets test taper rate was increased. The taper rate is the rate at which Pension 
payments are reduced as recipients’ assets increase, until they reach the point where they are no 




Figure 3: Aged dependency ratio in Australia (projected from 2015 to 2055) (Source: 
Australian Government 2015) 
 
The median age of populations in a number of European countries is now in the 
mid-40s or even higher, while Australia’s is 37 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2018a) and could rise to around 43 by 2066 with nearly a quarter of people aged 
over 65 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018b). Figure 4 illustrates how the age 
structure of the Australian population has changed since the 1970s, with older age 
groups now comprising a much higher proportion of the population and those 



























Figure 4: Age distribution of the Australian population in 1974 and 2018 (Sources: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 1979, 2018a) 
 
Australia currently devotes around 2.7% of GDP to the Age Pension and related 
pensions (CEPAR 2018b, p.19). The maturing of Australia’s compulsory 
superannuation system introduced in 1992 is likely to deliver only modest 
reductions in current spending and the proportion of retirees reliant on a part or 
full pension. Treasury forecasts predict a reduction in pension spending of 6% by 
2050, with the proportion of over-65s receiving some pension expected to decrease 
from 70% to 67% (Commonwealth of Australia 2015, p.65).9 Economist Saul Eslake 
(2017) has warned that the Government’s projections for pension spending have 
failed to adequately account for falling home ownership rates and larger debt 
burdens. Eslake predicts that this will result in more people using their 
superannuation to pay off their mortgages before turning to the pension. If more 
pensioners are still renting, pressure to increase the level of the pension is likely, 
and fewer people will be able to self-fund bonds for residential care facilities by 
selling their homes. 
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A recent report suggests that stagnant wage growth will also reduce 
superannuation balances and lead to higher-than-anticipated pressure on the Age 
Pension in the future (Stanford 2017). However, Daley et al. (2018) argue that, 
contrary to effective marketing by the superannuation industry, home-owning 
retirees currently and in the future will have a comfortable standard of living 
through a combination of superannuation, the Pension and other sources of 
income/wealth. They suggest an increase in Commonwealth Rent Assistance to help 
non-home-owning retirees would be a much more desirable policy change than 
raising the superannuation guarantee or the Pension level. Another recent report 
notes that Australia’s Pension spending is relatively modest by OECD standards and 
reasonably sustainable, though the rising costs of health and aged care are of 
greater concern (CEPAR 2018b, p.19). 
 
The Productivity Commission’s 2013 report An Ageing Australia was less optimistic, 
positing a perfect storm of adverse demographic and economic conditions over the 
next few decades: contraction of labour supply and labour productivity growth; 
falling labour participation rates; declining terms of trade; an increase in costs 
associated with health care, superannuation tax concessions and aged care; and a 
reduction in real income growth. Additional budget pressures equivalent to around 
6% of national GDP are expected by 2060, mainly due to ageing-related costs, with 
tax increases of 21% required to close the fiscal gap (Productivity Commission 2013, 
pp.2, 13). The Commission declared that “A period of truly diminished outcomes is 
likely to be at hand, unless luck or appropriate policy initiatives intervene” 
(Productivity Commission 2013, p.10). Other modelling suggests that between now 
and 2050, spending on health will expand by 25% and on aged care by 126%,10 with 
either a 32% cut in non-age-related expenditure or a 28% increase in the 
consumption tax rate, required to cover these increases (Kudrna, Tran & Woodland 
2015, p.106). The Parliamentary Budget Office predicts a $36b decrease to the 
budget bottom line by 2028 as a result of population ageing, although it notes that 
 
10 Expenditure on education and programs for families will contract at the same time, although by 




this is just one of many drivers of the Government’s fiscal position (Parliamentary 
Budget Office 2019, p.iv). 
 
Apart from the need to support more (and more expensive) dependents, slowing 
productivity growth alone can be problematic, and not just for the workers 
stretched by increased tax demands. Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and funded pension 
schemes both give people moral or legal claims on future production, but if future 
production is limited their claims will also be limited. High demand for scarce goods 
and services will push up prices, and the nest egg or fortnightly pension payment 
will not stretch as far (Thomson 1991, p.88; Barr 2001, pp.91-99; Myles 2002; Lindh, 
Malmberg & Palme 2005, p.485; Barr 2012, p.225). Slowing growth and productivity 
can lead to stagnant or even declining living standards. Government redistributive 
policy, especially the design of pension schemes, affects who bears the brunt of the 
slowdown and the associated ‘economic disappointment’ (Schieber 2011). Making 
current pensioners or the near-retired worse-off is rarely politically palatable. 
Instead, a combination of increasing the burden carried by workers and phasing in 
benefit cutbacks over time (affecting the same workers when they retire) is often 
favoured. For example, in Australia the Age Pension eligibility age (previously 65) is 
being increased incrementally until it reaches 67 in 2023 and a further increase to 
70 by 2035 has been mooted.11 The superannuation preservation age has also been 
increased incrementally from 55 to 60 for anyone born after 1964.12 
 
In addition to demographic changes, there have also been economic shifts over the 
last half-century suggesting that today’s young people may not enjoy the same 
benefits as their grandparents across their lives. While bearing heavier lifetime tax 
burdens to fund the pension, aged care and medical costs of an ageing population, 
including the large ‘Baby Boomer’ cohort, young workers are also 
 
11 In September 2018, new Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced that a further increase to the 
Pension eligibility age was no longer under consideration, although this could change. 
12 The National Commission of Audit has recommended linking the pension age to 77% of life 
expectancy (which would support an increase to 70 by 2053), as well as further increases to the 
superannuation preservation age (National Commission of Audit 2014; see also Productivity 
Commission 2013, pp.14-15, 201). 
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disproportionately affected by slowing economic growth, wage stagnation and job 
market precarity. As will be discussed in section 2.3, government policy tends to 
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the impact of demographic and economic shifts 
on the young. The redistribution of resources from older to younger members of 
society to spread the impact of structural change more evenly is uncommon. 
Rather, the burden of economic readjustment is left to fall most heavily on younger 
members of society, including children. In advanced industrial democracies it tends 
to be the young (particularly the low-skilled young) and families with children who 
bear the brunt of not only labour market transformation and demographic change, 
but also the welfare state’s failure to reform: the risk structure of society has been 
reshaped downwards (Esping-Andersen 1999, p.10, 150-167; Esping-Andersen 
2002; Esping-Andersen & Sarasa 2002, p.8; Bonoli 2006). 
 
Economists are increasingly considering the possibility that low growth is the new 
normal, which calls into question whether living standards will continue to rise from 
generation to generation as significantly as they have in the recent past. Since the 
1970s, advanced industrial economies have moved into the deindustrialisation 
phase of the modernisation trajectory, which tends to slow productivity growth. 
Deindustrialisation involves the shrinking of the manufacturing sector and the 
growth of the services sector in an economy, usually accompanied by labour market 
restructuring, automation and greater engagement with the global economy. The 
increasing cost of mitigating environmental damage and the effects of climate 
change (including extreme weather events) is also a developing trend.13 
 
The massive growth experienced in the US and other advanced industrial 
economies over the last two centuries may have been a one-off boost generated by 
industrialisation and associated productivity gains in areas such as manufacturing, 
transport and logistics (Kotlikoff & Burns 2005, p.99; Cowen 2011; Das 2015, 
pp.159-65). Technological and economic developments are now focused in areas 
 
13 Industrial societies have effectively deferred payment of some of the costs of past production and 
consumption by not factoring in the environmental damage being caused: a prime example of what 
economists call an ‘externality’, when a party, in this case future generations, is affected by a cost 
they did not choose to incur. 
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such as communications, health, education and entertainment, which are more 
resistant to productivity improvement (Peterson 1999, p.97; Cowen 2011, pp.23, 
30, 37; Productivity Commission 2013, pp.105-06; Atkinson 2015, p.121; Minifie, 
Chisholm & Percival 2017, pp.7-9).14 Where there are gains to be had, they 
increasingly accrue to a shrinking elite at the top, creating winner-takes-all markets 
that leave most people behind. There are fewer good jobs in the middle, leaving 
more of those in the labour market (especially young people just starting out) with 
low-paying, insecure work (Cowen 2013, p.39). 
 
From 1991 to 2013, Australia experienced an unprecedented spell of economic 
expansion built on productivity increases, but some of these gains can be traced 
back to events that are unlikely to be repeated - economic deregulation and 
privatisation in the 1980s, the mining boom and substantial increases in property 
prices. Economist Ross Garnaut argues that by failing to save a sufficient proportion 
of these gains, Australians prioritised private benefit over the public interest, and 
current comfort over making provision for future generations (2013, p.17). Garnaut 
believes that current living standards are unsustainable and a downward 
adjustment is inevitable. Grattan Institute researchers concur that older Australians 
have benefited from one-off windfalls over the last few decades and that growth is 
now likely to slow significantly (Daley et al. 2014, p.31; Wood, Griffiths & Emslie 
2019, pp.9-14). The assumption that continuing economic growth will compensate 
young people and future generations for current inequality or burdens we shift into 
the future, including the costs of mitigating environmental damage caused by 
current consumption, no longer holds. 
 
The technological developments, globalisation and labour market deregulation 
associated with deindustrialisation tend to concentrate wealth and shift economic 
power to a small elite at the top. Changing socio-economic dynamics in advanced 
industrial democracies from the 1970s have produced what sociologist Ulrich Beck 
has described as a ‘world risk society’ (Beck 1999). In many countries, including 
 




Australia, this has been accompanied by a move towards neo-liberal social and 
economic policies. Risks continue to be socially produced but they are now more 
likely to be borne individually (Bauman 2001, p.47; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002). 
Both governments and individuals find themselves having to make decisions under 
conditions of complexity and uncertainty and suffer the consequences, intended or 
otherwise (Beck 1999). Outcomes become increasingly unknowable at the same 
time as industrial society’s traditional safety nets become less reliable. A process of 
recommodification means individuals become more exposed to market forces, with 
risk-hedging institutions like the state and family weakened (Svallfors 2007a, p.6). 
The everyone-for-themselves struggle exacerbates problems in a society where 
collaborating and cooperating to manage uncertainty is the key to minimising it for 
everyone (Marris 1996, pp.130-54). 
 
Deindustrialisation and labour market restructuring do not produce unequal risk 
burdens and other forms of inequality if governments implement appropriate 
interventions. However, in many countries, economic and social policies have 
encouraged dualisation, or the reinforcement of an insider/outsider divide. Those 
with more influence are able to secure protection from structural pressures and 
retain their benefits and privileges by shifting risk burdens on to marginalised 
groups (Emmenegger et al. 2012a; Emmenegger et al. 2012b). Young people and 
migrants are two of the groups most exposed to changing economic conditions, 
forming the basis of a ‘precariat’ class which labours in a series of insecure, poorly 
paid, low-status positions with little in the way of occupational identity, career 
prospects or benefits (Standing 2011; Emmenegger et al. 2012b). Australia has a 
comparatively high number of non-standard precariat jobs and young Australians 
have disproportionately borne the impact of labour market restructuring over the 
last two to three decades, with the effects persisting into mid-life in some cases 
(Cuervo & Wyn 2016). A recent report on the future of work in Australia identified 
increasing precariousness of employment and a widening pay gap between old and 
young cohorts as key issues (Cassells et al. 2018). Young Australians, including 
university graduates, are affected more than older people by low wage growth, 




Young people have also been one of the groups most affected by austerity policies 
in Europe following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-8 (see Grasso 2018). 
While Australia was less impacted by the GFC than many countries, it has 
experienced its own version of austerity policy and discourse over the last decade 
(see Walsh & Black 2018). Youth studies researchers have found that the changing 
structural logic affecting young people’s lives has led many to see it as their own 
fault if they find it hard to navigate the new uncertainties (Woodman & Wyn 2011, 
pp.13, 24; Wieranga & Ratnam 2011, p.218). Young people have been encouraged 
to shape their own lives and invest in their individual futures through increasing 
levels of education and unpaid ‘internships’, but these investments of time and 
money don’t always pay off (Andres & Wyn 2010, p.45; Brown, Lauder & Ashton 
2011, pp.6, 135; Standing 2011, pp.16, 67-75; Bessant 2014, pp.21, 112; Bessant, 
Farthing & Watts 2017, ch.8). In advanced industrial democracies there are simply 
too many qualified candidates for a shrinking number of high-quality positions as 
wages stagnate, job security declines, and even high-skilled jobs are exposed to off-
shoring and automation.  
 
The assumption of a linear connection between education and good job 
opportunities no longer applies and accessing high quality education has 
increasingly come to depend on young people’s family or personal resources as 
investment in public education in Australia has declined (Wyn & Woodman 2006, 
pp.499, 506). The educational pathway to upward social mobility, or even just 
maintaining socioeconomic status, appears to have been left behind in the 
industrial age. However, rather than governments taking responsibility for 
addressing structural inequalities and reduced opportunities, the onus is placed on 
individuals. At the same time as it has become harder for younger people to access 
such basics as secure full-time work, housing, child care, even income support when 
necessary, the prevailing culture has been imbuing them with the idea that they can 




Similar economic and demographic changes are occurring across advanced 
industrial nations, including Australia and New Zealand, the UK, the US, Canada, 
many European nations, Japan and South Korea. The structural changes affecting 
countries at earlier stages of the modernisation trajectory, and where most of the 
world’s young people live, generate a different set of circumstances. Different 
policy responses by governments shape the way changes at each stage of the 
trajectory are experienced by different groups in society.  
 
2.3 Current policy responses 
 
Governments substantially decide who will bear the brunt of socio-economic 
change and increasing social risks, and who will be protected, through their 
redistributive policies. Appropriate tax and welfare policies can spread the costs of 
population ageing and structural economic change across society. Tax policies can 
ensure the economic elites who benefit most from technological change and 
globalised markets bear more of the associated costs. However, in many countries 
government policy settings magnify rather than relieve the burdens experienced by 
economically marginalised groups, serving to marginalise them further. For 
example, in Australia the Age Pension is set much higher than income support 
payments for single parents, the unemployed or students, although all of these 
payments serve the same purpose (income replacement for those not in salaried 
employment). Generous tax expenditures15 favour retirees, property owners and 
investors while increasing the tax demands on other groups who are less well-off.  
 
2.3.1 The ageing welfare state 
 
Government policy responses to both structural economic change and population 
ageing often tend to protect older citizens while leaving young adults and families 
with children more exposed. Some possible reasons for this, such as older people 
 
15 Tax expenditures are programs that provide benefits to particular individuals or groups through 
the tax system rather than as direct payments (for example, through tax rebates or concessional tax 
rates on certain forms of income). 
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having more electoral influence than the young, are discussed in Chapter 3. Over 
the last two decades in Australia, all age groups have, on average, become better-
off. However, the gap between younger and older Australians has been widening: 
older households have become much richer than older households were in the 
1990s while young households are only a little better off than their counterparts a 
quarter-century ago (Wood, Griffiths & Emslie 2019, pp.11-12).16 
 
While Australia has to some extent bucked the international trend of younger 
households’ incomes growing more slowly than older households’ over the last 
three decades, it is a different story for wealth, with the net worth of older 
households increasing much faster due to the accumulation of superannuation 
savings and the growth in house prices (Whiteford 2018, p.100). Australia could be 
heading in the same direction as other advanced industrial democracies such as the 
US, UK and many European countries, where young households have actually 
become worse off than their counterparts were in previous generations (Wood, 
Griffiths & Emslie 2019, p.13). Across the advanced industrial nations, it appears 
that today’s young adults are not only doing less well than older people, they are 
worse-off in relative terms than older cohorts were during their youth, and can 
reasonably be expected to be worse-off as seniors than are current seniors 
(Smeeding & Sullivan 1998; Price Waterhouse Coopers UK 2012; Steuerle et al. 
2013; Hood & Joyce 2013; see also Bessant, Farthing & Watts 2017, ch.1).  
 
It is not a matter simply of being less rich; young households and families are more 
likely than older households to suffer serious economic hardship. The Australian 
Council of Social Services (ACOSS) reports that that 17.3% of Australian children 
lived in poverty in 2016, including 39% of children in sole parent families; children 
therefore have a substantially higher poverty rate than other age groups (the 
population average is 13.2%, while the rate for those aged over 65 is 12%) 
(Davidson et al. 2018, pp.12, 38). The authors of this report note that child poverty 
 
16 This is not because young people are frivolous spenders. They spend less on non-essentials than 
young people did 30 years ago, while today’s older Australians spend considerably more than the 
seniors of 30 years ago (Wood, Griffiths & Emslie, p.27). 
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has been increasing over the last ten years at the same time as poverty among the 
elderly has been decreasing (although from a high base).17 They attribute a 
substantial part of the blame for this situation to welfare policy, including increases 
to the Age Pension, Carer Payment and Disability Support Pension which excluded 
Parenting Payment; the freezing of Family Tax Benefits and Newstart Allowance for 
the unemployed; and the transfer of many single parents from Parenting Payment 
to the far less generous Newstart (Phillips & Joseph 2016; Davidson et al. 2018).18 
 
Increased government spending on benefits for older Australians over the last two 
decades has augmented the advantages they already experience from 
‘demographic good luck’ and being relatively better protected from workforce 
restructuring and precarity. As the authors of a recent Grattan Institute report note, 
“Current tax and spending policies are underwriting unprecedented transfers from 
younger households to older ones” (Wood, Griffiths & Emslie 2019, p.32). In good 
times and in bad, government redistributive policies have increasingly favoured 
older Australians. Between 2004 and 2014, as households aged 65-74 became much 
wealthier and households aged 25-34 went backwards, government spending per 
65+ household rose substantially (Daley et al. 2014, pp.2, 22). Net government 
spending (benefits minus taxes) per 65+ household is much higher now than it was 
30 years ago, due to a combination of higher health and pension costs and 
increasingly generous tax concessions (Wood, Griffiths & Emslie 2019, ch.5). During 
this period, the incomes of over-65s increased much more than the incomes of 
under-35s, but the income tax paid by seniors increased far less than it did for 
 
17 Australia’s after-housing elderly poverty rate is low by OECD standards, but it should be noted that 
it is considerably higher for age pensioners who are renting (Yates & Bradbury 2010; CEPAR 2018b, 
pp.23-24). On broad definitions of poverty, based on deprivation as well as income, age pensioners 
do much better than low-wage workers, disability pensioners, sole parents and the unemployed 
(Saunders 2011, pp.148-49). 
18 The situation is even worse in the UK, where welfare policies have contributed to a rapid rise in 
child poverty over the last five years, with nearly half of children in sole parent families living in 
poverty (the rate of age pensioner poverty has more than halved since the turn of the century and is 
well below the population average) (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2018, pp.3-5). In the US, 2016 
data suggest child poverty is decreasing but remains higher than average, with under-18s 
representing 23% of the population but 32% of those living in poverty (National Center for Children 
in Poverty 2018). 
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under-35s; today only 17% of 65+ households pay income tax, compared to 27% in 
the 1990s (Wood, Griffiths & Emslie 2019, p.36). 
 
Some welfare states are more ‘elderly-oriented’ than others, although this appears 
to occur less by design than through institutional path dependence, policy drift and 
unintended consequences (Lynch 2006). Comparative data suggest that older-
oriented welfare states are generally less responsive to changing economic 
conditions and more likely to reproduce existing labour market and status 
differentials than ameliorate inequality (Esping-Andersen 1999, pp.181-82; Lynch 
2006, pp.182-83). It is also less efficient to focus resources on older people instead 
of investing in people early in life and reducing the level of support they are likely to 
need later (Hudson 1997, p.20). Poverty among elderly people who are no longer 
able to earn an income and have not accumulated much wealth was historically a 
pernicious problem which the modern welfare state has been highly effective at 
relieving; that same welfare state has been less effective at addressing economic 
hardship among the young, including families with children (see Mirowsky & Ross 
1999, pp.567-68). 
 
Australia’s welfare state has only a small elder bias compared to many countries 
(Esping-Andersen & Sarasa 2002, pp.6-7; Lynch 2006, pp.4, 33-35), largely because 
Australia’s Age Pension is set at a relatively modest level. However, unemployment 
benefits are comparatively also very low (Lynch 2006, p.113) and tax benefits 
targeted at seniors mitigate the youth orientation of some of Australia’s social 
policies (Lynch 2006, p.35). Alongside the increasing proportion of older voters 
there has been a shift towards redistributive policies favouring seniors in Australia 
over the last three decades, and particularly in the 2000s (Tapper, Fenna & 
Phillimore 2013; Daley et al. 2014; Daley et al. 2016).19 
 
19 There is little evidence of ‘middle-class welfare’ for Australian families (Tapper, Fenna & Phillimore 
2015) and analysis has found increased redistribution towards the elderly since the 1980s has been 
subsidised by middle to higher income families with children (Tapper, Fenna & Phillimore 2014). This 
analysis found single parents had benefited from increased redistribution, but other research reports 
a substantial reduction of benefits for the worst-off single parent families, at least since 2006 when 




In Australia, the Age Pension is more generous than income support payments 
which primarily benefit younger adults (including people with children). The 
maximum rate of Newstart Allowance for a single unemployed person is 
$550/fortnight (2019 rates). The maximum rate of Parenting Payment for a single 
parent is $768/fortnight, and once children reach the age of eight, the single parent 
is moved on to Newstart. Youth Allowance for young people aged 16-24 who are 
unemployed or studying ranges from $249 to $455/fortnight, depending on their 
circumstances. Meanwhile, the maximum Age Pension rate for a single pensioner is 
$834/fortnight plus supplements of $82/fortnight and in-kind benefits such as 
reduced medical, pharmaceutical, utility, vehicle registration and public transport 
costs (Department of Human Services 2018).20 The Age Pension is also privileged 
over other income support payments in other ways: it has the most favourable 
indexation arrangements,21 does not stigmatise beneficiaries and does not impose 
mutual obligation-type conditions.22 
 
2.3.2 The taxed and the taxed-nots 
 
Some elements of Australia’s tax-and-transfer arrangements exacerbate rather than 
ameliorate age-based and other forms of inequality. The current system generally 
suffers from inefficiency, conflicting policy objectives and a focus on private savings 
over collective risk pooling (Spies-Butcher & Stebbing 2011). It does very little to 
promote egalitarian aims and is only nominally progressive; it offers myriad 
opportunities for sheltering wealth, concealing income and minimising tax (Stilwell 
& Jordan 2007, p.204). It is heavily reliant on inefficient, incentive-distorting income 
and corporate taxes rather than focusing on the taxation of consumption, wealth 
 
20 Australia spends 1% of GDP on these in-kind benefits alone (CEPAR 2018b, p.29). 
21 Welfare payments are increased by indexation each year, usually in line with the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). The Age Pension, however, increases in line with wages, which have historically 
increased faster than the CPI. This means that during times of strong wage growth, pensioners keep 
pace with workers but other welfare recipients fall behind.  
22 The Department of Human Services’ own data indicate that Age Pension recipients even get their 
phone calls to Centrelink answered much more quickly than recipients of other income support 
payments (Conifer 2018).  
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and resource ownership.23 The significant roles played by superannuation, tax 
expenditures and policies favouring property owners reinforce labour market 
inequalities and expose people to market volatility.  
 
A comprehensive review of Australia’s tax system led by Ken Henry delivered its 
final report in 2010 and recommended a raft of changes to rationalise tax and 
income support arrangements and make the policy intent of various programs 
clearer (Henry 2010). The ‘retirement tax and transfer system’ settings in particular 
“lack coherence; produce inequitable outcomes based on various indicators 
including income, wealth and gender; and create high effective tax rates on work 
and saving for many Australians over the life cycle” (Ingles & Stewart 2017, p.418). 
The Government conceded in a 2015 discussion paper that the existing tax system 
was fragmented, heavily reliant on inefficient taxes, overly complex and 
characterised by concession and offset schemes which delivered sub-optimal 
outcomes (Australian Government 2015). However, tax reform is notoriously 
difficult to implement and the discussion paper made it clear that less politically 
palatable reform options such as changes to the tax treatment of the family home 
or the reintroduction of estate taxes were not open for consideration. 
 
Economist Ross Garnaut has noted “that more and more of the load is carried by 
income taxpayers with limited opportunities for avoiding taxation is economically 
distorting, unfair and probably politically unsustainable” (2013, p.149). Tax policy is 
very complex,24 which makes it hard for people to assess how fair it is and creates 
opportunities for well-informed actors to pursue their own interests at the expense 
of the public interest (Daley et al. 2015, p.19). A report from a Senate committee 
concluded that the tax system was likely to be contributing to inequality, including 
between age cohorts (Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee 2014). 
 
23 Consumption taxes tend to be more efficient, ensuring tax burdens are borne by those who reap 
the benefits of consuming (Merette 1998; Kotlikoff & Burns 2005, p.84), although they can place 
relatively greater pressure on lower income earners which needs to be compensated (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers 2013, pp.13, 40).  
24 Australia’s tax laws have been described as the most complex in the world, making it hard even for 
Treasury modellers to predict the exact consequences of reform and flow-on effects in other policy 




A series of Grattan Institute reports shows how an array of tax expenditures 
introduced or strengthened since the late 1990s disproportionately benefit wealthy 
and older Australians, causing detrimental social and economic impacts for other 
groups (Kelly et al. 2013; Daley et al. 2014; Daley et al. 2015; Daley et al. 2016; 
Daley, Wood & Parsonage 2016; Daley et al. 2018; Wood, Griffith & Emslie 2019). 
These programs include the superannuation tax concessions, the 50% capital gains 
tax discount on investment property, negative gearing, the Seniors and Pensioners 
Tax Offset (SAPTO), a higher Medicare levy income threshold for senior Australians, 
and a higher private health insurance rebate for senior Australians.  
 
Some of these programs have no discernible policy purpose or are not fit for 
purpose. For example, the superannuation tax concessions, equivalent to 2% of GDP 
(in terms of revenue foregone by the Australian Government), are ostensibly to 
incentivise people to put more money into super and reduce reliance on the Age 
Pension. However, despite modest reforms to the tax treatment of superannuation 
coming into effect in mid-2017, it was predicted that the cost of the scheme would 
surpass the total cost of the Age Pension in 2019 (CEPAR 2018c, p.40). Moreover, 
there is little evidence that the superannuation tax concessions encourage people 
who would otherwise receive the Age Pension to become self-funded retirees and it 
is poorly targeted, with most of the benefits going to wealthier households who 
would be pension-ineligible without topping up their superannuation balances 
(Daley et al. 2015; Stebbing 2015, pp.143-45; Daley et al. 2018b, pp.3-4, 92-97).25  
 
The over-65s have been described as a new class of ‘taxed-nots’ (Daley et al. 2016, 
p.3). Benefits for some groups result in burdens for other groups - to maintain 
spending levels others must pay more tax or the government must accrue more 
debt to be paid back by future taxpayers. In a 2013 report on tax reform, all the key 
 
25 It is impossible for the superannuation tax concessions to pay for themselves through a reduction 
in the Age Pension bill because abolishing the Pension means test entirely and making the Pension 
universal would only cost around half as much as the tax concessions (Ingles & Stewart 2017, p.423). 
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Australian taxes scored a red light for potential ‘intergenerational impact’ (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers 2013, p.41). 
 
2.3.3 Redistribution via private transfers 
 
Older Australians who have accumulated substantial wealth are able to pass it on to 
their inheritors on highly favourable tax terms. Since 1975, Australian states have 
progressively eliminated wealth transfer taxes, including estate taxes, inheritance 
taxes and so-called ‘death duties’ (Olsberg & Winters 2005, p.18). They remain 
relatively widespread around the world, especially in European countries,26 where 
there are often significant legal restrictions on how benefactors can allocate their 
estates (see Cremer & Pestieau 2006; OECD 2015, p.49). This approach recognises 
that bequest practice, with its potential to concentrate wealth and increase 
inequality, raises legitimate public interest concerns. Some economists argue that 
inheritance taxes are problematic due to high administrative costs, possible 
detrimental effects on job and economic growth, exemptions limiting the revenue 
raised and skilled advisors facilitating tax avoidance (Cole 2015). On the other hand, 
others suggest inheritance taxes have broader economic benefits such as increasing 
the labour force participation (and income tax contributions) of legatees who might 
otherwise opt out of work (Kindermann, Mayr & Sachs 2018). 27 
 
A common response to concerns about intergenerational equity and redistributive 
policies favouring some age groups and birth cohorts over others, particularly in 
Europe, is that familial solidarity will compensate. This argument suggests that 
private transfers, including bequests, and in-kind support are substitutable for 
public benefits and service provision. Public and private transfers are 
complementary, together smoothing out inequality between generations 
 
26 In 2015, 19 of 34 OECD countries had inheritance/estate taxes, ranging from 4% in Italy to 40% in 
the US and UK, 45% in France, 50% in South Korea and 55% in Japan (Cole 2015).  
27 The 2019 Federal Election campaign featured widespread false allegations on social media that 
Labor intended to introduce a ‘death tax’, raising serious issues around how to counter ‘fake news’ 
(Murphy, Knaus & Evershed 2019). Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this incident was the way 
it was assumed any genuine wealth transfer tax proposal would be met with universal horror. 
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(Gulbrandsen & Langsether 2000; Attias-Donfut & Wolff 2000a), while 
intergenerational solidarities at the family and societal levels reinforce each other 
(Foner 2000; Ward 2001; Timonen et al. 2013). The work of Vern Bengtson and 
colleagues on family cohesiveness has influenced this view (see, for example, 
Bengtson, Furlong & Laufer 1974; Bengtson & Roberts 1991; Silverstein & Bengtson 
1997; Bengtson et al. 2003), but a competing theoretical approach emphasises 
ambivalence and power differentials in family relationships (see, for example, 
Luescher & Pillemer 1998; Connidis & McMullin 2002; Pillemer & Luescher 2004). 
Later work by Bengtson and colleagues acknowledges the complex and dynamic 
nature of family relationships, refining the solidarity framework to include a conflict 
dimension (Bengtson 2001; Giarrusso et al. 2005).  
 
Intra-family support tends to be arbitrary and unreliable. The filial obligation to care 
for one’s parents in their dotage was once commonplace, although most people 
died without requiring long periods of intensive care (Daniels 1988, p.24). With the 
expansion of the welfare state, “within families, as in other contexts, we are no 
longer clear about who owes what to whom and with what limits” (Moody 2007, 
p.178). Bioethicist Norman Daniels has argued that parental and filial duties are 
fundamentally asymmetrical; the parental role is (usually) voluntarily taken on,28 
while the filial relationship is not, and no general principle of reciprocity arises 
(Daniels 1988, pp.29-34; see also Sheleff 1981, p.263). The precise nature of 
parental duties towards adult offspring is also unclear. In Australia, the increasing 
dependency of young adults on their families is variously attributed to lack of job 
opportunities, low youth wages, higher levels of participation in post-compulsory 
education, lack of affordable housing, and changes to income support programs 




28 The obligation to support one’s children is also legally enforced in some respects. 
29 Young people aged up to 25 may be ineligible for Youth Allowance on the grounds that their 
parents earn too much. This effectively mandates an ongoing relationship of parental dependency 
well into adulthood for many young people. 
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As discussed in section 3.3, support for social spending benefiting the elderly tends 
to be high across age groups and it is sometimes suggested that this is linked with 
practices around private transfers. For example, young and middle-aged people 
may support pensions and aged care provision because it relieves them of the 
burden of providing for their elderly parents (Foner 2000, p.273; Kohli 2011, p.474). 
Another argument is that generous public benefits for seniors flow down to younger 
generations through private transfers (Kohli 1999, p.94; Attias-Donfut & Wolff 
2000b; Attias-Donfut 2003; Litwak et al. 2003, p.32; Lindh, Malmberg & Palme 2005, 
p.483). However, this deprives younger people of agency: transferring resources 
from working-age adults to pensioners on the assumption that some of them will be 
transferred back again has been described as “curious” (Thomson 1991, p.214) and 
“perverse” (Esping-Andersen 1999, p.181). Private transfer of resources is not a 
neutral, value-free practice; transfers are discretionary and may come with 
conditions attached (Arrondel & Masson 2006, pp.1042-43). 
 
Some researchers suggest that testators may sometimes prefer bequests over inter 
vivos gifts30 because they wish to use their wealth to control their beneficiaries for 
as long as possible (Bernheim et al. 1985; Laferrère & Wolff 2006, p.954; Arrondel & 
Masson 2006, p.983).31 Bequests, like other intra-family transfers, tend to 
concentrate wealth and entrench existing inequalities and status differentials (see 
Bowles & Gintis 2002; Daley et al. 2014, pp.2, 11). The present cohort of seniors 
may leave smaller bequests than their current wealth levels suggest as they have a 
propensity to consume, they will be long-lived with high health and care costs in 
their final years, and the bequest ethic appears to be in decline in Australia, as 
elsewhere (Kelly & Harding 2006; Tomlinson 2012). A 2016 poll found that 79% of 
surveyed Australians strongly agreed or tended to agree that older people should 
enjoy their retirement and not worry about leaving a legacy (Bray & Gray 2016, p.7). 
 
30 Inter vivos gifts are transfers made during the lifetime of the benefactor, while bequests are 
transfers made after death. 
31 There is also likely to be an element of financial pragmatism in play. When people are uncertain 




As will be discussed, in the fieldwork for the thesis few participants, young or 
senior, placed much importance on leaving bequests. 
 
A large-scale study of the financial intentions of Australians aged 50+ found that 
many were oriented towards ‘me-first’ consumption rather than sharing wealth via 
gifts or legacies to their children or to charity (Olsberg & Winters 2005, pp.viii-xiii, 
90-92).32 A similar study found participants had given little thought to leaving 
legacies, and many felt they were owed something by the younger generation 
(Hamilton & Hamilton 2006, pp.35-37, 59). However, a more recent survey of 
people aged 50+ undertaken by COTA NSW found that a substantial majority would 
like to leave an inheritance for their children (though many would not necessarily 
be in a position to do so) (2017, p.39). 
 
An upwards flow of resources from young people to seniors during their lifetimes is 
unlikely to be compensated for by an equivalent downwards flow in the form of 
bequests. While the costs of supporting older people are spread across younger 
generations, only a small number of (mostly middle-aged) people receive 
substantial inheritances (O’Dwyer 2001). Daley and colleagues argue that large 
inheritances are likely to increase due to the wealth levels of some current retirees, 
but they will generally accrue to only a small number of people and relatively late in 
their lives, having the effect of increasing inequality (2018, p.18; see also Wood, 
Griffiths & Emslie 2019, ch.6). 
 
2.3.4 Homeowner benefits 
 
To the extent that older Australians aspire to leave a legacy for their inheritors, it is 
often the ‘family home’ that they hope to preserve for posterity. Home ownership 
traditionally carries substantial importance for Australians and there is an 
 
32 This research revealed an unfortunate narrative around older people denying their adult children 
financial assistance as ‘punishment’ for being ungrateful, selfish and improvident. Interviews with a 
similar age group in the UK found that they too thought of themselves as having inherited the 
frugality of their parents, compared with what they saw as the excessive materialism and over-
consumption of their children (Leach et al. 2013). 
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expectation that it will be facilitated by favourable tax treatment. Investing in 
property has also come to be seen as a legitimate goal for aspirational middle-class 
Australians and is treated differently from other forms of investment. Benefits for 
homeowners include full exemption from paying capital gains tax on profits made 
by selling an owner-occupied home and the effective exclusion of an owner-
occupied home (regardless of value) from the Age Pension assets test.33 Benefits for 
property investors include negative gearing and a 50% discount on the capital gains 
tax payable when selling an investment property. 
 
Meanwhile, rising property prices tend to operate as another form of 
intergenerational burden-shifting, with the high cost of housing a major contributor 
to inequality between generations (Daley, Coates & Wiltshire 2018, pp.81-84). 
Older people who became property owners when housing was more affordable 
receive a windfall that appears to come from nowhere. In reality, someone else will 
bear the cost of their windfall, in this case new entrants to the housing market. 
People have increasingly come to see residential housing as a means of generating 
wealth rather than having a primarily social purpose, and Government policies 
prioritise the wealth-building function of property ownership over ensuring housing 
security for as many people as possible (Kelly et al. 2013; Stebbing & Spies-Butcher 
2016).34 
 
Young people are affected by rising house prices whether they aspire to buy a home 
or to rent. The average Australian house price increased from 2.5 to 4.5 times 
average disposable income between 1985 and 2012, and rents went up at an even 
faster rate between 2002 and 2012 (Kelly et al. 2013, pp.10-11, 19).35 In Australia’s 
 
33 Unlike other assets and investments, owner-occupied houses are also largely exempt from means-
testing for aged care subsidies; they are either excluded or only counted up to a value of 
approximately $169,000 (Australian Government 2020). 
34 Tax expenditures such as the capital gains tax (CGT) exemption on the family home, the CGT 
discount on property investments and negative gearing incentivise people to buy residential 
property as a wealth generation strategy. 
35 In an international context, Australia’s rental conditions (including lease periods and termination 
notice requirements) tend to favour landlords, further undermining housing accessibility and 
security for tenants (Kelly et al. 2013, p.20; Kelly & Donegan 2015, pp.101-105; Hulse & Burke 2015; 
Ong 2017; Daley, Coates & Wiltshire 2018, pp.126-28). 
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most populous state, New South Wales, rental costs rose by 65% between 1994 and 
2014, while the cost of servicing the average mortgage rose by 30% (NSW 
Government 2016, p.33). 
 
Meanwhile, over 10% of Australian properties, usually owned by investors, sit 
vacant (Kelly et al. 2013, p.17) and many empty nesters remain in family homes 
located close to workplaces and services with far more space than they need. 
Psycho-social factors contribute to older people’s reluctance to down-size (Daley, 
Coates & Wiltshire 2018, pp.140-41), but government policies36 also create 
disincentives (Kelly et al. 2013, p.32). Housing availability and affordability was the 
top issue of concern among young Australians aged 17-24 surveyed in 2013 
(Australian Youth Affairs Coalition 2013). A 2017 poll found that while 92% of 
respondents saw home ownership as part of the Australian way of life, primarily for 
reasons of emotional rather than financial security, 87% were concerned that it 
would be out of reach for future generations (Sheppard, Gray & Phillips 2017, p.5). 
 
A 2014 report for the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute found home 
ownership amongst younger age groups in decline, with households taking longer to 
pay off mortgages and holding higher levels of debt relative to income than 30 years 
earlier (Burke, Stone & Ralston 2014, pp.1-3, 12).37 The only age group where home 
ownership rates have remained steady is the over-65s (Kelly et al. 2013, pp.10-11; 
Stebbing & Spies-Butcher 2016; Yates 2017, p.19; Ong 2017; Eslake 2017, pp.7-8). 
Adaptive responses such as maintaining two household incomes and moving to the 
suburban fringe bring their own potential challenges: “Households buying their first 
home far from city centres face much higher barriers to opportunity, job security 
and material prosperity than their parents ever experienced” (Kelly & Donegan 
2015, p.61). 
 
36 These policies include high levels of stamp duty on property transactions and the effective 
exemption of the full value of the family home from the Age Pension assets test. 
37 Home ownership among Australia’s young people is low by international standards. A 2017 report 
drawing on data from nine countries (Australia, the US, the UK, Canada, China, France, Mexico, 
Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates) found Australians born from 1981-1998 had a home 
ownership rate of 28%, compared to an average of 40% across the surveyed countries; only the 




The effective exemption of the full value of the family home from the Age Pension 
assets test creates a disincentive for older people to downsize, encourages the use 
of residential property to shelter wealth, and potentially contributes to high house 
prices by restricting supply.38 This policy is unusual in an international context and is 
associated with retirement housing consumption patterns that are also idiosyncratic 
compared to other countries: Australian seniors have comparatively high levels of 
home ownership, high levels of housing wealth and low rates of moving house 
(Bradbury 2010). Australians aged over 65 are more likely than younger people to 
be living in large dwellings (despite their smaller household sizes), have become less 
likely to move house since 2001, and are actually more likely to upsize than 
downsize when they do move (Judd et al. 2014, p.2). Less than 4% of older 
Australian homeowners have downsized primarily to release housing wealth 
(though even fewer claim retaining Age Pension eligibility as a reason not to 
downsize) (Productivity Commission 2015, pp.7-8). 
 
Age pensioners alone, quite apart from wealthier self-funded retirees, held $600b in 
residential property assets in 2011 and this is likely to have increased significantly 
(Cowan 2016, p.15). Six percent of age pensioners live in homes worth more than a 
million dollars and another 10% in homes worth $750,000 to $1m; 5% of the Age 
Pension budget (around $2b) is spent on households with assets of over $1m 
(CEPAR 2018b, p.4, 11). Grattan Institute analysis suggests even higher figures, with 
half of the Age Pension budget spent on retirees with net wealth of over $500,000 
and $6b going to households worth more than $1m (Coates 2018, p.18; Wood, 
Griffiths & Emslie 2019, p.51). 
 
The vast amount of wealth held by older Australians in the form of residential 
property makes it reasonable to expect them to draw down on their home value 
 
38 Modelling the likely impact of removing the family home exemption has found that households in 
the top wealth quintile would be disadvantaged, but all other households would benefit (Cho & Sane 
2013). Modelling by the Productivity Commission (2015) similarly found the negative impact of a cap 
on the exemption would be restricted to the wealthiest pensioners and would also send a much-
needed signal that housing wealth should be seen as a source of retirement income. 
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(such as through down-sizing or a reverse mortgage arrangement like the Australian 
Government’s Pensioner Loans Scheme) as part of supporting themselves in 
retirement (Daley et al. 2018, p.18). However, reverse mortgages remain a niche 
market (CEPAR 2018c, p.46) and the aspiration of home ownership is still deeply 
embedded in Australian culture. This makes reform of housing policy, and 
specifically any perceived diminution of the rights of property owners, challenging. 
Australian housing policy is characterised by inertia and a lack of coherence: some 
“policies - relics designed for a different economy, society and environment in a 
different century - remain frustratingly sacred cows that governments of all political 
persuasions are too afraid to touch” (Dufty-Jones & Rogers 2015, p.15). 
 
2.3.5 Public debt 
 
Australia’s ballooning public debt has been the subject of much discussion since the 
2019 Federal Election, with the re-elected Coalition Government vowing to return 
the annual budget to surplus and eventually pay down the debt that has been 
accumulating for over a decade. There is considerable debate among economists 
about the implications of carrying high levels of public debt, or what, in fact, 
constitutes a high level. At times of sluggish economic growth and interest rates 
that cannot be reduced much further, incurring debt is often viewed as a useful 
means of stimulating the economy, and public debt is very different to private 
(household or company) debt. Perceptions of public debt are complicated further 
by the perception that right-wing governments may use the need to reduce debt as 
a justification for cutting back on social service provision.  
 
A contrary view is that public debt is akin to deferred taxation, allowing 
governments to continue spending without major tax reform by shifting the costs of 
funding current consumption to workers of the future. Those who pay will not enjoy 
the benefits of the expenditure, have no say in whether it should be incurred and 
will be without recourse against those who incurred the debt on their behalf 
(Coombs & Dollery 2004a). Borrowing to pay for investment which will deliver 
future benefits, such as infrastructure projects or education, is often viewed as 
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justifiable (see Coombs & Dollery 2004b; Price Waterhouse Coopers 2013, p.36). 
Borrowing for pure present consumption may be harder to defend, with possible 
exceptions such as urgent defence needs or natural disasters (see Tremmel 2006, 
p.209). Australia’s current debt has been incurred primarily to fund spending on 
older Australians (Daley & Wood 2015). It has been estimated that each year of 
debt accumulation at the rates seen over the last decade represents a $10,000 
future tax burden for a household headed by one of today’s young adults (Daley et 
al. 2014, p.9).39 
 
Proponents of the generational accounting approach to government budgets, which 
had some popularity in the 1990s, argue that measures of public debt in fact 
understate the extent to which current generations are shifting fiscal burdens to 
future generations (see, for example, Auerbach, Kotlikoff & Leibfritz 1999; Kotlikoff 
2013). For example, governments often carry substantial explicit and implicit future 
liabilities relating to funded pension schemes for retired government employees, as 
well as public age pension programs.40 Generational accounting aims to specify how 
much different age cohorts will pay in lifetime taxes to cover government 
expenditure programs based on current policy settings. 
 
The Australian Government’s primary long-range planning exercise, the 
Intergenerational Report prepared by Treasury at least every five years (most 
recently in 2015), adopts a fiscal sustainability approach, although it has been 
suggested that a generational accounting framework would better address the 
interests of younger people (Bessant, Emslie & Watts 2011). However, the 
generational accounting approach has been criticised on various grounds, including 
basing long-term projections on unreliable assumptions (Williamson & Rhodes 
2011, p.42; Bessant, Farthing & Watts 2017, pp.78-79), measurement and labelling 
issues (Murphy 1998), failure to consider how policies change over time (Lynch 
2006, p.17), failure to consider how individual behaviour might change (Oreopoulos 
 
39 Others see public debt very differently, noting that it is often written off and governments can 
simply choose to default on it or ‘print money’ (Bessant, Farthing & Watts 2017, pp.75-78). 
40 Neither public debt nor generational accounting take into consideration the future costs of 
environmental impacts caused by present activities. 
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and Vaillancourt 1998, p.8; Williamson & Rhodes 2011, p.44) and exclusion of intra-
family transfers (Osberg 1998, pp.131-32; Williamson & Rhodes 2011, p.43). Some 
of these criticisms can be applied to any form of future-planning, with its inherent 
uncertainty. A more salient issue is that framing policy sustainability and fairness in 
terms of differential generational impacts may be inappropriate when intra-cohort 
differences can be extreme (Wolfson et al. 1998; Osberg 1998, pp.131-32; 
Williamson & Rhodes 2011, p.47). 
 
2.3.6 The retirement bargain 
 
Using debt to finance the growing costs of population ageing is one way of delaying 
what may be inevitable tax increases. Social and economic conditions were very 
different when pension schemes began to be introduced from the late nineteenth 
century in industrial societies, in recognition of the fact that people who were no 
longer capable of working for an income often faced destitution without family 
support. After a life of manual labour, and in an era of lower life expectancy and 
limited medical care, simply being over 65 was seen as a proxy for need. However, 
the twentieth century’s increases in life expectancy and medical care, along with an 
increasing proportion of knowledge/service workers with less physically demanding 
jobs, created a new and hitherto unforeseen welfare beneficiary: the fit and healthy 
pensioner. By late century, some of the conditions on which PAYG pension schemes 
had been predicated - high fertility, full employment, strong wage growth - were 
increasingly compromised (Myles 2002, p.149).  
 
However, by this time the expectation of enjoying a period of state-supported 
retirement, regardless of the capacity to continue working, was commonplace in 
advanced industrial societies.41 In many contemporary welfare states there is now a 
substantial net transfer upwards from younger working adults and families with 
children to older retired people (Wilkoszewski 2008, pp.175-76; Mason & Lee 2011, 
 
41 As with unemployment benefits, age pensions can create moral hazard by incentivising people 
who are capable of working not to work. For example, in 1950 the labour force participation rate for 
older American men was 46% but by the 1990s, in a mature welfare state, it had dropped to 16% 
(Hudson 1997, p.3).  
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pp.28-29). This is an anomaly in human history, for nearly all of which there have 
been net transfers of resources (including in-kind help and support) downwards 
from older people to younger people; that is, parents have invested more in their 
children than they have received back from them. Historically, people aged over 65 
in hunter-gatherer and agricultural societies have tended to be net contributors to 
productivity, continuing to undertake work suited to their skills and capabilities until 
physically incapable of doing so (Mason & Lee 2011, p.19). Now, with governments 
increasingly relying on debt to finance age pension obligations, even future 
taxpayers are being locked into funding the retirements of today’s seniors (Lee & 
Mason 2011, p.80).  
 
Moving to compulsory superannuation has broad support among experts and the 
public as a way of making welfare states more sustainable in an era of population 
ageing (Boeri, Börsch-Supan & Tabellini 2001, pp.31, 40-43; Gelissen 2001, pp.512-
13; Schieber 2011), and Australia is considered a world leader in this regard. 
However, the double burden this imposes on some cohorts is not often recognised. 
During the transition period of around five decades during which compulsory 
superannuation schemes come to full maturity, several generations of taxpayers are 
required to fund two sets of retirement: their own and those of their predecessors 
who were not required to contribute to superannuation for their whole working 
lives and therefore still largely rely on the age pension (Pierson 1993, p.609; 
Kotlikoff & Leibfritz 1999, p.87; Schieber 2011).42 It has been estimated that in 2011 
an Australian worker on an average salary of $66,000 making the compulsory 9.5% 
superannuation contribution was paying $6,270pa towards their own retirement 
per year and $3,500 towards older people’s (Cowan 2016, p.10). Those older people 
paid much less towards the retirements of their own predecessors: covering the 
pension cost workers half as much in 1971 as it did in 2011 (Cowan 2016, p.10). The 
 
42 Superannuation contributions are not an unearned bonus bestowed by generous employers; they 
would otherwise be transferred directly to workers in the form of higher salaries (see Henry 2010, 
Part A2-2; Coates, Mackey & Cowgill 2020). However, this point is not agreed on by all economists 
and is certainly not universally recognised. One study found 57% of surveyed Baby Boomers felt 
‘hard done by’ because they hadn’t saved as much superannuation as younger people (Hamilton & 
Hamilton 2006, p.xiii). They believed the Government had let them down - by not compulsorily 
quarantining more of their income during their working lives. 
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average worker in 1971 contributed 2.5% of his or her income towards funding 
retirement; the average worker today contributes nearly 15%. 
 
Similar analysis including not just the pension but other benefits for those aged 65+ 
finds that today’s retirees were supporting their forebears to the tune of $3,200 pa 
when they were 40-year-old workers. The average 40-year-old worker today 
contributes $7,300 pa to support retirees plus $6,800 in compulsory super towards 
supporting themselves in retirement. If existing policy settings remain in place, the 
children of these workers will be contributing the equivalent of $11,700 pa in 
today’s dollars plus 12% compulsory super by the 2040s (Wood, Griffiths & Emslie 
2019, p.39).  
 
As noted in section 2.2, Treasury’s own figures suggest only a modest reduction in 
the cost of the Age Pension as a result of the maturing of Australia’s compulsory 
superannuation scheme. In any event, even if the proportion of self-funded retirees 
increases, governments cannot opt out of the retirement support business (Barr 
2001, pp.123, 141). As well as the ongoing need for safety net provision, 
governments must provide regulatory protection for consumers and maintain a 
stable economic environment for superannuation funds to operate in (Barr 2001, 
p.124; Myles 2002, p.152). The Australian Government currently also foregoes tens 
of billions of dollars in revenue each year as a result of superannuation tax 
concessions. 
 
The introduction of compulsory superannuation illustrates how policy change in the 
area of retirement income can produce different outcomes for different birth 
cohorts. Divergence in the attitudes of young and older Australians towards 
financing retirement suggests young people expect that, despite paying taxes to 
fund the age pension for existing retirees, it is likely to be less accessible when they 
reach retirement age.43 As will be discussed, this was borne out in the fieldwork 
 
43 It is impossible to know what retirement income policies will be like in 50 years’ time. However, it 
is a reasonable assumption based on recent evidence that the Australian Government’s preference is 
likely to be for a reduction in pension spending over the coming decades. This is in line with the long-
standing commitment to promoting self-sufficiency in retirement through compulsory 
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undertaken for the thesis. In the 2005 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, only 2% 
of 18-34-year-olds said the age pension would ensure their secure financial future, 
compared to 40% of those aged 65+ (Pixley 2007, p.299).44 However, the young 
group were still nearly as likely as the older group to say everyone should get at 
least some age pension (49% compared to 53%) (Millward & Brooke 2007, p.168). 
Those aged 18-34 are much more likely to say people should retire gradually, they 
nominate the highest official retirement age of all age groups and they think older 
people should be working for longer (only 22% of 18-34-year-olds endorsed older 
workers ‘making way’ for the young compared to 39% of over-65s45) (Millward & 
Brooke 2007, pp.159, 162, 165). 
 
The recent increase of the retirement age from 65 to 67 is a further example of a 
policy change which disadvantages some birth cohorts. Workers born after 1956 
will fund pensions for older people from 65 but must wait until 67 before they are 
eligible for their own pensions. However, there are obvious collective benefits to 
more people working for longer,46 including increased productivity, additional tax 
revenues, reduced expenditure on pensions and enhanced social inclusion (see 
Galasso 2006; Barr 2012, p.225).47 The traditional retirement age of 65 dates from a 
period when life expectancy was shorter, a far smaller proportion of the population 
was over 65 and there was no Third Age of healthy, active retirement. Most people 
were only eligible for pension benefits for a short time, if at all. Instead of the 
 
superannuation from both Labor and Coalition Governments, as well as recent Coalition government 
policy on raising the Pension eligibility age (see further below) and constraining eligibility by 
increasing the taper rate for the assets test (see footnote 8). 
44 A differently phrased question in a more recent poll of Australian adults found that 33% of the 25-
29 age group expected to rely on the government in retirement (compared to 49% of the 50-70 age 
group), which suggests many young adults do still see the Age Pension as part of their financial 
future (Ipsos & MLC 2015, p.3). 
45 The authors noted that the older group may have been justifying their own early retirements. 
46 This includes unpaid productive activities such as caring roles or volunteering. A survey of people 
aged 50+ undertaken by COTA NSW found that 30% of respondents had a caring role and 55% 
volunteered in some capacity (2017, pp.46, 49). 
47 Delaying retirement would not necessarily mean older workers remaining in stressful high-level 
positions (or in physically demanding manual jobs); they could be encouraged to move into different 
roles, possibly part-time, as part of a transition to full retirement. 
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duration of working lives increasing in line with life expectancy,48 the average length 
of retirement has become longer.49 In Australia, individuals are net economic 
contributors to society50 from ages 25 to 58 on average (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2015, p.57) - 33 years out of an average life span of around 83 years. The 
average age of retirement for current retired Australians was 55.3, although this is 
increasing for more recent retirees (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017). 
 
Despite modest recent increases in workforce participation by older people, 
Australia lags behind countries such as the US, UK, New Zealand and Sweden 
(Chomik & Piggott 2012, p.8; CEPAR 2018a, p.24). People who are eligible for the 
pension but continue to work are effectively paying a very high marginal tax rate 
(Peterson 1999, p.130; Barr 2001, p.126). In Australia, both the Age Pension 
eligibility age and the superannuation preservation age act as signals that normalise 
retirement at certain ages as well as making it practically feasible (Jackson et al. 
2006, p.336; Productivity Commission 2013, p.187; CEPAR 2018b, p.6).51 Having 
‘reached retirement age/eligible for superannuation/pension’ is the most common 
reason by a significant margin that retired Australians cite for having ceased work 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017).  
 
Raising the Pension eligibility age is problematic as it inevitably pushes some older 
people on to the much less generous Newstart Allowance for the unemployed.52 
Involuntary redundancy (and age-related difficulty in securing alternative work) may 
 
48 Life expectancy increases in the twentieth century mean the retirement age should have increased 
by 0.15 years annually to keep the ratio between working and retirement years constant (Shoven & 
Goda 2011, p.159). 
49 At the same time, young people have tended to spend more years in education before 
commencing full-time work. 
50 That is, they contribute more in taxes than they receive in government benefits and services. 
51 Age discrimination is an issue affecting many older people in the workforce or seeking work. In a 
recent survey of people aged 50+, around a quarter reported experiencing workplace age 
discrimination in the preceding two years and a third of those who were managers admitted to 
taking age into consideration when making human resource-related decisions (Australian Human 
Rights Commission 2015, p.9). 
52 The Disability Support Payment (DSP) is available to people unable to continue working to pension 
age due to incapacity. The DSP is paid at the same rate as the Age Pension but is subject to fairly 
stringent eligibility requirements. New rules for claiming DSP came into effect in 2015, leading to 
much lower rates of approval and more people having to fall back on the far less generous Newstart 
Allowance (Hermant 2016; Davidson et al. 2018, pp.58, 75). 
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force many people to stop working earlier than they would otherwise choose 
(Jackson et al. 2006). Retirement income policy should recognise diverse pathways 
to retirement and non-paid forms of productive work, as well as the inevitability of 
losses (of health, fitness, mobility, cognitive capacity, friends and family) 
accumulating with age (Holstein 1997, p.33). John Daley and colleagues at the 
Grattan Institute advocate consideration of raising the Age Pension eligibility age to 
70 (and the superannuation preservation age to 65) but also ensuring people over 
60 who are no longer physically able to work can have earlier access to the Pension 
and/or their superannuation (Daley et al. 2018, p.5, 102). 
 
Means-testing of the Age Pension is another measure the Australian Government 
uses to reduce the costs of retirement support. Australia’s welfare system is highly 
residualist, meaning benefits are largely targeted at specific (needy) groups. 
Residualism is a defining characteristic of the liberal welfare regimes of the Anglo-
American countries (Papadakis & Bean 1993, Kangas 2003)53 and theoretically 
maximises the impact of welfare expenditure and produces broader economic 
advantages (see, for example, Kudrna 2016).54 However, means-testing payments is 
not particularly effective at reducing either poverty or inequality (Korpi & Palme 
1998) and the need to assess entitlement produces high administration costs. 
 
Residualism is criticised for stigmatising beneficiaries by highlighting the difference 
between recipients and those who pay into the system (Van Oorschot & Meuleman 
2014, p.247). It tends to encourage a dichotomy between so-called ‘lifters’ and 
‘leaners’, and a perception that welfare receipients are free riders taking advantage 
of the system. Universalist welfare programs appear to generate social trust, while 
 
53 Liberal regimes are one of the three types of welfare state identified by Gøsta Esping-Andersen in 
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), along with conservative and social democratic 
regimes. Australia and New Zealand have sometimes been classified as a fourth type of ‘wage-
earners’ regime, in which strong labour movements and wage regulation provide social protection, 
but the case for this separate classification is no longer as convincing as it once was (Esping-
Andersen 1999, p.89). 
54 Benefit generosity is distinct from benefit eligibility. In Australia, the real value of the full Age 
Pension has been maintained since the 1970s (see Tapper, Fenna & Phillimore 2013, p.8; Daley & 
Wood 2015, p.12) and it is considerably more generous than some other income support payments. 
However, tighter means-testing results in fewer people being eligible for a full pension, with more 
receiving a part pension instead. 
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residualist programs undermine it (Rothstein 1998, pp.160-61; Kumlin & Rothstein 
2005). Residualist programs subject benefit recipients to tests of entitlement, 
meaning at the same time as the welfare state relieves poverty it creates new forms 
of ‘debasement’ (Margalit 1996, pp.224-25; Rothstein 1998, pp.184-87). Evidence 
suggests some eligible beneficiaries do not access support because of the stigma 
attached (Wilensky 2002, p.325; Larsen 2006, p.100). However, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 3, aged pensioners are largely exempt from the moral judgement 
experienced by some other welfare receipients.  
 
Residual programs tend to produce incentive problems (benefits cease to be paid 
when a recipient earns over a set income threshold), which is a significant problem 
for several aspects of Australia’s retirement income system. As noted earlier, 
people who would be eligible for the Age Pension but choose to continue working 
are effectively paying a very high marginal tax rate. Another incentive issue is that 
people can maximise their overall retirement resources by spending their 
superannuation and falling back on the pension. Retirees can take their 
superannuation as a lump sum, spend it or use it to pay down debt before they 
reach pension eligibility age, and then fall back on the Age Pension.55 This allows 
them to benefit from both the Government’s generous concessional tax 
arrangements for superannuation savings and the taxpayer-funded pension. 
 
Adam Stebbing cites Australian Bureau of Statistics data from 2011 indicating that 
69% of retirees who received superannuation lump sums between 2003 and 2007 
did not use their benefits primarily for retirement income (2015, p.133). Other 
analysis found that around 10% of retirees receiving a lump sum in 2015-16 used it 
mainly to cover living or medical expenses, 18% reinvested it, 20% undertook home 
improvements, 22% paid off existing debts and 30% used it for another purpose 
such as taking a holiday or buying a car (CEPAR 2018c, p.28).56 In 2017, a third of 
lump sum recipients used their superannuation to pay off their mortgage, improve 
 
55 Taking superannuation as an annuity once attracted favourable tax treatment, but this was 
removed in 2007 (Chomik & Piggott 2012, p.13). 
56 However, this report did note that Australians tend to under-consume during retirement and leave 
unintended bequests (CEPAR 2018b, p.17; CEPAR 2018c, p.27). 
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their home or upgrade to a new home (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017), 
effectively sheltering this wealth from the Age Pension assets test. Economic 
analysis has found that very few Australian retirees choose to take their 
superannuation as an annuity in order to ensure a sustainable retirement income 
stream (and that pensioners subject to means-testing decumulate wealth at a faster 
rate) (Asher et al. 2017, p.603). The fieldwork undertaken for the thesis found that 
some seniors spoke of their superannuation as an obstacle to receiving the pension 
that needed to be eliminated as quickly as possible. 
 
A report drawing on data from 2010 found that not only did Australians aged 50-64 
have much higher debt levels than just eight years previously (the average property 
debt had doubled and credit card debt was 70% higher), they were increasing their 
debt as they approached retirement (Kelly Research 2012). The report found that 
the expectation of a substantial lump sum soon becoming accessible can change the 
behaviour of people nearing retirement and increase both their debt appetite and 
consumption levels.57 As noted earlier, more recent analysis concurs that growing 
debt burdens are likely to eat into superannuation balances and undermine any 
shift away from reliance on the Age Pension (Eslake 2017). 
 
This chapter has described how today’s young people are disproportionately 
affected by the costs of population ageing and structural economic shifts. This 
makes it likely they will shoulder an increased lifetime tax burden and many will 
miss out on benefits enjoyed by members of preceding generations, such as secure 
work, affordable housing, a generous state-funded pension and a strong social 
safety net. Young people’s disadvantage compared to older citizens is not an 
artefact of being young, but of being born later, and it is unlikely to be rectified over 
time. However, instead of spreading the costs of demographic and economic 
change more evenly, governments tend to reinforce young people’s disadvantage 
with redistributive policies that favour the older and better-off. Governments 
 
57 The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia subsequently issued a media release 
disputing a number of claims made in the Kelly Research report (Association of Superannuation 
Funds of Australia 2013). 
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similarly do very little to ensure the costs of mitigating and adapting to climate 
change are borne by those whose resource consumption has done the most 
damage, rather than the young and unborn.  
 
The next chapter will consider why policy settings that shift burdens onto younger 
citizens and into the future are able to persist. It investigates whether current policy 
settings are in line with public opinion, and if public opinion in fact does or should 
have significant influence over policymaking. The effect of age on policy attitudes is 
discussed, along with the relative levels of political influence exercised by citizens 
from different age groups. Concerns about the potentially divisive effects of framing 




The persistence of existing policy 
 
 
As though there were a tie 
And obligation to posterity. 
We get them, bear them, breed, and nurse: 
What has posterity done for us. 
That we, lest they their rights should lose, 
Should trust our necks to gripe of noose? 
 
John Trumbull, McFingal (1775) 
 
 
Redistributive policy gives governments the ability to spread the benefits and 
burdens of macro-level change in fair and sustainable ways. Chapter 2 argued that 
instead, redistributive policy in mature welfare states tends to magnify the effects 
of demographic and economic change on those groups who are most exposed, 
including children and young people. This chapter investigates why Australia has 
redistributive policy settings that disproportionately benefit older people and 
whether they persist because they are in line with public opinion. Factors such as 
the different political participation patterns exhibited by young adults and whether 
they have developed a distinctive set of preferences strongly aligned with their own 
interests are considered. The question of whether public preferences actually 
influence policymaking much at all is also discussed. First, some objections to 
analysing redistributive policy through the lens of intergenerational equity are 
addressed.  
 
3.1 The relevance of age and birth cohort 
 
Chapter 2 set out evidence that on average, children and young people in advanced 
industrial democracies such as Australia tend to be economically marginalised 
compared to older citizens. It also explained why they are likely to be disadvantaged 
across their lives as a whole in terms of economic wellbeing and life chances 
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compared to preceding generations. While it is not possible to predict the future, a 
moral society should heed warnings that its actions may be harming the futures of 
its young people and err on the side of protecting their interests over the interests 
of less vulnerable citizens. However, there remain some substantial objections to 
investigating fairness, inequality and disadvantage using constructs such as age and 
birth cohort. 
 
3.1.1 Class trumps age? 
 
The first objection is that framing disadvantage in terms of age groups or birth 
cohorts obscures the continuing effects of the structural inequalities social scientists 
have traditionally referred to as ‘class’. For every youth researcher who suggests 
that a new dynamic of age-related inequality has arisen (Woodman & Wyn 2015, 
p.55), there is another who argues that class remains the key factor shaping 
disadvantage (France & Roberts 2015). Similarly, while the effect of age and cohort 
on the formation of political attitudes will be discussed later in the chapter, many 
researchers assert that class remains a significant political influence even if its 
effects have become more complex and nuanced (see, for example, Pampel & 
Williamson 1989, p.177; Pampel 1994, p.187; Irwin 1996; Svallfors 1997; Bean & 
Papadakis 1998; Lewin-Epstein, Kaplan & Levanon 2003; McCarty, Poole & 
Rosenthal 2006; Lynch 2006, pp.49-53; Edlund 2007; Svallfors 2007b; Svallfors 2008, 
p.381; Kohli 2009; Svallfors, Kulin & Schnabel 2012; Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg & 
McKee 2017; Bullock 2017). 
 
To some extent youth and class are now conflated: being young is an economic as 
well as a demographic category, a reasonable proxy for relative disadvantage. While 
some young people in advanced industrial societies are protected from the 
economic pressures of workforce precarity, student debt, low wages and housing 
insecurity, usually by family wealth or privilege, the majority are not. It will be even 
harder for individuals to shield themselves from higher taxes or the impact of 




Age groups and birth cohorts are not homogeneous, but then neither are class 
groupings (which are also fuzzier categories). Intra-generational inequality is 
inextricably linked with inter-generational inequality (Wood, Griffiths & Emslie 
2019, p.9). Young people who are able to access substantial familial resources or 
receive gifts or bequests can leverage these to increase their resources and 
opportunities, allowing them to pull away from their age peers. Comparing the 
circumstances of different age groups/birth cohorts in society is a way of 
understanding how inequality plays out under a new set of conditions and over 
time, and what can be done to ameliorate it. Analysing economic inequality is 
limited but practical and revealing: 
Focusing on economic wellbeing keeps the discussion tractable and picks up 
a lot of what we care about. Money isn’t everything, but incomes are well-
correlated with overall welfare. This is partly because greater resources can 
support improvements in other things we care about such as health and 
environmental sustainability. (Wood, Griffiths & Emslie 2019, pp.8-9) 
 
3.1.2 Present problems trump future problems? 
 
A second, related, objection to associating disadvantage with birth cohort and 
taking a long-range view is that current problems trump any future difficulties. It is 
one thing to compare people’s rights contemporaneously, but as soon as a 
temporal dimension is introduced it becomes more complex. Establishing a basis for 
(and quantifying) duties to people in the future is fraught with difficulty, making it 
easier to justify the ‘hang posterity – what did it ever do for me?’ approach. 
Assessing the long-term impact of current policies raises inherent uncertainties and 
complexities.  
 
If young people are likely to do less well across their lives than their predecessors, is 
this necessarily a problem? Morally and legally most human societies assume 
people owe a duty of care to their own children, but what of other people’s, or 
descendants further removed? The question of whether societies owe anything to 
posterity is plagued by philosophical conundrums, especially in relation to the very 
young and the yet-to-be-born who can offer little in return for their needs being 
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considered. Justice to people in the future cannot be based on the direct reciprocity 
that characterises contractarian theories due to the asymmetrical relations 
between people now and people decades hence – the latter usually cannot 
reciprocate in kind and the principle of mutual advantage is undermined (see Rawls 
1971, pp.139-40, 291; Barry 1989, pp.189-92; Mathis 2011). Looking further ahead, 
we do not know who the people living will be, what they will value or whether they 
will come to exist at all. Derek Parfit (1982, 1984) has grappled at length with 
dilemmas such as the uncertainty objection, the non-identity problem and the non-
existence problem (see also Barry 1999; Page 2006; Page 2008; Gosseries 2008; 
Partridge 2008; Hendlin 2014), which undermine attempts to establish a 
philosophical basis for respecting the rights of people living in the future.  
 
Some scholars circumvent these issues by envisaging an unbroken ‘chain of 
concern’ linking adjacent generations and establishing obligations which stretch 
into the future (see Passmore 1974, p.89; Hubin 1976; Becker 1986, pp.230-50; 
Barry 1989, pp.193, 201; Gosseries 2001; Page 2006, pp.115-16). Others view 
humanity as an ongoing community with interests other than the aggregated 
interests of living individuals - more than the sum of its parts (Partridge 1981a, p.16; 
Partridge 1981b; Rolston 1981; Johnson 2003) - or emphasise the fundamental 
connectedness and inter-dependency of all people, contemporaneous or not (see, 
for example, Elias 2000; Bauman 2001; Fineman 2004). Robert Goodin (1985) 
conceptualises our obligations to others, including people in the future, as 
grounded, not in reciprocity, but in vulnerability – how susceptible are the others to 
being negatively impacted by our actions and choices? Some theorists take their 
cues from the trustee or stewardship model found in many religions and pre-
industrial cultures, in which each generational cohort acts as temporary custodian 
of the Earth with a responsibility to preserve and pass on their inheritance to their 
successors (Weiss 1988; Page 2006, p.108). Brian Barry has described neglecting this 
responsibility as a sort of ‘cosmic impertinence’ (Barry 1977, p.284). 
 
Assuming those who currently hold power owe something to those who will follow, 
a new and equally difficult conundrum arises: what is the nature of this something 
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and how much of it should be passed on? In the industrial age, the expectation of 
ongoing economic growth was commonly seen as a reasonable justification for 
paying scant regard to future people’s rights. If material living standards continued 
to increase at the same rate as they had since the modernisation project began, 
future taxpayers were still likely to be better-off than people in the present even if 
they were saddled with burdens like demographic ageing and repaying debt. Some 
theorists suggest that we are morally obliged to increase present consumption by 
drawing on future people’s resources. According to this argument, people are likely 
to be living so luxuriously in years to come that intergenerational justice requires 
the transfer of some of their resources to people living now (see, for example, 
Beckerman & Pasek 2001, p.52; Guest & McDonald 2003; McDonald 2005).58 
 
More moderate approaches suggest that while present people have some 
responsibility to ensure sufficient resources are conserved for people living in the 
future, the duty is limited and it is very difficult to determine the level of sufficiency. 
The idea of an appropriate savings rate was addressed in John Rawls’ ground-
breaking discussion of intergenerational justice in A Theory of Justice (1971). 
Rawlsian justice as fairness explicitly places sustainability at the heart of a just 
society. Justice is not founded on a temporary set of conditions, a snapshot of the 
ideal society at a given point in time. Rather, justice arises from the continuation of 
fairness over time. A condition that cannot persist cannot be just.  
 
Rawls’ famous thought experiment asked what distributive principles would be 
chosen by rational, free and equal people in the ‘original position’, that is, under a 
veil of ignorance which blinds them to their status in society, including their natural 
assets and their psychological preferences. He concluded that people in the original 
position would only tolerate social and economic inequalities that met two key 
 
58 Economists have effectively institutionalised this view by applying discount rates when valuing 
future goods – a good consumed now is worth more than the same good consumed later. Notably, 
the climate change policy reviews headed by Nicholas Stern in the UK in 2006 and Ross Garnaut in 
Australia in 2008 both chose to use near-zero rates of pure time preference discount, allowing only 
for the tiny possibility that the human race would go extinct and no future enjoyment of goods 
would be possible (Smith 2011). 
79 
 
conditions: they were attached to positions open to all under equality of 
opportunity; and they were of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged 
members of society. Just institutions would be established accordingly, and each 
generation would be required only to pass on what was necessary to preserve these 
institutions.59  
 
It is sometimes argued that egalitarianism requires resources to be directed 
towards the currently worst-off, whose rights must be prioritised over the rights of 
people at some later point in time, before the question of saving for the future can 
be addressed (see, for example, Beckerman & Pasek 2001, pp.1, 55, 70; Gosseries 
2001, p.324; Gaspart & Gosseries 2007).60 Australian theorist Janna Thompson 
suggests that we should be cautious about the level of present sacrifice expected 
for the sake of people in the future, and mindful that intergenerational justice is 
two-way: successors also owe something to their predecessors, and people in the 
future might need to forgo benefits to ensure current people’s needs are met 
(Thompson 2003a; Thompson 2003b). Thompson (2009) finds the basis for 
intergenerational justice in the concept of ‘lifetime-transcending interests’ – 
individuals caring about what happens after they are dead (and what happened 
before they were born). On this account, current people are obliged to carry on the 
projects and further the interests of their predecessors, and in turn may oblige their 
successors to protect their own legacies.61 
 
With no way of predicting what future conditions will be like, or what people will 
value in the future, it is impossible to quantify what and how much should be 
 
59 This thesis does not take an explicitly Rawlsian approach but recognises it as a valuable framework 
for thinking about duties in relation to redistribution, particularly over the often-neglected temporal 
dimension. 
60 These arguments proceed almost as if a just societal framework is yet to be established, therefore 
the question of preserving it for the future is premature. The focus is usually on lifting the worst-off 
up rather than also bringing the best-off down to meet them halfway. 
61 This formulation raises several issues. The dead no longer have any interests and never will again, 
therefore no duties can be owed to them. People may not be motivated to preserve legacies from 
the past merely for the sake of preservation, and there is no recourse for those whose legacies are 
abused. It is unclear who our successors are and a narrow definition (such as restricting a person’s 
‘successors’ to their direct descendants) would perpetuate existing inequalities. Thompson (2009) 
acknowledges that lifetime-transcending interests need not be moral or altruistic and are quite likely 
to arise from egocentric concerns. 
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preserved to meet the requirements of intergenerational justice. Rawls offers 
several vague, and possibly inconsistent, formulations of our precise duties 
(Beckerman & Pasek 2001, pp.36-37; Mathis 2011, p.104), sounding less than 
confident about the practicalities of actually negotiating a just savings rate: 
In attempting to estimate the fair rate of saving the persons in the original 
position ask what is reasonable for members of adjacent generations to 
expect of one another at each level of advance. They try to piece together a 
just savings schedule by balancing how much at each stage they would be 
willing to save for their immediate descendants against what they would feel 
entitled to claim of their immediate predecessors. (Rawls 1971, p.289) 
 
Jörg Tremmel suggests intergenerational justice requires that the average member 
of a generation has better opportunities to fulfil his or her needs than the average 
member of the preceding generation (2009, p.199). The reference to ‘needs’ rather 
than ‘wants’ suggests that our duties to people in the future relate only to 
fundamental, universal human requirements, avoiding subjective assessments of 
what might be valued and placing limits on what must be preserved.62 Tremmel 
departs from Rawls and many other theorists by explicitly requiring us to ensure the 
next generation is better-off in relation to meeting its needs. On this formulation, 
intergenerational justice incorporates the expectation of ongoing progress and 
improvement in the conditions of life.  
 
It remains somewhat difficult to justify an interest in the conditions of people in the 
future when there are substantial inequalities between people now, especially 
taking the world as a whole. Being born at a particular time may impact on material 
resources and life chances but being born in a particular place is even more 
significant. Nevertheless, a consideration of redistributive justice must be framed 
and bounded in some way that makes it tractable and there is a powerful 
symbolism about wealthy societies disregarding the current and future claims of 
 
62 Tremmel advocates the use of the Human Development Index, a composite of life expectancy, 




their youngest members. The ethics of care and responsibility being undermined in 
the process are crucial to addressing broader global inequalities. 
 
3.1.3 The divisiveness of young vs old 
 
A third objection to framing disadvantage in terms of age is that it encourages 
antagonism between the generations. There are powerful social norms which make 
it difficult to suggest that senior citizens may be claiming more than their fair share 
of society’s resources and should give up some of their benefits. The elderly 
command a high level of public sympathy and benefits for seniors are underpinned 
by perceptions that they are vulnerable and needy (vulnerable and needy children 
are seen as the responsibility of their parents, not the state). The idea that seniors 
have earned the right to a comfortable taxpayer-funded retirement of indefinite 
duration is firmly entrenched. Criticising one’s elders remains a powerful taboo; this 
was borne out by the reluctance of the young adult participants in the fieldwork 
undertaken for the thesis to endorse any suggestion that some older people might 
take advantage of policy settings (and seek to preserve them) to maximise their 
own benefits. 
 
Older people have traditionally been at risk of economic hardship when they have 
become unable to work and there are long-standing, cross-cultural norms around 
respecting and helping the elderly.63 In earlier periods of human history, the aged 
made up a much lower proportion of the population and in pre-literate times they 
were a key source of knowledge about the past, which often made their wisdom 
highly valued. The aged are no longer treated with quite the same reverence – 
there are many more of them and the pace of change means the lessons of a 
lifetime ago may no longer be relevant to contemporary problems (Turner 1998, 
p.303; Blaikie 1999, p.213; Cuddy & Fiske 2002, p.13). However, the social norm of 
the young being expected to accord their elders respect persists at least to some 
extent, as do norms around showing consideration for people who are (or are 
 
63 In practice, this doesn’t prevent ageism and elder abuse; see, for example, the Benevolent 
Society’s recent report Drivers of Ageism (2017). 
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perceived to be) less able-bodied. Social constructions of the aged are nevertheless 
marked by ambivalence and duality (Donow 1994; Johnson 2005; Gilleard & Higgs 
2005, pp.3-4). Colluding in the dependence/deficit stereotype can help the elderly 
secure practical assistance and resources (Williams & Nussbaum 2001, pp.50, 292; 
Katz et al. 2003, p.311). Simone de Beauvoir’s landmark 1972 study, Old Age, is a 
highly sympathetic portrait of senior citizenship, but it notes that a tendency to 
perceive oneself as victimised may increase with age. The elderly may feel resentful 
due to their increasing social marginalisation in a fast-changing world or simply 
because they have grown old. 
 
The gift of what historian Peter Laslett (1989) described as ‘The Third Age’, of being 
released from responsibilities while still retaining the capacity to enjoy life’s 
pleasures, could be seen as compensation not just for the work of past living but 
also for imminent dying. The Third Age today, at least for relatively privileged 
retirees in advanced industrial societies, has been described as ‘well-off ageing’, 
linked to processes of ‘hypercommodification’, with a focus on economic wellbeing 
and material comfort (Gilleard & Higgs: 2002, p.371; see also Rees-Jones et al. 
2008).64 In advanced industrial economies, seniors consume resources at many 
times the rate of children, often out-spending adults in their peak earning years 
(even after controlling for health expenditure); further, their rate of consumption is 
increasing much faster than that of other age groups (Kotlikoff 1998, p.130; 
Peterson 1999, p.108; Mason et al. 2009; Daley et al. 2014; pp.2, 23-24).65 People 
often feel they have been implicitly promised retirement living standards at least as 
high as they had during their peak earning years (Myles 2002, p.164), and this is 
encouraged by heavy marketing of consumer products to older people. 
 
64 In contrast, some studies find retirees to be remarkably thrifty, to decumulate wealth slowly and 
to be satisfied with lower living standards in retirement (see, for example, Bradbury & Mendolia 
2012; Asher et al. 2017). However, these studies may look only at pensioners rather than self-funded 
retirees and include people older than the Baby Boomers, that is, from the more frugal cohort raised 
during the Depression and World War II. 
65 Daley et al. (2018) present a more nuanced picture of the spending habits of older Australians, 
arguing that while their average capacity for discretionary spending exceeds that of working-age 
people, their consumption levels tail off significantly as they age, with the exception of medical 
expenses. The increasing number of older people who live into a Fourth Age of chronic disability or 
illness no longer spend heavily on leisure and material goods, but their consumption of health and 
other forms of care increases dramatically (Mason & Lee 2011, p.29). 
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Government policy agendas play their part, acting as much to support the 
citizenship of the old in consumer society as to relieve elder poverty (Blaikie 1999, 
pp.73, 205-208; Gilleard & Higgs 2005). 
 
Framing seniors as a ‘drain on resources’ has the potential to inflame tensions 
between the generations and contribute to older people being poorly treated. 
Intergenerational relations became a live issue in the 1980s in the US, when 
demographer Samuel Preston (1984) highlighted a growing disparity between the 
wellbeing of children and older people, illustrated by rising rates of child poverty. 
Seniors were absorbing an increasing and disproportionate share of public benefits 
while programs targeting children were being rolled back. Preston argued that 
Americans were in thrall to a worldview based on individualism and self-interest, 
with no sense of collective responsibility. With falling fertility rates, fewer of them 
(especially outside minority groups) had children in their care, so they saw the 
needs of the very young as irrelevant. Older people appeared interested in the 
future only to the extent that they would still be around for it. 
 
The intergenerational equity debate in the US became associated with the same 
neo-liberal agenda that was allegedly undermining American compassion and 
solidarity. Rather than promoting justice and equality within the welfare state, 
intergenerational equity was used as a rallying call by conservatives who wished to 
shrink the welfare state as a whole (for discussion, see Heclo 1988; Kingson & 
Williamson 1993, Quadagno 1996; Williamson & Watts-Roy 1999; Marmor, Cook & 
Scher 1999; Williamson & Rhodes 2011). However, welfare is not necessarily a zero-
sum game: a strong welfare state is likely to provide better support for both old and 
young (Adams & Dominick 1997, p.104; Esping-Andersen & Sarasa 2002, pp.6, 11).  
 
Discussion of intergenerational equity can take on a hyperbolic tone: British 
politician David Willetts (2010) has accused the Baby Boomers of stealing their 
children’s future, while Americans have been warned of ‘the coming generational 
storm’ and the ‘fiscal child abuse’ of public debt accumulation (Kotlikoff & Burns 
2005). Other commentators have been less exercised about the foreshadowed 
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ageing crisis, suggesting the need for urgent reform of welfare states and health 
spending tends to be over-stated (see, for example, Disney 1996; Mullan 2000). In 
Australia, discussion of intergenerational equity has been more muted than in the 
US and Europe66 and there is little sign of ‘generational warfare’. 
 
Publics in advanced industrial societies do appear to recognise that it can no longer 
be assumed that children will do as well or better than their parents, though the 
extent to which redistributive policy is seen as contributing to this situation is 
unclear. In a 2015 poll, a third of Australian parents said they expected their 
children to lead a less prosperous lifestyle than they had experienced (Ipsos & MLC 
2015, p.4).67 The Foundation for Young Australians 2016 report card on the state of 
the nation’s youth observed that pay packets for 15-24-year-olds had increased by 
only 20% since 1985 (compared to 39% for the workforce as a whole), three and a 
half times as many young people were underemployed as in 1985 and a house in 
Sydney cost ten times average annual income compared to four times in 1985.68 A 
recent report from a longitudinal study of young Australians noted that there was a 
growing consciousness among young people that they were encountering a 
distinctive (and challenging) set of circumstances not experienced by previous 
generations (Wyn et al. 2017, p.2). 
 
Despite widespread awareness that Australia’s young people may not be getting a 
‘fair go’, there appears to be little impetus for change to redistributive policy. The 
Australian Labor Party proposed a number of redistributive policy reforms in its 
2019 Federal Election campaign, which would have had the effect of redistributing 
resources from the older and better-off to the younger and worse-off, but it failed 
 
66 Intergenerational equity was invoked to some degree by the Howard government to justify a neo-
liberal policy agenda in Australia (Bessant 2008, p.362). 
67 Australians have more optimistic expectations than some other publics. In France just 7% of those 
surveyed thought young people would have a better life than their parents (Ipsos MORI 2014, p.49). 
68 Despite these indicators, it has been noted that young people appear more relaxed than might be 
expected about their prospects, possibly because of factors such as political disengagement, 
complacency, lack of awareness, a weak sense of cohort identity, delaying major life transitions, 




to win government69. The primary purpose of the fieldwork undertaken for the 
thesis was to explore whether seniors or young people support reforms to existing 
redistributive policy and the factors underpinning their attitudes. The preceding 
section considered some possible reasons for resistance to considering 
redistributive policy through an age/birth cohort lens. The remainder of this chapter 
reviews what we already know about attitudes towards redistributive policy and 
whether they are influenced by age. First, the issue of how young people and 
seniors express their policy preferences in different ways is addressed.  
 
3.2 Age and political participation 
 
Participation matters in a democracy. Arguably, electoral participation matters most 
of all, and young people are less likely to vote than seniors. The young are 
disadvantaged not only by their decreasing relative numbers, but also by their 
disenfranchisement – formal in the case of children, and informal in the case of 
young adults who show different political participation patterns to older adults. 
Electoral participation in many countries, notably the US, has been declining over 
the last few decades and the decline is concentrated among young people, who 
appear to see voting as less a civic duty than “an individual choice option” (Blais 
2007, p.633; Wattenberg 2016, ch.4-5). In Australia, compulsory voting mitigates 
this problem, although there are still large numbers of eligible voters (mostly young) 
not registered on the electoral roll (Martin 2012b, p.31) and young people appear 
more likely to intentionally lodge informal votes (Hill & Rutledge-Prior 2016).70 
 
While voter registration rates were very high ahead of the 2019 Federal Election,71 
turn-out rates fell to near-record lows in seats with a young median age (Wright & 
Koslowski 2019). The young are also less likely than older people to join political 
 
69 Post-election analyses have generally not found that the swings against Labor were from older 
voters. 
70 Only 68% of Australians aged 18-24 report that they would still vote if it was not compulsory, 
compared with 88% of those aged 65+ (Cameron & McAllister 2018). 
71 The 2017 same-sex marriage plebiscite spurred an influx of new registrations from young people, 
and enrol-to-vote campaigns targeting young people were run. 
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parties (Scarrow 2007, p.642), contact government officials, make political 
donations, or work with others on community problems, although they are more 
likely to attend protests and work in political offices (Erkulwater 2012). Not only do 
young people in advanced industrial democracies today have lower levels of overall 
political participation than their elders, they have lower levels of participation than 
previous cohorts did at the same age and may continue to do so as they grow older 
(Dalton 2011, p.10; Anduiza 2011, p.90).72 
 
Andrea Campbell (2003a) showed how participation begets policy (and policy 
begets participation) in her in-depth analysis of American seniors’ reaction to 
proposals to cut back Social Security. Political participation by older people had 
increased significantly since the introduction of the program, and this participation 
was highly focused on Social Security rather than political issues more generally. 
Social Security had given seniors resources, time (through permitting them to retire) 
and a significant stake in policy. It had made age a politically relevant characteristic 
and facilitated the mobilisation of seniors as a group, turning them into the “Über-
citizens of the American polity” (Campbell 2003a, p.2). In contrast, benefit programs 
for the unemployed imposed demands to meet job-search requirements and other 
conditions that undermined this group’s practical and cognitive capacity for political 
participation, making them easy targets for cutbacks.73 It has also been noted in the 
Australian context that neoliberal policies (such as those imposing mutual 
obligation requirements on the unemployed and undermining access to secure 
affordable housing) effectively disenfranchise some marginalised young people and 
erode their citizenship, making their effective political participation unlikely 
(Edwards 2009). As Campbell notes, “That some groups participate less and suffer 
 
72 Political practices adopted by people during young adulthood may persist to some degree 
throughout their lives and those who fail to develop ‘civic concern’ during youth may be unlikely to 
ever do so (see, for example, Damon 2011, p.20). 
73 There is some debate over whether economic hardship (leading to lack of time and resources) 
inhibits political participation or nurtures grievances which incite participation – the direction of 
influence may depend on other factors, such as opportunities for mobilisation (see, for example, 
Giugni & Grasso 2016; Grasso & Giugni 2016b). A relevant contextual factor may be the extent to 
which people perceive their situations as amenable to change; this may be less likely in neo-liberal 
policy environments which emphasise individual responsibility for poor outcomes (Grasso & Giugni 
2016b, p.676).  
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policy disappointments as a result is problematic for political equality and 
democratic governance…Participatory quiescence can lead to policy disaster” 
(2003a, p.140). 
 
There is debate over whether young people have opted out of political participation 
or embraced different forms of participation. Russell Dalton (2008) has argued that 
youth participation is taking on an alternative character rather than declining (see 
also Pickard & Bessant 2018). Young people are more likely to adopt what he 
describes as ‘engaged citizenship norms’ that favour individualised, direct action, 
participatory strategies over voting in elections, which occur infrequently and are 
linked to broad programs rather than specific policies.74 Even over the short period 
from 1999 to 2009, these norms were found to have risen among adolescents in 21 
countries (Hooghe & Oser 2015). In Australia, young people are less likely than their 
elders to be highly engaged with electoral politics such as voting and party 
identification: they tend to take a broader, more flexible approach to political 
participation and citizenship (Harris, Wyn & Younes 2010; Martin 2012a; Martin 
2012b). Despite these different participation patterns, and some age cohort effects 
on views towards Australian democratic practice, the young are not necessarily 
markedly more complacent, apathetic or politically disconnected than older people 
(Stoker et al. 2017). 
 
Nathan Manning’s qualitative research with young Australians suggests that while 
they may not subscribe to traditional modes of collective action, or the liberal ideal 
of the autonomous, rational political self, they have a strong sense of themselves as 
connected to others and embedded in networks of politically charged 
interrelationships, offering opportunities for new forms of political practice and 
engagement (Manning 2012). Mark Chou (2017) agrees, describing youth 
engagement as a matter of perspective and noting that while young people may be 
rejecting politics in some respects, they are also simultaneously refining and 
 
74 There is a risk that more individualised and issue-specific forms of engagement will leave people 
less concerned with the big picture, including balancing trade-offs, considering collective interests 
and taking a long-term view (see, for example, Kumlin 2004, pp.216-22). 
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revolutionising it. Young people’s political practice tends to be less hierarchical, 
more cause-oriented, heavily networked and characterised by sometimes 
contradictory concerns; these shifts may herald a rethinking of democracy rather 
than its demise (Pruitt 2017, p.95). Judith Bessant (2014) suggests that young 
people’s distinctive use of new media technologies for political purposes represents 
a different but not necessarily lesser form of democratic participation (see also 
Vromen, Xenos & Loader 2015). 
 
However, the less conventional forms of political activism favoured by the young 
tend to be practised only by small numbers (Grasso 2018) and (currently) don’t 
have as much potential for policy influence as direct electoral choice. Additionally, 
young people are much more likely to distrust government and feel they lack 
political efficacy than older people (Bean 2012, p.103).75 Australian Election Study 
data from 2016 show that only 20% of Australians aged 18-24 think people in 
government can be trusted, compared to 36% of those aged 65+; further, 58% of 
young people (compared to 46% of seniors) believe the government is run for a few 
big interests rather than society as a whole (Cameron & McAllister 2018). Recent 
analysis of Australians’ views on and levels of political trust found only limited 
evidence of generational differences; however, young adults were more likely to 
feel that they didn’t have a say (15% compared to 8% of those born 1946-1964) and 
that young people were not well-represented in politics (19% compared to 6% of 
the older cohort) (Stoker et al. 2018, p.42). James Arvanitakis and Eric Sidoti (2011) 
describe a typology of citizenship across axes of engagement/disengagement and 
empowerment/disempowerment, with many young Australians falling into the 
engaged/disempowered quadrant dubbed ‘endangered citizenship’. Being 
sufficiently engaged to be acutely aware of the barriers to your empowerment is to 
find yourself in an invidious position. 
 
 
75 Families with children, who tend to be disproportionately time-poor and/or economically 
disadvantaged, may also have more limited opportunities to promote their interests than older 
people (see, for example, Pampel 1994, p.158; Wilensky 2002, p.282).  
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A survey of 15 to 18-year-old Australians found high levels of disenchantment with 
political institutions and processes they felt marginalised them and were not 
responsive to their interests and views (Harris, Wyn & Younes 2010). Young 
Americans also report perceiving themselves as lacking the resources or importance 
necessary to have any influence on policymaking: 
Students are not eschewing politics as much as they do not see politics as an 
option. They see no clear access points, and their perceptions and 
experiences with the political system suggest to them that they cannot have 
an impact, which is what they seek. (Kiesa et al. 2011, p.144) 
 
Older adults are more likely to participate in forms of influential political 
organisation such as interest groups and lobbying. In the US, the American 
Association for Retired Persons (AARP) boasts millions of members and a huge 
budget, making it one of the most powerful lobby groups in Washington D.C. - it has 
been observed that “most American politicians would rather appear naked in public 
than take on AARP” (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2014, p.124).76 Retirees tend to be 
more single-minded political actors than younger working people, focusing all their 
political capital on a very small number of issues (usually pension benefits and 
health care) (Mulligan & Salai-Martin 2003). While senior citizens are a disparate 
group, they have significant potential to unite in the face of a perceived threat to 
their common interests (Rhodebeck 1993). They tend to be highly loss averse and 
most likely to mobilise if they fear a benefit to which they have become accustomed 
is at risk, rather than in response to a policy opportunity (Campbell 2003b; Goerres 
2008, p.133). 
 
3.3 Age and policy attitudes 
 
In terms of policymaking, young people’s different forms of political participation 
are significant to the extent that they have different preferences than seniors to 
express. If the young have distinctive views on redistributive policy, but fewer 
 
76 In Australia, the two national seniors’ bodies, National Seniors Australia and Council on the Aging 
(COTA), are much lower profile than AARP, but effective policy influencers. 
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opportunities to influence policymaking, the quality of democratic representation is 
compromised. General support for government redistribution, social policy 
spending and the welfare state, especially age pensions and health care, tends to be 
high across age groups. However, some systematic variation in policy attitudes by 
age has been observed. In particular, while young people support spending on the 
aged, older people appear less likely to support spending that benefits children and 
young adults. Young people are more likely to place themselves on the left of the 
political spectrum and empirical evidence from elections in the US and other 
democracies has found different voting patterns by young adults (Wattenberg 2016, 
ch.6). 
 
In Australia, the 2019 Australian Election Study (AES) reports a growing divide 
between younger and older voters in terms of the issues they care about and how 
they vote. People aged 18-24 are concerned about the environment and property 
prices, while older voters prioritise management of the economy. More than half of 
over-65s vote Liberal as their first preference, while only 15% of under-25s do 
likewise; 29% of over-65s vote Labor and 2% Greens, while 44% of under-25s put 
Labor first and 37% the Greens (Cameron & McAllister 2019a, p.18). These 
differences are increasing: the 2019 election was the lowest Liberal Party vote on 
record for under-35s (and the highest for the Greens) while those aged 55+ voted 
Liberal by the greatest margin since the AES began in 1987. As Cameron and 
McAllister put it succinctly: “Young voters are moving further to the left, older 
voters are moving to the right” (2019a, p.18). 
 
A self-interest/rational choice framework for understanding policy attitudes 
suggests age should influence attitudes towards social policies, many of which affect 
different age groups very differently. Education primarily benefits children and 
young adults, family payments and childcare benefit young to middle-aged adults 
and their children, health and age pensions largely benefit older citizens. In some 
cases, notably age pensions, age is the factor that triggers entitlement to particular 
benefits. Economic policy areas such as housing and tax also have substantially 
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different impacts by age group. Gøsta Esping-Andersen has argued that age is a 
significant predictor of social policy attitudes: 
Support for pensions, health, and various benefits for the aged is 
overwhelming and homogeneous across all age groups…But when we turn 
to youth programmes, such as family benefits, child care, unemployment 
support, or education, the generations clash: massive support from the 
younger cohorts, very little if any from the aged. (Esping-Andersen 1999, 
pp.147-48) 
 
In Europe, rapidly-progressing population ageing and the political activism of 
seniors has led to predictions that gerontocracy would destroy any possibility of 
pension reform (Sinn & Uebelmesser 2002) and some research has found that 
countries where seniors have greater political leverage have more generous 
pension provisions (Fernández 2012). However, other work has found little 
evidence of a link between ‘grey power’ and pension generosity, noting that aged 
voters do not all vote identically on a single-issue platform, especially when many 
already have well-established party identifications (Tepe & Vanhuysse 2009). Older 
people may be torn between divergent interests: they tend to prefer conservative 
parties but it is often the progressive parties who are most likely to expand the 
public transfer programs from which they benefit (Rhodebeck 1993, pp.359-60). It is 
also suggested that commonalities cutting across age groups, such as gender, 
education and class, are more likely than age-based interests to influence voting 
behaviour (Irwin 1996; Goerres 2008).77 
 
Age is only one of many socio-political cleavages and the empirical evidence on how 
well it predicts policy attitudes is mixed. Many analyses use data from the 1980s 
and 1990s (when the fiscal challenges of demographic change were less pressing) 
and aggregate data from a range of different policy areas, which may mask age 
effects. An analysis of data from 14 OECD countries which separately examined five 
social policy areas (education, unemployment insurance, health, pensions and social 
assistance) found the influence of age on policy support was systematically linked to 
the age-relatedness of the policy (Busemeyer, Goerres & Weschle 2009). People 
 
77 Age is itself related to factors such as education and wealth (see, for example, Turner 1998). 
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tended to favour policies likely to benefit them personally based on their age,78 with 
the strongest age effect in the area of education spending.79 Similarly, an analysis of 
22 Swiss referenda on pension policy, labour market policy and maternity insurance 
found evidence of voting on the basis of self-interest, with age a much stronger 
cleavage than income or gender. Older people strongly supported improvements to 
their own benefits but tended to reject policy proposals designed to improve the 
position of workers and young families (Bonoli & Häusermann 2010, p.201). 
 
Some studies find that young people are generally more supportive than older 
people of higher levels of government spending on social policies and the welfare 
state (see, for example, Andreß & Heien 2001; Jæger 2006a; Street & Cossman 
2006). This may reflect a birth cohort rather than age effect: older people at the 
time of these studies were from the pre-Baby Boomer generations and formed their 
political values in times of greater frugality and reduced social spending. However, 
Australian Election Study data from 2016 show that 63% of 18-24-year-olds support 
the redistribution of income and wealth, compared to only 47% of those aged 65+ 
(Cameron & McAllister 2018). The percentage of young people in favour of 
redistribution rose sharply from 42% in 2010, while the number of seniors in favour 
declined four percentage points during that period. 
 
Other studies find that support for social spending increases with age, although this 
support tends to be for spending on age pensions and health rather than programs 
benefiting children or the unemployed (Smith 2000; Boeri, Börsch-Supan & Tabellini 
2001, pp.25, 34-36). Findings of lower welfare state support among older people 
may be attributable to their increased tendency to view welfare recipients as 
undeserving. While older people are more likely than any other age group to be 
welfare recipients, many age pensioners appear not to consider themselves 
 
78 Other research has found that older voters are more likely than younger voters to be influenced by 
the age-relatedness of policies (Rhodebeck 1993, p.357). 
79 The authors noted that rational choice/self-interest did not give a complete picture of policy 
preferences and warned against drawing any conclusions about a ‘war of generations’ from the 
modest age cleavages observed. 
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members of the ‘transfer classes’.80 Older citizens are more likely to take a highly 
conditional view of who deserves welfare support (Van Oorschot 2000, p.40; Van 
Oorschot 2006, p.34; Larsen 2006, p.83; Schofield & Butterworth 2015) and to 
favour income distributions based on merit (Aalberg 2003, pp.59-60). They are less 
likely to endorse social policies aimed at supporting groups affected by ‘new social 
risks’ arising from changes to labour markets and family structures (largely the 
young, low-skilled, women, sole parents and low-income families), who tend to be 
poorly served by the traditional welfare state (Armingeon 2006; Kitschelt & Rehm 
2006). 
 
A comparison of attitudes in Australia and Finland found the young and seniors 
were more likely to favour lower welfare benefits than the middle-aged (Kangas 
2003), reflecting a range of sometimes conflicting factors which potentially affect 
support for welfare state programs. Older people wishing to avoid being a burden 
to others may lead them to express a preference for lower benefits (Logan & Spitze 
1995; Zaidi, Gasior & Manchin 2012, p.221) and this group is also more likely to be 
fiscally conservative in general (Silverstein et al. 2000, p.276). Middle-aged people 
may be eager to see benefit levels maintained because this relieves them of 
responsibility for their elderly parents, and because they anticipate shortly being 
beneficiaries themselves (Logan & Spitze 1995). Some researchers have suggested 
that younger people may prefer lower benefits because they are more likely to have 
absorbed individual responsibility and user-pays norms that developed out of neo-
liberal policy agendas in the 1980s and 1990s (Silverstein & Parrott 1997; 
Silverstein, Angelelli & Parrott 2001; Hodgkin 2014, p.62; see also Vromen, Loader & 
Xenos 2015). They are also less likely to have had much contact with the welfare 
state, so may have lower awareness of the benefits it provides (Wilson 2006, 
p.531). 
 
A study exploring the views on inequality of young people from Australia, the UK 
and the US found a reluctance to attribute ‘blame’ for disadvantage and little 
 
80 Analysis of Australian Survey of Social Attitudes data has found an association between being a 
welfare recipient and holding negative views of welfare recipients (Schofield & Butterworth 2015). 
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acknowledgement of the entrenched privilege of elites (Vromen, Loader & Xenos 
2015). Participants in that study tended to de-emphasise the role of structural and 
systemic factors in people experiencing poverty or disadvantage. Judith Bessant 
suggests that one of the distinctive characteristics of contemporary youth is the 
extent to which they have embraced an “individualist neoliberal political sensibility” 
(2014, p.112). Qualitative research with young Australians has found that they see 
the contemporary economic landscape as “completely normal” (Muller 2006, p.1) 
and have wholly embraced neoliberal discourse, including the individualistic 
imperative and the idea that people are in control of their own fates, or at least 
must accept them if they cannot change them (Alloway & Dalley-Trim 2009). Neo-
liberal subjects are encouraged to construct themselves as depoliticised ‘business 
enterprises’, expected to shape and improve the self while structural factors and 
social change are sidelined (Scharff 2016). British research based on longitudinal 
survey data has found that young Britons who came of age in the Thatcher era 
internalised neo-liberal values, and the effect is even more pronounced among 
those who grew up under New Labour, when these values became entrenched and 
normalised (Grasso et al. 2019). 
 
US research has found that young adults view corporate and market forces as 
outside the control of government, and essentially non-accountable in any 
democratic sense (Zukin et al. 2006). This longitudinal study found significant age 
cohort differences in political attitudes and participation (Zukin et al. 2006). 
Younger groups (born from around 1965) mixed traditional views with a range of 
new perspectives, resulting in some apparent contradictions. They had higher levels 
of faith in government but were relatively indifferent to politics (and especially 
voting) overall. Higher levels of idealism and empathy did not translate into much 
sense of responsibility or obligation to society. Young people were supportive of big 
government, but also more likely to endorse market solutions to problems and to 
see a substantial role for the private sector in delivering services. Above all, the 
young were more tolerant than the old of diversity in people’s backgrounds, 
opinions and behaviour. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the data 
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collected for the fieldwork component of the thesis aligned with these results, 
although notably the young participants were more realistic than idealistic. 
 
There is a body of empirical evidence suggesting that seniors are less likely than 
other age groups to support spending on education and programs benefiting 
children (see, for example, South 1991; Poterba 1997; Poterba 1998; Brunner & 
Balsdon 2004; Street & Cossman 2006; Grob & Wolter 2007; Cattaneo & Wolter 
2009).81 Analysis of German data found that older (and childless) people were less 
likely to support transfers to families (Wilkoszewski 2009).82 In Sweden, support for 
policies benefiting seniors has been found to be higher across all age groups than 
support for policies benefiting families with children, with support for senior-
oriented policies increasing with age and support for family policies decreasing 
(Svallfors 2008). Analysis of data from across Europe has found that state childcare 
provision and programs targeting needy families enjoy only moderate levels of 
public support and are most popular among those holding egalitarian attitudes 
towards gender roles, including women, the young and the better educated 
(Mischke 2014).83 
 
By contrast, Australian research has found only limited evidence of a relationship 
between age and attitudes towards social policies. Analysis of the 2005 Australian 
Social Attitudes Survey data found no difference between young and older adults 
on agreement that all families deserve payments to help with the cost of raising 
children, although 18-34-year-olds were 11 percentage points more likely than the 
65+ age group to agree that single parents deserved payments to stay home and 
raise children (Wilson & Meagher 2007, p.269). Little age-related difference in 
 
81 Some of these studies found lower support for social spending more broadly, not just on children 
and families, among older people. 
82 For example, a 65-year-old respondent was 85% less likely than a 20-year-old to support an 
increase in child benefits, while a childless person was 50% less likely than a parent to support this 
policy (Wilkoszewski 2009, p.16). Even on what might seem a fairly innocuous measure, more 
flexible working hours for parents, a 65-year-old was 50% less likely to be in favour than a 20-year-
old (Wilkoszewski 2009, p.17). 
83 Other research has found conflicting evidence on the extent to which age influences attitudes 
towards public childcare provision, with socio-cultural and other contextual factors being most 
influential (Goerres & Tepe 2010; Goerres & Tepe 2012). 
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attitudes towards health spending or state provision of aged care services in 
Australia has been detected (Wilson, Meagher & Hermes 2012b, p.116; Hodgkin 
2014). Attitudes towards inequality and redistribution in Australia have been found 
to be more influenced by people’s perceived (or aspired-to) level of economic 
status than any demographic characteristics (Saunders & Wong 2013). 
 
Even where age is not a direct influence on attitudes towards redistributive policy, it 
may be a filter through which other influences, such as normative beliefs, 
institutional context and situational factors, act. Analysis of International Social 
Survey data for 24 countries found that public attitudes towards the welfare state 
and social policy are collective as well as individual phenomena and influenced by 
circumstance (Blekesaune & Quadagno 2003). For example, public support for 
unemployment benefits was higher in countries that were experiencing high 
unemployment at the time, with seniors just as likely as younger people to be 
supportive despite not being at risk personally. Other research finds only limited 
evidence that young people have a distinctive set of political values, concluding that 
class is still the most powerful socio-political cleavage (Furlong & Cartmel 2007, 
pp.123, 140). 
 
A study using data from the 2008 European Social Survey found some age variance 
in the normative beliefs informing policy attitudes: older people were more likely to 
endorse authoritarian, ethnocentric, egalitarian and anti-welfare dependency 
norms, and to support government intervention and redistribution as a form of 
protection against social disorder (Staerklé, Likki & Scheidegger 2012, pp.97-99). 
Another study analysing data from the same source found that values had no 
relevance to age effects on welfare attitudes, to the extent that those effects 
existed at all (Svallfors, Kulin & Schnabel 2012). Acknowledging that their findings 
contradicted much previous research (including their own), the authors could 
detect no systematic patterning of age-attitude associations and concluded that age 
was not an important fault line in relation to welfare policy, even for clearly age-
based policies. The lack of age cleavage was attributed to three factors: we all 
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expect to grow old and benefit from senior-biased spending, age groups are bonded 
together through intra-family solidarity, and the aged are seen as highly deserving. 
 
Some scholars suggest that younger voters support spending on pensions and 
health out of self-interest, expecting to benefit from this spending personally in the 
future (Foner 2000, p.273; Blekesaune & Quadagno 2003, p.416; Svallfors 2008, 
p.390; Daatland, Slagsvold & Lima 2009, p.129; Busemeyer, Goerres & Weschle 
2009, pp.199-200; Tepe & Vanhuysse 2009, p.22). However, this support may also 
stem from social norms or altruism. Young adults are unlikely to be highly focused 
on their own wellbeing in retirement, which remains a far-off prospect, and it would 
be risky to assume that whatever benefits are now in place will remain unchanged 
decades hence for the enjoyment of those currently funding them through tax-and-
transfer.84 People also access age-based entitlements unequally (Kohli 2009, p.67); 
some die before becoming eligible for a pension, while others draw benefits for 
thirty years or more.  
 
The existing research on the relationship between age and attitudes towards 
redistributive and social policy is inconclusive. Without more extensive longitudinal 
studies it is also impossible to separate the effects of current age group and birth 
cohort on policy preferences.85 However, one of the emerging themes is that while 
all age groups support spending on seniors, support for spending on families and 
young people is generally weaker among the contemporary aged. This may be due 
to self-interest, although it is likely that factors such as normative beliefs and 
institutional influences are also relevant. The fieldwork undertaken for the thesis 
 
84 Martin Kohli (2009, p.67) makes a useful distinction between age-based and generationally-based 
(or birth cohort-based) entitlement to benefits. Many people assume programs such as the Age 
Pension are age-based and (almost) everyone will pass through the stages of contribution and 
benefit over time. However, the rules of welfare states do not remain stable, and this, coupled with 
demographic change, makes programs generationally-based. We often end up as beneficiaries (or 
not) of programs very different from the ones we contributed to as taxpayers. 
85 For example, studies may find that people currently aged 20-30 are more supportive of family 
welfare policies than people currently aged 60-70, but it is not clear if the twentysomethings will 




investigated the factors underpinning the redistributive policy attitudes of young 
adults and seniors in detail. 
 
3.4 Public preferences and policy 
 
The distinctiveness of different age groups’ policy preferences is something of a 
moot point if policymakers are not actually influenced by public attitudes. There is 
debate over whether policymaking is substantially affected by public opinion or 
remains primarily an elite activity (see Borre & Goldsmith 1995, p.4). Some 
researchers contend that for democratic policies and institutions to retain 
legitimacy, they must align with citizens’ values and attitudes (see, for example, 
Jacobs & Shapiro 2000; Thomassen 2007, p.432; Svallfors 2012, pp.2-3). Empirical 
evidence suggests a correlation between public opinion and policy (Page & Shapiro 
1983; Wlezien 2004), but it is not clear which comes first: the opinion or the policy 
(Forma 1999, p.89). Attitudes are influenced by habituation to what is already in 
place, and decision-makers and elites (including survey designers and researchers) 
can manipulate public opinion. 
 
3.4.1 Mechanisms of influence 
 
An analysis of the relationship between public opinion and policy reform since the 
1980s onwards found that New Zealanders (and to a lesser extent Australians) had 
‘rolled over’ and accepted neoliberal norms and values in at least some policy 
domains,86 possibly through persuasion by elite messaging or just because they 
couldn’t see any other alternative (Humpage 2015). In the US, political elites 
(including the President) display ‘a chronic intent to manipulate’ public opinion into 
support for the elites’ preferred policy stances, though with only moderate success 
(Druckman & Jacobs 2015; see also Jacobs & Shapiro 2000).87 However, public 
 
86 The effect was strongest in relation to attitudes towards support for the unemployed and 
government taxation and redistribution. 
87 Elites were found to have the most influence over public opinion through priming/framing effects 
rather than overt persuasion, and in relation to the perceived salience of issues rather than 
substantive policy attitudes (Druckman & Jacobs 2015). 
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opinion is complex and heterogeneous, and policymakers exhibit varying degrees of 
responsiveness to different groups in society (Wlezien & Soroka 2007, p.811; 
Druckman & Jacobs 2015, p.34). In the US, policymaking is generally much more 
responsive to the preferences of affluent Americans than those of the poor or 
middle-class (Gilens 2012). 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that under some circumstances mass public opinion 
can have an important influence on policymaking. Analysis of US data found that 
politicians are generally alert to public opinion and welfare spending is an area 
where they take particular notice of the public’s preferences (Wlezien 2004). 
Analysis of cross-national data on welfare state attitudes suggests that policymakers 
are influenced by mass opinion during election campaigns and while in office, at 
least at a macro-level (domain-specific preferences being less influential) (Brooks & 
Manza 2006; Brooks & Manza 2007). Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza (2007) argue that 
the influence of public opinion is a significant part of why welfare states persist with 
a high degree of policy inertia, as well as explaining cross-national differences. They 
propose an ‘embedded preferences’ model: rather than individual preferences 
being shaped by economic considerations and subject to fluctuation, attitudes are 
underpinned by relatively stable social and institutional contexts, including people’s 
group memberships and collective memory of state-building activities. Habituation, 
vested interests and loss aversion are key factors. Once people become welfare 
state beneficiaries, they are very unwilling to see a reduction in their entitlements – 
their support for the welfare state in its existing form is effectively locked in. 
 
A number of researchers suggest that public opinion influences policy by acting as a 
signalling mechanism akin to a thermostat: if policy moves too far in one direction, 
it loses support, and government responds by shifting its position accordingly 
(Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 2002; Stimson 2004, pp.31-40; Soroka & Wlezien 
2010). Empirical testing of this model has found that it works most effectively in 
institutional settings where it is possible for the public to send and receive clear 
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signals,88 and citizens only need enough information to assess whether a policy has 
gone too far or not far enough to send a meaningful signal (Soroka & Wlezien 2010). 
The electorate exhibits a generalised ‘policy mood’ (tending to prefer either more 
or less government intervention at any one time) as well as issue-specific 
preferences, and a shift in the views of just a small proportion of voters is often 
sufficient to generate change (Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 2002, p.432). In 
Australia, a correlation between issues seen as important by the public, such as the 
economy and health, and issues which are prominent on the national legislative 
agenda has been noted (Dowding & Martin 2017, ch.9). It has also been observed in 
the Australian context that government responsiveness to public attitudes can 
contribute to policy developments that are sub-optimal and potentially unjust 
(Lewis 2007). 
 
3.4.2 Public competence 
 
Some researchers argue that the general populace has only limited impact on how 
elected representatives behave, and public opinion is rarely a sound basis for 
policymaking in any case (Papadakis 1992; Bartels 2012, pp.4-5; Achen & Bartels 
2016). This echoes a long-standing debate around the political competence of the 
ordinary citizen, dating back to Philip Converse’s influential article ‘The Nature of 
Belief Systems in Mass Publics’ (1964), which suggested that the average 
American’s political attitudes were simplistic and internally inconsistent. On this line 
of thinking, citizens in advanced industrial democracies are generally ill-informed 
about policy issues and often report conflicting points of view that tend to be 
unstable over time (see Zaller 1992; Stimson 2004). There is not a pre-existing body 
of public opinion waiting to be uncovered – most people do not have a considered, 
coherent package of political views (Stimson 2004, p.26). Rather, people appear to 
make it up as they go along, or as the researcher pushes them for answers. Fixed 
attitudes don’t exist; instead, people make ‘attitude reports’ based on whatever 
 
88 Federal arrangements, for example, tend to confuse the signalling effect and weaken the opinion-
policy link (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p.173). 
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considerations are salient at the time or that they happen to be able to call to mind 
(Zaller 1992). Most people will show a recency bias in this regard and will be more 
likely to recall the latest information they have heard (Chong & Druckman 2010). 
The way survey questions are framed may also make a big difference to how people 
respond (Zaller 1992, p.32; Brooks 2012). 
 
This conception of people’s political thinking may be at least partly an artefact of 
quantitative survey methodologies, with qualitative studies more likely to discover 
thoughtfulness, nuance and pattern in citizens’ views (see, for example, Hochschild 
1981). This was borne out in the qualitative fieldwork undertaken for the thesis. 
However, in a complex policy environment, even politically aware and well-
informed citizens are likely to use heuristics as cognitive short-cuts. Symbolic cues 
come from key communicators, including media, politicians and experts. In 
Australia, party identification acts as a particularly significant short-cut (McAllister 
2011, p.33). Beliefs, values, interests, demographic characteristics and life 
circumstances shape individual predispositions, through which information and 
cues are filtered (see Sears & Funk 1991; Zaller 1992). In addition to filtering cues 
from other sources, value orientations may operate as important heuristic devices, 
helping people form more consistent and coherent sets of political attitudes (Van 
Deth & Scarbrough 1995; Goren 2001). 
 
Debate continues around how effectively democracy can function if the average 
voter is somewhat less informed and ideologically-driven than classical theorists 
might have anticipated, and the overall picture we have of political attitudes 
remains murky (Kuklinski & Peyton 2007). Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels 
(2016) argue that between complexity and human cognitive limitations, most 
people’s political judgement and decision-making leaves much to be desired as a 
foundation for good government. In their view, partisan loyalty based on group 
identity trumps ideology or policy reasoning for most voters. 
 
Other researchers suggest that the post-Converse ‘voters are fools’ school of 
thought underestimates the sophistication and influence of public opinion, which at 
102 
 
least in the aggregate is “relatively structured, internally consistent, persistent over 
time and even, to a certain extent, subtle and sophisticated” (Kaase & Newton 
1995, p.79; see also Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 2002; Aalberg 2003, p.110; 
Stimson 2004, p.19; Kinder 2006; Brooks & Manza 2007, p.147; Soroka & Wlezien 
2010, p.33). The electorate proves to be more than the sum of its parts, as 
uninformed, random voters cancel each other out, and the informed and attentive 
voters exercise a disproportionate influence. Less educated citizens are less likely to 
turn out to vote at all (see Hill 2011). It is also suggested that voters can make 
reasoned choices without full information (Lupia & McCubbins 1998; Althaus 2006, 
p.96; Lupia 2006; Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p.19). Increasing levels of education in 
advanced industrial democracies tend to equip more people with the cognitive skills 
necessary for political reasoning, although at the same time the policy landscape 
has become more complex. 
 
To the extent that voters do not fully grasp policy nuance, there can be significant 
ramifications. People with limited political knowledge are likely to find it harder to 
interpret cues and identify which party best aligns with their policy preferences. An 
analysis of policy preferences and voting patterns in 27 democratic countries found 
that significant numbers of people were liable to switch their votes if supplied with 
additional relevant information (Arnold 2012). The lack of information problem may 
be particularly acute in the case of public opinion on welfare state policies, which 
can be highly complex. Public knowledge is likely to stem from greatly simplified 
summary information in the media, which rarely provides a complete picture and 
may be actively misleading. For example, some sections of the media (and the 
political elite) promote stereotypical perceptions of particular groups of welfare 
recipients. 
 
It is worse if voters suffer from misinformation rather than simply ignorance. 
Several studies in Britain and Europe have concluded that the public’s knowledge of 
social and tax policies and their redistributive effects is limited (Boeri, Börsch-Supan 
& Tabellini 2001, p.42; Taylor-Gooby, Hastie & Bromley 2003; Orton & Rowlingson 
2007; Wilson, Meagher & Hermes 2012a). “People have the facts wrong, often in 
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systematic ways, and confidently believe they have them right” (Aalberg 2003, 
p.89). One point of misinformation was that people substantially overestimated 
how much the state spent on unemployment and single parent benefits compared 
to age pensions (Taylor-Gooby, Hastie & Bromley 2003, p.7). In the US, researchers 
have found that that high levels of misinformation make people more anti-welfare 
than they would be if they were better informed (Kuklinski et al. 2000). Australian 
research has found voters underestimated how tough Howard Government-era 
welfare reforms were on some low-income groups (including single parents and the 
unemployed) (Wilson, Meagher & Hermes 2012a). 
 
In general, the public tends to be under the influence of ‘fiscal illusion’, 
underestimating the costs of providing public services and therefore demanding 
more spending than they would with better information (Winter & Mouritzen 
2001). People focus primarily on the benefits rather than the costs of government 
action and public opinion varies relative to what the government happens to be 
doing at the time (Stimson 2004, pp.31, 41). Larry Bartels suggests the attitudes of 
most people appear to be based on a limited understanding of economic realities. 
Analysing the American public’s attitudes towards regressive tax cuts, Bartels (2005) 
found a disconnect between political values and policy attitudes. While many 
Americans recognised that inequality was growing and regretted that fact, there 
was no widespread opposition to tax cuts which were largely intended to benefit 
the very wealthy. It was as though people failed to make the connection between 
inequality and public policy or recognise that different policy settings would be 
better aligned with the values they professed to hold. 
 
Characterising average citizens as politically and economically incompetent is 
potentially a convenient excuse for elites who prefer to pursue their own policy 
agendas rather than demonstrate responsiveness to public preferences (Jacobs & 
Shapiro 2000, pp.299-300). Paul Burstein (2014) shifts the emphasis from citizen 
incompetence to citizen disengagement in the face of a complex and uninspiring 
policy landscape. He argues that there is simply no meaningful public view on the 
majority of specific policy proposals, which are too obscure or lacking in salience to 
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seriously engage the attention of average citizens. Government generally responds 
when the public has clear views which it makes known, but there can be no 
responsiveness to public opinion where no discernible public opinion exists.  
 
3.4.3 Invisible policy 
 
Another significant information problem is that some welfare state and 
redistributive policies, particularly programs operating through the tax system, have 
low visibility. Tax expenditure programs provide benefits to particular groups in 
society but result in the government forgoing revenue it would otherwise receive,89 
implying a shifting of tax burdens to other groups. Tax expenditures are less visible 
than other public transfers,90 they originate and develop in ways that are different 
to direct spending programs, their objectives and impacts can be unclear, and they 
can shift and grow with little scrutiny or transparency (Howard 1997). However, 
their substantial redistributive impact means they should be included in any 
comprehensive assessment of the welfare state and social policy outcomes (Howard 
1997; Stebbing & Spies-Butcher 2010). 
 
Tax expenditures form a large part of what Suzanne Mettler (2011) describes as ‘the 
submerged state’. They tend to obscure some types of redistribution, usually 
benefiting the affluent, organised interests and private actors (particularly the 
finance, real estate and insurance industries). Democracy depends on citizens being 
able to form and express meaningful opinions on policy, but they can hardly do so 
effectively if large swathes of policy are barely visible (or nearly impossible to fully 
understand): “The submerged state conducts governance by ‘smoke and mirrors’” 
(Mettler 2011, p.26). Mettler’s empirical work has found that giving people more 
 
89 Tax expenditures are often in place to incentivise certain forms of behaviour and if they were 
removed, some taxpayers would be likely to change their behaviour. This would impact on the 
government’s revenue stream, making it difficult to precisely measure the cost of these programs. 
The ‘revenue foregone’ measure does not take into account behaviour changes; an alternative 
measure, ‘revenue gain’, does, but is inevitably based on assumptions that may not hold up in 
reality. 
90 The Australian Government publishes information on the scale of tax expenditure programs in its 
annual Tax Expenditures Statement, but costs are given in aggregate and the redistributive effects of 
programs are masked (see Stebbing 2015, pp.140, 145). 
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policy-specific information, especially about redistributive effects, helps them form 
opinions and connect policies to their underlying value orientations. Other work has 
found that distributive concerns carry less weight for voters in countries with less 
visible policy structures such as tax expenditures, compromising citizens’ ability to 
hold politicians to account (Gingrich 2014). 
 
Including tax policies as well as social policies in attitudinal research can reveal 
interesting patterns and anomalies in people’s values and opinions. Analysis of data 
from the 2005 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes found that people tended to 
view social policy and tax policy in terms of the same normative framework (Wilson, 
Spies-Butcher & Stebbing 2009). For example, those who supported expanded 
welfare services were more likely to also support higher taxation to pay for these 
services. The data also revealed that supporters of welfare paternalism were much 
more likely to support action on tax evasion, suggesting an underlying 
authoritarianism and view of government as enforcer. On the other hand, the 
familiar discrepancy between support for government services and willingness to 
pay for them was evident. 
 
Contrary to what many have suggested, the fieldwork undertaken for the thesis 
found that participants were far from politically incompetent, expressing 
thoughtful, considered opinions across a range of issues. In line with Mettler’s 
findings, tax expenditures were an area where opinion formation was affected by a 
lack of information. Participants’ attitude sets were characterised by ambivalence 
and contradiction, but also by pattern and structure based on their underlying 
values. 
 
3.5 Inequality of political voice 
 
To the extent that the public has coherent preferences that influence policymakers, 
and there are age-based differences in preference sets, different participation 
patterns by age produce an ‘inequality of political voice problem’ (Erkulwater 2012, 
p.230). While the relationship between age and political attitudes and behaviour is 
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not straightforward, age-based variations in electoral and organised political 
participation are likely to reinforce demographic factors and give older people more 
political clout than young adults and families.91 Governments will reasonably be 
wary of upsetting a large group of active voters with significant potential for 
mobilisation around common interests. With the median voter age rising across 
most countries,92 it may become less likely that the interests of younger people will 
be fairly represented in our legislatures.  
 
Philippe Van Parijs (1998) notes that this problem could be addressed by 
encouraging older voters to take into account the interests of the young when 
exercising their disproportionate power. As noted in section 3.1.2, in many religions 
and pre-industrial cultures, older people are seen as trustees or stewards, with a 
responsibility to act with due regard to the young and future generations. This view 
is echoed in psychoanalyst Erik Erikson’s (1963) concept of generativity, which 
involves older people preserving or producing benefits of some kind for those who 
will outlive them (see section 4.3.10). Older citizens have a clear opportunity to act 
in a generative way when voting, as do policymakers when formulating policy which 
affects young people or has long-range impacts.  
 
However, as Francis Schrag has warned, “it is always dangerous for one class to 
have its interests entrusted to another” (1975, p.445). There is little evidence that 
older voters or policymakers act as custodians of the future, or otherwise consider 
the interests of young people who are excluded from voting.93 Older people’s policy 
views, as noted above, tend to reflect a preference for retaining and supplementing 
 
91 Another obstacle to those most affected by new social risks following deindustrialisation 
mobilising around common policy goals is that this group is so diverse, encompassing the young, the 
low-skilled, sole parents, low-income families with children, women and immigrants (Bonoli 2006, 
pp.4-5; Kitschelt & Rehm 2006, p.53). 
92 Those aged over 50 comprised 41% of Australian voters in 2012 but they are expected to be a 
majority by 2060, leading the Productivity Commission to predict that political resistance to policies 
favouring younger people is likely to increase and reform should be pursued sooner rather than later 
(2013, p.54). 
93 Wood, Griffiths & Emslie take a more optimistic view of older voters’ willingness to vote against 
their own interests, noting that in the 2019 Federal Election (at which Labor proposed to remove 
franking credit refunds which mainly benefit self-funded retirees), electorates with the highest 
franking credit refunds actually swung towards Labor on average (2019, p.51). 
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their own benefits over enhancing benefits for younger cohorts. Sonja Grover 
observes wryly that “seniors appear not to be as concerned with the interests of the 
young as one might hope” (2011, p.200). Meanwhile, policymakers in Australia are 
reluctant to risk electoral backlash by taking effective action on climate change or 
adjusting redistributive policies that favour retirees and property-owners.  
 
Van Parijs (1998) quickly abandons the possibility of older voters being entrusted to 
represent the young in favour of institutional modifications. Strategies that could be 
considered include establishing a ‘future commission’ to represent the interests of 
the young and unborn, codifying intergenerational justice in national constitutions, 
introducing quotas for youth representation in legislatures94, lowering the minimum 
voting age, weighting the votes of younger people more heavily and giving parents 
proxy votes for children (see Van Parijs 1998; Bessant 2004; Süssmuth & von 
Weizsäcker 2006, p.181; Tremmel 2006; Tremmel et al. 2015). Allowing for young 
people to have greater policy impact through their preferred modes of political 
participation would also assist. For example, policymakers could make greater use 
of direct democracy activities such as single-issue referenda, consultative forums 
and online polling. Van Parijs notes that it would be hard to assess the real effect of 
institutional changes on distributive justice across generations, but at the very least 
there would be a symbolic impact, sending a signal to young people that their 
interests matter. 
 
Young people’s relative lack of electoral clout presents a substantial barrier to 
reforming policies that exacerbate intergenerational inequality. However, it cannot 
be assumed that facilitating increased political representation and policy influence 
for young people would change the policy landscape. The fieldwork undertaken for 
the thesis found neither senior nor young participants were particularly supportive 
of reforming existing redistributive policy settings despite perceiving them to 
produce unfair and unsustainable outcomes. The key to this anomalous finding is 
 
94 Quotas for parliamentary representation do not attract much support from the public. Recent 
work on public attitudes towards democracy found introducing quotas based on gender, ethnicity or 
age were the three least popular of fifteen potential democratic reforms (Stoker et al. 2018, p.44).  
108 
 
the way underlying value orientations influence attitude sets, giving them pattern, 
structure and consistency. The next chapter examines the myriad factors shaping 






The Formation of Political Attitudes 
 
 





This chapter considers the multi-dimensional nature of people’s preferences in the 
area of redistributive policy and the many factors influencing their formation. This 
analysis will provide some important explanatory frameworks to aid in the 
interpretation of the results of the fieldwork undertaken for the thesis. In particular, 
the role of value orientations in underpinning redistributive policy attitudes will be 
considered. People’s views in this area are not usually based simply on self-interest, 
nor on a single over-arching ‘justice principle’. Rather, people tend to weigh up 
multiple considerations and attempt to resolve tensions between conflicting values 
when forming their views. 
 




As noted in Chapter 3, people’s political attitudes are sometimes characterised by 
changeability and a lack of internal consistency or coherence. This is not surprising 
given the range of influences on policy attitudes, including normative beliefs, self-
interest, sociotropic concerns, societal norms, institutional context, emotion and 
membership of particular social groups (including age groups and birth cohorts). If 
there is a conclusion to be drawn from research on how people form their attitudes 
towards redistributive policy, it is that they tend to be pulled in multiple different 




In general, public opinion is fairly supportive of the welfare state and redistribution 
from the better-off to the worse-off and has become more so over time. Trend data 
from the 2019 Australian Election Study indicate that a third of people would like 
more spending on unemployment benefits (up from 18% in 2016) and 68% would 
like more spending on age pensions (up from 53% in 2016) (Cameron & McAllister 
2019b, pp.62-64). The proportion of people who favour less taxation has fallen 
steeply from two thirds in the 1980s to just over a third three decades later, while 
the proportion who favour more spending on social services has risen from just 15% 
in the 1980s to just over a third (Cameron & McAllister 2019b, p.111). More than 
half of Australians say income and wealth should be redistributed, while the 
proportion who say it should not be has dropped from a high of 35% in 1990 to 19% 
in 2019 (Cameron & McAllister 2019b, p.112). Forty-seven percent of Australians 
say high tax makes people unwilling to work, but this is down from a high of 76% in 
1998 (Cameron & McAllister 2019b, p.113). However, when it comes to specific 
policies with identifiable winners and losers, public attitudes are revealed to be 
more nuanced. 
 
Some common cross-cultural themes emerge from investigations into people’s 
attitudes towards distributive justice. There is a high level of support for 
redistribution and social justice as abstract ideals, but when people are asked about 
specific scenarios that involve someone giving something up in order that someone 
else may gain, some of this support evaporates (Miller 1992; Kangas 1997; Gelissen 
2000, p.287). Beliefs about justice are pluralistic; people do not form their attitudes 
based on a single fundamental principle applicable in all situations (Miller 1992; 
Swift et al. 1995, p.35; Aalberg 2003, pp.42, 197; Reeskens & Van Oorschot 2013). 
People recognise merit95 and need as two primary principles of distributive justice 
but tend to place particular emphasis on merit and will focus on achievement over 
effort (Miller 1992; Swift et al. 1995, p.23; Marshall et al. 1999, pp.349, 358-359; 
Aalberg 2003, pp.42-47, 196). 
 
 
95 Merit can also be described as ‘desert’ or ‘equity’ – the degree to which people are perceived to 
have earned their gains through hard work or the application of talent, skill or knowledge. 
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Assuming there is equality of opportunity and everyone’s basic needs are met, the 
average citizen will generally tolerate a reasonably high level of inequality, and very 
few express support for pure equality of outcomes (Feldman & Zaller 1992, p.285; 
Marshall et al. 1999, p.358; Kelley & Evans 2009, p.66; Forsé 2009, pp.101-104). 
There is much more support for a floor (a guaranteed minimum income level) than 
a ceiling (a maximum upper income level) (Kluegel & Miyano 1995, p.100; Marshall 
et al. 1999, p.358; Saunders & Wong 2013, p.66). The justice principle which 
attracts most support overall is ‘bounded inequality’, a compromise distribution 
based on a combination of merit and need which maximises income after setting a 




Many people favour principles of strong reciprocity and can be described as 
conditional co-operators (or altruistic punishers) (Gintis, Bowles & Fehr 2006, p.8). 
These people want to cooperate, but they need to be able to trust that others will 
cooperate too (Rothstein 1998, p.137; Holmes & Sunstein 1999, pp.176, 207; Kahan 
2006). This group cares not just about outcomes but the fairness of the process by 
which they are achieved; procedural as well as distributive justice (Barret-Howard & 
Tyler 1986; Kumlin 2004, pp.42, 182; Gintis, Bowles & Fehr 2006, pp.18-20). 
Solidarity is undermined if people feel they are required to bear the costs of over-
consumption or under-production by others (Schmidtz 1998, p.76). 
 
The prevalence of strong reciprocity, and the influence of context on the expression 
of values, makes it very important for policy and institutions to create the kind of 
conditions where cooperation will be maximised (Deutsch 1985; Gintis, Bowles & 
Fehr 2006, p.4; Fehr & Fischbacher 2006, p.167; Ostrom 2006; Kahan 2006; Taylor-
 
96 In modern liberal democracies, most people tend to be instrumental rather than intrinsic 
egalitarians, inclined to favour redistribution primarily to relieve the deprivation of the worst-off and 
bring everyone up to a minimum standard of living. However, individuals still tend to judge their own 
situations by comparison with those around them (see Forsé 2009, p.91) and marked inequality has 
the potential to splinter a shared sense of civil community (see, for example, Margalit 1996; Scanlon 
2002; Pickett & Wilkinson 2010). 
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Gooby 2008, pp.181-82). As will be discussed, in the fieldwork conducted for the 
thesis participants were strongly supportive of redistributive policy in general and 
highly egalitarian. However, the two groups diverged in their views of the 
importance of reciprocity, with the older group placing much more emphasis on 
individuals taking responsibility for their own circumstances and having obligations 
towards the collective. 
 
The welfare state enjoys a high level of public support even in liberal welfare 
regimes with a strong emphasis on reciprocity, although this support may be 
tempered by criticism of specific aspects of its operation and outcomes (Roosma, 
Gelissen & Van Oorschot 2013) and based on pragmatism rather than an ideological 
commitment to egalitarianism (Feldman & Zaller 1992, p.298).97 The welfare state 
embodies government’s redistributive role and public approval of welfare policies is 
crucial to their legitimacy. Support for the welfare state tends to be strong and 
stable across countries, age groups, educational background and income levels 
(Gelissen 2000; Edlund 2009), suggesting its popularity extends beyond those who 
are direct beneficiaries. Steffen Mau (2003, 2004) posits generalised, 
institutionalised reciprocity as a mid-way point between self-interest and altruism 
that motivates people’s welfare state support. Citizens are happy to support the 
welfare state, even if it is an unequal exchange and they don’t expect to be net 





Meritocratic societies, including liberal welfare regimes such as the US, UK and 
Australia, are more likely to favour merit over need as a criterion for distribution 
(Aalberg 2003, p.47) and to prefer market-based distributive outcomes with 
 
97 It has been suggested that Americans’ support for social policy and the welfare state is based less 
on egalitarianism than on humanitarianism – a desire to assist specific groups in need, which justifies 




minimal state interference.98 Market distribution is seen as fairer than political 
redistribution and justice primarily means receiving what you have earned rather 
than what you need. Robert Lane (1986) argues that the market has a number of 
advantages over the polity when it comes to citizens’ perceptions of the way goods 
are allocated. The market distribution comes first, and then the polity intervenes to 
redistribute, which usually involves taking away what people see as rightfully theirs. 
The market is viewed as an impersonal, neutral allocator, following natural rather 
than political laws. It delivers goods that are preferred over collective goods which 
people do not value as highly (at least until they have to go without them). Finally, 
unlike market justice, political justice forces people to think about the claims of 
others rather than just their own. 
 
This creates a problem for justice across generations as the young have not yet had 
an opportunity to demonstrate that they ‘deserve’ their share of society’s 
resources. A related dimension is whether people see individuals as responsible for 
their own success, or as swept along by forces outside their control. Hard work may 
be seen as a guarantee of reward, or more accurately as a necessary but insufficient 
condition for reward.99 The corollary of the former view is that the unrewarded 
have not put in enough effort. People in meritocratic societies are inclined to 
attribute poverty to individual ‘blame’ (such as laziness) more than individual ‘fate’ 
(bad luck), social ‘blame’ (social actors creating conditions that cause poverty) or 
social ‘fate’ (uncontrollable changes in external circumstances) (Van Oorschot & 
Halman 2000). 
 
The extent to which people deserve rewards on the basis of innate skills and 
abilities over which they have no control is also at issue. The difference between 
 
98 There is some evidence that economic development reduces tolerance for inequality, or at least 
makes people more likely to express disapproval of inequality, but they remain accepting of very 
different distributive outcomes based on reward for differing education levels and work 
performance (see Kelley & Evans 2009, p.66). 
99 Acknowledging that hard work does not guarantee reward may discourage effort and act as a 
reminder that the successful are not necessarily more deserving than others. Downplaying the role 
of luck in delivering material rewards also encourages people to feel entitled to retain more of their 
income, making taxation seem like forcible confiscation of what is rightfully theirs (Frank 2016, p.96). 
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chance and choice quickly becomes blurred (see Dworkin 2000, pp.287-91). It is 
difficult to distinguish between wealth that arises arbitrarily and wealth that 
represents fair reward for application – between manna that has fallen from the sky 
and manna that has been mixed with effort (Parfit 2002, pp.91-92). Public opinion 
in liberal welfare regimes tends to emphasise moral hazard: if support is too readily 
available and/or too generous there are no incentives for people to work hard (or at 
all) and take the risks required to generate innovation and economic growth.100 
Income support programs for the poor and unemployed in particular do not sit well 
with the focus on merit and the view that we are each responsible for our own 
outcomes (Larsen 2006, pp.55, 92). Citizens in liberal regimes may support high 
levels of spending in social policy areas such as health and education, but they are 
much less likely to support government intervention to mitigate labour market risks 
and outcomes (Wilson, Meagher & Hermes 2012b, pp.121-22; Jensen 2014). 
 
Meritocracy can readily function as a way of legitimising inequality and inhibiting 
any impetus for change. If a society is perceived as highly meritocratic, people are 
more likely to believe that those who are better off deserve their higher status as a 
result of being worthier than others (through having superior talents and/or 
working harder). Concomitantly, those who are worse off are seen to deserve their 
lower status, presumably as a result of being less worthy. Citizens of highly 
meritocratic societies are more likely to support distribution according to 
meritocratic principles (merit over need), regardless of their own position in the 
social structure (Kunovich & Slomczynski 2007; Page & Goldstein 2016). A recent 
qualitative-led study found that young Australians from a range of socioeconomic 
backgrounds had internalised the prevailing meritocratic ‘doxa’ that the world was 
a fair place where hard work and good choices would be rewarded (Donovan 2017). 
 
Australia scores highly on both degree of meritocracy and support for meritocratic 
distribution (resource distribution largely based on superior talent or effort). It is 
 
100 An extension of this idea is the neo-liberal view that not only does state interventionism permit 
moral degeneracy, it creates it by producing dependency and undermining citizens’ moral character 
(Davis 2014, p.37). 
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also a residual welfare state with highly visible income taxes, which Shaun Wilson 
(2006) suggests contributes to a significant level of tax resistance (a preference for 
lower taxation even to the detriment of public service provision). In the 2005 
Australian Social Attitudes Survey (AuSSA), 82% of Australians thought income 
inequality was too high but only 39% supported redistribution from the better-off 
to the worse-off (Wilson & Meagher 2007, p.274).101 Australian Government policy 
at the time appears to have been in line with public opinion: the extent of 
redistribution from high to low income earners declined between 1994 and 2004 
(Meagher & Wilson 2008). Question wording can make a significant difference to 
people’s responses: when people are asked more specific questions about 
inequality which incorporate doing something about it, they are less likely to say 




Attitudes towards the welfare state can be broken down into broad ideological 
support, views on specific programs, and satisfaction with the way these programs 
operate in practice (Kumlin 2007b, p.363). High levels of support for the welfare 
state in general mask significant differences in support for individual programs. The 
social safety net cushions some groups better than others: some forms of benefit 
are more accessible, more generous and less conditional on reciprocal obligations 
(Van Oorschot 2008, p.268). Public attitudes towards who should receive help, how 
much and under what conditions are influenced by an almost automatic 
‘deservingness heuristic’ (Petersen et al. 2011). Wim Van Oorschot (2000) identifies 
five deservingness criteria affecting how worthy people think welfare beneficiaries 
are of support: 
 
 
101 Data from the British Social Attitudes survey reflect a similar gap (Taylor-Gooby 2005; Orton & 
Rowlingson 2007; Taylor, Saunders & Toomse-Smith 2017, p.16). 
102 Ian McAllister reports an overall increase in collectivist orientation, including support for social 
spending and income redistribution, among Australians since the 1980s (2011, pp.196-98), but this 
rise followed a nadir in the 1970s, when people felt the Whitlam government had gone too far and 
hardened their views accordingly.  
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• Having limited control over their situation. 
• A high degree of neediness. 
• Proximity or closeness to the rest of society (are they like us?). 
• Attitude – how docile, compliant and grateful they are. 
• Reciprocity – the degree to which they have earned support. 
 
The aged score highly on these criteria, particularly compared to young unemployed 
people. Van Oorschot (2006; 2008) finds that a deservingness ranking of the aged, 
the sick and disabled, the unemployed and finally immigrants is common across 
countries, although there can also be a cultural dimension (Van Oorschot & 
Meuleman 2014, p.250). Australians’ views towards people who are perceived as 
choosing not to work are relatively harsh by international standards (Matheson & 
Wearing 1999; Tony & Matheson 2000; Kangas 2003; Miller & Orchard 2014; 
Schofield & Butterworth 2015). Support for keeping unemployment benefits low 
and for the expansion of paternalistic welfare103 is largely bipartisan, and recent 
Australian Government policy has reflected public opinion in this area (Spies-
Butcher 2014a, Spies-Butcher 2014b).104 Welfare paternalism or conditionality 
assumes that requiring support is at least partly attributable to intrinsic rather than 
external or structural factors, and that people have some choice about whether to 
be reliant on benefits; it is also intended to modify recipients’ values and behaviour 
(Carney 2015, pp.345-49). 
 
In Australia, nearly all welfare benefits, including the Age Pension, are subject to 
means-testing and this model of targeting benefits at needy groups is popular with 
the public (Wilson, Spies-Butcher & Stebbing 2009). However, analysis of data from 
17 countries, including Australia, concluded that high levels of targeting undermine 
 
103 Paternalistic welfare refers to the ‘mutual obligation’ requirements and conditions (such as 
participating in job search and training activities or work programs) that some welfare beneficiaries 
must satisfy to retain their benefits.  
104 Many groups have advocated for an increase to Newstart to reduce the financial stress on job-
seekers and ensure they have an acceptable standard of living (see Price Waterhouse Coopers 2013, 
pp.12, 22; Business Council of Australia 2013, p.87; Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee 
2014; Morris & Wilson 2014; Phillips, Webster & Gray 2018). This advocacy intensified during 2019 
and public support increased sharply, but people remain more than twice as likely to want the 
Pension to go up as Newstart (Cameron & McAllister 2019b, pp.62-64). 
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support for welfare state programs (Jordan 2013). Recent modelling suggests that 
current welfare settings need to be adjusted to optimise poverty minimisation 
within the existing budget; a substantial increase to Newstart (funded by reductions 
to either the Age Pension or family payments depending on the poverty measure 
used) is the clearest change required (Phillips, Webster & Gray 2018, p.22). 
 
If benefit conditionality is embedded in a discourse of contractual reciprocity and a 
balance between rights and responsibilities, represented as the natural moral order 
(Hamilton 2014), people who have reached a certain age are exempt from this 
‘social contract’: they have only rights, not responsibilities (presumably because 
they are seen to have already discharged them). They are implicitly assumed to 
have made useful contributions to society and earned the right to public support in 
return (Svallfors 2008, p.383). Senior citizens are the ultimate deservers of welfare – 
they have earned it, their need is often pressing and they are not to blame for 
getting old and being unable to work. As Pampel and Williamson have noted, “The 
aged have normative legitimacy to their claims on the welfare state that is denied 
to most other groups” (1989, p.167). It has been suggested that continued broad 
support for seniors’ claims on welfare spending, as it becomes evident that the 
same benefits will not be available for those who are currently young, will depend 
on compassion arising from the stereotype of older people as “helpless and needy” 
(Huddy, Jones & Chard 2001, p.468). 
 
However, public attitudes towards the neediness and deservingness of different 
groups of welfare beneficiaries have not necessarily kept pace with social and 
economic change. This was evident in the fieldwork for the thesis, with participants 
showing little inclination to update their attitudes or question long-standing social 
norms in line with changing conditions. People turning 65 today are less likely to be 
as needy as over-65s were when pension schemes were first introduced: on average 
they are healthier, have more years of life ahead of them, and are less likely to have 
spent their working lives in manual labour. Meanwhile, the tendency to judge non-
aged welfare recipients as actual or potential exploiters of public generosity 
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continues despite growing recognition that structural inequalities can cause long-
term unemployment and poverty.105 
 
People receiving income support while caring for young children appear to score 
relatively highly on the deservingness criteria, however public views toward single 
mothers106 are often negative.107 So-called ‘welfare queens’ are accused of 
producing children to access benefits - the need for support is attributed to the 
availability of support (see Handler & Hasenfeld 2006). Another factor underlying 
some people’s negative attitudes towards single mothers may be that social 
security benefits allow women to establish autonomous households, independent 
of male control (Goodin 1998, p.124). There is also a general consensus that while 
supporting the aged is a collective duty, supporting children is largely a private one, 
possibly because having children is seen as a personal choice, while we must all 
grow old (Svallfors 2008, p.384). This ignores the fact that everyone in society reaps 
the return on investment in children (Esping-Andersen 2002, p.62; Fineman 
2004).108 
 
4.1.5 Psychological biases 
 
People may see their world as fair and just because that is what they want to see. 
The just world hypothesis suggests that we are psychologically more comfortable 
believing the world is fair and people get what they deserve, rather than outcomes 
being arbitrary or unjust (Lerner 1980). Despite the pernicious effects this has for 
victims of misfortune or injustice, who are blamed for their own fates, faith in the 
idea that everyone can improve their circumstances through their own efforts – pull 
 
105 People are as likely to attribute working age neediness to insufficient ability or effort and ‘loose 
morals and drunkenness’, as to failure of the economic system or unequal opportunity (Mau 2003, 
p.121). 
106 Moral judgement is usually restricted to the single mother rather than the less common single 
father. 
107 Public opinion commonly places single parents close to par with the unemployed in terms of 
perceived deservingness, although attitudes may be softened when their role as child carers is 
emphasised (see Taylor-Gooby 2005, p.15; Larsen 2006, p.47). 
108 Not everyone sees children as a collective benefit. Marcel Wissenburg (2011) argues that future 
people are an ‘optional burden’ from a societal point of view, and those who choose to procreate 
must take full responsibility for meeting all the claims of their children across their lifetimes. 
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themselves up by their bootstraps - remains remarkably resilient in the US in 
particular (see Hochschild 1995). People may be comfortable with favourable 
treatment for the rich because they believe they themselves have a reasonable 
chance of one day joining their ranks, if only they try hard enough; or worse, that 
they are not worthy of such treatment because of innate failings. 
 
Related psychological biases further reinforce people’s endorsement of inequitable 
distributions. System justification theory suggests that people prefer existing social 
arrangements even when alternative arrangements may be fairer and/or more 
personally beneficial (Jost, Burgess & Mosso 2001; Jost, Banaji & Nosek 2004; Van 
der Toorn et al. 2015).109 Empirical evidence from the US and Europe suggests that, 
counter-intuitively, higher levels of inequality are associated with lower levels of 
public support for redistribution across all social classes (Kelly & Enns 2010; Jæger 
2013; Luttig 2013). System justification can have a palliative effect, addressing 
existential needs for security and stability by making people feel comfortable with a 
status quo that may be very hard to change, and therefore more easily accepted 
than resisted (Jost & Hunyady 2003; Jost 2017).110 
 
Meanwhile, the cognitive bias described as ‘fundamental attribution error’ makes 
us more likely to see what happens to people (including ourselves) as resulting from 
personal characteristics or behaviour rather than extrinsic causes (Lane 1962, p.79; 
Kluegel et al. 1995, p.186; Yzerbyt & Rogier 2001, pp.107-109). This can give people 
a greater sense of control over their lives because problems arising from intrinsic 
causes may appear easier to address than broader systemic issues or the vagaries of 
fate. People also seek to avoid cognitive dissonance by embracing simple, 
consistent explanations of the world, including seeing people and groups in 
stereotypical terms (see Crandall & Beasley 2001, p.79). Politically conservative and 
right-wing attitudes have been linked to a range of personality and psychological 
variables, including death anxiety, fear of threat and loss, aversion to ambiguity and 
 
109 Empirical evidence that disadvantaged groups are more likely than advantaged groups to see 
existing inequalities as fair is mixed at best (see, for example, Caricati 2017). 
110 However, this effect may be short-lived, with negative psychological effects in the longer-term 
(Harding & Sibley 2013). 
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uncertainty, high need for order and closure, and low openness to experience111 
(see, for example, Jost et al. 2003; Napier & Jost 2008; Jost, Nosek & Gosling 2008; 
Cornelis et al. 2009). Sometimes support for what already is arises simply from habit 
or expediency (Zelditch 2001, p.44). 
 
4.2 The complexity of attitude formation 
 
Not only are there multiple dimensions to redistributive policy attitudes, the 
process by which they are formed is complex and multi-faceted. It involves the 
interaction of demand-side factors (values and socio-cultural context), intermediary 
influences (political communication) and supply-side factors (institutional settings, 
government policy performances) (see Norris 2011). Political socialisation and social 
networks influence attitude formation in direct and indirect ways (Zuckerman 2005; 
Huckfeldt, Johnson & Sprague 2005; Levine 2005). Welfare policy attitudes are 
subject to a range of inter-related influences: socio-demographic characteristics and 
cleavages, values and orientations, risks and resources, institutional frameworks, 
predispositions and evaluation of the policy outcomes (Svallfors 2007a, pp.9-13; 
Svallfors 2012). Together these factors create a ‘moral economy’ which embodies 
ideas about reciprocity, obligation and responsibility (Svallfors 2007a, p.11; Svallfors 
2007c, p.267; Oskarson 2007, p.120). 
 
4.2.1 Self-interest and rational choice 
 
To the extent that attitude formation is systematically associated with particular 
demographic or other individual characteristics, this does not necessarily indicate 
people are governed by self-interest. The link between demographic variables and 
what best serves someone’s individual interest is often unclear and the role of self-
interest in attitude formation is sometimes overstated (Sears & Funk 1991). Self-
interest and societal interests may coincide and it is impossible to tell which forms 
 
111 The higher prevalence of at least some of these factors among the economically disadvantaged 
may help explain why people in this group sometimes vote for conservative and right-wing parties 
against their economic self-interest (see Frank 2004; Napier & Jost 2008). 
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the basis for someone’s attitudes (Funk 2000, p.41). It can be hard to work out 
exactly what is in one’s self-interest and few people are likely to do so in complex 
policy areas (Lau & Heldman 2009, pp. 524, 535). The strongest self-interest 
influences appear in attitudes towards taxation and related economic issues - the 
‘hip-pocket effect’ – and other cases where the personal stakes are high, concrete 
and visible (Sears & Funk 1991; Kumlin 2004, pp.87-89; Cusack, Iversen & Rehm 
2006). A related influence on attitudes is personal experience of economic 
insecurity, which tends to increase support for redistribution and policies that 
mitigate the effects of economic risk (Margalit 2013; Hacker, Rehm & Schlesinger 
2013; Owens & Pedulla 2014; Naumann, Buss & Bähr 2016; cf. Mughan 2007). 
Analysis of people’s motivations for seeing a particular political issue as important 
has found that a sense of civic duty, affective response and personal awareness of 
the issue are more influential than self-interest or peer influence (McCombs 
1999).112 
 
While the power of self-interest as a predictor of attitudes and behaviour may be 
overstated, the idea of its potency can take on a life of its own: “the ideology of 
self-interest, widely celebrated in individualistic cultures, functions as a powerful 
self-fulfilling force” (Miller 1999, p.1059; see also Miller & Ratner 1998). Institutions 
are designed on the assumption that self-interest is a dominant motivation, which 
in turn fosters self-interested behaviour. The norm of self-interest can make people 
feel it is inappropriate to act in accordance with other motivations (Ratner & Miller 
2001). They assume that without a vested interest, an issue is none of their business 
and they may even be negatively judged for interfering. 
 
4.2.2 Irrational choice and emotion 
 
Economics and rational choice theory have tended to conflate rationality and self-
interest, but it can be rational to behave contrary to one’s own self-interest. 
Sometimes rational people make decisions on the basis of what is good for others 
 
112 Some significant age differences were found in this research: the influence of emotion and peers 
increased with age, as did self-interest until middle age. 
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or the sort of society they would like to live in (Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 2002, 
pp.16-17; Taylor-Gooby 2008). Citizens tend to distinguish between private and 
public concerns and see both as relevant when considering policy options (Funk 
2000). Attitudes are at least partly informed by considerations related to social 
justice and fairness (Kaase & Newton 1995, p.76; Kumlin 2004, pp.37-38, 144; Van 
Oorschot et al. 2012). 
 
Psychology also finds repeated evidence of humans thinking and behaving 
irrationally (Sears & Funk 1991, p.4). Linguist and philosopher George Lakoff warns 
against clinging to an out-dated view of reason as conscious, objective, interest-
based, value-neutral and logical (Lakoff 2009). People are swayed, often 
unconsciously, by emotion and subjectivity, making them highly susceptible to 
being influenced by language, narrative and the way issues are framed. Social 
emotions, such as compassion for the needy and disdain for opportunists, have a 
more powerful influence on people’s attitudes than political ideology (Petersen et 
al. 2012). 
 
Fully informed rational choice is rarely even possible: “political choices are made 
under conditions of radical cognitive indeterminacy” (Elster 1989, p.181) and beliefs 
can be rational without being true (Elster 1983, p.16). People’s emotional or ‘gut 
feeling’ response to politics (often sub-conscious) is a more powerful determinant 
of attitudes and behaviour than rational reasoning based on interests (Westen 
2008). Feelings of anxiety and uncertainty can overcome habitual responses, 
activating rationality and making people more open to considering alternative 
policy options (Marcus 2002). 
 
Anger is a common response to perceived injustice and has been described as the 
defining political emotion (see Lyman 2004; Henderson 2008; Duffy 2017). Feelings 
of anger normally require a target; an agent identified as to blame for the unjust 
situation and responsible for fixing it (see Smith & Ellsworth 1985; Smith & Lazarus 
1993; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose 1996; Javeline 2003; Carver & Harmon-Jones 
2009; Seip, Dijk & Rotteveel 2014). Anger may always be latent in politics, even 
123 
 
during times of stability; it can be driven by economic inequality and operate as a 
force for political mobilisation under the right conditions (Ost 2004). Simon 
Thompson (2006) suggests that anger plays a consciousness-raising role: the fact of 
an injustice reveals itself through the feelings of anger it produces.  
 
4.2.3 Institutional influences 
 
Bo Rothstein (1998) suggests that political institutions have a significant influence 
on the norms that develop in different societies, including shaping what people 
think the state should do. Institutions are an expression of a society’s normative 
values, but also shapers of those values, including what people see as appropriate 
welfare state outcomes (Mau 2003). The salience of particular issues, and the effect 
of policy feedback on how people view these issues, is filtered through the media 
and elite opinion, which present reality in politically constructed ways (Kumlin 
2014a, p.193). When it comes to translating attitudes into behaviours, institutional 
factors are key. As Ronald Inglehart has observed, “behavior requires both motive 
and opportunity” (Inglehart 1997, p.52). People must have options for articulating 
their opinions, whether through voting or other forms of political participation, and 
sometimes an organising force such as a political party or lobby group will need to 
generate these options (Svallfors 2007a, p.13; Edlund 2007, pp.44-45). 
 
Institutions are the media through which individuals are connected to the collective 
and the political context (Conover & Searing 2002, p.105). Policy feedback defines 
political communities and citizenship, incentivises and facilitates political 
engagement, and structures public perceptions of societal problems and 
government action. The institutional approach places some emphasis on Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of liberal, conservative and social democratic 
welfare regimes, which suggests different institutional settings are aligned with 
different sets of welfare values. Liberal regimes such as Australia tend to have lower 
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levels of state intervention, and are generally characterised by high residualism, low 
decommodification113 and high stratification. 
 
Many studies have tested the idea that the public’s support for government transfer 
programs varies by welfare regime type, hypothesising that people in liberal 
regimes will be less likely to support extensive, universal transfer programs, but 
empirical evidence has been mixed. Some studies have found little evidence that 
any relationship between regime type and welfare state support exists (Papadakis & 
Bean 1993; Bean & Papadakis 1998; Lapinski et al. 1998; Bonoli 2000; Gelissen 
2000, pp.290, 298; Aalberg 2003: p.201; Taylor-Gooby 2004; Garfinkel et al. 2006; 
Jæger 2006b; Gelissen 2008). Others find some (often qualified) evidence that there 
are lower levels of support for redistribution and benefit programs in liberal 
regimes (Svallfors 1997; Arts & Gelissen 2001; Andreß & Heien 2001; Linos & West 
2003; Kangas 2003; Larsen 2006; Sabbagh & Vanhuysse 2006; Dallinger 2010). The 
broader social and economic context, including factors such as unemployment 
rates, job security and economic growth, can also affect how people think about 
redistributive policies (Blekesaune & Quadagno 2003; Schwander & Häusermann 
2013; Jæger 2013; Hacker, Rehm & Schlesinger 2013). 
 
Evidence that public attitudes are influenced by contextual and institutional factors 
also comes from research finding that people in eastern Germany whose formative 
years were post-1989 had very different attitudes towards government 
responsibilities than their elders (but similar to people in western Germany) 
(Svallfors 2010). Institutional effects on attitudes may vary by policy domain and are 
particularly strong in relation to age pensions (Reeskens and van Oorschot 2013) 
and beneficiary deservingness (Larsen 2006). Policies and institutions may 
encourage people to be self-interested and narrow-minded, or they may foster 
tolerance, compassion and concern for others and the collective good (Kumlin & 
Rothstein 2005; Stolle 2007, p.666). Citizens’ direct personal experiences with 
 
113 Decommodification refers to the degree to which public benefits mitigate individual dependence 
on the market for a livelihood. 
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institutions, particularly welfare state institutions, shape their policy opinions and 
more general political orientations (Kumlin 2004).114 
 
4.2.4 Path dependence and habituation 
 
A defining feature of institutions is their stability, making them a powerful driver of 
path dependence in welfare states (Goodin 1996; Pierson 2004). Policies are often 
more malleable than other types of institution but can still lock in patterns of 
behaviour that make reform challenging. Pensions and retirement income programs 
are especially subject to ‘lock-in effects’ – people have based their choices over a 
long period of time on existing policy settings, and if these are changed there may 
be electoral backlash (Pierson 1993, p.610). Positive feedback effects, including 
beneficiaries of current policy settings acting to buttress and preserve them, make 
switching to alternative settings increasingly difficult and costly (Pierson 2004, 
pp.18-20, 41). 
 
Paul Pierson (2004) notes that institutional and policy inertia are exacerbated by the 
tendency of political actors to have short time horizons and a resulting lack of 
attention to long-term, cumulative outcomes; social scientists analysing patterns of 
institutional development likewise pay too little attention to the longue durée. 
Others have suggested that polarisation in electorates and legislatures makes it 
harder to find common ground, contributing to policy gridlock and reducing 
governmental capacity to respond to changing social and economic conditions 
(McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2006). Loss aversion also creates a barrier to policy 
change as people feel a reduction of benefits more acutely than an equivalent gain; 
this asymmetry means politicians are more likely to be blame-avoiding than credit-
claiming (Weaver 1986). 
 
114 Welfare recipients (other than age pensioners) often get the message that they are second-class 
citizens – disempowered, stigmatised, subjected to demanding mutual obligation tests, and forced 
into entanglement with Kafkaesque bureaucratic labyrinths (see Soss 1999). A recent Anglicare 
report examined how income support recipients and their advocates experience interacting with 
Centrelink, describing long call waits and high rates of disconnection, hostile service centre 





The price to be paid for institutional stability is rigidity and an inability to adapt to 
changing circumstances (Offe 1996, p.206; Esping-Andersen 1999, pp.4, 97, 124; 
Pierson 2004). Institutional reform is only likely to succeed under ideal conditions, 
and after existing institutions have broken down and lost legitimacy. Even then, 
conscious, purposeful institutional (re)design faces significant challenges and often 
produces unintended consequences.115 Attempts at intentional design take place in 
the shadow of what has come before – there is no tabula rasa, and institutions 
rooted in the past or tried-and-tested elsewhere tend to gain acceptance more 
readily (Offe 1996). As Pierson notes, “Actors find that the dead weight of previous 
institutional choices often seriously limits their room to manoeuvre” (2004, p.152). 
Welfare states develop their own constituencies (including beneficiaries and 
administering bureaucrats) over time, making reform even harder as people fight to 
retain their entitlements (Pierson 1993; Pierson 1996; Pierson 2004; Galasso 2006, 
p.56; Brooks & Manza 2007, p.23). 
 
People tend to adapt their political preferences through habituation, resignation, 
and what they perceive to be possible. An existing state of affairs is likely to become 
accepted and people will adapt their view of fairness accordingly – what is 
eventually turns into what should be (Pierson 1996; Marshall et al. 1999, pp.349-51; 
Gelissen 2001, p.498; Kohli 2011, p.471). This works in both directions: day-to-day 
exposure to solidaristic norms makes people more likely to support solidarity (Arts 
& Gelissen 2001, p.288), while people express greater tolerance of inequality when 
they are accustomed to seeing it around them (Austen 2002).116 As with the ‘just 
world’ effect discussed earlier, people have a need to believe that the 
arrangements in place are fair (Aalberg 2003, p.40), and perceptions can be more 
important than reality (Kangas 2003, pp.729, 739). 
 
115 Claus Offe (1996, p.214) notes that it can fall victim to what Jon Elster has described as 
‘hyperrationality’ – willing what cannot be willed (Elster 1983, p.56; Elster 1989, p.17); see also 
Heazle (2010) on the uncertainty inherent in the policymaking process and its outcomes. 
116 Perceiving inequality as excessive can sometimes make people more supportive of redistribution, 
although satiation eventually sets in and tamps demand for further redistribution; people also 
appear less concerned about the rising tide lifting some boats more than others as long as it is lifting 




4.2.5 Government Performance 
 
Assessments of government performance can affect people’s attitudes, even 
shifting the ideological lenses, once assumed to be highly stable, through which 
people view politics (Kumlin 2006). Poor government performance can result, not 
just in citizens punishing the incumbent government, but also in developing a more 
generalised distrust of politicians, institutions and democracy itself, especially when 
lines of accountability are unclear (such as in the case of federal systems, bicameral 
parliaments, and areas of high policy complexity) (Kumlin 2007a, p.88; Oskarson 
2007; Kumlin 2014a, p.193). This is particularly concerning if citizens have limited 
knowledge and information about the performance of government and welfare 
state programs and are making ill-informed judgements (Kumlin 2014b, p.304). 
 
It is hard for governments to please everyone (or anyone) when it comes to welfare 
policies. Redistribution creates losers who are usually unhappy with the situation, 
and winners who aren’t much happier because they often still feel like losers in the 
overall scheme of things. Program beneficiaries don’t think their benefits are 
generous enough; taxpayers think spending on benefits is too high. The state can’t 
win and it is even hard to predict how publics will react if they are unhappy with 
program outcomes. The ‘undermined welfare state’ hypothesis predicts that poor 
outcomes will reduce public support for any further spending, while the ‘overloaded 
welfare state’ hypothesis predicts that poor outcomes will lead to calls for more 
spending (Kumlin 2007a). There are also conflicting hypotheses about the effect of 
program size on public opinion. The visible costs hypothesis suggests that citizens 
become less satisfied as programs become larger and more expensive, while the 
visible interests hypothesis posits that program legitimacy is enhanced as more 





4.3 Normative beliefs and values 
 
4.3.1 Changing value paradigms 
 
Fundamental values such as equality, freedom, security, tradition and individual 
responsibility exert a direct influence on political attitudes and behaviour, in 
addition to operating as a filter through which other influences act. Values are 
transcendental, applying in a range of different contexts, while attitudes relate to a 
specific object or situation. Sometimes certain values tend to be grouped together 
to form over-arching belief systems or value orientations. For example, people who 
prize security often also favour tradition, conformity and authority. Value 
orientations serve various functional purposes - cognitive, emotional, social, 
political - for individuals (Jost, Federico & Napier 2009). They tend to be ‘looser’, 
less formal and less structured than political ideologies. 
 
A key element of Philip Converse’s critique of public opinion, discussed in the 
previous chapter, was most people’s apparent lack of a comprehensive and 
internally coherent belief system. They appeared to hold views that ‘didn’t go 
together’; their underlying values seemed to conflict with each other. It turned out 
that many people didn’t fall neatly into the left/right or progressive/conservative 
categories that political theorists used and political parties aligned themselves with. 
This made citizens’ political views and behaviour inconveniently harder to explain 
and predict. 
 
However, just because most people don’t adhere rigidly to a formal ideological 
position doesn’t indicate they have no meaningful, over-arching belief systems.117 
Value orientations can substitute for ideology to allow the average citizen to form 
policy attitudes characterised by some degree of coherence, facilitating the exercise 
of meaningful democratic citizenship (Goren 2004; Keele & Wolak 2006). Values 
 
117 Voting along party lines requires people to opt for a particular ‘package’ of ideologically-inflected 
policies even if they don’t internalise it. 
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tend to be more influential than ideology for all but the most politically 
sophisticated and can be powerful enough to disrupt usually stable partisan 
identification (Keele & Wolak 2006; cf. Goren 2005). Political sophistication is not 
necessary for people to use domain-specific beliefs and values to produce 
meaningful policy preferences (Goren 2004). 
 
Value orientations offer a more flexible way of understanding why people form 
particular attitudes than ideology. If the traditional ideological frameworks were 
ever a realistic reflection of most people’s political thinking, social and economic 
change means they are no longer. They also have limitations when applied in cross-
cultural contexts. New ways of thinking about the patterns underlying political 
attitudes and behaviour are required. The postmaterialism values paradigm 
associated with Ronald Inglehart is of particular interest as it encompasses the 
impact of socioeconomic change on attitudes, and differences in thinking between 
young and older people. Several other theoretical approaches to value orientations 




Milton Rokeach (1973) conducted empirical work that found significant value 
differences between rich and poor and also between age groups, although value 
change appeared to take place throughout life. Rokeach concluded that the ‘big 
two’ values – equality and freedom – largely explained people’s political views.118 
Equality and proportionality (of reward) have been proposed as the two poles of a 
bi-dimensional value framework informing people’s judgements about distributive 
justice (Rasinski 1987).119 Equality of opportunity and the work ethic have been 
identified as core values informing policy preferences and political evaluations in 
the US (Feldman 1988). Later work has added social order and economic security as 
key values and found that individuals’ attitudes vary in a patterned and coherent 
 
118 Attitudes towards welfare state policies can be particularly useful in signalling where people strike 
the balance between equality and freedom (Kumlin 2007b, p.362). 
119 Bi-dimensional or oppositional value frameworks imply that it may be difficult to reach social 
consensus on questions of fairness and justice.  
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way according to the priority they assign to these values (Jacoby 2006; Swedlow & 
Wyckoff 2009). 
 
‘Materialism’, conceived as the degree to which people see material possessions as 
important to achieving their goals, can be considered a value (Fournier & Richins 
1991), but it is more usefully conceptualised in a broader sense as a set of related 
values: a value orientation. This broader conception can take in a range of material 
concerns, including availability and security of employment, individual economic 
aspirations, living standards, a preference for unregulated market outcomes, 
economic growth, tolerance for risk, debt and credit, and consumption of goods and 
services. The materialist values paradigm dominated in industrial society through to 
the post-war economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s. Ronald Inglehart’s 
postmaterialist paradigm, developed alongside the economic shifts of the 1970s, 





Inglehart (1990) proposed that cohorts growing up in conditions of prosperity and 
economic security were more likely to have a reduced focus on material conditions 
and economic aspirations and to attach greater importance to personal wellbeing, 
quality of life and individual autonomy. Postmaterialism is associated with youth, 
being highly educated, social progressivism and tolerance of diversity. 
Postmaterialists’ education and socialisation are likely to have produced a ‘cognitive 
mobilisation’ effect which improves their skills in accessing and processing political 
information. Postmaterialist values are associated with lower voter turnout and 




120 This contrasts with grievance explanations of political activism, which posit that material 
deprivation is a primary factor in motivating individuals to protest. 
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On Inglehart’s thesis, socialisation in early life is the key to people’s political 
preferences, which then remain relatively stable over the lifecourse. The birth 
cohort effect (the time in which people come of age shapes their long-term values, 
attitudes and behaviour) is emphasised over the age group effect (people’s political 
thinking and behaviour changes over time as they grow older). Analysing data from 
the World Values Survey across several dozen countries from the 1970s to the early 
1990s, Inglehart (1997) finds the most significant differences between the value 
orientations of old and young in countries that have experienced rapid economic 
growth and argues that materialist/postmaterialist values have taken over from 
socioeconomic status as a key political cleavage. In subsequent work, the rise of the 
postmaterialist value orientation is examined as a key element of the human 
development process, underpinned by an ethos of choice and individual autonomy 
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Socioeconomic modernisation removes external 
constraints on freedom, which is usually followed by a cultural shift towards 
postmaterialist and self-expression values and is strongly associated with 
democratisation (democratic institutions being best suited to supporting liberty and 
human rights).121 
 
The evidence for postmaterialism remains mixed. Analysis of data on the values of 
American youth in the 1970s and 1980s found a steady increase in private 
materialism and a sharp decline in self-fulfilment goals, with no evidence of this 
being driven by feelings of economic insecurity (Easterlin & Crimmins 1991). Other 
work has found that level of education is the most significant factor affecting the 
relationship between year of birth and postmaterial values, with material security 
or affluence during formative years having little effect (De Graaf & Evans 1996). 
These authors suggested that a postmaterial orientation is more strongly aligned 
with progressive liberal values such as tolerance and political equality than with 
economic values, and that it is quite possible to emphasise the former while still 
holding materialistic beliefs. 
 
121 Inglehart has acknowledged, however, that modernisation is not entirely deterministic and does 
not follow an identical trajectory in every society, with cultural contexts and traditions continuing to 




Other studies conclude although individuals can respond to Inglehart’s 
postmaterialism index in meaningful ways that reflect their issue priorities, there is 
really no underlying materialism/postmaterialism value paradigm (Davis, Dowley & 
Silver 1999; Davis & Davenport 1999). The index has been characterised as flawed, 
with the increase in postmaterialism since the 1980s amounting to a measurement 
artefact (Clarke et al. 1999; see also Macintosh 1998). Cross-cultural research on 
young people’s value orientations suggests that rather than convergence on 
postmaterialist values across the advanced industrial countries, local and national 
cultures continue to play a role in shaping outlooks (Karvonen et al. 2012). 
 
An analysis of the influence of political values on voting behaviour in the US 
between 1972 to 1992 data found only qualified support for the postmaterialist 
thesis (Carmines & Layman 1997), as did a later study using data from 1984 to 2008 
(Shafer & Spady 2014). The salience of cultural (rather than economic) issues had 
substantially increased during this period but there was no clear link between these 
issues and postmaterial values. The later study found that the least-educated 
continued to be driven by economic values, while others, including African 
Americans, were influenced by group identification more than values. People are 
influenced by competing group memberships - class might push them one way, 
while race or gender or age pulls them in another. Harold Wilensky has argued that 
while citizens in rich democracies have value sets characterised by ambivalence and 
contradiction, traditional concerns around material security remain dominant, and 
there is little evidence of a cohort-based sea change in basic values (2002, pp.192-
96, 677). 
 
4.3.4 Postmaterialism today 
 
A recent study found that material values (conceived as viewing possessions as 
indicative of success, being central to life and conveying happiness) had only a 
moderate, and nuanced, influence on political orientations, but materialism was 
actually strongest among the young (Friesen & Hibbing 2016). It has been suggested 
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that in Europe in particular, austerity policy following the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008 is associated with a resurgence of material concerns among young people (see 
Grasso 2018, p.190). Some researchers have found evidence that, contrary to what 
the postmaterialism paradigm would predict, young people have lower levels of 
community feeling, less concern for others and are more interested in intrinsic than 
extrinsic goals compared to previous generations (see, for example, Twenge 
Campbell & Freeman 2012). Others argue that claims of youthful narcissism are 
overstated and indicative of ‘youth of today’ stereotyping (Arnett 2013). 
 
In place of traditional concerns about economic security, a new kind of 
individualistic, consumption-oriented materialism may have developed, particularly 
among the young (Hellevik 1993; Hellevik 2002; Rahn & Transue 1998). Christian 
Welzel argues that postmaterialist values tend to be overlaid on material concerns, 
rather than the latter falling away once basic survival needs are met. He suggests 
that the key component of the postmaterialist orientation is its focus on self-
expressive and emancipative liberal aspirations, which are largely driven by the rise 
in individual autonomy rather than economic security (though the latter facilitates 
the former) (Welzel 2007, pp.193-97). Inglehart has also recognised the 
development of new forms of hedonism and consumption which function mainly as 
mechanisms of self-expression rather than indicators of socioeconomic status 
(2007, p.235). 
 
Data from Western Europe, which has tended to score highly on the postmaterialist 
index, point to a synthesis of materialist and postmaterialist values rather than the 
wholesale replacement of materialism (Kaase & Newton 1995, pp.77-78). Australian 
analysis suggests postmaterialism remains underpinned by material concerns in a 
Maslowian-style hierarchy (and the formation of materialist/postmaterialist values 
is more nuanced than Inglehart suggested) (Marks 1997). A largely qualitative 
comparative study of young people from Australia, the UK and the US found that 
their political engagement and views on inequality were shaped by interdependent 
materialist and postmaterialist ideas, and a focus on ‘lifestyle’ and ‘identity’ politics 
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had not replaced ongoing material-based influences (Vromen, Loader & Xenos 
2015). 
 
In Australia, a postmaterialism index is incorporated into the Australian Election 
Study (AES) survey which coincides with federal elections. The data indicate that a 
mixed materialist/postmaterialist orientation is most common, comprising a 
relatively constant 59 to 67% of the population since 1990; those with a materialist 
orientation have varied between 18 and 30% during this period, while those with a 
postmaterialist orientation have ranged from 11 to 18% (Cameron & McAllister 
2018; Cameron & McAllister 2019b). The most significant trend has been a decline 
of 12 percentage points in materialist orientation between 2007 and 2016, with 
both the mixed and postmaterialist orientations rising as a result. The 18-24 age 
group has broadly followed the population-wide trend, with a 9 percentage point 
rise in postmaterialist orientation between 2010 and 2013, all at the expense of a 
mixed orientation.122 The 65+ age group has fluctuated more, culminating in a steep 
drop in materialist orientation from 33% in 2007 to 15% in 2016. This was 
accompanied by a seven percentage point rise in postmaterialism and a 12 
percentage point rise in mixed orientation. 
 
Analysis of the 2007 AES data found a correlation between preferences for 
environmentalism and increased welfare state spending, with the authors positing 
the emergence of a constituency motivated less by an ‘old left’ commitment to 
material equality than by a broad social justice orientation, including the 
decommodification of both people (labour) and land (environment), as well as a 
general ‘politics of wellbeing’ that supports social spending and the welfare state 
(Spies-Butcher & Stebbing 2016). It should be noted that some researchers have 
suggested the Australian Election Study data on postmaterialism may be distorted 
by measurement effects, including temporary period effects making people more 
materialist during election campaigns and the influence of the two-party system, 
which may be less conducive to postmaterialism than the multi-party systems 
 
122 It should be noted that the AES sample generally only includes a small number of young people.  
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common in Europe (Tranter & Western 2003; Tranter & Western 2010; Tranter 
2015). 
 
Other theorists propose alternatives to the postmaterialism paradigm that may also 
help enhance our understanding of the value orientations underpinning people’s 
political thinking, particularly in relation to inter-generational justice and related 
issues. These alternative formulations are considered briefly in the remainder of the 
chapter. 
 
4.3.5 Engaged citizenship 
 
Picking up on similar themes to postmaterialism, Russell Dalton (2008) argues that 
traditional duty-based norms of citizenship are increasingly being replaced (largely 
through generational change) by ‘engaged citizenship’. Duty-based citizenship 
emphasises majoritarian views, respect for the law and the authority of 
government, national pride, individual responsibility, less spending on social 
programs, and serving one’s country.123 Engaged citizens, like postmaterialists, are 
more concerned with social than economic issues and exhibit greater tolerance and 
appreciation for diversity. Engaged citizenship norms are positively associated with 
support for spending on areas such as foreign aid, social security, childcare, 
environment, education, health and public transport. Duty-based citizenship norms 
are negatively correlated with support for spending on most of these areas but 
strongly associated with support for military spending. Dalton presents data which 




123 People who retain a preference for hierarchy and limited redistribution have also been described 
as having a ‘social dominance orientation’ (SDO), which contrasts with postmaterialism (Pratto et al. 
1994). SDO encompasses conservatism, patriotism, support for meritocracy and just world belief; it 
is negatively correlated with support for women’s rights, gay rights, environmental action and social 
welfare programs.  
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4.3.6 The Schwartzian continuum 
 
Other major work on value orientations places less theoretical emphasis than 
Inglehart on how values are related to age group and birth cohort effects. One body 
of research focuses on the stability of values over time on an individual and cultural 
level. Values are generally assumed to have a high degree of ‘stickiness’, but some 
malleability of personal and political values is evident in empirical studies. This is 
sometimes associated with particular cognitive conditions, but also with normal 
ageing and life events and even the feedback effects of political behaviour (see 
Konty & Dunham 1997; Maio & Olson 1998; Bernard, Maio & Olson 2003a; Bernard, 
Maio & Olson 2003b; Hitlin & Piliavin 2004; Bardi et al. 2009; Bardi & Goodwin 
2011; Vecchione et al. 2013; Gouveia et al. 2015; Vecchione et al. 2016). Analysis of 
European data has found that, while people’s attitudes are influenced by prevailing 
economic conditions, values remain relatively unaffected (Reeskens & 
Vandecasteele 2017). 
 
Values research is hampered by the contestability of basic ideas such as freedom, 
equality, justice, security, fairness, and solidarity, which can mean very different 
things to different people (see Stjernø 2008; Lakoff 2009, p.177). There is some 
debate within the field over how terms such as ‘values’, ‘value systems’, ‘ideology’, 
‘worldview’ and ‘attitude’ are to be defined (see Rohan 2000). Shalom Schwartz 
defines values as goals that serve as guiding principles for a person or other social 
entity across different contexts, and can motivate and justify action (1994, p.21). 
Starting from four motivational bases (self-enhancement/self-transcendence and 
openness to change/conservation), Schwartz identified a continuum of ten values: 
power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, 
benevolence, tradition, conformity and security.124 Empirical work has shown a 
systematic age-values relationship: age is positively correlated with security, 
tradition, conformity and universalism values (Schwartz 2005). 
 
 
124 In later work, Schwartz et al. (2012) expanded the original ten values to 19 by introducing two 
new values, face and humility, and dividing some of the original values into multiple dimensions. 
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In subsequent work, Schwartz and colleagues identified a range of political values, 
including law and order, traditional morality, equality, free enterprise, civil liberties 
and blind patriotism, which arise from the ten personal values (Schwartz, Caprara & 
Vecchione 2010). Empirical testing found these political values were a better 
explanation of voting than left/right ideology, structuring and giving coherency to 
people’s political thinking (Schwartz, Caprara & Vecchione 2010; Schwartz et al. 
2014). Demographic characteristics, including age, did not explain any additional 
variance in political choice, suggesting that the influence of social group 
membership may be mediated through values (see also Piurko, Schwartz & Davidov 
2011). 
 
Comparing his typology with others, Schwartz (1994) noted that Inglehart’s 
materialist value orientation corresponded with security and power, while a 
postmaterialist value orientation aligned with universalism and self-direction. In 
Rokeach’s dualistic model, equality was aligned with universalism and freedom with 
self-direction. Empirical research has shown that postmaterialist and self-expression 
values are positively correlated with Schwartz’s universalism and self-direction and 
negatively correlated with tradition, conformity and security (Wilson 2005; Siegers 
& Kuntz 2012). In line with Inglehart’s work, Schwartz finds that self-direction, 
stimulation, universalism, benevolence and hedonism all increase in importance 
with socio-economic development and democratisation, while tradition, power, 
conformity and security values decrease (Schwartz & Sagie 2000). Analysis of 
European data has found that Schwartz’s self-transcendence values are associated 
with greater support for redistributive policies, but the values-attitudes link is 
weaker among less materially secure groups, possibly due to self-interest 
considerations ‘crowding out’ the influence of values, and difficulty making 





4.3.7 Individualism and collectivism 
 
Individualism/collectivism is another dualistic value typology that is highly relevant 
to the formation of social policy attitudes. Harry Triandis (1995) notes that 
collectivist people and cultures are more likely than individualists to: 
• Accept hierarchy, authority and inequality. 
• Deemphasise individual freedom and autonomy. 
• Treat members of their outgroup very differently to members of their 
ingroup. 
• Behave in accordance with duty, social norms and expectations regardless of 
personal sacrifice. 
 
Collectivist cultures are ‘tight’, with strong norms and little tolerance for deviancy, 
while ‘loose’ cultures allow much more scope for individuals to determine their own 
behaviour. Research by psychologist Michele Gelfand et al. (2011) has found that 
tightness is associated with threat. Societies that face resource scarcity, conflict, 
disease, environmental problems or high population density tend towards 
tightness. People in these societies become highly socialised into ‘tightness’ norms. 
This aligns well with postmaterialism, where economic security and prosperity (i.e. 
the absence of threat) leads to people being socialised into greater individualism or 
‘looseness’. 
 
Triandis notes that collectivist tendencies generally increase with age and align with 
tradition, conformity and security on Schwartz’s typology, while individualists are 
high on self-direction. On Rokeach’s value typology, collectivist societies are low 
freedom while individualist societies are high freedom; both collectivism and 
individualism may be low or high equality depending on whether they take a 
vertical (stratified) or horizontal form125 (Triandis 1995, p.51). Collectivism is more 
 
125 Vertically-oriented societies are more accepting of inequality and distribution of resources by 
rank. In vertical collectivist societies, rank is likely to be based on birthright or another fixed 




likely to arise in conditions of cultural tightness (cohesiveness and homogeneity) 
and cultural simplicity (such as small-scale, rural settings and conditions of resource 
scarcity). A number of scholars have noted that different countries are more 
strongly oriented towards either individualist or collectivist norms and this shapes 
citizens’ values and attitudes towards social policies (Kluegel & Miyano 1995, pp.82, 
86-88, 101; Kluegel et al. 1995; Wegener & Liebig 1995; Lewin-Epstein, Kaplan & 
Levanon 2003; Hadler 2005). 
 
4.3.8 Cultural value dimensions 
 
Sometimes no clear distinction is made between individual values and 
societal/cultural values and the same typologies are seen as applicable at both 
levels (see, for example, Fischer & Poortinga 2012). However, both Schwartz and 
Inglehart have applied modified versions of their typologies at country-level, 
allowing for the identification of distinct cultural value orientations and cross-
cultural comparison. Geert Hofstede (2001) has also been influential in this area, 
with his early research involving employees of a major corporation across 72 
countries from the late 1960s. Hofstede initially identified four main cultural value 
dimensions: 
• High versus low power distance (degree of hierarchy or inequality). 
• High versus low uncertainty avoidance. 
• Individualism versus collectivism. 
• Masculinity versus femininity (distinct emotional gender roles). 
 
A fifth dimension, long-term versus short-term orientation (deferred versus 
immediate gratification), was added later. Hofstede found correlations between 
these dimensions - for example, cultures high in power distance are also likely to be 
high in uncertainty avoidance and collectivism. Australia scores low on power 
distance, fairly low on uncertainty avoidance, very high on individualism, fairly high 
on masculinity and very high on short-term orientation, generally falling close to the 




4.3.9 Welfare cultures 
 
Researchers have increasingly explored how ideas (including norms, paradigms, 
frames and discourses) rather than interests shape public policy (Campbell 2002). 
Birgit Pfau-Effinger (2005) argues that societies have broad ‘welfare cultures’, which 
include beliefs and values about justice and redistribution, the operation of the 
labour market, roles within the family, the balance between state and market, and 
collective responsibility. These norm sets or paradigms shape social and economic 
policy. Welfare cultures need not be coherent or internally consistent. Individuals 
will be affected, not only by their society’s dominant norms, but also by their own 
predispositions and personal experiences, potentially leading to ambivalence, 
conflicting views or ‘split consciousness’ (Kluegel et al. 1995). Egalitarian and 
inegalitarian norms are in constant tension: “duality in thinking about principles of 
economic justice is a universal feature of capitalist economic societies” (Kluegel & 
Matěju 1995, p.231). 
 
Cognitive scientist George Lakoff (2009) suggests that most people are 
‘biconceptual’: they have both conservative and progressive moral frames which 
can be activated by how an issue is presented in political discourse. The 
conservative frame is authoritarian, has low tolerance for ambiguity, prioritises 
direct personal responsibility for outcomes over systemic causation, and relates 
human worth to self-control and discipline. The rags-to-riches or pull-yourself-up-
by-your-bootstraps narrative is popular in this way of thinking (Lakoff 2009, p.29). 
The progressive frame, on the other hand, prioritises empathy, cooperation, 
connection and an ethic of care. This view recognises that the self-made figure is 
largely a mythical one. Success is always facilitated in some way by the state, even 
just through enforcement of the rule of law. 
 
4.3.10 Values in tension 
 
The richness and complexity of people’s value orientations and how they shape 
policy attitudes is impossible to capture through quantitative survey data alone. 
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Jennifer Hochschild (1981) conducted in-depth interviews with adults from a range 
of backgrounds on their redistributive views and found ambivalence was a common 
feature. Most people’s views aligned with a pattern of favouring egalitarianism in 
social and political domains, and differentiation (equity or reward-based norms) in 
the economic domain, but they acknowledged the tensions between the different 
facets of their belief systems. Many people had absorbed various differentiation 
norms and could not see any alternative to the existing distributive system based on 
those norms, although they were uncomfortable with the outcomes that were 
produced. 
 
Politicians and policymakers do not necessarily have more internally coherent value 
orientations or attitude sets than members of the public. A qualitative study based 
on interviews with US state senators found that their attitudes are not as 
ideologically-driven as might have been assumed; rather, ambivalence (about 
matters such as the proper role of government, the market’s impact on justice, and 
the tension between equality and efficiency) was the dominant narrative across 
representatives of both major political parties (Reeher 1996). Individuals’ political 
thinking is more likely to be based on a combination of sometimes conflicting values 
and principles than on coherent ideological positions along the traditional left-right 
continuum (Carmines & D’Amico 2015). 
 
Tension also arises between cultural norms and their institutional context. Robert 
Bellah et al. (1992) note that the Lockean ideal of the autonomous individual free to 
pursue success and fortune is in fundamental tension with the American economic 
and political system. The idea that we can live good lives as self-sufficient 
individuals striving only for personal gain in a complex society full of 
interdependencies is flawed. Affluence and the capitalistic markets that generate it 
have been variously linked with rising inequality (Picketty 2014), the undermining of 
social capital (Putnam 2000), the decline of civic-mindedness and long-term 
commitment (Offer 2006) and the general “degradation of values to the point 
where everything is acceptable and no one is accountable” (Stiglitz 2012, p.xlvii; cf. 
Friedman 2006). Prosperity is usually accompanied by the rise of emancipatory 
142 
 
values and self-expression (including through consumption), but it can be hard to 
reconcile these individualistic orientations with a sense of social responsibility and 
solidarity with others. Bellah et al. posit that “the question for the responsible 
citizen today is, Are we responsible only for our own good or also for the common 
good?”126 (1992, p.81). 
 
Self-interest is not inherent in individualism. The individualist/collectivist value 
dimension should not be conflated with egoism/altruism; solidaristic individualism 
is quite feasible (Rothstein 1998, pp.198-99; Welzel 2010). Data from the World 
Values Survey indicate self-expression values are associated with altruism and 
peaceful collective action, reflecting a socially responsible form of individualism 
(Welzel 2010). Emancipative, democratic and humanistic modes of social 
interaction can generate new forms of social capital characterised by generalised 
interpersonal trust, support for individual choice and autonomy, openness and 
flexibility, and intrinsic motivation rather than externally-imposed standards 
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005).127 
 
4.3.11 Time perspective and generativity 
 
Two other broad psychological orientations provide useful frameworks for analysing 
attitudes towards policies that have different temporal impacts: time perspective 
and generativity. People are differently oriented towards past, present and future 
(Becker 1986, p.250). Psychologist Philip Zimbardo and colleagues have developed 
the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI) which scores people on five 
dimensions: past-negative, present-hedonistic, future, past-positive and present-
fatalistic (Zimbardo & Boyd 1999).128 No single orientation is suited to all 
circumstances, although an ideal overall profile is high past-positive, moderately 
 
126 This conception of the common good is explicitly extended to the future good of all, including the 
unborn (Bellah et al. 1992, p.97). 
127 This type of social capital is sometimes described as ‘bridging’, while ‘bonding’ social capital is 
based on ascriptive group membership and emphasises conformity and restraint of individual 
impulses. 
128 A sixth time perspective is people’s orientation towards achieving personal goals and rewards 
after death (Boyd & Zimbardo 1997). 
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high future, moderately high present-hedonistic, low past-negative and low 
present-fatalistic (Zimbardo & Boyd 2008, p.297). Zimbardo and Boyd argue that 
time perspective is a pervasive psychological construct, subtly influencing many 
more obvious orientations. Empirical work has found a positive correlation between 
future-oriented policies (such as those that benefit children and families) and 
cultural-level Schwartzian values of egalitarianism (as opposed to hierarchy) and 
harmony (as opposed to mastery) (Kasser 2011). 
 
Being future-oriented can seem abstract, with nothing tangible to hold on to, only 
present sacrifice for uncertain and delayed reward (sometimes accruing to faceless 
future others) (Birnbacher 2006, p.36; Dierksmeier 2006, pp.77-78). The demands 
of the present are much more concrete and emotionally engaging than those of the 
future (Wittmann 2017, p.21). However, adopting a future-orientation can be 
crucial to moving away from egoism and expanding the bounds of social 
responsibility (Sieger Derr 1981, p.37). It has been suggested that “a person’s 
ethical capacity can be roughly measured by the span of his ‘we’ ” (Rolston 1981, 
p.125), and this includes people who are not our exact contemporaries in time but 
will nevertheless be affected by our actions. A sense of ‘historical consciousness’, of 
being part of a grand human project stretching backward and forward in time, is 
required (Partridge 1981a, p.16). We anticipate that something of what we care 
about will be perpetuated (Partridge 1981b, p.204) and that it will be built upon 
through progress and improvement, rather than a diminution of human 
opportunities and prospects over time (Green 1981, p.96). 
 
Future orientation is closely linked to the concept of generativity (Morselli 2013). 
Generativity in its original formulation, developed by psychoanalyst Erik Erikson 
(1963) as one of the key stages of human psycho-social development, was 
associated with midlife, but older adults can continue to be generative in many 
ways. Generativity involves producing value of some kind for people who will 
outlive the generative individual. This could mean preserving the Earth’s resources, 
caring for or teaching young people, sharing values and ideas or simply being a good 
citizen and paying taxes (McAdams, Hart & Maruna 1998; McAdams & Logan 2004, 
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p.16). Generativity is explicitly future-oriented and change-oriented - Erikson 
contrasted it with stagnation. Generativity involves supporting the young to 
develop their own identities rather than older people attempting to enforce the 
preservation of their own values and institutions (Takatoshi 2004, p.93). It requires 
the letting go of what has been produced and what is of value so that these goods 
can be transmitted to the future (McAdams & Logan 2004, p.16). 
 
Older people are well-placed to make a unique generative contribution: they have 
developed skills and experience that can be shared; they are likely to have more 
time to devote to generative activities; they can act as stewards and conservators, 
linking what has been and what is to come (see, for example, Callahan 1987, pp.42-
48; Laslett 1989, p.196). Making a contribution to others and to the ‘ongoingness’ of 
humanity can help to console and reconcile us to our individual obsolescence 
(Mannheim 1952, p.294; Parfit 1984, p.281). It also allows us to transmit norms 
around care for others and the environment, the value of fairness and justice, and 
hope for the future (see McKinnon 2012; Attfield 2014, p.130). 
 
People vary in their propensity to engage in generative activities and to feel 
connected to others, especially those from different generations. Kimberly Wade-
Benzoni and colleagues have found that a complex interplay of psychological factors 
determines people’s attitudes to the type of legacy (material or otherwise) they 
would like to leave for the future (Wade-Benzoni 2006; Wade-Benzoni 2008; Wade-
Benzoni et al. 2008; Wade-Benzoni & Tost 2009; Wade-Benzoni, Sondak & Galinski 
2010). These factors include the extent to which people identify with and feel 
affinity towards younger generations, norms of reciprocity, and feelings of 
responsibility and stewardship. The behaviour of previous generations is also 
important, suggesting that the norm of ‘paying it forward’, or passing something on 
to the next generation in lieu of paying back the previous generation,129 is at risk if 
people do not feel they have received an appropriate legacy from their 
 
129 This form of indirect reciprocity is a way of extending contractarian notions of justice to the 
asymmetrical relations between people over time (see, for example, Sheleff 1981, p.268; Callahan 
1981, p.77; Goodin 1985; Becker 1986, p.231; Howarth 1992; Gosseries 2001; Page 2006, p.108; 
Partridge 2008, p.6). 
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predecessors (Wade-Benzoni 1999; Wade-Benzoni 2002). If ethics of care and 
justice and generativity have not been demonstrated by their elders, younger 
people are less likely to practice them in relation to their own successors. What 
John Passmore has described as the ‘chain of love and concern’ (1974, p.89) linking 
the generations can be broken. 
 
4.3.12 Integrating value frameworks 
 
This chapter has covered a range of useful frameworks that may be used to 
enhance our understanding of how underlying values shape attitudes towards 
redistributive policy. Figure 5 maps elements of the Rokeach, Inglehart, Triandis and 
Hofstede value typologies, along with Zimbardo’s future orientation and Erikson’s 
generativity, onto the quadrants created by Schwartz’s higher order dimensions for 
comparative purposes. 
 
Broadly speaking, a key value orientation for shaping political attitudes and 
behaviour is the extent to which people are concerned with rights to personal 
autonomy and self-expression, not just for themselves, but also for others and as 
abstract principles. This value dimension is strongly associated with Inglehart’s 
postmaterialism and Rokeach’s high equality/high freedom orientation: people who 
value autonomy and self-expression tend to recognise that these qualities are 
grounded in equality as well as freedom. Autonomy/self-expression cuts across the 
individualism vs collectivism binary to some extent. It is concerned not just with 
individual rights, but also the rights of others, aligning it with Schwartz’s 
universalism. 
 
Inglehart’s postmaterialism orientation is useful shorthand for a cluster of related 
values: high equality, high freedom, individual autonomy, self-expression, 
universalism and future orientation. This is the locus where individual self-
determination meets a concern for all and for the future, and where an attempt can 
be made to reconcile equality and freedom. The key to the postmaterialist 
orientation is not the deemphasis of economic or other security concerns. Rather, 
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the defining characteristic of postmaterialism is its openness – to difference, to 
change, to new ways of being both alone and together. It offers up the possibility of 
not being forced to choose between freedom and security, or between the 
individual and the group, but embracing both. 
 
      Self-transcendence 
 
 
          Low power distance 
  Postmaterialism            Generativity   
  High equality, high freedom   High equality, low freedom 
  Horizontal individualism    Horizontal collectivism 
  Future orientation 
   Universalism    Benevolence 
 
         Tradition 
 
   Self-direction    Conformity 
Openness 
to change                       Conservation 
 Low uncertainty avoidance    High uncertainty avoidance 
  Stimulation      Security 
 
   Hedonism   
 
   Achievement    Power  
  Vertical individualism    Vertical collectivism  
Low equality, high freedom   Low equality, low freedom 
      Materialism 
       High power distance 








The discussion of the various influences on attitude formation presented in this 
chapter informs the analysis of the fieldwork conducted for the thesis, which 
investigated the factors affecting the attitudes of young and senior Australians 
towards redistributive policy. Of the explanatory frameworks discussed in this 
chapter, value orientations proved particularly useful in interpreting the fieldwork 
findings. Value differences were key to explaining the ways in which the young 
participants thought differently to the seniors, and why neither group was 
supportive of policy reform. Before turning to the results of the fieldwork, the 








It’s a cruel jest to say to a bootless man that he ought to lift himself by his own bootstraps. 
 
 Martin Luther King, Jr (1968) 
 
 
The fieldwork undertaken for the thesis investigated what a group of young adults 
and a group of seniors thought about selected Australian Government redistributive 
policies, why they thought as they did and whether any age-based differences were 
evident. The fieldwork methodology is set out in this chapter. The fieldwork 
involved 55 participants in total, 25 aged 18-24 and 30 aged 60-70. Participants 
completed an online survey and 53 of them took part in an in-depth semi-
structured interview of one to two hours conducted by the researcher.130 The 
largely qualitative nature of the fieldwork made possible a different set of insights 
compared to quantitative survey data on policy attitudes and values. 
 
5.1 Relevant policy areas 
 
Only a limited number of policy areas could be included in the fieldwork due to time 
constraints and the need to avoid excessive demands being placed on participants. 
The fieldwork focused on the key policy areas of: 
• Income support (including levels of payment, means-testing and eligibility 
requirements). 
• Retirement income (including the superannuation tax concessions and 
superannuation preservation age). 
• Other tax expenditures, particularly for property-owners. 
• Public debt. 
 





These policy areas tend to involve the redistribution of resources between different 
age groups. Further information about the specific policies considered in the 
fieldwork is set out in Appendix A, including a loose assessment based on available 
data of which age groups benefit most from each policy. Policies that affect 
different age groups differently were of particular interest because age is more 
likely to be a salient influence on attitudes towards these policies, highlighting any 
differences in political thinking that exist between young adults and seniors. Policies 
that deliver benefits largely to older Australians are also of interest because they 
are likely to become increasingly costly as the population ages, calling into question 
their sustainability and whether reform is necessary. The policies selected can be 
seen as test cases for public perceptions of fairness and sustainability. 
 
It was important that the policies included were relatively easy to understand, that 
their costs were readily quantifiable and that clear and potentially viable alternative 
policy settings existed. The fieldwork aimed to explore attitudes towards specific 
policies in detail rather than ‘taking the public pulse’ or measuring the general 
policy mood, which can obscure some of the detail of why people think the way 
they do. However, findings that relate to the value orientations underlying specific 
policy attitudes may also have relevance at a less granular level of analysis. 
 
Tax expenditures were included alongside social assistance programs to better 
represent the range of policies that affect significant redistribution between groups 
in society. Measuring the impact of tax expenditure policies is difficult as the 
foregone revenue figures prepared by Treasury are not necessarily directly 
comparable with the costs of other policy programs (see, for example, Carling 
2015). One of the purposes of tax expenditure programs is to change taxpayer 
behaviour. If alternative settings were in place, taxpayers would be likely to behave 
differently and this would affect the Government’s revenue. 
 
Policy areas for which state governments are partly or wholly responsible were 
excluded from the fieldwork in order to simplify the range of policies considered 
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and focus on larger-scale programs and policy settings that affect all Australians.131 
This meant the significant social policy areas of health and education were not 
considered, although they involve large-scale redistribution of resources that is 
heavily skewed towards particular age groups: older Australians in the case of 
health132 and children/young adults in the case of education. Health and education 
are also complex and multi-faceted areas, making it difficult to meaningfully assess 
public opinion. Environmental policy, another area which effectively involves 
shifting burdens between age groups (because only younger people will be affected 
by the medium and long-term outcomes), was also excluded from consideration for 
similar reasons and because it is impossible to measure the redistributive effects. 
 
The specific policies included in the fieldwork were intended to be ‘case study’ 
indicators of how well Australian Government redistributive policy is aligned with 
public opinion. Attitudes towards specific policies also shed light on how people 
think about redistributive policy more broadly and the value orientations underlying 
their attitudes. 
 
5.2 Methodological issues 
 
5.2.1 Strengths and limitations of survey data 
 
Political attitudes and values are usually investigated through the analysis of 
quantitative survey data. A range of large-scale surveys are undertaken at periodic 
intervals across many countries, including the World Values Survey, the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the Eurobarometer and European 
Social Survey. Related survey series on electoral behaviour are also undertaken in 
many countries. In Australia, key large-scale survey exercises include the biennial 
 
131 There are policy variations between states in the areas that they are responsible for. 
132 A longitudinal study using English data found that health care costs increased by 30% between 
the ages of 65 and 85 and increased tenfold in the last 5 years of life (Seshamani & Gray 2004). In 
Australia, Daley et al. (2014) analyse data showing that in 2010 a person in their 70s received well 
over $10,000pa in health expenditure compared with just over $2,000pa for someone in their 20s or 
30s, and that health spending on older people is rising much faster than average health spending. 
151 
 
Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA), which includes the ISSP module, and 
the Australian Election Study (AES) timed to coincide with federal elections.  
 
These survey exercises have three particular advantages: 
• The volume of data gathered allows for meaningful statistical analyses. 
• Extensive collaborative efforts mean the same questions are asked across 
multiple countries, facilitating cross-cultural comparison. 
• Where the same questions are asked each time a periodic survey is 
conducted, trends over time can be identified. 
 
However, large-scale survey data tell only part of the story of what people think and 
why. Surveys may be administered online (or via mail), by phone or face-to-face, 
usually comprising mainly closed questions and generating largely quantitative data. 
This raises the usual limitations applicable to quantitative data and models in the 
social sciences: the social world is too complex to fully capture through numerical 
measurement and qualitative data are required to complement quantitative 
analyses. In addition, multi-national surveys cannot capture policy-specific attitudes 
as policies differ across countries. Context and culture also vary and can have a 
considerable impact on how people respond to surveys, in ways that might not 
always be visible. 
 
Fixed-choice surveys which require participants to select from a limited range of 
responses may have been more informative, or at least less likely to miss key 
nuances of public opinion, when people’s political attitudes and behaviours were 
less fragmented and subject to fewer competing influences. As the political 
environment has become more complex in advanced industrial democracies, and 
voters generally more sophisticated, traditional social cleavages such as class, 
race/ethnicity, gender and religiosity have become less predictive of political 
thinking and behaviour (see, for example, Dalton 2014). Citizens are more likely to 





Public opinion polls allow for large and theoretically random samples, but they are 
not always representative of the general population due to non-response bias. 
Particularly when they are self-administered, surveys require a degree of basic 
literacy. People with higher levels of knowledge about, and interest in, the subject 
matter are more likely to respond to invitations to participate. For example, 
respondents in the Australian Election Study (AES) survey are much more likely than 
the average Australian to have post-school qualifications and to own their own 
homes (Goot 2013), which also indicates higher socioeconomic status. Survey data 
is also heavily influenced by response effects – people give different answers 
depending on how questions are worded, the order in which they are asked, and 
the pre-specified response options that are provided (Zaller 1992, pp.32-33, 95). 
The process of collecting and analysing quantitative data is not as objective as might 
be assumed. It involves indeterminacy and interpretation at each stage, from survey 
design through to the choice of statistical methods and presentation and 
interpretation (Schweder 2016). 
 
5.2.2 Strengths and limitations of interview data 
 
An inductive, qualitative methodological framework makes it possible to situate 
people’s views in particular social contexts, a key aim of this fieldwork. 
Supplementing surveys with other methods can help mitigate distortions arising 
from framing effects, question ordering and wording, and over-reliance on cues and 
heuristics by respondents. Open-ended and semi-structured questioning can be 
more effective at eliciting people’s true views and allows the researcher to seek 
further detail and clarification where required. An element of reflexivity can be 
introduced in which the researcher responds to the participant’s feedback with 
modified questioning, and the participant in turn responds to the researcher’s more 
tailored, individualised approach and can seek clarification of questions as required. 
The researcher is able to tell if questions have been misunderstood or technical 
terms require explanation (Goot 2013). It has been noted that “complex 
reactions…are best given meaning and are optimally articulated…through a dialogue 
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which encourages reflection on, rather than mere reporting of, experience.” 
(Crouch & McKenzie 2006, p.487). 
 
Broadly speaking, the strength of qualitative data is contextualisation and the 
strength of quantitative data is generalisability. Any compression or generalisation 
of data gives up some detail and context for the sake of simplification and 
coherence. Quantitative data analysis will miss the richness and depth that 
qualitative methods can reveal. In a study aiming to explore attitudes to specific 
policies and the reasons underpinning them in detail, a qualitative dimension is 
essential. This offers a way of giving greater voice to participants through the 
opportunity to reflect on and fully explain their views. Surveys allow respondents to 
provide answers out of context, without consideration of broader consequences 
(Kangas 1997, p.489). The interview approach can go beyond simple statements of 
principle or preference and recontextualise people’s attitudes. The complexity, 
ambivalence and value conflict embodied in attitudes towards social and 
redistributive policies are not easily explored with closed, fixed-choice questions 
alone: 
Many people do not possess a single attitude toward the welfare state. 
Rather, they seem to possess a range of only partially consistent reactions to 
it. Complex attitudes of this type are, we believe, best captured by a 
combination of open-ended and closed-ended interview techniques 
(Feldman & Zaller 1992, p.295). 
 
While qualitative data are less generalisable than quantitative data from large 
representative samples, there are some ways that interview data can potentially be 
applied more broadly. Judith Hochschild (1981) identifies four possibilities: 
• Interview data are interesting in themselves and judgements can be made 
about their generalisability based on their resonance with the researcher’s 
experience. 
• Interview data can generate insights and anomalies which can then be used 
to formulate hypotheses for quantitative testing. 
• Interviews can fill in gaps in opinion research, particularly by allowing the 
researcher to make inductive links between variables. 
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• Interviews can produce new findings that are not possible through survey 
methods. 
 
Qualitative analysis of policy opinion can be seen as an exercise in discovery rather 
than verification, an investigation of the “microlevel stepping stones” through 
which people form their attitudes (Conover & Searing 2002, pp.102-103). 
Individuals’ political thinking does not occur in a social or cultural vacuum, and is 
best analysed contextually, which is only possible with an in-depth qualitative 
approach. The value of quantitative investigation must be limited when phenomena 
are not fully explicable by immutable laws or universally-applicable models, and 
when true experimental conditions are impossible to achieve.133 Public opinion as a 
macro-level phenomenon needs to be disaggregated into individual-level measures 
to be examined in detail (Luskin 2002a, p.237).134 However, there is rarely a 
straightforward relationship between the micro and macro levels. For example, the 
macro acts on the micro, including through institutions shaping norms and values, 
and this may produce emergent properties at the aggregate level that represent 
more than simple cumulation of the micro (see MacKuen 2002). 
 
Small, unrepresentative samples are not a disadvantage when conducting inductive 
investigations using a qualitative methodological framework that is embedded in 
prior theorising (Crouch & McKenzie 2006). The fieldwork undertaken here took a 
‘middle way’ between objectivism and relativism (Crouch & McKenzie 2006, p.486), 
recognising that participants had individual responses to an independent and 
impersonal social framework that constrained them in particular ways. The research 
aimed to explore how people form policy attitudes as part of a dynamic, reflexive 
process rather than simply how many hold particular views. In essence, each 
participant represented an individual case of value orientations and attitude 
formation in a particular social context. Participants in each group shared a 
 
133 It is invariably impossible to control key variables, avoid sampling bias and account for 
indeterminacy when conducting research into political attitudes (Conover & Searing 2002, p.107).  
134 Notably, the factors affecting the development of postmaterial values have largely been 
investigated at the macro rather than individual level (De Graaf & Evans 1996), a gap which the 
fieldwork undertaken for the thesis aims to address in part. 
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common social context (and one that was distinct from that of the other group) to 
the extent that they were of similar age and politically socialised at the same time. 
 
Judith Hochschild (1981) conducted 28 interviews on people’s beliefs about 
distributive justice and while she found much evidence of contradictory views, value 
conflict and ambivalence, this did not mean there were no meaningful, systematic 
patterns detectable in her data. She took issue with the idea, dating from Converse 
(1964), that the average citizen’s beliefs were problematic because they did not 
conform with the standard of ideological consistency imposed by elites: 
“Respondents are not inconsistent and are not nonparticipants in the history of 
ideas; instead, they have coherent, intelligible, flexible, complex – if ultimately 
contradictory – beliefs grounded in solid philosophical traditions” (Hochschild 1981, 
p.258). In-depth interviewing techniques are able to reveal the structure 
underpinning people’s views, as well as the ambivalence that co-exists with 
coherency. 
 
Grant Reeher (1996) conducted research on US state senators’ attitudes towards 
distributive justice and argued that an in-depth interview approach was necessary 
to understand respondents’ views on these complex issues and gain insight into the 
contextual factors shaping those views. While noting that survey tools are more 
representative and reproducible, Reeher contended that the in-depth approach can 
generate data that in many ways are more reliable and less ambiguous, providing a 
fuller and more accurate view of the way people think about political issues: “In so 
doing, it offers a distinctive contribution to the study of politics, and ultimately to 
the pursuit of justice” (Reeher 1996, p.19). Advantages of in-depth interviews 
include: 
• Allowing for more subtle and nuanced interpretations of the content and 
structure of beliefs. 
• Better recognising that people think in different ways and are affected by 
contextual influences differently. 
• Aiming for an understanding of the real nature of people’s positions and 
their meanings rather than simply identifying attitudes and preferences. 
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• Giving a better sense of affect as well as cognitive-based beliefs (Reeher 
1996, p.18). 
 
Like Hochschild, Reeher found coherent structure and pattern, as well as some 
ambivalence and inconsistency, in the qualitative interview data he gathered. He 
was able to identify common themes across his respondents, such as the impact of 
personal experience and early socialisation on their views. The richness of his data 
allowed Reeher to categorise his respondents in terms of three dominant narratives 
about distributive justice and to interrogate the links between attitudes and 
behaviour, including why legislators did not always act in accordance with their 
beliefs and the extent to which other influences affected their decision-making. This 
generated a much fuller picture of why and how legislators were making decisions 
and particular policies were being enacted than would have been possible using 
survey data or analysis of the legislators’ voting records. 
 
Problems with using an in-depth interview approach to collecting individual-level 
(particularly non-elite) public opinion data include the inevitability that the 
interview process will create opinion as much as gauge it, and that the analysis will 
be biased towards particular constructions. These two factors may combine to 
suggest higher levels of rationality, sophistication, structure and significance than 
really exist in people’s political thinking (see Luskin 2002b; Achen & Bartels 2016, 
pp.309-10). Opinions and attitudes depend on the context in which they are elicited 
(MacKuen 2002). 
 
5.2.3 Opening up the policy menu 
 
Democratic governance does not mean citizens have a free choice about what the 
state does. Rather, they are presented with a menu of alternatives shaped by policy 
settings, institutions and elite influences (such as party platforms) (Sniderman & 
Levendusky 2007). There are policy possibilities on which citizens are not given an 
opportunity to express their views because government or political parties do not 
consider them ‘on the table’ for discussion. In Australia, policy settings that are 
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effectively treated as ‘not up for debate’ include the absence of a wealth or wealth 
transfer tax, the very costly capital gains tax exemption on owner-occupied 
properties, and the exclusion of the family home from the Age Pension assets 
test.135 
 
The fieldwork undertaken here included some questions about specific policy 
options that are not currently subject to much discussion or promoted as viable 
options. The fieldwork also aimed to give respondents an opportunity to suggest 
their own favoured policy solutions to some problems rather than being restricted 
to the more politically palatable options on offer via party platforms and electoral 
choice. This encouraged a refocusing on core values and concerns. However, the 
research recognises that policy preferences must be grounded in political reality 
and the de-contextualisation of attitudes risks rendering them meaningless. 
 
5.3 Fieldwork approach 
 
The fieldwork aimed to address the relative dearth of qualitative data on 
redistributive policy attitudes and underlying value orientations and to explore 
these issues in an Australian context. It adopted an explanatory sequential mixed 
methods approach (see Guest, Macqueen & Namey 2012, ch.8; Creswell 2014, 
pp.224-25) in order to first gather quantitative data on participants’ policy attitudes, 
then qualitative data explaining the basis of these attitudes. The first stage of data 
collection involved a survey comprising fixed-choice, closed-ended questions. This 
was followed by semi-structured face-to-face interviews. The survey allowed for the 
collection of basic attitudinal data, which could then be explored in more depth 
during the interview phase. It also meant participants came to the interviews better 
prepared, having already reflected on the issues to be discussed. However, the 
 
135 For example, in September 2019 the Australian Government announced a wide-ranging review of 
Australia’s retirement income system, but Treasurer Josh Frydenberg asserted that the Government 
would ‘never’ include the family home in the Age Pension assets test. The Government also “ruled 
out touching several parts of the system that could hurt Baby Boomer voters who helped the 
Coalition win the election, including super tax concessions” (Kehoe & Mather 2019). 
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small number of participants (55 for the survey) meant the quantitative results 
needed to be interpreted with care. 
 
Using two data collection methods broadened the range and type of data collected, 
provided greater explanatory power and produced a fuller picture of participants’ 
attitudes and values. Validity of the data was enhanced by generating two datasets 
which could be triangulated. Data reliability (to facilitate comparison of the two 
different-age groups of participants) was managed by ensuring that each group was 
asked the same questions in the survey and by incorporating a relatively high 
degree of structure in the interviews. As Guest et al. note, “Structure facilitates 
reliability, and therefore comparative analysis”. 
 
Interviews with individuals were specifically chosen over discussions with focus 
groups because the study aimed to encourage participants to reflect on their own 
views free from the influence of other participants. It was also desirable for each 
participant to have an opportunity to express their views without any competition 
for ‘airtime’ from other participants. Exploring policy attitudes within same-age and 
mixed-age focus groups would introduce interesting new dynamics, particularly 
around whether diversity of opinion was replaced to some extent by solidarity 
between age peers, and whether conflict between different age groups was 
evident. However, focus groups of this type would require careful facilitation to 
avoid discussion being dominated by a small number of participants with strong 
views, and this is a task for future research. 
 
The fieldwork was conducted within a framework that combined elements of 
interpretivist and positivist approaches, recognising that qualitative methods can be 
reconciled with the latter as well as the fomer (see Guest, Macqueen & Namey 
2012, p.5). The fieldwork aimed to retain comparability of data within and between 
the two sample groups. Personal interaction between the researcher and individual 
participants naturally introduced new variables into the data collection process but 
efforts were made to at least partially control the distorting influence of these 
variables. Personal interaction provides opportunities to ensure participants 
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understand the questions they are being asked (and that the researcher has 
accurately interpreted the responses), and to encourage participants to be 
expansive in their responses. However, the researcher aimed to avoid interacting 
with participants in ways that suggested approval or disapproval of the views being 
expressed or were too revealing of the researcher’s own personal views, as this 
could unduly influence the participant and distort the data. Nonetheless, interview 
situations inevitably involve collaboration between the researcher and participants 
(Holstein & Gubrium 2016, p.77). The fieldwork recognised that participants would 
often construct responses and attitudes in the course of the research, particularly in 
relation to policy areas they knew little about, and unavoidably under the influence 
of cues from the researcher (as well as factors external to the interview process). 
Analysis of the interview data required appropriate contextualisation of the process 
of meaning-making undertaken by participant and researcher alike. 
 
The fieldwork engaged with both age and birth cohort as potential influencers of 
political values and attitudes. As noted in Chapter 2, it is very difficult to disentangle 
the effects of being a certain age at the time of the study and being born (or, more 
accurately, socialised) at a certain point in time. The fieldwork made some attempt 
to isolate relevant influences by asking participants about their subjective sense of 
belonging to a certain age group and birth cohort, and in the case of the senior 
participants, to reflect on how their political thinking had changed over time. 
However, the best way to investigate the separate effects of age and birth cohort is 
through a longitudinal panel study tracking the same cohort of participants over 
time. With birth cohort as a constant, the effects of changing age (growing older) on 
political attitudes can be isolated. Studies of this type are rare due to the logistical 
difficulties and the length of time involved (Jennings 2007, pp.33-34). In the case of 
the fieldwork undertaken for the thesis, neither sufficient time nor resources were 








Of the 55 participants involved in the fieldwork, 25 were aged 18-24 and 30 were 
aged 60-70. Thirteen of the young participants were female and 12 were male. 
Seventeen of the senior participants were female and 13 were male. Both age 
samples included some participants who were originally from regional areas, as well 
as several who were born outside Australia. Two of the senior participants, both 
male, completed the survey but withdrew before interview due to ill-health, 
meaning a total of 53 participants (25 young people and 28 seniors) were 
interviewed. For some items in the survey, the number of participants was less than 
55 because one or more participants did not give a response. 
 
The younger group was intended to represent adults who were old enough to vote 
but young enough to be affected by the outcomes of current Government policy a 
long way into the future. This gave them a direct personal interest in the 
sustainability of current policy and the effectiveness of the Government’s future 
planning. Under-18-year-olds were excluded because they were not yet eligible to 
vote. The participants in the older group were all retired or semi-retired; some were 
on the Age Pension and others were fully self-funded. People aged over 70 were 
excluded to limit the span of the older sample, and ensure that all of the group 
were born after World War II as part of the ‘Baby Boomer’ generation, which is 
often viewed as a distinctive birth cohort in terms of the conditions they 
experienced growing up (such as post-war prosperity and the social change of the 
1960s). 
 
Participants were recruited through posters (Appendix B) on noticeboards at 
community facilities (mainly public libraries operated by local councils) in the inner 
suburbs of Adelaide, a medium-sized city with a population of approximately 1.3m 
in South Australia. Participants from the young group were also recruited through 
promotion of the research at the University of Adelaide city campus. Senior 
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participants were also recruited through a small paid advertisement in The Senior 
print newspaper, distributed free at community venues in Adelaide. 
 
Neither sample was intended to be representative of its age group or birth cohort 
across the broader population of Adelaide or Australia. The largely qualitative 
nature of the research and the use of individual interviews meant the sample sizes 
needed to be small for practical purposes. Representative sampling would have 
required much larger sample sizes and it would not have been possible to gather 
rich, detailed data for each participant. Both samples were likely to have been 
biased towards participants of higher than average socioeconomic status and 
education levels, reflecting the inner-city residential population and the background 
of students at the University. It is a reasonable supposition that the participants 
were likely to be more politically engaged than average, due to their higher 
socioeconomic status and education, and greater age in the case of the seniors. 
 
Participants were self-selecting, and more likely than average to have an interest in 
the subject matter of the research. This is a common issue when it comes to opinion 
research, particularly qualitative research. Prospective participants are more likely 
to proactively volunteer to participate, or agree to participate when approached, if 
they are interested in the topic under investigation. An advantage of this is richer 
data, because interested and engaged participants will generally provide informed 
and reflective responses. The chief disadvantage is that the participants are less 
representative of the overall population and it is harder to justify generalising the 
data. In the fieldwork undertaken for this thesis it is likely that the young and older 
samples were both biased in the same way, making meaningful comparison 
possible. 
 
A representative cross-section of the Adelaide population would potentially have 
magnified the influence of socioeconomic status and education as independent 
variables. Reduced disparity in these factors within and between the two samples 
highlighted the effects of age/birth cohort on the dependent variable of policy 
attitudes. The research focused on whether and how the views of young adults 
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from relatively high socioeconomic and educational backgrounds differed from the 
views of older people from similar backgrounds. The attitudes of people with higher 
than average socioeconomic status and education levels were of particular interest 
because they were more likely to have some knowledge about the relevant policies 
and to be able to offer informed opinions.  
 
The focus on age/birth cohort as the independent variable affecting values and 
attitudes meant that this study did not attempt to analyse the influence of other 
important elements of participants’ personal ‘biographies’, such as their 
socioeconomic, education, work and housing backgrounds. This would have 
significantly expanded the scope of the study and required a different approach to 
sampling, data collection and analysis which was not feasible within time and 
resource constraints. However, it is recognised that a broader analysis of this kind 
would be highly valuable to generate a fuller picture of how people form their 
attitudes towards redistributive policy.  
 
Including a greater range of age groups/birth cohorts in the study would also have 
been interesting, but would similarly have made the sampling, data collection and 
analysis much more complex. Maximising the age difference between the 
participant samples sharpened the focus on age/birth cohort effects. This allowed 
for more meaningful comparison and contrasting of the two datasets. 
 
5.4.2 Policy information 
 
Participants in the fieldwork were provided with a small amount of policy-specific 
information to help them reflect on their attitudes from an informed perspective. 
The purpose of the fieldwork was to explore people’s attitudes once they had at 
least a minimal level of knowledge about the relevant policies, rather than attempt 
to find out what they thought about policies they may not even be aware existed. 
Once prospective participants had expressed their interest in the research, they 
were sent a link to the online survey, along with a Participant Information Sheet 




The Participant Information Sheet, prepared using the University of Adelaide 
Human Research Ethics Committee template, provided general information about 
the research and associated ethical considerations such as confidentiality. The 
Background Information Sheet was intended to provide participants with a basic 
awareness of the relevant policies before completing the survey and interview. The 
background information intentionally highlighted how much the relevant policies 
cost in terms of Government expenditure or foregone revenue and that 
redistributive policies tended to benefit some groups in society (not necessarily the 
neediest) more than others. Participants were also primed to think about how 
redistributive policies might affect different age groups differently. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, research on public attitudes towards redistributive and 
welfare state policies faces a problem in that many respondents may be not just ill-
informed, but misinformed. Policy settings in this area can be highly complex and 
even economists may disagree on their precise effects and the likely impact of any 
reforms. Staffan Kumlin has described the general question of how informed and 
considered people’s attitudes and preferences are as one that has not yet entered 
the mainstream of research into public opinion on welfare state policy (2007b, 
p.378). This may be partly due to reliance on mass survey data over richer 
qualitative data. Quantitative survey data often does not reveal how much 
knowledge people have and it is easy to assume their responses are more informed 
than they may actually be. 
 
The feedback effects of existing policies and institutions on public attitudes are 
dynamic, which means that public attitudes can also be expected to fluctuate over 
time. The attitudinal data gathered in the fieldwork undertaken for this thesis 
reflect public opinion in 2017, based on the Australian Government’s policies and 
activities at that time. The underlying values on which these attitudes were based 









The first stage of data collection involved participants completing a survey 
comprising 36 questions (Appendix E). The survey was available online using the 
Survey Monkey application, but participants were also offered the opportunity to 
complete a hard copy version if they preferred, and several in the older group took 
up this option. The survey was structured to encourage participants to consider 
related policies as a group rather than in isolation and to facilitate comparison. For 
example, questions on income support payments were grouped together. A 
person’s view on the level of the Newstart Allowance for the unemployed is more 
meaningful if he or she is aware that it is substantially lower than the level of other 
income support payments. Encouraging participants to take a holistic view of 
related redistributive policy settings also meant they were more likely to reflect on 




The second stage of data collection involved participants meeting with the 
researcher for individual face-to-face interviews. The interviews took place in 
meeting spaces at local libraries or on the University of Adelaide campus, or in 
cafes. In recognition of the fact that the survey and interview process involved a 
reasonable time commitment and a fairly demanding process of reflection, 
participants were given a $25 gift voucher to reimburse them for their time and 
travel expenses. With the signed consent of participants, the interviews were audio-
recorded and transcribed by the researcher.  
 
The interviews were flexible and semi-structured, with the researcher using a list of 
key questions and possible follow-up questions to elicit further information as 
required (Appendix F). The question list was modified slightly during the data 
collection process as key themes emerged. Some questions were tailored for each 
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participant based on responses they provided in the survey. In this way, the 
interviews built on the data gathered via the surveys, seeking to elicit further 
information from participants about why they answered the closed-ended 
questions in the way they did and encouraging further reflection. Follow-up 
questions were only used where necessary, as prompts to encourage participants to 
provide more focused responses or comment on issues they had not mentioned 
spontaneously. The aim was for participants to speak freely and fairly discursively in 
the interviews, with minimal interference or interruption from the researcher. At 
the same time, it was desirable for each interview to cover some basic common 
ground to allow for comparability of responses. Interviews should aim for a balance 
between openness (flexible enough to allow for unexpected value judgements and 
idiosyncratic responses) and discipline (structured enough to allow comparisons) 
(Hochschild 1981, p.22). 
 
Participants were advised at the start of the interviews that the purpose was to 
ascertain their individual views on particular issues, not to elicit the ‘right’ answers, 
and that the researcher would avoid indicating agreement or disagreement as her 
personal views were not relevant to the process. It was also acknowledged that 
some of the issues covered were complex and participants were not expected to 
have full information. When a participant requested more information about a 
question or an issue during the interview, the researcher aimed to provide clear, 
neutral and succinct explanation: the minimum clarification necessary to allow the 
participant to provide a meaningful response to the question. Interview questions 
were designed to avoid emotional appeals and minimise the risk of participants 
‘laundering’ their responses (see Kangas 1997; Kohli 2011, p.460; Brooks 2012, 
pp.212-14). The interview process aimed to capture dualities and ambivalences 
rather than encouraging participants to commit to clear-cut responses or say what 
they thought would make them appear in the best light. 
 
Intimations of ageism, assumptions of conflict between cohorts, and 
homogenisation of participants within age categories were especially important to 
avoid in a study of this type (Bytheway 2005). Working with participants selected on 
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the basis of belonging to particular age cohorts raises the issue of the researcher’s 
position in relation to the participants (Grenier 2007). In this case, the researcher 
(aged 42-43 at the time of data collection) did not fall into either of the two target 
age groups. This avoided any issue of the researcher having insider privilege in one 
of the sample groups; she was what Biggs & Lowenstein (2011, pp.xii-xiii) describe 
as an ‘age-other’ for all the participants. 
 
5.5.3 Validation of methods 
 
The use of a mixed methods approach received some validation from participants 
themselves in the course of the data collection process. Ten of the 45 interviewees 
observed without prompting that they valued the opportunity to discuss their views 
in more depth as their survey responses had not fully captured their thinking. Five 
interviewees reported that they had skipped survey questions because they didn’t 
feel able to endorse any of the possible responses without providing further 
explanation or qualification. When reflecting on their survey responses during the 
interviews, participants sometimes modified their views or acknowledged that a 
survey response did not really align with what they actually thought. Participants 
tend to complete surveys with less reflection and engagement than interview 
participation requires. The interviews allowed the researcher to monitor individual 
response sets (including survey answers) for internal consistency, as well as 
matching against what would be expected given individuals’ circumstances (Boeri, 
Börsch-Supan & Tabellini 2001, p.15), and to seek clarification from participants 
where necessary. 
 
5.6 Data Analysis 
 
5.6.1 Thematic analysis 
 
The fieldwork did not attempt to formally quantify values as measurement scales 
designed for this purpose already exist and have been extensively tested 
empirically. Nor did the fieldwork take a rigorous approach to measuring 
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correlations between particular values and policy attitudes, although more work in 
this area would be helpful. Quantitative data from the surveys were aggregated and 
analysed with very basic statistical techniques. 
 
The richness and complexity of qualitative data sets is a challenge, but this does not 
mean they cannot be analysed systematically and with rigour. The interviews were 
transcribed from audio recordings by the researcher and uploaded to NVivo 
software. The data were then analysed using applied thematic analysis, a process of 
identifying themes in the data, segmenting text from the interview transcripts, and 
categorising the text segments according to codes aligned with themes at various 
levels of granularity (see Guest, Macqueen & Namey 2012). Identifying themes 
involves an interpretive approach while the process of coding text is more 
positivistic, the aim being to summarise or reduce the data set in a way that makes 
it meaningful whilst retaining structure and patterns. In this case the themes 
represented attitudes to specific policy settings and indicators of political values. 
 
Qualitative data analysis is art as well as science (Guest, Macqueen & Namey 2012, 
p.124). It has been observed that “the driving forces of biopsychosocial interests are 
usually immersed in the fog of symbolism and signification which envelops them 
both in the survey/interview situation and in the wider social reality” (Matheson & 
Wearing 1999, p.136). Perceiving the forces at work in the fog becomes the goal of 
the qualitative analysis process. Data on values and attitudes cannot always be 
taken at face value as there may be factors in play of which research participants 
themselves are not consciously aware: “People can’t tell you in polls and focus 
groups what really influences them because they don’t know” (Westen 2008, 
p.435). Analysis of qualitative data from this fieldwork took an inductive approach 
to investigating how individuals’ policy attitudes are influenced by underlying value 






5.6.2 Values, attitudes and behaviour 
 
It is generally assumed that values and beliefs determine attitudes rather than the 
other way around (see, for example, Rokeach 1973) and the fieldwork undertaken 
for this research does not seriously question this assumption. However, it 
recognises that the causal linkages between values, attitudes and behaviour are 
very difficult to pin down. There may be times when attitudes inform the 
development of values and beliefs. For example, people may have an instinctive 
response to a candidate or policy which they then attempt to rationalise with 
appropriate underpinning beliefs (Wawro 2006). Interview questioning and non-
intrusive probing are more likely than fixed-choice surveys to shed light on the level 
of deliberation and reflection behind people’s responses, and how their values and 
attitudes are interacting. 
 
The relationship between attitudes and behaviour is also complex and circular, and 
sometimes there is little direct relationship between them (Norris 2011, p.36). 
Geert Hofstede has argued that changing people’s behaviour is an effective way of 
changing their mental programming, including their values and attitudes (2001, 
p.12). Charles Kiesler (1971) demonstrated in a series of experiments that people 
aim to avoid dissonance between the way they think and what they do. They may 
infer what they think from how they act, and once they have committed to a 
particular view, will act accordingly. 
 
However, attitudes are just one of many factors determining political behaviour and 
may be best thought of as predispositions to act in certain ways (Swift et al. 1995, 
pp.40-41). Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 4, there are multiple influences on the 
formation of policy attitudes. Analysis of the data collected in the fieldwork 
undertaken for the thesis resists overly deterministic interpretations, recognising 
that value orientations may be best characterised as predispositions to think in 




The analysis also notes the simplification inherent in ascribing particular 
characteristics to all members of an age group or birth cohort (Rudolph & Zacher 
2017). These authors recommend an alternative approach based on an integrative 
lifespan model built around understanding how socio-contextual influences affect 
attitudes and values at an individual rather than aggregate level. Qualitative 
analysis is necessary to contextualise people’s views in terms of their individual 
experiences and other influences. The fieldwork undertaken here used interviews to 
obtain this contextualised understanding and aims to avoid excessive generalisation 
when comparing data from within and between the two age groups. The results of 




Fieldwork results: overview 
 
 
The inability to imagine a world in which things are different is evidence only of a poor imagination, 
not of the impossibility of change. 
  
Rutger Bregman, Utopia for Realists and How We Get There (2017) 
 
 
An overview of the data collected in the survey and interviews is given in this 
chapter. The survey generated basic data on participants’ attitudes towards various 
Australian Government redistributive policies. The interview phase of data 
collection aimed to find out more about the factors influencing participants’ policy 
attitudes. The survey also provided an indication of participants’ views on how 
effectively the Government plans for the future and whether young people are 
adequately represented in policymaking, as well as the extent to which participants 
had a ‘generational consciousness’. These issues were investigated in more detail in 
the interviews. The fieldwork results are discussed and analysed in more depth in 
Chapter 7, and the possible significance and implications of the results is considered 
in Chapter 8. The explanatory frameworks for understanding attitude formation 
discussed in Chapter 4 are drawn on to interpret and understand the fieldwork 
results. Note that for some survey results the number of respondents is less than 55 
as a result of participants skipping questions. 
 
6.1 Income support payments 
 
6.1.1 Age Pension - level 
 
The survey asked participants whether the 2016 Age Pension rate of $798 per 
fortnight (basic maximum rate for a single pensioner) was appropriate. Results are 
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set out in Table 1. Around half of participants, from both the young and senior 
groups, said the level of the Age Pension was too low or much too low. Most of the 
other half of participants believed it was about right, with very few saying it was too 
high or much too high. Participants were less likely to believe the Age Pension was 
too low than other income support payments. This suggested some recognition of 
the relative generosity of the Age Pension, particularly compared with Newstart and 
Youth Allowance. 
 
Table 1: Age Pension level 
 Much too 
low 
Too low About 
right 
Too high Much too 
high 
Young participants (n=25) 0 12 11 1 1 
Senior participants (n=30) 3 12 14 1 0 
Total (n=55) 3 24 25 2 1 
% of young participants 0% 48% 44% 4% 4% 
% of senior participants 10% 40% 47% 3% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Qualitative data from the interviews affirmed the survey results. Nine of the 12 
seniors who commented on the level of the Age Pension complained that it was too 
low, mainly because of the rising cost of living, and especially the need to cover 
private health insurance premiums. The other three seniors who commented said 
they found the Pension to be adequate, while noting that they led relatively frugal 
lifestyles. Five of the nine young participants who commented on the level of the 
Age Pension thought it was too low, noting that it was likely to be a longer-term 
benefit than Newstart, Parenting Payment and Youth Allowance, recipients didn’t 
have the choice of working instead and they had earned the right to a generous 
pension. The other four young participants expressed mild scepticism about 





I was surviving on the $200 per fortnight and I was like, well, if I can survive 
on that, why are they getting like $600? What is this? So, considering that 
they own a home, which is a really big asset, and they have a block, and like, 
have got a lot more money than me to begin with…that just seemed a 
bit…uneven. (Participant 6 - Female, 23) 
 
Five senior interviewees said they would like to see greater tailoring of the Pension 
to individuals’ needs, observing that the blanket application of eligibility rules 
caused inequities. Conversely, three seniors reported that they had found the 
Pension rules to be overly complex and extracting information from the Centrelink 
bureaucracy problematic. Participants who mentioned the potential benefits of 
enhanced tailoring and targeting also recognised that this would be administratively 
very difficult. 
 
6.1.2 Age Pension – family home exemption 
 
Participants were asked in the survey whether they endorsed the current policy of 
effectively exempting the full value of the family home from the Age Pension assets 
test. They were also asked to select the most appropriate threshold if the value of 
the home above a certain point was to be included in the assets test. The results are 
set out in Tables 2 and 3. Many participants, particularly from the senior group, had 
a strong view on this issue and responses were somewhat polarised. Forty percent 
of the young group and 60% of the senior group supported exempting the family 
home from the pension assets test, although significant numbers (52% of the young 
group and 37% of the senior group) disagreed with the exemption. The most 
common response to the question of an appropriate threshold if part of the home’s 













Young participants (n=25) 3 10 2 8 2 
Senior participants (n=30) 6 5 1 11 7 
Total (n=55) 9 15 3 19 9 
% of young participants 12% 40% 8% 32% 8% 
% of senior participants 20% 17% 3% 37% 23% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 3: Most appropriate threshold if part-value of family home exempt from 
assets test 










Young participants (n=23) 6 8 6 2 1 
Senior participants (n=29) 6 16 0 3 4 
Total (n=52) 12 24 6 5 5 
% of young participants 26% 35% 26% 9% 4% 
% of senior participants 21% 55% 0% 10% 14% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Divergent views on the exemption of the family home from the Age Pension means 
test were expressed in the interviews. Of the 19 young participants who 
commented, five thought the family home should be fully exempt from the Pension 
assets test and the other 14 thought the value of the home above a set threshold 
should be included. Those who supported retaining full exemption tended to 
emphasise the importance of older people being able to remain in their homes for 
psycho-social reasons such as attachment to a long-term residence or local area and 
proximity to family and friends. Three of the young participants strongly endorsed 
older people downsizing, with two noting the potential benefits of freeing up 




I think the family home is something you work for and it’s not something that 
can easily be turned into monetary wealth (Participant 42 - Male, 19). 
 
I don’t see the benefit to the community in letting people live in these big 
houses. I don’t see what’s the point…it’s just a big, big waste of space, like 
you’re taking up a lot of room (Participant 16 - Male, 19). 
 
You have a house that’s worth $1m. Why do you need the Pension? It doesn’t 
make any sense (Participant 43 - Male, 18). 
 
Nineteen senior participants commented on this issue in the interviews, with eight 
saying the family home should be fully exempt from the Pension assets test and 11 
saying home value above a set threshold should be included. Two participants said 
people who had lived in the same house for a long period of time (several decades) 
should continue to have the full value of their properties exempted even if others 
did not. Two participants noted that thresholds for including house value in the 
assets test should be based on the relevant median house price, which varies across 
Australia. Six of the senior participants strongly endorsed older people downsizing, 
although only one mentioned the potential collective benefits of releasing housing 
stock suitable for families.  
 
Their home wasn’t expensive when they bought it. So they shouldn’t be 
penalised if they’re still living in that kind of home (Participant 5 - Female, 
64). 
 
If it’s your home and you’ve looked after it and I know it’s quite a luxury, like 
myself, I live in a 4-bedroom home and it’s only me, but I need all those 
rooms…I like the space and if you’ve worked hard for it, why not? 




If people are living in some parts of Sydney they’re living in a 3, 4, 5-million 
dollar house and it’s not being counted as part of their assets, it makes no 
sense to me at all (Participant 18 - Male, 70). 
 
You’ve got people who’ve got properties worth that much and yet still 
getting the Pension, it’s ridiculous…that’s just another way of rorting the 
system (Participant 23 - Male, 61). 
 
None of the young participants were familiar with using reverse mortgage schemes 
to generate an income stream from a home while still living in it, but 11 of the 
seniors had a view on this practice, still relatively uncommon in Australia. Only 
three were positive about the idea, with the other eight worried about the potential 
for financial exploitation, the diminution of bequests to inheritors and the principle 
of returning to a state of indebtedness after paying off a home. 
 
I think once you own something, I wouldn’t want to re-mortgage it because 
you worked so hard to own something (Participant 35 - Female, 63). 
 
6.1.3 Welfare universalism 
 
Participants were encouraged in the interviews to reflect more generally on 
whether they preferred Australia’s highly targeted, means-tested approach to 
welfare payments or a more universal system. They were also asked what they 
thought about the idea of a universal basic income. Seventeen of the young 
participants commented, with 12 endorsing means-testing as a way of targeting 
welfare payments. Five expressed cautious support for a less targeted approach and 
the possibility of a universal basic income scheme. Nine others recognised 
advantages to a universal basic income, such as reducing the stigma of being 
dependent on income support, reducing the administration costs of means-testing, 
and addressing the problem of structural unemployment should it increase in 




Of the 14 seniors who commented, half preferred a targeted and half a universal 
approach. The seniors based their views on a range of different considerations. 
Those who preferred targeting cited grounds such as ensuring the well-off were not 
receiving payments they didn’t need, minimising the overall cost of the welfare 
system and avoiding a ‘handout mentality’. Those who preferred universality, 
including four who specifically endorsed a universal basic income scheme, cited 
grounds such as reduced stigma, more efficient administration, addressing 
structural unemployment, and egalitarian considerations. Three seniors suggested 
reduced targeting would encourage a handout mentality for younger people but not 
for older people: universal benefits were seen as appropriate for retirees because 
everyone who had worked hard and paid taxes had earned a state-funded 
retirement regardless of whether they had the means to be self-funded or not. 
 
If things are means-tested, someone who’s worked hard all their life and 
built up their assets is going to be penalised, whereas someone who has 
always rented or hasn’t saved money is going to have quite a nice free ride 
(Participant 35 - Female, 63). 
 
6.1.4 Newstart - level 
 
The survey asked participants whether the 2016 Newstart Allowance rate of $529 
per fortnight (basic maximum rate for a single person) was appropriate. The results 
are set out in Table 4. A significant majority of participants, 68% of the young group 
and 73% of the senior group, believed the level of Newstart Allowance was too low 





Table 4: Newstart Allowance level 
 Much too 
low 
Too low About 
right 
Too high Much too 
high 
Young participants (n=25) 4 13 7 1 0 
Senior participants (n=29) 8 13 7 1 0 
Total (n=54) 12 26 14 2 0 
% of young participants 16% 52% 28% 4% 0% 
% of senior participants 28% 45% 24% 3% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
As in the survey, there was strong support in the interviews for raising Newstart. 
The senior group were generally more conscious than the younger participants of 
cost of living issues, which are particularly acute for people on Newstart, the lowest 
of the income support payments. This came through in the interviews, with five of 
the senior participants citing cost of living as the reason they thought Newstart was 
too low. One young respondent and two seniors thought setting Newstart too low 
made life difficult for recipients and potentially contributed to social unrest and 
crime. Two senior participants noted that a very low level of Newstart made it 
harder for recipients to absorb the economic and psychological costs of looking for 
work. Five young participants said that it was unfair to penalise people with a low 
benefit when they may not be unemployed by choice.  
 
People will be so concerned about trying to live that how do you expect 
people to go looking for jobs? (Participant 31 - Male, 70). 
 
If you keep it really low that’s just going to encourage a nasty sort of attitude 
and a struggle for them (Participant 32 - Female, 68). 
 
I can’t conceive of people just being like oh, I’m going to sit around all 





However, 15 of the 36 participants (16 young and 20 senior) who commented on 
the level of Newstart thought setting it too high could encourage abuse of the 
system and disincentivise people from taking a low-paid job. Five participants 
expressed scepticism that large numbers of people would actually choose to subsist 
on Newstart payments in preference to working. Three young participants thought 
a low level was defensible because Newstart was intended as a temporary rather 
than long-term payment. 
 
I consider the payment too high. If it was lower, it would give them more 
incentive to go out and find work. But they’re just prepared to live off that 
amount of money that they get (Participant 11 - Male, 66). 
 
If you pay people something that they can survive on quite well, they’re not 
going to want to go and apply for jobs and things (Participant 35 - Female, 
63). 
 
If you throw money at them, what’s the point of going out to work? 
(Participant 40 - Female, 60). 
 
6.1.5 Newstart – structural employment issues 
 
Concerns about distorting incentives for jobseekers highlighted a broader issue 
around how much control people believe the unemployed have over their situation. 
Interview participants were asked to what extent they thought the long-term 
unemployed in particular had made a ‘lifestyle choice’, or whether their 
circumstances were a result of forces beyond their control such as economic 
conditions. They were also asked whether they thought it had become more 
difficult over the last half-century for young people to make the transition to full-
time work. Participants generally gave nuanced, thoughtful responses in this area. 
Of the 22 young participants and 25 seniors who commented, only three (all 
seniors) took a fairly simplistic view of welfare dependency resulting from a failure 




They choose that lifestyle. That’s it. Especially young girls, as soon as they 
leave school, instead of going out and looking for work, they decide to go 
and get pregnant and live off the welfare system (Participant 11 - Male, 66). 
 
I think a lot of it is their fault…I just think it’s such a pathetic lack of 
responsibility for self (Participant 39 - Female, 70). 
 
You’ve got the people who perhaps don’t want to work, and let’s call them 
dole-bludgers…they certainly wouldn’t do something they think is below 
them. Even though they should be doing it (Participant 5 - Female, 64). 
 
Most participants recognised that a complex mix of factors contribute to people 
being on income support payments. Eleven of the young participants and nine of 
the seniors thought there may be a small minority of people who were lazy or 
inflexible about the jobs they would consider or took insufficient responsibility for 
ensuring they developed job-appropriate skills. However, all but the three senior 
participants quoted above also mentioned a range of problems people may have 
that are largely outside their control. These included poor educational 
opportunities, general socioeconomic disadvantage, a history of abuse, family 
issues, mild physical or intellectual disability, drug addiction, mental health issues, 
ageism, the psychological impact of being long-term unemployed, lack of support to 
address issues and become job-ready, and geographical location and lack of public 
transport making jobs inaccessible. 
 
It’s just unfair, I think, to demonise people for not being able to work when 






The cost of punishing people who are on it through no fault of their own is 
too high. I do accept the problem, that if the payment ever got too high 
overall, that could breed welfare dependence, and that would be a bad 
thing, but I don’t think that’s a risk at the current level it’s at (Participant 48 
– Male, 21). 
 
Three young participants and six seniors thought it was difficult for some 
unemployed people to meet employers’ higher expectations of experience and 
qualification levels, and that the education system was partly to blame for this. 
Twenty of the young group and 19 of the seniors viewed broader economic 
conditions as problematic. Factors that were mentioned included a depressed jobs 
market in Adelaide, increasing casualisation of the workforce, automation and the 
decline of the manufacturing sector, lack of investment in new industries, 
globalisation, privatisation and structural unemployment. 
 
It seems more competitive and you need to be the best to be able to get 
there rather than just sort of, you’ve got a degree (Participant 3 - Female, 
22). 
 
I’ve done really well through high school, I’ve done really well so far at uni, 
but I’m still worried about my job prospects…even if I pass uni with flying 
colours, there’s no certainty anymore (Participant 42 - Male, 19). 
 
Nineteen of the young participants and 17 of the seniors thought changes to 
economic conditions since the 1960s had made it considerably harder for young 
people to transition into the full-time workforce. No one said things had become 
easier, although three young participants and four seniors suggested there had 
been an inflation of expectations around what a job should offer. 
 
When I left school, you got a job the next day. And if you didn’t like it you got 




When I first looked for employment in Australia it was times of full 
employment. It is no longer that. It may never be that (Participant 28 - 
Female, 62). 
 
When I left school you could walk into a job, had a choice of jobs, and they 
would be full-time, permanent (Participant 8 - Female, 67). 
 
Seven of the young participants and 13 seniors thought there was a good chance 
unemployment would rise in the future and remain persistently high, with a 
segment of the working age population becoming almost unemployable due to the 
large-scale decline of lower-skilled jobs through out-sourcing and automation. One 
of these young participants and five of the seniors held out some hope that the 
creation of new jobs in technology and services would partly offset the jobs that 
would disappear. The young participants were split in terms of whether they valued 
choice and flexibility over stability and greater certainty around their pathways into 
work and adulthood. Eight of the 19 young interviewees who commented on this 
issue actively embraced choice and the risks that came with it. The other 11 had 
some trepidation about entering the full-time job market and would trade some of 
their choices for more certainty. Five said having too many choices made things 
harder for people, and one noted that sometimes the appearance of choice was an 
illusion. Five of the senior participants commented on the balance between 
flexibility and certainty for young people, with four thinking more certainty would 
be valuable, and two describing the range of choices available as ‘scary’. 
 
I think having too many choices makes things a little difficult, you don’t know 
where to go (Participant 44 - Female, 22). 
 





What if I’m just investing three years, four years, in a degree that doesn’t get 
me anything? Like, that could happen. And we just don’t know (Participant 
47 – Male, 20). 
 
6.1.6 Newstart – conditionality 
 
Participants were asked in the interviews if they thought the conditions attached to 
the receipt of Newstart payments were reasonable.136 The conditions given as 
examples were applying for a minimum number of jobs each week, participating in 
mutual obligation/work for the dole-style programs, and the Government’s 
proposed introduction of drug-testing.137 Twenty-five young participants and 21 of 
the seniors commented. Eleven of the young group said some job search 
requirements were necessary, but they were probably too arduous. Nine thought 
current requirements tended to be overly punitive, demeaning income support 
recipients and undermining their individual autonomy by absorbing much of their 
time and energy and sometimes compelling them to undertake particular kinds of 
work. 
 
If you’re unemployed I still think you should have personal choice and 
freedom, like it doesn’t make you a criminal (Participant 14 - Male, 22). 
 
Some of the conditions they put on…are just archaic, almost, they’re just 
there for no real purpose other than to demean people (Participant 42 - 
Male, 19). 
 
That’s super dehumanising and it’s just like you’re doing things for the sake 
of ticking boxes rather than pursuing something which is meaningful and 
that you care about (Participant 52 – Female, 21). 
 
136 The Government made changes in mid-2018 to strengthen penalties for job seekers who don’t 
meet their requirements and proposed another raft of new compliance measures in 2019 
(Henriques-Gomes 2019). 
137 Introducing mandatory drug testing for some Newstart and Youth Allowance recipients was a live 




Five of the young group thought the existing conditions were appropriate. Two 
noted that attaching conditions to Newstart helped to legitimise the system in the 
eyes of the taxpayers required to fund it. Surprisingly, six of the young participants 
were relatively supportive of the drug testing proposal and six were not. Only two 
of the young participants commented on work for the dole schemes, saying they 
didn’t seem to serve any useful purpose. This lack of familiarity may be because the 
young participants didn’t remember the wave of media attention generated by 
changes to these requirements under the Howard Government.  
 
I’m okay with the conditions and the drug testing because we need to fight 
the culture of entitlement (Participant 53 – Female, 21). 
 
Three of the seniors endorsed job search requirements to encourage individual 
responsibility. Nine liked the idea of work for the dole schemes as long as they were 
meaningful and non-exploitative. Six thought current requirements tended to be 
overly punitive. One of the senior participants was strongly supportive of the drug 
testing proposal but seven were concerned about it. One of the seniors thought 
that the stricter conditions, the better. 
 
I think that anybody that receives government funding has to have some 
accountability, like what are you doing with that money? (Participant 23 - 
Male, 61). 
 
Why should the state continue to fund people who are into drugs or who 
don’t care about getting a job? (Participant 39 - Female, 70). 
 
In the interviews, participants reflected on income support payments and 
Australia’s welfare system more generally. Five young participants and 11 seniors 
endorsed a standardised system of payments, largely because the cost of living was 
the same for everyone. However, five young participants and six seniors favoured 
greater tailoring of payments to people’s individual circumstances, although they 
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recognised the administrative challenges this would entail. Three said lower rates of 
payment might be justified when people were only expected to need benefits for a 
short time period or finding a job was a realistic alternative for them. 
 
Eight participants commented on the stigma and potential psychological effects of 
being dependent on welfare benefits (other than the Age Pension). Another four 
participants recognised that benefits were returned to the economy in some form 
and providing adequate support for people may reduce expenses associated with 
social problems such as crime. Participants generally felt that income support 
payments should provide people with a decent (rather than barely adequate) 
standard of living and hope for the future. 
 
Welfare’s meant to support people, it’s not meant to be just a safety net, it’s 
meant to support people in being able to live sustainably and well 
(Participant 19 - Female, 19). 
 
I think we’re a rich country and there shouldn’t be people struggling to the 
degree that they are (Participant 18 - Male, 70). 
 
Only two participants, both seniors, seemed more concerned about abuse of the 
welfare system than its role in providing effective support for people in need. 
 
I’m being penalised because people are poor…you’re either gambling, taking 
drugs or whatever, or drinking. So I’m being penalised because people aren’t 
doing the right thing and I don’t think that’s a fair system (Participant 38 - 
Female, 66). 
 
6.1.7 Other income support payments 
 
The survey asked participants about the levels at which other income support 
payments were set. The results are set out in Appendix G (Tables 15 to 18). The 
majority of participants from both the young and senior groups thought the 
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Disability Support Pension, Carer Payment, Parenting Payment and Youth Allowance 
were set too low or much too low. Very few participants thought these payments 
were too high.  
 
Only a small number of participants mentioned income support payments other 
than the Age Pension and Newstart in the interviews. Seven young participants 
advocated a higher Disability Support Pension because disability was often 
permanent and people did not necessarily have the choice of finding a job to 
increase their income. One young participant and one senior thought discrimination 
could be a barrier to the disabled working even when they had the capacity to do 
so. Two seniors commented that the eligibility requirements around the Disability 
Support Pension should be kept tight to prevent abuse of the system.  
 
Six senior participants mentioned Carer Payment in the interviews, with five 
likening the in-home care role to external/private care work and believing it should 
be remunerated accordingly. Three young participants mentioned Carer Payment, 
suggesting that it should be higher because recipients could not make the choice to 
increase their income by getting a job due to their caring responsibilities. 
 
Three young participants and ten seniors commented on Parenting Payment 
(Single) in the interviews, with the young participants and three of the seniors 
saying it should be relatively generous given that recipients were supporting 
someone other than themselves. 
 
I want there to be plenty of money for parents trying to provide for their 
children whilst they themselves are unable to work (Participant 47 – Male, 
20). 
 
I don’t think it’s an incentive for them to have children, no. And I really 
strongly support the single parent funding because children need to get a 




The remaining seven seniors who commented were broadly of the view that 
women who became welfare-dependent single mothers138 had shown themselves 
to be irresponsible or had produced children in order to maximise their welfare 
benefits, and therefore did not necessarily deserve support. None of these 
participants acknowledged that children would inevitably be affected by any 
reduction or withholding of income support payments for single parents. 
 
How many children can someone have if you can’t support them? And they 
just have one after the other after the other…They get so much money for 
bludging (Participant 5 - Female, 64). 
 
I’m not anti-supporting parents, I think if you have one accident, that’s okay. 
I think when we see there are people that are having many, multiple 
children, then why should society provide for them? It’s a choice that they 
make (Participant 27 - Female, 64). 
 
I haven’t got children, but it just seems there’s been so much handed out it’s 
very difficult to take any back (Participant 39 - Female, 70). 
 
They see that having babies means the Government’s going to pay them 
more and more child support…the country is doomed! The wrong people 
having babies. And I think that’s a horrible thing to say, but there’s got to be 
more personal responsibility (Participant 35 - Female, 63). 
 
All seven of the young group and the sole senior who commented on the level of 
Youth Allowance in the interviews thought it was too low. The young participants 
personally knew students who were attempting to survive on Youth Allowance and 
experiencing severe impacts on their academic progress and wellbeing, although 
some also knew of people who were receiving plenty of support from parents but 
had managed to access Youth Allowance via a ‘loophole’. Nine of the young 
 
138 Single fathers were not mentioned. 
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participants and two of the seniors thought the eligibility conditions, including 
demonstrating independence and the maximum income thresholds (for recipients 
and their parents), were too strict.139 
 
I myself cannot get Youth Allowance because my step-mum earns over the 
limit, but I don’t get any support or anything from her (Participant 16 - Male, 
19). 
 
I’m quite lucky, my mum’s happy to support me, but I have friends who are 
the same age as me and have been completely cut-off financially. And 
they’re obviously really struggling (Participant 4 - Female, 19). 
 
I know a lot of people that have parents over the threshold, but their parents 
don’t give them anything (Participant 41 - Female, 20). 
 
The assumption that everyone’s circumstances were the same, and all parents 
earning over the maximum income threshold were supporting their adult children 
during their studies or periods of sickness or unemployment, was viewed as 
problematic by some participants. Only two of the young participants said parents 
had a responsibility to keep supporting their adult children into their 20s. Eight of 
the seniors thought it was parents’ responsibility to keep supporting their adult 
children if they were studying in their 20s, while the same number thought young 
people should be considered independent once they were out of their teens. 
 





139 Young adults who are not able to demonstrate independence from their parents have a parental 
income test included in the means-testing for Youth Allowance, which renders many ineligible for 
any support and wholly reliant on their parents until the age of 25. 
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6.2 Retirement income 
 
6.2.1 Retirement age 
 
Survey participants were asked what they thought were the most appropriate ages 
for retirement, pension eligibility and superannuation preservation. The results are 
set out in Appendix G (Tables 19 to 21). There was little support for further raising 
the pension eligibility age or superannuation preservation age. Well over half of 
participants saw 65-69 as the appropriate age to retire. Although nearly a fifth of 
participants were in support of people working until at least age 70, more were in 
favour of retirement before 65. These results align with a 2016 poll in which almost 
half of Australians surveyed preferred a pension eligibility age of 65, while 27% 
supported an increase (Bray & Gray 2016, p.4). A slightly earlier 2009 poll similarly 
found 60% of people opposed to an increase (Kendig et al. 2015, p.3). Young 
participants were more likely to opt for retirement ages both younger and older 
than the 65-69 range, possibly because they cared less about this issue than the 
seniors and were not as committed to the status quo. 
 
Participants’ views on the appropriate age for pension eligibility were largely 
aligned with their views on the appropriate age for retirement.140 Some who saw 
70+ as an appropriate retirement age still favoured a pension eligibility age of less 
than 70. There was strong support for the superannuation preservation age being 
set lower than the pension eligibility age, despite it potentially meaning some 
people retired prematurely or exhausted their superannuation before reaching 
pension age. More than three-quarters of participants favoured a superannuation 
preservation age between 60 and 64. Only small numbers favoured a preservation 
age of less than 60, suggesting endorsement of the Australian Government’s recent 
reforms in this area which raised the preservation age to 60. 
 
 
140 Pension eligibility has historically made retirement possible for many people, so it is to be 
expected that these ages would be in alignment, but higher numbers of self-funded retirees may 
lead to a greater disconnect between the pension eligibility age and the age at which people retire. 
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Opposition to raising the pension eligibility age to 70 came through strongly in the 
interviews. All 25 of the young interviewees commented on this issue and 18 of 
them said 70 was too high, mainly because health issues became more common in 
people’s 60s and the physical requirements of some jobs meant people would be 
worn out and/or unable to perform their work by their mid-60s. Three of these 
participants were concerned that people could die at any time and if they had to 
wait till 70 to retire they may miss out on retirement altogether. Seven of the young 
participants were relatively comfortable with raising the pension age to 70 in 
recognition of increased life expectancy, although they emphasised that this should 
be a on a case-by-case basis as some people may need to retire earlier.  
 
All 28 of the senior interviewees commented on the pension eligibility age and 25 of 
them said 70 was too high. Seniors had the same concerns as the young group 
about health issues and the physical requirements of some jobs. Ageism and 
difficulty coping with the rapid pace of change were also mentioned as barriers to 
longer workforce participation. Three of the seniors were relatively comfortable 
with raising the pension eligibility age to 70, with the same proviso as the young 
participants. Of all the interviewees across both age groups, only four young 
participants and two seniors observed without prompting that long taxpayer-
funded retirements and fewer taxpayers were going to result in fiscal pressures.  
 
You should retire when you can’t work rather than when you don’t want to 
work (Participant 44 - Female, 22). 
 
If you’re fit enough to work, you go to work (Participant 7 - Male, 69). 
  
Where’s the money going to come from for everyone who needs to go on the 
pension? You know, it doesn’t come off the tree (Participant 36 - Female, 65). 
 
We can’t expect to retire at the same age and live for another 15 years. 




Even when prompted in the interviews to consider the sustainability of the Age 
Pension system under conditions of longer lifespans, an ageing population and a 
shrinking taxpayer base, most of the participants emphasised the importance of 
retiring well before the onset of chronic ill-health over other considerations. These 
participants saw the right to a healthy, state-funded retirement as a given, now and 
in the future. Eight of the seniors characterised retirement as a period of leisure 
earned by right, with another six emphasising the importance of retirees continuing 
productive activities (largely for community benefit). 
 
I think we all deserve that, like if we spend our whole lives working and stuff, 
are we supposed to just work until we’re too sick and old to work? 
(Participant 41 - Female, 20) 
 
If they want to just spend their time holidaying, they’ve probably earned it by 
then (Participant 45 - Male, 18). 
 
Nine young participants said everyone had the right to retire at around 65 and 
enjoy a period of leisure even if they were still fit enough to keep working. Five 
young participants thought it was important that retirees participated in productive 
activities such as caring and volunteering (largely for their own personal benefit). 
Two of the young participants preferred a model of taking breaks for travel, study 
and non-work activities throughout the lifecourse rather than saving everything up 
for retirement. 
 
I think the idea that a lot of people have of, like, when I retire I’ll do this, or 
I’ll retire young and do all these things I’ve always wanted to do, is almost 
just a bit odd because you could be enjoying life now, when you’re working 





6.2.2 Superannuation – compulsoriness 
 
In the survey participants were asked whether they thought the primary 
responsibility for funding retirement lay with individuals (through private savings or 
superannuation). The results are set out in Table 5. This was a polarising issue, with 
similar proportions of participants in agreement and in disagreement and a 
reasonable number of participants selecting ‘neither agree nor disagree’. 
 
Table 5: Individuals should make private provision for retirement 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 1 9 6 8 1 
Senior participants (n=30) 2 10 5 9 4 
Total (n=55) 3 19 11 17 5 
% of young participants 4% 36% 24% 32% 4% 
% of senior participants 7% 33% 17% 30% 13% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Participants were asked in the interviews whether they endorsed Australia’s system 
of compulsory superannuation. Twenty-three of the young participants 
commented, with all but three of them broadly supporting compulsory 
superannuation (coupled with a safety net pension). Three noted that people 
needed to be compelled to save for retirement and three supported 
superannuation on the grounds that it encouraged self-sufficiency. Four were 
concerned that the Government may eventually use the maturity of the 
superannuation system to justify removing the pension safety net. The three young 
participants who were not supportive of super preferred a means-tested pension 
system funded through tax-and-transfer. None of the young participants seemed 
aware that the introduction of compulsory superannuation schemes involves 
several generations paying taxes to fund the pensions of older generations at the 




Eighteen of the senior group commented on compulsory superannuation, with four 
saying they did not support it and another five expressing some ambivalence. The 
generally lower level of support among the senior group was based on their lived 
experience of superannuation and distrust of government and markets. Six senior 
participants complained that superannuation allowed government to interfere with 
their money and subject it to market fluctuations. Of those senior participants who 
supported compulsory super, eight emphasised the importance of retaining a safety 
net pension. Four mentioned encouraging self-sufficiency and people taking 
individual responsibility for their retirement as advantages of super. Two noted that 
superannuation relieved the burden of pension payments on the public purse.  
 
The superannuation we’ve got now is basically a cash cow for the 
Government and the fund managers (Participant 34 - Male, 68). 
 
I support the superannuation, I think it was a very good project that in our 
situation has worked brilliantly…I think we’re the envy of the world actually 
(Participant 28 - Female, 62). 
 
6.2.3 Superannuation – lump sums 
 
Despite the maturity of the superannuation system over the next few decades, 
Treasury forecasts predict only a small drop in pension spending (see Chapter 2). 
This is partly due to growing numbers of older people and partly because many of 
them are not expected to have sufficient superannuation to be fully self-funded in 
retirement. There is no requirement for superannuation to be used to fund day-to-
day living costs in retirement. Once they are eligible to access their super, retirees 
can withdraw it as a lump sum, spend it as they wish and fall back on the pension. 
Interview participants were asked whether they thought people had a responsibility 
to use their superannuation to fund their living costs in retirement. Some 
participants found it difficult to answer this question, finding themselves torn 
between individuals’ right to choose how to spend their superannuation and 




Twenty-one young participants and 24 seniors commented on this issue. Sixteen of 
the young participants but only three of the seniors were supportive of people’s 
right to spend their superannuation lump sum as they pleased. The young 
participants resisted the idea of the Government telling people what to do with 
their own money and thought it was understandable if they wanted to spend it 
quickly because ‘life was short’. Five young participants (and seven seniors) did 
support tax incentives to encourage retirees to draw their superannuation as an 
annuity rather than a lump sum. 
 
At that age, or if you live that long, I think you probably have the rights to 
your own superannuation in a way. I mean, it’s your money, you should be 
able to decide what you want to do with it (Participant 16 - Male, 19). 
 
We do live in a free society and I think when you start controlling the way 
people spend their money to that extent, there are more negative 
consequences than positive ones (Participant 53 – Female, 21). 
 
It certainly seems a bit dictatorial to sort of give it out in increments 
(Participant 47 – Male, 20). 
 
Does the Government have to look after us like children and say you can’t 
spend this money? (Participant 43 - Male, 18). 
 
They can spend it; if they want to spend it stupidly, they can spend it stupidly 
(Participant 9 - Female, 20). 
 
The seniors who supported the individual’s right to spend his or her superannuation 
freely justified their views differently to the young participants. These seniors 
tended to see the pension as an entitlement regardless of how much 
superannuation people had. In fact, superannuation was viewed as an obstacle to 




That’s what I did! And it shouldn’t be allowed…I bought a brand new car…I 
used the system to my advantage…I went on an overseas holiday too. I 
thought why not…the Government’s only going to use it as an excuse not to 
give me the pension (Participant 31 - Male, 70). 
 
You’re gonna try and get rid of that superannuation so as to get yourself on 
the pension (Participant 11 - Male, 66). 
 
If someone’s struggled all their lives and they get a small amount of money 
and they want to buy a Winnebago and go travel, good luck to them. And if 
they come back then and need a pension, if they’ve actually paid their taxes 
and all that through their lives, good luck, they can have their pension 
(Participant 8 - Female, 67). 
 
Even among the ten seniors who had reservations about people’s right to spend 
their superannuation freely, five reported that they knew people who were 
purposely spending their lump sums in order to become pension-eligible and 
maximise their overall retirement funds.  
 
I think there’s very much a mindset in a lot of people I talk to of a similar 
age…it’s we worked hard and we won’t be eligible for the pension because 
we’ve got this money, therefore I need to spend the money as fast as I can 
and then whack myself on the pension (Participant 25 - Female, 60). 
 
I personally know a couple…they are going on lots of holidays overseas, new 
cars, fancy cars, doing up their house, and when they’ve spent their super, 
they’re going to go on the pension (Participant 22 - Female, 65). 
 
Three young participants and four seniors were firmly of the view that people 
should not be permitted to take all of their superannuation as a lump sum. Three 
seniors objected to the practice of ‘double dipping’ - taking advantage of the 
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superannuation tax concessions and then also receiving a taxpayer-funded pension. 
Three seniors and three young participants thought it was irresponsible for people 
to squander their superannuation and fall back on the pension. Six seniors were 
concerned about spending superannuation too quickly, not because it was the 
wrong thing to do, but because ending up totally reliant on the pension was risky. 
 
6.2.4 Pension as entitlement 
 
A number of interview participants believed that people over a certain age should 
be automatically entitled to state-funded income support, regardless of need, 
because they had worked hard and paid taxes during their lives. 141 Of the eight 
senior participants who commented, six believed a pension of indefinite duration 
was their due reward for having been a working taxpayer, while two were sceptical. 
Eight seniors spoke of themselves and/or their age peers actively trying to reduce 
their assets (including by spending superannuation pay-outs and sheltering wealth 
in the family home) so as not to miss out on the means-tested Age Pension. While 
there was heavy criticism of this practice from most seniors, three complained 
bitterly that their superannuation and other assets were preventing them from 
receiving what they saw as their own rightful pension entitlements. 
 
My income tax should be preserved for my retirement (Participant 30 - 
Female, 66). 
 
If you have worked then I think you’re entitled to the pension come pension 
age. I really feel strongly about that. Because then I wouldn’t be draining my 
super (Participant 38 - Female, 66). 
 
 
141 None of the participants followed this through to the logical conclusion that people who had 
undertaken unpaid work (including home duties and child-rearing), or been reliant on working-age 
income support, had not earned the right to an aged pension. 
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I paid taxes, it’s my right! The reality is it’s a non-contributory scheme…so 
overall I think the Age Pension can be something of a rort. It’s being pork-
barrelled (Participant 7 - Male, 69). 
 
Young participants were also fairly supportive of the idea of state-funded 
retirement as entitlement and reward. Of the nine young participants who 
commented, six agreed with the idea and three objected, pointing out that 
targeting income support at the needy was a more efficient and effective use of the 
available resources. 
 
If you’ve worked your whole life, you definitely have the right to an active 
retirement of some kind. I think it’s more than fair (Participant 16 - Male, 
19). 
 
When you’ve been an active contributing member of society for 65 to 70 
years, whatever it is, you kind of have the right to mooch off society a little 
bit, even if it’s not, you know, entirely right (Participant 41 - Female, 20). 
 
It would be good for the Government to kind of pay you back for being a 
responsible citizen and paying your taxes (Participant 43 - Male, 18). 
 
Any excess money would be better channelled into developing our aged care 
system, to put money into that sector, rather than giving a general reward to 
everyone for good hard work (Participant 10 - Female, 23). 
 
The young participants were reluctant to disparage the behaviour of their elders or 
to call into question their entitlement to public assistance by virtue of their age 
alone, whether they needed it or not. By contrast, the senior participants were 





I think there is a general climate that old people do need to be looked after. 
But I don’t know that there’s any logical reason why they should be any more 
looked after than any other section of the population (Participant 1 - Female, 
69). 
 
6.3 Tax expenditures 
 
6.3.1 Awareness of programs 
 
In the survey, participants were asked how informed they felt they were about 
significant tax expenditure programs, including superannuation tax concessions, 
exemption of the family home from capital gains tax, the capital gains tax discount 
on investment properties, tax offsets for seniors and the childcare rebate. The 
results are set out in Appendix G (Tables 22 and 23). Responses were relatively 
spread out on the issue of being well-informed about tax expenditure programs for 
the seniors; not unexpectedly, young participants were less likely to feel well-
informed. A quarter of young participants and a third of seniors claimed to be well-
informed about the programs, but this was not borne out in the interviews, during 
which very few participants evinced much knowledge of the programs specified. 
However, the substantial majority of participants who agreed that tax expenditure 
programs should be considered as redistributive policies suggested some level of 
awareness of the general implications of these programs. 
 
Interview data confirmed that most participants had only a limited understanding of 
tax expenditure programs, even when they had personally taken advantage of 
them. Eighteen of the young participants and 12 of the seniors freely admitted that 
they knew very little and thought more information should be made available to the 





You need to have a tax accountant or lawyer to really understand it all…You 
know that you don’t know much about tax law, but then you actually study it 
and you realise how little you know…it’s a troubling area (Participant 15 - 
Male, 23). 
 
Based on what they knew, 14 of the young group and 14 of the seniors thought tax 
expenditure programs appeared to largely benefit the well-off. Participants were 
generally somewhat vague about whether this was because the programs purposely 
targeted the well-off, or that these people had more knowledge of how to work the 
system to their advantage (or both).  
 
For me, I always glaze over when I hear negative gearing (Participant 35 - 
Female, 63). 
 
I will be one of those who have no clue. And the ones that do know are the 
ones with all the money. (Participant 36 - Female, 65). 
 
Most of these things seem to be geared towards people with lots of money, 
rather than the poor people, they just get left behind, they’ve got no idea 
(Participant 24 - Male, 70). 
 
6.3.2 Purpose of programs 
 
Participants were asked what they thought were acceptable purposes for tax 
expenditure programs, and what purposes the programs served in reality. The 
results, set out in Appendix G (Tables 24 and 25), reflected a misalignment between 
what participants saw as the legitimate and actual purposes of tax expenditure 
programs. For example, very few participants thought it was acceptable for tax 
expenditures to transfer resources to people who were well-off or to influence 
voting behaviour, but a much larger number believed these were actual effects of 
the programs. Similarly, participants were much more likely to think tax 
expenditures should be used to transfer resources to those who were not well-off 
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and promote socially desirable aims than to believe these were actual outcomes of 
the programs.  
 
In the interviews, seven young participants and eight seniors objected to the use of 
tax breaks to incentivise certain behaviours and were sceptical about the collective 
or social benefits of such programs. Three young participants and ten seniors 
thought that incentivising behaviour that was in the public interest was a legitimate 
purpose of tax break programs in principle, although they generally did not agree 
that this was actually what was occurring. It was noted that if tax expenditures were 
to genuinely serve a social purpose, they needed to be fair, well-thought out with a 
clear cost/benefit rationale, and effectively communicated to the public. Six seniors 
were concerned about the possibility of these programs having unintended 
consequences, although only one specifically raised the market distortions that 
often result.142 One young participant and three seniors thought some tax 
expenditure programs had been introduced for valid reasons but had passed their 
use-by dates. 
 
I think there’s too many schemes where people can avoid paying the 
appropriate level of tax. I mean, you’ve got to have money to be able to do 
that and that’s ironic, because if you’ve got enough money you should 
perhaps be paying a fairer whack of tax (Participant 35 - Female, 63). 
 
If they’re there, I’ll use them too, even if I disagree with many of them 
(Participant 20 - Male, 62). 
 
It’s taking money, it’s giving money to people who don’t need it, and to my 
mind don’t deserve it because they look after themselves and they’re taking 




142 For example, schemes like childcare subsidies, private health insurance rebates and first home 
buyer grants may just push up costs rather than making goods and services more affordable. 
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6.3.3 Generosity of programs 
 
Survey participants were also asked, from what they knew of the specified tax 
expenditure programs, whether they thought any were too generous or not 
generous enough. The results are set out in Appendix G (Tables 26 and 27). There 
was a high rate of participants skipping these questions or selecting ‘none of the 
above’ for one or both questions, suggesting many participants felt unable to 
answer in an informed or meaningful way. The capital gains tax discount for 
investment properties was the program most frequently viewed as too generous, 
while the childcare rebate was the program most frequently viewed as not 
generous enough, particularly by the young group. 
 
At interview, 19 participants from the young group and 24 from the senior group 
said they thought the scale of at least some of the tax expenditure programs 
seemed excessive and supported them being wound back or caps being placed on 
the benefits they provided. Programs delivering benefits to property investors such 
as negative gearing and the capital gains tax discount were the least favoured. The 
participants who commented on the superannuation tax concessions were split, 
with one young participant and three seniors supporting the current or an 
expanded version of this program, while one young participant and three seniors 
viewed it as too generous. The participants in favour assumed that the 
superannuation tax concessions were fulfilling the purpose of converting people 
who would otherwise become pensioners into self-funded retirees, although this 
has been disputed (see Chapter 2). Two of the seniors reported that they liked the 
private health insurance rebate because they personally benefited. One of the 
young participants supported the childcare rebate, but the two seniors who 
commented on this program were resentful that it hadn’t been available to them 
when they needed it. 
 
I think with inflation running at, what, about 1%, 1.5% a year, a 50% capital 




6.4 Housing Affordability 
 
6.4.1 The role of housing 
 
Survey participants were asked some general questions to elicit their views about 
the role of housing and the balance between affordability and wealth generation 
through property ownership The results are set out in Appendix G (Tables 28 to 30). 
Participants felt strongly that housing should be more affordable even if this meant 
house prices decreased, disadvantaging current property owners. Only two of the 
seniors and none of the young participants disagreed with this proposition, while 
77% of the senior group and 88% of the young group agreed or strongly agreed. 
Most of the senior participants were homeowners themselves but were willing to 
sacrifice some of the value of their homes in the interests of enhancing affordability 
for new entrants to the market. 
 
The results for the other two questions in this section, whether wealth generation 
was an important purpose of residential housing and whether people who 
benefited from house price rises had earned their gains, were more ambivalent. 
Participants from both groups had some trouble answering, with significant 
proportions selecting ‘neither agree nor disagree’ (including over half in the case of 
whether people had earned their house price gains). Participants who did express a 
view on whether generating wealth was an important purpose of residential 
housing were relatively polarised. Of the minority of participants who expressed a 
view on whether people had earned their house price gains, both groups (especially 
the young) were more likely to agree. 
 
Discussion about housing issues in the interviews was similarly characterised by 
ambivalence, inconsistency and uncertainty about the proper function of residential 
property in Australian society, particularly among seniors. Senior participants were 
in some ways more concerned than the young about housing affordability issues 
because for them owning a home evidently carried a different set of meanings. 
They emphasised the need to put down roots and build an emotional attachment to 
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place, rather than the practical matters of securing somewhere to live or sharing in 
the wealth generated by rising property prices. This put some senior participants in 
the difficult position of wanting young Australians to enjoy the same emotional 
benefits of owning a home, but also favouring the retention of policies that treated 
the family home as more than just another asset even if these policies potentially 
contributed to higher property prices. 
 
Many of the senior participants appeared to want the homes they owned to be 
recognised as the product, not of their good fortune at being able to enter the 
property market when housing was more affordable, but as evidence that they had 
made good choices and led fiscally responsible lives. Just as a state pension was 
commonly viewed as reward for hard work and paying taxes, having your home 
granted privileged status in a policy context was seen as due recognition of hard 
work and saving. It also reinforced a sense of economic and emotional security. 
 
I think people are entitled to have the home that they’ve lived in and worked 
hard for…I’m not into any touching of the family home (Participant 25 - 
Female, 60). 
 
I’m just gonna sit on this house (Participant 32 - Female, 68). 
 
Young participants had absorbed cultural beliefs about the emotional importance of 
home and this made many of them broadly sympathetic to policies that granted the 
family home special status. However, none of the 21 young participants who 
commented on how they and their peers viewed home ownership expressed much 
of an affective element for themselves. Instead, they couched home ownership in 
terms of the practicality of needing somewhere to live and financial investment, if 
they aspired to it at all. 
 





I think that young people are not as attached to family, they don’t like the 
idea of staying in one place…for me, for example, a house doesn’t mean 
anything (Participant 44 - Female, 22). 
 
I think most people now should actually just look at a house as an 
investment, not a home, if that makes sense? (Participant 16 - Male, 19). 
 
Four mentioned the possibility of young people developing an emotional desire for 
home ownership, particularly if it came to be seen as more accessible to them, 
although most expected their relatively dispassionate stance to persist as their 
generation grew older. 
 
I think if we can get a home, if we can actually have the same sort of security 
that older generations had, maybe that attachment will maintain 
(Participant 42 - Male, 19). 
 
I think because homes are seen as far less accessible to us…we don’t value 
the idea of it as much...It’s not as vital if we don’t have the white picket fence 
(Participant 9 - Female, 20). 
 
I think it’s definitely a thing like people do place sentimental value on their 
homes. But I personally not that much. I also don’t think I’m going to have 
enough money to buy a home and that might be a hard thing for my 
generation in general (Participant 50 – Male, 21). 
 
6.4.2 Housing affordability and policy 
 
Both the survey and the interviews asked participants to specifically consider the 
relationship between housing affordability and Australian Government policies such 
as tax expenditure programs benefitting property owners. The survey results are set 
out in Appendix G (Table 31). Only a small number of participants thought housing 
affordability was unaffected by any of the policies. Negative gearing and the capital 
204 
 
gains tax discount for investment property were more commonly seen as having an 
affordability impact than the exclusion of the family home from the Age Pension 
means test or the capital gains tax exemption for the family home. This 
differentiation between policies favouring people owning the home they live in and 
policies favouring property investors was reflected in the interview data. 
 
Twenty-four of the 25 of the young participants and 26 of the 28 seniors 
commented on links between housing affordability and Government policies in the 
interviews. Twenty-two of the young group thought house prices were too high, 
although five were not particularly concerned about the issue. The other two young 
participants felt house prices were acceptable and in fact would be concerned 
about any interventions to slow market growth or discourage investors. All 26 of 
the senior group who commented had concerns about housing affordability, 
although two did not feel strongly about this and pointed out that cheaper houses 
were available in some areas. Seventeen of the young group and 22 of the seniors 
thought that Government policies were contributing to higher house prices, 
although six of these young participants and two seniors viewed house prices as 
largely (and properly) the product of market forces. Three of the young group and 
two seniors were sceptical that Government intervention did or could influence 
house prices.  
 
Nine of the young participants said house prices were not a big issue for them 
because they and their peers were happy to rent and did not aspire to home 
ownership or would only purchase property for investment purposes. Seniors were 
more concerned about the impact of housing affordability on the young than the 
young themselves, with 12 of the senior participants dismayed at how difficult it 
was for new entrants, mainly young people and families, to gain access to the 
market. However, three of the seniors thought the main problem was that new 
buyers had inflated expectations and didn’t want to settle for a lower quality home 




Policies benefiting investors, especially negative gearing, attracted the most 
criticism, with seven young participants and 18 seniors wanting to see these wound 
back. Seven seniors were concerned about foreign investment in particular and two 
thought immigration and population pressures contributed to high house prices. 
Two young participants and two seniors thought urban planning and land use 
policies were also contributing to housing affordability problems. The young 
participants favoured more medium density housing, while the seniors were against 
infill development and advocated the release of more land at the urban fringe. 
 
It’s a basic necessity and where did it start to become an income-producing 
asset for so many people when so many others don’t have basic 
accommodation…the whole system’s stuffed (Participant 8 - Female, 67). 
 
Negative gearing just seems like a flagrant waste of money and a vote-getter 
for people who might have a bit more political capital than the lower people 
in society (Participant 42 - Male, 19). 
 
As for the investment properties, well, that’s investment and that should be 
taxed accordingly (Participant 34 - Male, 68). 
 
6.5 Wealth transfer tax 
 
The survey noted that many countries had a wealth transfer tax and that Australia 
had had similar taxes at state level in the past. Participants were asked whether 
Australia should consider introducing an estate tax for a small number of large 
estates.143 The results are set out in Table 6. A majority of participants from both 
groups were in favour of Australia considering the introduction of an estate tax for a 
small number of large estates. Just under a fifth disagreed or strongly disagreed 
 
143 This question was left vague deliberately as it was intended to ascertain in-principle support for 
considering the introduction of an estate tax, rather than support for a specific policy proposal. The 
subsequent question about the minimum value estate at which people thought the tax should apply 
gives some guidance as to what participants considered to be a ‘large estate.’ 
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with this proposition. The most commonly selected minimum estate value for such 
a tax to be applied was $3m, followed by $5m (see Appendix G, Table 32). 
 
Table 6: Australia should consider an estate tax for a small number of large estates 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 0 6 3 11 5 
Senior participants (n=30) 3 1 6 15 5 
Total (n=55) 3 7 9 26 10 
% of young participants 0% 24% 12% 44% 20% 
% of senior participants 10% 3% 20% 50% 17% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Sixteen young participants and 15 seniors commented on this issue in the 
interviews. Ten of the young participants and 11 seniors were supportive, although 
they generally said the tax rate should be relatively low and applied only to fairly 
large estates. These participants thought large estates could easily absorb the 
impost, the earner of the wealth was dead, and there was no obligation to 
bequeath wealth to direct descendants.  
 
Once you die, you’re not going to miss it, and for your heirs, it’s not money 
that they would have had anyway, so it should be a relatively pain-free, or 
victim-free, tax (Participant 1 - Female, 69). 
 
I don’t see why in particular my child should get all this money simply 
because I’ve been wealthy (Participant 18 - Male, 70). 
 
We’ve left the time when parents made money and the next generation 






There was some (limited) recognition of the role inheritance can play in 
concentrating wealth and entrenching disadvantage. 
 
If you’re starting out with two people, one with wealthy investment from 
their parents, and one who doesn’t have that same benefit, it’s hard to 
justify that it’s a fair go for all (Participant 10 - Female, 23). 
 
In the interviews, three of the young participants and one senior were unsure how 
they felt about an estate tax and said it would depend on the circumstances. Three 
young participants and three seniors were opposed. Their main concerns were that 
such a tax was inefficient and would lead to the break-up of farms and other 
properties and businesses worth preserving, and that government already meddled 
too much in people’s private affairs and taxed excessively. 
 
None of the young participants placed much importance on material legacies being 
passed down from one generation to the next and they were unconcerned about 
the idea of older people ‘spending the kids’ inheritance’. This was in keeping with 
their general view that people were entitled to do what they wished with their own 
money and there were no duties or obligations attached to wealth. An estate tax 
was unproblematic on this view because the individual with the wealth was dead 
and no-one else had a right to it. Four of the seniors expressed support for the 
tradition of leaving material bequests, but not because they felt obligated to ‘share 
the wealth’ they had accumulated during periods of favourable economic 
conditions. Rather, there was a sense that being able to leave your house to your 
children showed you had worked hard and been fiscally responsible, a mark of 
success and achievement. 
 
Eight of the young participants talked about passing on non-material legacies, such 
as specific values, norms and practices, from one generation to the next. Only five 
of the seniors had anything to say in this area, and their comments were brief. The 
young participants were in the process of exploring the resources and opportunities 
available to them - the hand they had been dealt – and this seemed to make them 
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reflective about what societies pass on to their young people. Those doing the 
dealing, the seniors, appeared relatively uninterested in what they were handing 
down. 
 
6.6 Other tax and spending issues 
 
Interview participants were asked whether they favoured any reform of Australia’s 
taxation regime. Seven of the young participants and 20 seniors commented. Four 
of the young group and 12 of the seniors said they would like to see the winding 
back of tax breaks and loopholes that allowed the very well-off and big business to 
minimise their tax. One senior participant observed that perceived tax evasion by 
large companies encouraged tax resistance among the general population. Two 
young participants and 11 seniors wanted to see the company tax rate maintained 
at the current 30%, or even increased, rather than reduced to 25% as proposed by 
the Government in the 2016-17 Federal Budget. Two seniors supported a decrease 
in company tax rates. Six of the seniors advocated an increase in the level and/or 
scope of the Goods and Services Tax (GST). 
 
Interview participants were asked to reflect on the Australian Government’s 
spending priorities, and whether there were areas where they would like to see 
more or less spending. Nearly all participants implicitly supported more spending on 
welfare in their survey responses by saying some of the income support payments 
were set too low. However, few specifically mentioned welfare when reflecting on 
government spending priorities in the interviews. Participants generally had trouble 
identifying ways that higher welfare costs and other increased spending could be 
funded. Cutting spending on other programs was more popular than increasing 
taxation. Reducing tax subsidies, closing tax loopholes and ensuring big business 
paid its share were popular strategies for increasing government revenue.  
 
Views were surprisingly mixed on education spending. Two of the young group 
thought too much was spent and one advocated spending more. One senior 
thought too much was spent and two wanted to see spending increased. There was 
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some concern that Australia’s education system was not doing a particularly good 
job of preparing young people for the changing structure of employment 
opportunities. Six of the ten young participants and seven of the eight seniors who 
commented on the quality of education said school and especially university 
education needed to be more practically focused. Four of the young group and two 
seniors complained that universities encouraged students to embark on courses 
with relatively poor career outcomes, but three of the young applauded the quality 
of Australia’s university sector. 
 
Health was unsurprisingly a popular option for more Government spending, cited by 
three young participants and seven seniors, although none of the participants 
reflected on problems that might result from the escalating costs of the health care 
system, or the possible causes (an ageing population, increasing rates of obesity, 
over-servicing, poorly targeted interventions, the cost of new treatments, etc). Four 
seniors wanted to see more spending on ‘essential services’ such as utilities and law 
and order. Four young participants and one senior advocated more Government 
investment that would deliver benefits in the future, including in renewable energy, 
infrastructure, scientific research and innovation. 
 
6.7 Government debt 
 
The survey noted that from 2008 to 2015 the Australian Government had accrued a 
debt of around $360b and participants were asked whether they thought it was 
appropriate for this debt to continue to accumulate. They were also asked whether 
the single best way to stop building up debt was to increase taxes or cut spending. 
The results are set out in Tables 7 and 8. The senior participants in particular 
evinced a significant level of debt aversion. Less than half of young participants but 
over three-quarters of the senior group wanted the Government to stop 
accumulating debt. Participants were somewhat split on the best approach to 
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stopping the growth of debt. Young participants preferred increasing taxes while 
seniors preferred cutting spending.144 
 
Table 7: It’s okay for the Federal Government to continue accumulating debt 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 2 9 8 5 1 
Senior participants (n=29) 15 7 4 3 0 
Total (n=54) 17 16 12 8 1 
% of young participants 8% 36% 32% 20% 4% 
% of senior participants 52% 24% 14% 10% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 8: The single best way for the Federal Government to stop accumulating debt 
 Increase taxes Cut spending 
Young participants (n=25) 15 10 
Senior participants (n=29) 12 17 
Total (n=54) 27 27 
% of young participants 60% 40% 
% of senior participants 41% 59% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
All 25 of the young participants and 27 of the 28 senior interviewees commented on 
public debt in the interviews, but this was an area in which participants freely 
admitted to feeling inexpert. Of the young participants, twelve said they were 
comfortable with Australia’s level of public debt, ten were cautious about it 
becoming excessive and three thought it needed to be paid down. Of the seniors, 
five were comfortable with our current level of debt, 12 were cautious and 11 
thought it needed to be paid down.  
 
 
144 Young Australians tend to prefer more tax and more social spending than seniors. For example, in 
the 2016 Australian Election Study, only 19% of Australians aged 18-24 favoured less tax, compared 
to 34% of those aged 65+ (Cameron & McAllister 2018). 
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How often in your day-to-day life do you think about oh, damn, Australia’s 
really in debt, I feel bad…you don’t. I don’t feel as though it’s ever influenced 
my life at all (Participant 43 - Male, 18). 
 
Everyone else is running on debt, why shouldn’t we all just keep running on 
debt? (Participant 6 - Female, 23). 
 
Everyone’s in debt, like honestly, that’s not an issue…a budget will never be 
in surplus, it’s not a thing! (Participant 53 – Female, 21). 
Some participants had difficulty articulating why they felt comfortable or 
uncomfortable about current debt levels. One young participant and four seniors 
appeared to object not to debt per se, but to incurring debt to fund what they 
perceived as wasteful spending. Four young participants who said they were 
comfortable with debt were predominantly concerned about the welfare cuts that 
often accompany efforts to get back into surplus. One young participant and one 
senior were more worried about who the debt was owed to than the level of the 
debt or its implications. Three young participants and one senior said they were 
comfortable with Australia’s public debt because it wasn’t as bad as in other 
countries. One senior objected to public debt on the grounds that it represented 
bad economic management and another four were primarily worried about the 
debt being poorly managed, with no strategy for containment or repayment. 
 
Two young participants and seven seniors took what could be described as forward-
looking, consequentialist approaches to thinking about public debt. The young 
participants considered how hard it might be to pay debt down with the shrinking 
taxpayer base that characterises ageing populations. One senior was concerned 
about the possible impact on Australia’s credit rating if debt continued to 
accumulate. Five of the seniors looked to the day when the debt would have to be 
repaid and the impact this could have, noting that future generations would bear 
the burden rather than those who were currently benefiting from debt-funded 
spending. Despite prompting, none of the other participants viewed the 
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accumulation of public debt as ‘deferred taxation’ or a potential source of 
intergenerational inequality. 
 
There’s a point where debt becomes too great and then, you know, future 
generations are saddled with paying back the debt plus interest that present 
generations have helped to build up. That doesn’t seem to be fair to me 
(Participant 18 - Male, 70). 
 
Someone asks for their pound of flesh eventually! (Participant 2 - Male, 65). 
 
There’s got to come a time some day when you’ve gotta pay the butcher’s 
bill… Why should my children have to bear the responsibility for it? 
(Participant 31 - Male, 70). 
 
6.8 Policy sustainability 
 
6.8.1 Future growth 
 
Survey participants were asked whether they expected their living standards to 
exceed those of their parents. The results are set out in Appendix G (Table 33). Only 
44% of young participants but 84% of seniors agreed that their living standards 
across their lifetimes were likely to exceed those of their parents. This may be partly 
because seniors, towards the end of the lifecycle, have already had the chance to 
assess how their living standards across time have compared with those of previous 
generations. Younger participants were required to make a prediction, and a 
quarter answered ‘neither agree nor disagree’. However, nearly a third were 
pessimistic about the chances of their lifetime living standards exceeding those of 
their parents, while only one of the seniors felt similarly. 
 
Interview participants were asked whether they thought the trend of economic 
growth and rising living standards would continue into the future. Twenty-three 
young participants commented, with 15 thinking it was quite likely that economic 
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growth and living standards would rise more slowly or plateau in the medium to 
long-term. Eight thought improvements would continue, particularly as a result of 
new technologies becoming available. 
 
I think we’re going to hit a plateau because it can only get so good before it’s 
ridiculous… I think economic growth, I kind of think it’s irrelevant. It’s good, 
it’s a positive thing, but it’s not going to be the be all and end all of whether 
or not Australia is doing well (Participant 41 - Female, 20). 
 
I don’t think that economic growth is the be all and end all…I don’t think 
that’s what we should be aiming for as a society (Participant 4 - Female, 19). 
 
Eighteen of the young participants said they would not be concerned about a 
plateau which meant their generation did less well materially than their parents’ 
generation and they may even see it as a positive thing.145 These participants felt 
that on the whole Australians were sufficiently well-off that non-material concerns 
such as sustainability, the environment, justice, equality, health and education were 
more important than continuing material progress. 
 
I think it’s going to get to a point where we’re like what more can we expect? 
(Participant 12 - Male, 23). 
 
We live so well in the developed world…even to be on the poverty line in the 
Western world is to live better than most people have…pretty much everyone 
in history lived worse (Participant 48 – Male, 21). 
 
 
145 Australians tend to be somewhat sceptical about the benefits of economic growth. A recent 
survey found only 5 percent of people felt they had personally gained a lot from 26 years of 
sustained economic growth (CEDA 2018, pp.14-16). The young participants in this survey, however, 
were ambivalent about growth in principle, rather than because they didn’t expect it to deliver 
benefits for them personally. 
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We should maybe stop focusing on the economy so much and slowly start 
focusing on environment…I think things are good enough and we can value 
other things (Participant 43 - Male, 18). 
 
Seventeen senior participants commented on future economic growth, with 15 
expecting growth and living standards to rise more slowly or plateau in the medium 
to long-term. Only two thought that technological advances would result in a 
continuing upward trajectory for the foreseeable future. Seven of the seniors 
commented that today’s young adults were likely to be worse-off in material terms 
across their lifetimes than the preceding generations, and they were less sanguine 
about this prospect than the young participants. Seniors were concerned about 
economic issues that the young participants didn’t mention: flat wages growth, 
public debt, the rising cost of living and population pressures. Four seniors 
mentioned similar concerns to the young around sustainability, environment, 
equality and health. 
 
I think we had a huge, huge leap the past generation, a huge leap, and it’s 
hard to see that happening again (Participant 1 - Female, 69). 
 
Well, we had a boom and it’s gone…If we’re going to maintain our standard 
of living, we have to change our practices a lot (Participant 32 - Female, 68). 
 
6.8.2 Future planning 
 
The survey asked participants whether they thought the Australian Government 
had sustainable policies and planned effectively for what lay ahead. Results are set 
out in Appendix G (Tables 34 and 35). Participants from both groups were 
pessimistic about the Government’s capacity to ensure sustainable policies were in 
place and to plan for Australia’s future. Over three-quarters of participants 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that the Government’s current policies were 
sustainable over the next 50 years. Sixty-four percent of young participants and 84% 
of seniors disagreed or strongly disagreed that the Government planned effectively 
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for the future. Interestingly, a third of young participants recorded ‘neither agree 
nor disagree’ responses for this question, suggesting that it may be hard to have a 
meaningful opinion without having seen government policy play out over a period 
of time. 
 
Participants were asked in the interviews to reflect on whether the Government’s 
approach to planning for the future aligned with public preferences and if there 
were any obstacles to effective planning. Three of the young group thought the 
Government did a reasonable job of forward-planning, while 20 were critical, as 
were all 28 of the seniors. Three young participants and one of the seniors 
cautioned that plans should remain adaptable to changing circumstances.  
 
I think they’re kind of spending for now and not spending on things that are 
going to be in the future. And they’re missing out on opportunities 
(Participant 12 - Male, 23). 
 
I think governments have been very knee-jerk with their policy and 
planning…it’s just the next election, what’s going to keep us in power at the 
next election (Participant 26 - Male, 64). 
 
It seems to be kind of a malaise with government, doesn’t it? An inability to 
plan for the long-term (Participant 29 - Female, 67). 
 
Twelve of the young group and seven of the seniors thought the Government’s 
short-termism aligned with what the public wanted, although two young 
participants and two seniors suggested more grass-roots consultation would assist 
with future-oriented policymaking. One participant thought it was up to 
Government to set an example by taking a more outward and forward-looking view, 
which may then be picked up on by the public. Two participants lamented that the 
public had become less idealistic. One noted that planning and putting aside 





Realistically, they’re inside of a system where they have to be producing 
results to their voters and their electorate…and I think really a part of the 
problem is we are quite short-sighted (Participant 47 – Male, 20). 
 
The government’s job is not to be popular, the government’s job is to govern 
effectively and fairly…the people who are actually in government need to 
take their responsibility, they’re custodians of a nation’s future, and they 
need to take that really seriously (Participant 51 – Female, 18) 
 
There’s a resistance in the community, it’s a now generation. I want it now, 
what about me?...People are resistant to change if it impacts upon their hip 
pocket (Participant 7 - Male, 69). 
 
Nine of the young participants and seven of the seniors thought the electoral cycle 
was a key driver of short-termism in policymaking. Four of the young participants 
and six of the seniors said they would be happy to see four-year terms replace the 
current three years for the Australian Government; one senior favoured five-year 
terms. Seven participants advocated retaining three-year terms in the interests of 
accountability or because they thought it would make no difference to the 
Government’s capacity to plan and act. 
 
Other obstacles to effective government planning that were identified by 
participants were a lack of vision (11 participants), government instability and weak 
leadership (ten participants), unknowns and unintended consequences (nine 
participants), politicians’ self-interest (seven participants), the adversarial nature of 
politics and lack of bipartisanship (six participants), politicians pandering to vested 
interests (four participants), political reality frustrating attempts at change (four 
participants), lack of control over some areas (two participants), and a fragmented 
or piecemeal approach to policy (two participants). Eight participants said Australia 
had had stronger, more visionary leaders in the past; former Prime Ministers Gough 
Whitlam, Bob Hawke, Paul Keating and John Howard were mentioned. One senior 
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participant suggested that young people were relatively disengaged from politics 
partly because there were no visionary leaders to inspire them. 
 
6.8.3 Duties to the future 
 
Interview participants were asked to reflect on whether people had any duties to 
future generations, including both their immediate descendants and society as a 
whole. Fourteen of the young participants and 12 of the seniors commented. 
Interestingly, the seniors had less to say on this issue than the younger participants, 
even though they were at the stage of life where they might be expected to be 
considering the legacy they were likely to leave. Several of the seniors evinced a 
slight defensiveness in response to this line of questioning, explaining why their 
resources would be exhausted and endorsing people’s right to spend all they had 
earned. 
 
The young participants showed little interest in material bequests, particularly to 
immediate descendants. Eight young participants commented on people leaving 
bequests to their children and family members, with six saying there was no duty to 
do so and older people should spend the money they had earned on themselves. 
Two recognised that some people may wish to leave their children something but 
thought this should be balanced with broader considerations around giving back to 
society as a whole. Another four young participants were actively against wealth 
being passed down through families, saying it would be better left to charity or 
other organisations working for the collective good. Seven seniors commented on 
bequests to family, with four supporting the practice. Of the other three, one 
advocated ‘spending the kids’ inheritance’ and two were dismayed that 
inheritances seemed to be all about the money rather than preserving a family 
home or passing on items with sentimental value. 
 
Participants were not specifically asked about the now relatively common practice 
of parents providing inter vivos gifts and in-kind support to their children, for 
example by allowing them to live rent-free in the family home well into adulthood 
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or providing them with a deposit for purchasing property. These are important 
forms of intergenerational wealth transfer, but the fieldwork focused on public 
rather than private transfers (see section 2.3.3 for further discussion of the 
relationship between public and private transfers). Some of the young participants 
reflected on the support their parents continued to provide to them and spoke of 
how grateful they were, but with a sense of implicit acknowledgement that they 
knew they were expected to be grateful because they had no automatic right to be 
supported.  
 
With some prompting, the young participants evinced more interest in the idea of 
non-material than material legacies. Eight of the young participants thought it was 
important to pass on certain values, norms and practices from one generation to 
the next. Three mentioned fairness and equality and three mentioned social 
inclusion. Other valued legacies included stable and secure social institutions, skills 
and experience, infrastructure, investment in research and education, and 
environmentally sustainable practices. Eight of the young participants said people 
had a duty or moral obligation to consider the effects of their actions on 
younger/future generations. 
 
I think if you’re not going to leave a better world than the one you inherited, 
that’s kind of a shitty way to look at things. I think from the start, from the 
beginning of humans doing stuff, each time it’s gotten a little bit better 
(Participant 12 - Male, 23). 
 
Do they have a moral claim on us acting better for them if they don’t exist 
now?...I think they do, but that’s really very abstract, it’s something 
understandably a lot of people would struggle to really connect with 
(Participant 47 – Male, 20). 
 
Despite prompting, only five of the senior participants commented on non-material 
legacies, and all the comments were brief, suggesting this was not an issue the 
seniors had thought a great deal about or had much interest in. Valued legacies for 
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these five participants were fairness, vision for the future, and environmentally 
sustainable practices. None spoke of duties or obligations to their successors, 
although one referred to a ‘responsibility’ to future generations and the 
environment. Two of the young group and two of the seniors acknowledged the 
intergenerational impact of environmental damage in that the people who caused 
the damage would not be the ones who paid the price. 
 
Only a few of the interviewees were enthusiastic about the practice of establishing 
sovereign wealth funds to ring-fence some of the gains from good economic times 
for use at a later date when conditions may be less favourable. Seven young 
participants liked the thought of money being put aside at times of surplus to partly 
discharge responsibilities to future generations, and potentially protect them in 
difficult times. Of the six seniors who commented, three were mildly enthusiastic 
about putting a surplus aside for a rainy day. One couldn’t see the point, one 
thought people justifiably wanted to spend what they had now rather than 
investing it for the future, and one found the idea “too utopian”. 
 
6.9 Other policy issues 
 
6.9.1 Policy complexity 
 
Most interview participants recognised that the Government faced policymaking 
challenges, including balancing different interests, avoiding unintended 
consequences, managing the impacts of globalisation and economic forces, taking 
account of unknowns and uncertainties, and obtaining sound advice. They were less 
understanding about policymakers being influenced by their own self-interest, 
including their desire for re-election. Despite acknowledging the challenges, all nine 
of the young participants and 11 of the 12 seniors who commented said they 
thought Australia’s tax and welfare systems were too complicated; one senior 





The participants who found the system overly complex identified two consequent 
problems: difficulty for the average person in navigating policies and processes, and 
the creation of loopholes that could only be taken advantage of by the well-
informed and/or well-resourced. Three young participants and three seniors 
reported that their own personal experience of interacting with Centrelink had 
been very frustrating and this had shaped their view of the system. Three young 
participants and one senior wanted to see more education and information, 
including clear statements of policy rationales, to empower the general public to 
navigate the system effectively. 
 
6.9.2 Policy fairness 
 
Interview participants were asked to reflect on the trajectory of economic growth 
Australia had experienced since World War II, and whether the benefits of this 
growth had been spread evenly or if some groups in society had missed out on their 
fair share. Many found this a difficult question to answer and the most common 
groups cited as falling through the gaps were Indigenous people, the disabled, the 
mentally ill and the homeless. Despite prompts to think about the equitable 
distribution of resources in age cohort terms, only a few participants did so. Six of 
the young participants thought the distribution skewed in favour of older people at 
the expense of young people and families, but they were relatively sanguine about 
this, with one even justifying it as “respect for elders”. One of the seniors thought 
the young were missing out and two thought working families with children should 
receive more benefits. None of the participants mentioned single parent families as 
an at-risk group, even though their welfare benefits have been cut back over the 
last decade and they have a very high poverty rate (see chapter 2). Four of the 
senior women said they themselves had struggled during their time as single 
parents but they took the view that if they had managed to do it then young 
women today should also be able to cope. 
 
Two of the young participants and two of the seniors observed that certain states 
such as Western Australia had done better than others, particularly during the 
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mining boom. This may reflect a perception that South Australia’s economic 
development has proceeded more slowly than most of the other states’ in recent 
decades. Three young participants and eight seniors thought economic growth had 
mainly benefited a small circle of insiders at the top, including multi-national 
companies and high net-worth individuals, whose wealth was growing at a much 
faster rate than that of the middle class and the poor. Two of the young and one of 
the seniors believed everyone in Australian society was doing okay and did not 
identify any groups that were falling behind. 
 
I do have this feeling of slight economic disenfranchisement almost. This 
contrasts very strongly with my general optimism for my future (Participant 
47 – Male, 20). 
 
6.10 Representation and engagement 
 
6.10.1 Representation of youth interests 
 
The survey asked whether participants felt the Government’s current redistributive 
policies struck the right balance between the three age groups of young adults 
(around 18-30), families with young children, and older adults (around 60+), as well 
as whether participants expected to contribute more in taxes than they received in 
benefits across their lifetimes. The survey also asked whether people aged 16-25 
had enough influence over decisions that would impact on Australia’s future, and if 
participants endorsed measures to increase the influence of this group over 
policymaking. The results are set out in Appendix G (Tables 36 to 39).  
 
More than a third of participants were neutral on whether Government 
redistributive policies struck the right balance between age groups, suggesting that 
many participants found this a difficult question to answer in a meaningful way. The 
majority of participants who did express a view disagreed that the right balance was 
struck. The views of young and senior participants diverged on the question of 
whether they expected to pay more in taxes than they would receive in 
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Government benefits over their lifetimes. Sixty percent of seniors and 84% of the 
young group expected this would be the case. A third of seniors (compared to only 
one of the young group) selected ‘neither agree nor disagree’. The most likely 
explanation is that many of the seniors felt they could not make an accurate 
assessment of their taxes vs benefits even in hindsight, while the young 
participants, who were predominantly undertaking university studies, predicted 
they would go on to become relatively high-earning members of the workforce. 
 
Responses from the young participants and seniors also diverged on the question of 
whether 16-25-year-olds had enough influence over decisions affecting Australia’s 
future. Eighty-eight percent of the young group but only half of the seniors 
disagreed that this was the case. A third of seniors answered ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’, but all of the young participants had an opinion on this question. It is 
possible that some of the seniors did not feel qualified to answer in a meaningful 
way, while the young group had a keen sense of their own (lack of) political efficacy. 
Despite the differences between the two groups on the level of youth influence, 
both young and senior participants were supportive of introducing measures to 
increase this influence. The two most popular options were arranging for the 
electoral enrolment of young people through schools in Year 12 and establishing a 
youth consultative forum but there was also some support for extending the vote to 
16 and 17-year-olds.  
 
Interview discussion suggested that neither young nor senior participants were 
particularly satisfied with the quality of political representation in Australia. While 
three of the young participants complained about politicians acting in their own 
self-interest, the biggest concern for this group was that the Government paid little 
attention to the interests of young people or their future. Nineteen of the 22 young 
participants who commented thought the Government was too concerned with the 




Government policy doesn’t just affect the here and now, a lot of it is to do 
with the future, which is not going to be the old people who are voting for it 
(Participant 3 - Female, 22). 
 
I just think the reality is in Australia we have an ageing population and we’re 
also a democracy, so naturally what is happening, the laws are in favour of 
the older people because in Parliament they want to keep their seats 
(Participant 14 - Male, 22). 
 
We’re obviously looking forward to the future. They’re going to have a really 
narrow kind of like, well, I’m going to be dead in ten years, I don’t care 
(Participant 12 - Male, 23). 
 
6.10.2 Youth engagement 
 
Eight of the young participants in the interviews attributed blame for poor 
representation of youth interests partly to young people themselves for failing to 
vote (or enrol to vote) and engage in effective political participation. 
 
I feel like young people in general just year after year have less faith in the 
Government or feel like the Government doesn’t respond to what they’re 
saying. So they don’t vote, which is pointless, because of course the 
Government’s not going to listen to your say because you’re not saying 
anything if you’re not voting (Participant 9 - Female, 20). 
 
They’re prejudiced against young people because they want to suit their own 
interests, they want to feather their own nests. I think there’s that 
perspective of politics among young people. And a lot of them, a lot of 
people just don’t care. They just don’t see how it affects them personally…I 
think when you start to get the taxation, you start to demand more 




However, thirteen of the young participants thought some of the reasons for lower 
levels of engagement by young people were embedded in the system. These 
included a lack of civics education at school, Government and politicians failing to 
reach out to young people through appropriate media, policies relevant to young 
people not making it on to the political agenda, the disenfranchisement of under-
18-year-olds and the Government being uninspiring and lacking in vision. The young 
participants thought that given these factors, it was unsurprising if many young 
people were apathetic about politics. 
 
I don’t think it’s anyone being ‘let’s not let young people be involved so we 
can do what we want’, but…there’s no encouragement and that kind of 
suggests discouragement (Participant 3 - Female, 22). 
 
Not to be rude about it but all the politicians are already nearing their end! 
So they don’t have to be as concerned with the long-term future because 
they don’t really have much of a long-term left…If young people were taught 
about it more they would be more frustrated with the policies being made 
(Participant 4 - Female, 19). 
 
It’s really just a bunch of bald old white men…they’re not relatable, and so 
because of that you don’t feel like they’re actually caring about you because 
they’re nothing like you (Participant 49 – Female, 21). 
 
Three of the young participants thought young people may take more of a forward-
oriented approach to politics, but only out of self-interest, and over time they too 
would adopt the narrower perspective of older people.  
 
Maybe we would look into the future a bit more because that’s what young 
people are told to do. But then…I think we’d only look to our future and not 




Three young participants thought it would take some sort of crisis to encourage 
young people to become more engaged in politics or to shift their value set. Two 
young participants noted that young people tended to be interested in specific 
social issues rather than economic policy in a broad sense. 
 
There might be more people politically active, but…I don’t ever see there 
being a majority unless the world goes into absolute crisis and the oceans 
are knocking down houses or what not (Participant 42 - Male, 19). 
 
We live quite well in Australia, we’re not really starving or anything like that, 
there’s not really horrible, terrible things happening. Maybe if that was 
happening people would be more involved. But I guess they’re happy, they’re 
safe, that’s kind of where it ends (Participant 17 - Female, 24). 
 
I don’t scroll through Facebook and see a large following behind tax reform 
(Participant 45 - Male, 18). 
 
The senior participants also tended to perceive the young as relatively disengaged 
and apathetic about politics. Twenty-seven seniors commented on issues around 
representation, political engagement and government responsiveness. Of these, 
two thought Australians were politically engaged due to compulsory voting, but 
eleven believed the public was generally quite disengaged, with the problem being 
particularly acute amongst young adults. As with the young participants, these 
seniors thought political disengagement among the young was partly due to 
structural factors such as a lack of civics education in schools, the Government and 
politicians failing to engage effectively with young people, and uninspiring 
leadership. 
 
The problem may be they just want to be carefree and have uncomplicated 
fun. I can’t imagine too many 16-25s having an interest in this survey 




I think the younger generation are obviously ignored, mostly, by government 
(Participant 33 - Male, 61). 
 
6.10.3 Seniors’ representation concerns 
 
The senior participants emphasised a range of concerns about Government 
representation and responsiveness that were not a strong focus for the young 
participants. Nine seniors thought politicians’ self-interest was a major driver of 
policymaking. These participants saw many politicians as motivated by the desire 
for reelection, and the power, money and perks that came with being a Member of 
Parliament, producing the much-maligned ‘career politician’. Six seniors complained 
that politicians were too beholden to vested interests and lobby groups, and ten 
that they were out of touch with ordinary people.  
 
I think it’s self-interest. I’ll do what I can to get re-elected into this position 
(Participant 37 - Female, 69). 
 
Members of parliament get wage rises, they get the pension for life, I’ve 
worked to support them and I get a kick up the backside. That’s the way I see 
it…I think they’re only attracted there for their salary and perks…they’re all 
the same, all with the same mentality, and they have no idea of how the 
other half live (Participant 38 - Female, 66). 
 
Eight seniors thought politicians were excessively influenced by the need to toe the 
party line on ideological and policy matters, rather than making decisions for the 
good of the country as a whole. Six seniors lamented that political life in Australia 
had become increasingly adversarial and negative, leading to sub-optimal 
policymaking. Three of the seniors said the ethical and behavioural standards of 
Australia’s politicians set a bad example, particularly for young people. However, 
four seniors were relatively positive about the motivations of politicians and 




I think it’s one of those things that when you enter politics you’ve got all 
these ideas, and you want to make a real difference, and a lot of people work 
hard, but I think power corrupts (Participant 35 - Female, 63). 
 
6.10.4 Diversity of representation 
 
Six young interview participants and nine seniors said they would like greater 
diversity in Federal Parliament, with groups such as Indigenous people, women, 
non-Caucasian ethnicities, LGBTQ+ people, young adults and people from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds all seen as under-represented. Three of the seniors 
said they were satisfied with the level of diversity in Parliament. One young 
participant and one senior advocated quotas, at least temporarily, to encourage 
greater diversity, while three seniors said they would prefer candidates were 
selected purely on merit. One young participant said she would prefer people with 
relevant expertise in Parliament and one senior said she was happy with 
parliamentarians who were “older and wiser.” One young participant and three 
seniors suggested policymakers should undertake more grass roots and community 
consultation and implement direct democracy measures (such as public voting on 
specific policy proposals) to improve responsiveness to public opinion. 
 
6.10.5 Other institutional influences 
 
Some of the interviewees reflected on how institutions other than Federal 
Parliament and the political parties influenced policymaking and public opinion. One 
young participant and two seniors were disillusioned by their personal experiences 
dealing with Centrelink and said it had affected their views on various policies and 





I’m actually in the process of trying to get some Centrelink, but it’s been 
really, really difficult to get a hold of someone, so it’s been a very long 
process…the amount of forms you need and the amount of things they 
require you to do, that has been a little bit baffling (Participant 44 - Female, 
22). 
 
Centrelink’s a…I won’t say that, it’s a four-letter word! (Participant 30 - 
Female, 66). 
 
Some interviewees commented on media influence. Not unexpectedly, when 
talking about where they obtained their political information, young participants 
were more likely to mention social media while the seniors cited television, radio 
and newspapers. Four young participants and two seniors recognised the potential 
for social media to make political content accessible to the young and facilitate 
political mobilisation. Two young participants and seven seniors thought the 
mainstream media was biased in its presentation of information or did a poor job of 
keeping the public informed.  
 
Government and especially the Murdoch media in this country are one and 
the same in my eyes…It’s really obvious what their agenda is and that’s to 
keep the Liberals in power and propagate these ideas that poor people are 
all bad (Participant 42 - Male, 19). 
 
6.10.6 Democratic practice 
 
One young participant and three seniors took the opportunity to reflect on what 
patterns of engagement, representation and responsiveness meant for Australian 
democracy more broadly. Two of these seniors were quite comfortable with the 
state of democratic practice in Australia and not willing to contemplate any 





Democracy is very fragile, I think people take it for granted, and I just don’t 
really want to see the system altered for no really good reason (Participant 
35 - Female, 63). 
 
I can’t think of a better way of doing it (Participant 22 - Female, 65). 
 
I’m pretty sure if you asked a lot of people what capitalism is they’d be able 
to tell you what it is, but not understand the implications of it. They don’t 
understand how it can be changed (Participant 42 - Male, 19). 
 
The data on specific policy attitudes collected in the fieldwork undertaken for this 
research are broadly consistent with prior work in the US, UK and Europe, with 
some peculiarly Australian twists such as a strong emotional attachment to housing 
(particularly for the senior participants) and a robust egalitarian streak that is 
sometimes at odds with a general endorsement of neo-liberal-oriented policies 
(particularly for the young participants). The qualitative results add richness, depth 
and context to existing data on attitudes towards redistributive policy, largely based 
on survey data, and insight into the complex interplay of factors influencing attitude 
formation. The results also enhance the inconclusive data on how age is related to 
policy attitudes in this area. While there were few signs of intergenerational tension 
in Australian society, and many commonalities in thinking between the young adults 
and seniors, there were also some significant differences, which are analysed 





Fieldwork results: discussion 
 
 
All is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. 
   
Voltaire, Candide (1759) 
 
 
Political reforms seem beside the point if the next generation’s hearts and minds are already bought 
and sold. 
 
 Malcolm Harris, Kids These Days (2017) 
 
 
The results of the fieldwork, outlined in Chapter 6, suggest that attitudes towards 
redistributive policies are affected by age and birth cohort in significant but 
nuanced ways. Drawing on the analysis presented in Chapter 4, this chapter 
considers the key values that emerged as significant influences on participants’ 
attitudes towards existing redistributive policy settings. Fieldwork participants were 
asked some specific questions about the values underlying their policy attitudes, 
but indicators of their value positions emerged primarily from general discussion in 
the interviews.  
 
In some respects the young and senior participants had similar policy attitudes and 
shared underlying values, particularly a focus on egalitarianism. Participants across 
both groups reported a range of influences on their political thinking and difficulty 
reconciling conflicting values in some respects. While both the young participants 
and the seniors perceived problems with existing policy settings, there was only a 
limited appetite for substantive policy reform, with the young participants’ support 
for the economic status quo a somewhat unexpected finding. The two groups 
differed in their reasons for taking this position. The contrasting value orientations 
underlying each group’s views shed light on how age is related to redistributive 
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policy attitudes and the ways in which young participants may have been influenced 
by the relative prosperity and neo-liberal norms they have experienced during their 
youth.The significance of these results is considered in Chapter 8. 
 
7.1 Value trade-offs 
 
The survey asked participants to select which of a pair of values they saw as most 
important. Selected results are set out in Tables 9 to 12 and the remainder in 
Appendix G (Tables 40 to 49). 
 
Table 9: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Freedom Equality 
Young participants (n=25) 9 16 
Senior participants (n=30) 12 18 
Total (n=55) 21 34 
% of young participants 36% 64% 
% of senior participants 40% 60% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 10: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Big government Small government 
Young participants (n=25) 14 11 
Senior participants (n=29) 9 20 
Total (n=54) 23 31 
% of young participants 56% 44% 
% of senior participants 31% 69% 





Table 11: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Responsibilities Rights 
Young participants (n=25) 11 14 
Senior participants (n=30) 30 0 
Total (n=55) 41 14 
% of young participants 44% 56% 
% of senior participants 100% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 12: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Material goods Experiences 
Young participants (n=25) 3 22 
Senior participants (n=30) 2 28 
Total (n=55) 5 50 
% of young participants 12% 88% 
% of senior participants 7% 93% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Participants demonstrated clear preferences for some of these value pairs. Very few 
participants from either group preferred short-term over long-term or past over 
future, suggesting that people like to think of themselves as taking a long-range, 
future-oriented view even if this is not always borne out in their attitudes towards 
specific policies. Unusually for the value-pair questions, four senior participants 
skipped the ‘past vs future’ questions. It is possible these seniors had a preference 
for the past but were reluctant to appear backward-looking. 
 
Only two (young) participants were willing to admit to preferring individual over 
collective interest. Hard work was considered more important than good luck by a 
significant majority of participants, as was minimising risks over taking risks, being 
progressive rather than conservative, being realistic rather than optimistic, security 
over adventure, experiences over material goods, and having a global rather than 
local outlook. Participants were more evenly split on freedom vs equality (though 
equality was preferred), and individual responsibility vs collective responsibility (the 




Some interesting age-related differences emerged from these questions. Young 
participants tended to value freedom over equality more than seniors, although 
both groups preferred equality overall. Seniors tended to value hard work over 
good luck more than young participants, although again both groups preferred hard 
work overall. Perhaps surprisingly, a higher proportion of young participants than 
seniors favoured minimising risks over taking risks. Less surprisingly, seniors were 
more likely than the young to value conservatism over progressivism, although both 
groups had a strong preference for progressivism. The young skewed a little more 
towards optimism than seniors, although both groups had a strong preference for 
realism. Young participants favoured big government over small government by a 
small margin, while seniors preferred small government by a large margin. Finally, 
all of the seniors but less than half of the young group preferred responsibilities 
over rights. These value preferences are explored in more detail in the remainder of 
this chapter. 
 
7.2 Freedom and equality 
 
7.2.1 Concerns about inequality 
 
Egalitarianism was a strongly held value across both the young adult and senior 
groups. Equality was preferred by a majority of both groups when participants were 
asked to choose between freedom and equality in the survey. This preference came 
out strongly in the interview discussions, especially around income support 
payments and future growth. While there was acknowledgement of the fact that 
material conditions were very good in Australia compared to other countries, nearly 
all of the participants who commented were concerned about what they perceived 
to be rising inequality in Australia, particularly the rate at which the wealth of the 





I think it comes down to political capital, and the fact that poor people 
usually have none, no representation (Participant 42 - Male, 19). 
 
I think it’s embedded in the system. It’s like playing Monopoly. If you’ve got 
the money you can make even more (Participant 24 - Male, 70). 
 
People think in Australia we’re all rich, it’s a classless society. It isn’t 
(Participant 20 - Male, 62). 
 
Eighteen of the 22 young participants who commented on this issue felt like 
Australia was less equal than it should be; three thought most people in Australia 
were doing fairly well compared to other countries. Twenty of the 23 seniors who 
commented would have liked to see inequality reduced; three were relatively 
sanguine about the class divide. Six young participants and 14 seniors said 
inequality in Australia had worsened over the last three to four decades; one young 
participant and two seniors thought things were much the same as they had always 
been. 
 
Everyone’s moving up but the top group’s moving up much faster 
(Participant 18 - Male, 70). 
 
Our egalitarian society? It was never egalitarian, but I think things are 
becoming more unequal as we go (Participant 33 - Male, 61). 
 
Three of the young participants and six of the seniors were tolerant of unequal 
outcomes as long as there was a minimum level of material wellbeing that everyone 
reached and equality of opportunity to rise higher. 
 
Some people have always been rich, that is part of capitalist society and I 
think we all agree that is the best system, so that’s always going to happen 




I think once everyone is at a certain point, really, and there’s no longer 
people sitting in the mall begging, I think that’s okay. And if the hard workers 
or investors, or entrepreneurs maybe, have more than that, well, as long as 
the rest of us are not starving, I think that’s okay. It’s better than a kind of 
dictatorship (Participant 28 - Female, 62). 
 
Discomfort about relative inequality was widespread. Sixteen young participants 
and 17 seniors expressed some concern about the gap between rich and poor, 
regardless of whether the poor were doing well enough. Five of the seniors worried 
that a big gap generated resentment and social unrest. Nine young participants and 
13 seniors were doubtful that equal opportunity was a reality in modern Australia. 
Six of the seniors thought particular groups, such as Indigenous people, the disabled 
and the homeless, had missed out on the benefits of economic growth and fallen 
through the gaps. Four young participants and four seniors wanted to see the 
super-rich contribute more in tax; four seniors objected to excessively high salaries 
for some CEO-level positions and five seniors complained about ‘excess’ in principle. 
 
I will continue to be industrious and work really hard for the things I have but 
I have basically been able to run the race that I’ve run so far without any 
hindrances or any weights on me. Whereas so many people have had to run 
the exact same race, if not a harder race, with like 10, 15, 20 kilo weights on 
their arms and legs (Participant 50 – Male, age 20). 
 
One of the perhaps surprising results from the fieldwork was the level of in-
principle support participants expressed for an estate tax as a way of reducing 
wealth concentration. Estate and inheritance taxes, sometimes referred to as ‘death 
duties’, have been notoriously unpopular in the UK and the US even when they 
disadvantage only a small number of high net-worth individuals (see, for example 
Bartels 2005; Orton & Rowlingson 2007). Australians may attach less importance to 
bequests than people in some other countries, and it was certainly the case that the 
participants in the fieldwork were not particularly supportive of material legacies, 
with only four participants (all seniors) saying it was important to leave a bequest to 
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family. In keeping with the Australian tradition of the tall poppy syndrome, 
participants generally had little sympathy for the very well-off or their offspring and 
were quite happy to see them taxed more. 
 
7.2.2 Welfare state support 
 
In line with the high levels of egalitarianism exhibited, and the degree of popularity 
generally enjoyed by the welfare state in advanced democracies, most of the 
fieldwork participants were in favour of relatively generous income support 
payments. There were only small pockets of resistance to welfare spending, such as 
the three seniors who viewed dependence on Newstart as most often a simple 
matter of irresponsibility, and the seven seniors who thought single mothers usually 
did not deserve their benefits. All participants recognised the importance of a 
strong social safety net, and the existence of circumstances that meant some 
people found themselves in need of support for reasons outside their control. 
 
However, as is usually the case in meritocratic liberal welfare regimes, the 
participants were generally in favour of conditional social spending. They expected 
welfare to be directed towards those most in need, with the majority endorsing 
means-testing as an appropriate way of targeting benefits. The seniors also tended 
to think that income support recipients who were under retirement age and fit to 
work should hold up their end of an implicit social bargain. The terms of this bargain 
included people taking responsibility for supporting themselves and their children 
wherever possible, not being fussy about the type of work they were willing to do 
and complying with mutual obligation requirements as long as they were not overly 
punitive. 
 
This conditionality aligns with the increasing residualism146 of Australia’s welfare 
system over the last few decades. Australians have become accustomed to 
 
146 In residualist welfare systems, benefits are largely targeted at specific (needy) groups, often 
through means-testing. In universalist systems, at least some benefits are granted on a needs-blind 
basis (for example, a pension may be automatically granted to everyone over a set age regardless of 
their wealth or income levels). 
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compulsory superannuation and the idea of self-funded retirement. Means-testing 
of payments has become more common and stringent. Participants’ views appeared 
to be somewhat shaped by the system already in place, especially in the case of the 
young participants who had never known anything different. However, they were 
also shot through with a streak of egalitarian opposition to the well-off receiving 
benefits they did not need and a focus on discouraging a ‘handout’ mentality. 
 
7.2.3 Redistribution via tax expenditures 
 
Nearly three-quarters of participants knew enough at the survey stage to realise tax 
expenditure programs had redistributive effects and there was some suspicion that 
these programs may not always have the most egalitarian of effects. However, 
participants (especially from the young group) generally did not have a detailed 
understanding of these programs and tended to be surprised by the magnitude of 
the foregone revenue for the Government. It was common for interview 
participants to say that the very limited information they received about tax 
expenditure programs through participation in the research had been enlightening 
and increased their awareness of the impact of these programs. In this sense the 
results aligned with Suzanne Mettler’s (2011) findings about the low visibility of 
some significant government redistributive policies, suggesting that giving people 
policy-specific information can help them form opinions. 
 
The young participants in particular did not endorse governments’ use of tax 
incentives and disincentives to influence people’s behaviour. As strategies which 
assume rational decision-making to maximise individual utility, it might have been 
expected that the more market-oriented, individualistic young participants would 
be more comfortable with these programs than older people. However, the 
programs can also be seen as attempts by government to control and manipulate 
almost by subterfuge, and the young participants were highly sensitive to any 
suggestion of individual autonomy being compromised. This was an area where 
many participants were torn between different considerations and weren’t quite 
sure what to think, which exacerbated the effects of the low information levels. 
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7.2.4 Collective duties 
 
Some of the interview participants made comments suggesting how they thought 
individual and collective interests should be balanced. Five of the young participants 
emphasised individual autonomy and the right to choose, even if this resulted in 
poor choices (from an individual or collective point of view). 
 
I think in the past people had that very communal sense of being, that you 
were part of something, you were part of a family, but not for me. And I 
think a lot of my friends are quite like that as well, it’s more of an individual 
mindset now and that applies to everything (Participant 44 - Female, 22). 
 
The freedom to choose, and that means the freedom to choose to be an idiot 
(Participant 9 - Female, 20). 
 
Another six young participants emphasised the need for individuals to recognise the 
collective interest and expressed some regret at a perceived loss of empathy and 
connection with others in contemporary society. 
 
I think the Government’s at the moment falling a bit more on the individual 
rather than the collective side of the balancing act (Participant 10 - Female, 
23). 
 
No one lives their life individually. Everyone’s supported by society in some 
way or another...As part of a society I have a duty to give back, or to allow 
those people to have the same path that I’ve had or at least ease that path 
(Participant 50 – Male, age 20). 
 
The senior participants were more likely than the young to emphasise the 
individual’s responsibility to the collective interest. All 14 of the seniors who 
reflected on the balance between individual and collective interests emphasised the 
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need for individualism to be moderated and the connections between people to be 
strengthened. 
 
I want to have my freedom and my ability to make decisions, but I also think 
people should have a commitment to the community at large (Participant 22 
- Female, 65). 
 
You grow as a person and you understand that it’s not about you, or where 
your family is, it’s about everybody else, everything’s connected (Participant 
40 - Female, 60). 
 
I think individualism is of value, it just needs some greater rate of control and 
I haven’t got an answer to how to control it… there needs to be a higher 
standard of ethics (Participant 26 - Male, 64). 
 
The whole idea of helping your brother sort of thing, it’s not there anymore 
(Participant 2 - Male, 65). 
 
As a child and a young adult, I was aware of a collective focus and that’s very 
much been torn apart now (Participant 25 - Female, 60). 
 
If you want to live in society you have rights, but you have obligations as well 
as rights, don’t you, you have responsibilities. It’s not all one way, it’s not all 
about you (Participant 36 - Female, 65). 
 
Five of the seniors said governments, institutions and the broader culture had a role 
to play in restoring norms around helping others and building a shared sense of 





By us slowing down a bit, having less work, and putting more into 
volunteering, helping other people, we would get life into a bit better 
perspective. But the Government needs to be driving things like that 
(Participant 27 - Female, 64). 
 
7.2.5 Individual responsibility 
 
The duty of individuals to work hard and take responsibility for their own lives, 
rather than ‘free riding’, can be seen as a type of obligation to the collective. In line 
with their strong support of welfare conditionality, the senior participants in 
particular placed a high degree of importance on individual responsibility. Eleven of 
the young participants and 18 of the seniors talked about people of all ages taking 
advantage of the system and being largely concerned with looking out for 
themselves. While most participants recognised that some people experienced 
disadvantage or reduced opportunities, they felt that there came a time when you 
had to take responsibility for your circumstances. There was a widespread view, 
especially amongst the senior participants, that a sense of entitlement had become 
increasingly pervasive at all levels of society over the last few decades. Four of the 
young participants and ten seniors thought the ‘rot’ started at the top, with 
politicians and policymakers largely motivated by self-interest (including retaining 
power, money and perks). 
 
That’s probably the major issue of policy studies, you have people who are 
very frugal and plan out what they’re going to do and hopefully they can 
survive, then you’ve got some people who just spend their money and kind of 






I think there will always be an element of people who are lazy and who don’t 
want to make the best of their time on this Earth. But I think that element 
has increased dramatically in the last, I would put it down to maybe the last 
20 years…the world doesn’t owe you a living, but you have to go out and find 
one at the end of the day and make your path (Participant 39 - Female, 70). 
 
Both the young and senior participants generally believed it was up to the individual 
to make his or her own way in the world, with appropriate safety nets in place. For 
the young, the focus was firmly on individuals’ right to be independent and self-
directed, to make their own choices. The seniors emphasised each person’s 
obligation to work hard and act in fiscally responsible ways. Large-scale 
redistribution of resources and universal approaches to welfare were not 
compatible with either group’s view of the self-sufficient individual who would 
make his or her own choices and reap the consequences. 
 
However, the participants did not wholly subscribe to the pull-yourself-up-by-your-
bootstraps narrative. Only a fifth of the participants who commented said they 
would tolerate very unequal outcomes for individuals provided there was equality 
of opportunity. The rest had some concern about relative inequality and advocated 
enforced moderation of outcomes, such as increased taxation of the super-rich, the 
introduction of a wealth transfer tax, eliminating tax breaks and loopholes taken 
advantage of by the well-off, and retaining the company tax rate at 30%.147 
 
7.2.6 Values in tension 
 
This tension between sometimes conflicting values – the freedom of the individual 
and the equality of all – was a fundamental source of inconsistency and internal 
incoherence in the attitude sets of many participants, particularly from the young 
group. It was as though these participants had absorbed the individual 
responsibility mantra of neo-liberalism but couldn’t quite reconcile themselves to 
 
147 During the data collection period the Australian Government announced plans to reduce the 
company tax rate to 25%. 
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its logical progression in practice. Participants took various approaches to living with 
these contradictions. Some young participants appeared to be putting their heads in 
the sand in relation to their future economic security because they still could. 
 
It’s not something I think about cause that’s just future me’s problems 
(Participant 16 - Male, 19). 
 
Yep, I’m quite ignorant with that stuff, usually I don’t think about that. I’ll see 
what happens, if I can’t afford it, I’ll figure something out (Participant 43 - 
Male, 18). 
 
That’s not something I’m really invested in (Participant 44 - Female, 22). 
 
A lot of people my age don’t have any idea about the economy, or the 
government, so, not saying we don’t have access to that education, but 
we’re just not paying attention a lot of the time (Participant 44 - Female, 22). 
 
It’s not something I really think too much about so much. I know that sounds 
bad, but yeah, some of us don’t, really (Participant 16 - Male, 19). 
 
Meanwhile some of the seniors, even those with children and grandchildren, 
seemed to abdicate responsibility for and even any interest in the consequences of 
present actions.  
 
I’ll be dead, so I don’t know whether it worries me a lot (Participant 30 - 
Female, 66). 
 
That’s scary, that’s…I’ll be dead by then (Participant 40 - Female, 60). 
 
I’m glad I’m not going to be here! That’s my opinion, and that’s most of my 




Other participants were optimistic that unexpected solutions to problems would 
turn up eventually.  
 
Something is going to come along. There’ll be something, you know, there 
was the mining, there’s gotta be something somewhere (Participant 5 - 
Female, 64). 
 
I think the majority of people are just hoping for the best (Participant 33 - 
Male, 61). 
 
Some participants took a short-term, self-interested perspective - as long as things 
were okay for them right now, all was well with the world – and others adopted a 
‘close enough is good enough’ approach.  
 
Everything’s pretty cruisy, I think, right now (Participant 16 - Male, 19). 
 
I mean, I’m fine, just thinking about my life, I’m fine (Participant 43 - Male, 
18). 
 
We might have a bit of debt here, or a bit of conflict there, but it’s not 
enough to get people going (Participant 42 - Male, 19). 
 
I think that the older I get the less I trust but at the same time I’m still kind of 
oh, they’re not going to ruin it so much that it will impact my life (Participant 
49 – Female, 21). 
 
I don’t really have economic qualms. But I do sympathise that people do. I 
guess my concern is that I won’t have those issues, but my children 
will…because we’re going to struggle come 50 when the world is ruined, but I 




I think from my perspective, my world is good, so I’m quite happy with things 
bubbling along…we really are very lucky and even if things aren’t quite as 
they should be, it’s okay (Participant 35 - Female, 63). 
 
Another approach was to be resigned to the status quo despite its flaws, rather 
than expending the effort required to reconcile conflicting values or challenging 
prevailing social norms.  
 
I feel like we adjust our goals based on what is achievable…there is a lot of 
resignation within my generation because we’re just oh well, it’s not gonna 
happen…no sense crying over spilt milk sort of thing…My mum always told 
me life isn’t fair. So I kind of never expected it to be…It does feel like we’re 
paying for stuff that other people have screwed up. But there’s really no 
helping that particularly (Participant 6 - Female, 23). 
 
I think it’s just these days that’s just, that’s kind of how it is at the 
moment…there’s not a whole lot we can do about that (Participant 15 - 
Male, 23). 
 
That’s life, you know, sometimes you win and sometimes you lose…That’s 
just how it is. So they put up with it…what can you do? (Participant 40 - 
Female, 60). 
 
Sometimes you just feel too worn out trying to fight every battle (Participant 
8 - Female, 67). 
 
This sense of resignation tended to be exacerbated by a widespread sense among 
participants that the global economic system had taken on a life of its own, which 
could not be countered by national governments, let alone by ordinary citizens 




If you had of asked me a lot of these questions like three or four years ago I 
would have probably been like yeah, government needs to do a lot more, but 
I think I’ve become a bit more realistic (Participant 15 - Male, 23). 
 
Globalisation just happens and no government can really control it is my 




Self-interest did not emerge as a strong influence on participants’ policy attitudes. 
Participants rarely spoke of the personal benefits they experienced from existing 
policies or reforms that might be in their own interests. Nearly all participants 
appeared to be aiming to take well-considered positions on the various issues, 
based on a broad view of the impacts across society. However, there was some 
discussion in the interviews around the benefits participants felt they had a right to 
expect for themselves and of the ways in which others were motivated by self-
interest. 
 
7.3.1 A sense of entitlement 
 
Eight of the seniors singled out young people as having inflated expectations, 
although there was limited evidence of this from the young participants themselves. 
It was, in fact, the senior participants who more commonly demonstrated a strong 
sense of entitlement in the interviews. Many of the seniors were highly attuned to 
any suggestion they might be missing out on something, concerned about retaining 
government benefits they felt they had a right to, and expectant that government 
would make appropriate provision for them. This was at odds with their persistent 
focus on individual responsibility, which some appeared to feel was no longer 
applicable after a certain age. 
 
The younger generation are getting very greedy. They expect a lot more and 




None of the young participants expressed anything akin to an expectation that 
government would take care of them. They did not think it would happen and they 
did not think it should happen. The young sample comprised mostly university 
students who may have assumed that their education would help them secure 
employment enabling them to be self-sufficient. However, many were apprehensive 
about their job opportunities, including 23 who were concerned about structural 
economic conditions, 19 who thought it had become harder for young people to 
transition into the full-time workforce over the last few decades, and 12 who would 
trade flexibility for greater certainty and security. 
 
Two young participants did think that today’s young adults were less hard-working 
and fussier about what jobs they did than previous generations. Another admitted 
he was scared at the thought of having to work all his life, although two were very 
focused on the contribution they intended to make and achieving self-sufficiency. 
Five of the young participants and 11 of the seniors singled out older people as 
rorting the system by making irresponsible choices and drawing pensions they 
didn’t need. 
 
Seniors who have multiple properties, have shares, are totally fine and then 
they’re still gaining this income just so, you know, they can go on cruises 
once a year. I don’t find that appropriate (Participant 52 – Female, 21). 
 
Some people retire with huge amounts of money, and they’re determined 
that they’re not going to miss out on their pension as well, so they have ways 
of hiding it…it’s a way of life for some people to work out how to get the 
most out of the system…they even have signs on the back of the car: 
‘spending the kids’ inheritance’. And you think, is that something to be proud 
of? (Participant 8 - Female, 67). 
 
Three young participants and one senior said that the only way to make people do 
the right thing was for the system to force them to. The view that the system also 
247 
 
needed to incorporate incentives for individuals to work hard and take 
responsibility for their own lives was common across both groups of participants. 
 
I think entitlement is rife in Western society, to be honest...I think the people 
who need it the least are probably the most entitled...and it’s all personal 
interest…sad to say, I’d probably do the same. So it’s about governments 
saying no, you cannot do that (Participant 42 - Male, 19). 
 
There’s an innate greed in individuals…they actually require the structure of 
governments to monitor and framework what they do, otherwise they will 
take complete advantage of the system (Participant 7 - Male, 69). 
 
In line with the psychology of ‘just world’ theory (see section 4.1.5), people felt that 
effort ought to bring success, and conversely, that rewards should only accrue to 
those who had put in the effort. Seven of the young participants and seven seniors 
emphasised the importance of hard work, with another four seniors noting that 
people needed to plan ahead to ensure their financial and physical health in their 
later years. The role that luck played in achieving success was acknowledged by four 
of the young participants and three of the seniors, who observed that having been 
born in the right place at the right time had something to do with their current 
relatively comfortable circumstances. 
 
I think the average Aussie, if you wanted to make it you could, and that’s not 
to say it hasn’t been hard work, but the opportunity has been there 
(Participant 35 - Female, 63). 
 
I think that there’s an expectation, particularly for younger people, that they 
don’t work hard and therefore the issues that they are facing are because of 
them (Participant 10 - Female, 23). 
 
It’s hard to tell if people have had to work to get where they are or if it was 




I feel it’s just luck, it’s not entitlement, it’s not because I’m super-clever or 
anything like that, I’ve just been lucky. I don’t feel guilty, but I don’t feel 
entirely comfortable…I was born at the right time, white, educated, living in 
the lucky country (Participant 37 - Female, 69). 
 
One of the young participants referred to people being influenced by aspiration, 
with the less well-off condoning the advantages of the better-off in the hope that 
they too would one day benefit. Interestingly, one young and one senior participant 
commented on loss aversion, another psychological bias affecting people’s 
judgement of what is fair. These participants thought people complained more if 
benefits were taken away than if they were never granted at all. 
 
A lot of people don’t necessarily think of themselves as poor, they think 
they’re going to be rich one day…and therefore they don’t want big taxes on 
the rich people because they think it’s going to be them one day (Participant 
4 - Female, 19). 
 
There’s also a generational thing where they expect to have the pension and 
so when it’s taken off them it’s a bigger deal than it would be for someone 
my age where we’re used to having our money taken from us (Participant 6 - 
Female, 23). 
 
7.3.2 The pension as entitlement 
 
The highly conditional view participants tended to take of income support 
payments was relaxed in the case of the Age Pension, where the incentive problems 
that plague means-tested welfare systems came to the fore. The persistence of the 
pension-as-entitlement view, particularly among the young, is perhaps surprising 
after a quarter-century of compulsory superannuation in Australia. It is inconsistent 
with the strong support the young participants expressed for the superannuation 
system and the means-testing of welfare payments, and the emphasis placed on 
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avoiding a ‘handout mentality’ and culture of entitlement by some of the seniors. 
The most likely explanation is that, in line with work by Wim Van Oorschot (2000, 
2006, 2008) and others (see Chapter 3), people consider seniors a uniquely 
deserving category of welfare beneficiary. In a 2009 poll, 57% of Australians thought 
seniors were getting ‘less than their fair share’ of government benefits (Kendig et al. 
2015, p.3). Older people are assumed to have paid their dues to society and 
demonstrated their worth, in a way that other potentially needy groups such as 
children and young jobseekers or single parents have not. There is also a powerful 
social sanction on criticising the aged. This may arise from a combination of young 
people being socialised into respecting their elders, pity felt towards the aged and 
recognition that they are often vulnerable members of society. 
 
7.3.3 The right to retire 
 
Related to the earned pension view, most participants from both age groups 
retained a strong commitment to the ideal of retiring well before the onset of 
chronic ill-health and incapacity to work. This is a social norm that has become 
highly entrenched despite dating back only to the mid-twentieth century. For most 
of the seniors, 65 was the retirement age they were accustomed to and they had 
come to view a state-funded retirement from 65 as an earned entitlement. Young 
participants objected to increasing the pension-eligibility age beyond 67 because 
they perceived being required to work longer as a diminution of personal choice. 
They took the view that people should be free to decide when to retire rather than 
being forced to continue working. 
 
On the whole, participants did not exhibit much depth of thought about this issue. 
There was little acknowledgement that population ageing was likely to have 
implications for the sustainability of the pension system and may necessitate 
reconsideration of the long healthy retirement ideal for those who were not self-
funded. This wasn’t because participants expected the maturing compulsory 
superannuation scheme to relieve pressure on the pension system; most just didn’t 
perceive there to be any looming problem. There appeared to be an assumption 
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that it would and should continue to be business as usual for retirement in 
advanced industrial economies: that most people would continue to be able to 




7.4.1 Material goods and consumption 
 
Participants were unanimous in thinking that Australian society had become overly 
materialistic. Six of the young participants and 13 seniors said young people were 
markedly more materialistic and consumer-oriented than older generations. 
 
Oh, I am gob-smacked at how much my kids acquire stuff and get rid of it! 
My God! (Participant 22 - Female, 65). 
 
I think the younger ones are more want, want, want (Participant 38 - 
Female, 66). 
 
Eight young participants and 13 seniors thought a rise in consumer culture over the 
last three to four decades had affected all age groups. 
 
My parents want the next iPhone as much as I do. They have the better 
version, I’ve had this one for three years, their ones they got two months 
ago! (Participant 49 – Female, 21). 
 
Seven young participants and four seniors said peer pressure, status anxiety and 






It is your money but don’t you feel some kind of moral duty to go well, I don’t 
need a Lamborghini, like no one needs a Lamborghini…I don’t think anyone 
really wants a Lamborghini, it has no intrinsic value, it’s just to show that 
you’re richer than your neighbour, right? (Participant 50 – Male, 20). 
 
Eight young participants and seven seniors attributed the growth in consumerism to 
broader cultural influences, especially advertising. Three young participants and 12 
seniors observed that young people in particular sought immediate gratification, 
wanting (or expecting) the best of everything or the latest model straightaway. Two 
young participants and six seniors complained about built-in obsolescence and the 
‘throwaway’ society. 
 
I do often look at people and go why have you got all this stuff? What do you 
do with it? (Participant 6 - Female, 23). 
 
The way we live is the day-to-day, what’s my next phone, what’s my next 
car? (Participant 12 - Male, 23). 
 
The young participants were savvy and self-aware about their consumer practices. 
Two of them said they tried to resist the lure of shallow consumption for status or 
reward purposes and instead consider functionality when making purchases. Two 
young participants reflected on the act of shopping itself as a form of short-term 
gratification and two on the citizen as consumer. 
 
Everyone falls into the trap, it’s really nice, it’s really comfortable, if you’re 
sad you can just go shopping…it’s almost like we’ve been separated from the 
real world (Participant 41 - Female, 20). 
 
Three young participants thought it was impossible to compare the materialism of 
young people today with that of young people in the past, or older people today, 
due to the different sets of cultural influences in play. Four young participants 
noted that social media was a key enabler of materialism. One young participant 
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reflected in detail on how competitive consumerism damaged human relationships 
and values. Another discussed the trajectory of consumer culture over seven 
decades since ‘the dawn of the supermarket’. 
 
It’s our culture saying it’s okay, spend money, build the economy (Participant 
16 - Male, 19). 
 
There’s very much that culture of things that you’ve bought, things that you 
have, and sharing that with the world (Participant 17 - Female, 24). 
 
Four of the seniors also had particularly sophisticated views on materialism and 
consumer culture, discussing how values inherent in capitalism drove acquisition, 
and how young people had been set a poor example by older generations and left 
with little choice but to embrace the consumer society. 
 
I can’t blame the generation below, because we started it. My generation’s 
the materialistic one, we started it and accumulated all this stuff (Participant 
27 - Female, 64). 
 
Young people are drifting in a morass of materialism really because there’s 
not much of an alternative that they can see. And they think it’s normal 
(Participant 29 - Female, 67). 
 
The culture is set up for consumption and for…dog eat dog…the competitive 
nature of it, you know. And the meaninglessness (Participant 8 - Female, 67). 
 
Eight participants made interesting comments directly relevant to Ronald 
Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis without showing awareness that they were doing 
so and without prompting. These participants reflected on how growing up in 
conditions of prosperity and material comfort may have shaped the values of 
today’s young adults, reducing their resilience and forbearance, even depoliticising 
them. The seniors who commented realised that they too had been raised in good 
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times, but with an awareness of what their parents had experienced in the 
Depression and World War II and what they saw as associated values (thrift and 
frugality, hard work, community spirit, supporting those in need). For the young 
participants, harder times were too distant to have much resonance. 
 
7.4.2 Market orientation 
 
Interview participants revealed quite moderate and nuanced views on when 
governments should intervene in markets. None of the participants were strongly 
libertarian or pro-intervention. Of the fourteen young participants who expressed a 
view on this very broad issue, all were in favour of governments intervening to 
regulate market outcomes in limited cases. Ten emphasised the need to avoid a 
‘nanny state’ that impinged too much on people’s individual autonomy, three noted 
the limits to government control in a globalised world, and five thought it was 
important that intervention did not slow down the market. 
 
I like the idea of the Government staying out of all my business, but I feel like 
also corporations are getting bigger and bigger…so I would like the 
Government to step in, but when I want it to step in. Which is very individual 
for everyone (Participant 9 - Female, 20). 
 
The 16 seniors who indicated at interview where they stood on the balance 
between market and state generally skewed a little more in favour of government 
intervention than the young participants and were a little less concerned with 
protecting individual freedom and market rewards. Half could be characterised as 
fairly pro-intervention. Three seniors were concerned that excessive intervention 
could compromise individual freedom and one that limiting market rewards could 
slow down economic development. Three noted that governments had limited 




Oh, global markets are disastrous…governments must be more responsible. 
They must interact with the system and have the final say (Participant 26 - 
Male, 64). 
 
I don’t believe market forces work for the benefit of society as a whole. They 
work for the benefit of some (Participant 37 - Female, 69). 
 
I think the Government meddles too much…they now seem to believe that 
they have a right to insinuate themselves into every aspect of our lives 
(Participant 29 - Female, 67). 
 
If people work hard and they earn money, for goodness sake, you’re not 
living in a Communist country. They should be allowed to do what they want 
with their surplus money (Participant 39 - Female, 70). 
 
Both the young and senior participants recognised that capitalist norms of 
individual reward, consumption, materialism and growth had delivered benefits 
across Australian society since the mid-twentieth century, with the rising tide lifting 
almost all boats, although there was widespread acknowledgement that some 
boats had been lifted a lot more than others. The seniors tended to be less tolerant 
of consumption norms and variable market outcomes than the young adults. They 
remembered a time when other values, including thrift, fairness, collective 
responsibility and community, had been more influential. 
 
For the seniors, rewards were generated by hard work and sensible choices, albeit 
under favourable economic conditions, and the role of luck was downplayed. The 
seniors tended to see the wealth and entitlements they had accrued as products of 
their own actions. Some appeared susceptible to fundamental attribution error, 
ascribing people’s success or failure to their personal characteristics when external 
circumstances had in fact also been influential. The seniors adhered to one of the 




Significantly, the young had moved on to the post-industrial version of this trope - 
effort may be required, but don’t expect it to guarantee reward. They were 
sanguine about the role of luck and accepted that markets sometimes produce 
unfair outcomes. While the seniors expressed discomfort with market 
unpredictability, the young participants viewed this as an inherent feature of 
capitalism and generally saw only a limited role for government in moderating or 
correcting market outcomes. The young participants appeared to think that if you 
won the lottery of life it may have only a little to do with your personal merits, but 
you would still be entitled to keep your winnings to yourself. 
 
7.4.3 The value of housing 
 
Consumption usually has an emotional component, and in Australia a special 
gratification attaches to owning property. The inviolable and symbolic status of the 
family home in Australia is a powerful social norm which underpinned participants’ 
support for it being treated differently to other assets. The seniors tended to view 
their homes as representative of a lifetime of hard work, saving and responsibility - 
not mere places to live, but expressions of identity and sources of security and 
comfort. The young participants were broadly sympathetic to the senior 
participants’ emotional attachment to home, which meant some shared the view 
that people’s main residence should receive special treatment. However, the young 
themselves tended to view houses pragmatically, as bricks and mortar, and they 
generally did not expect to develop an emotional attachment even if they were able 
to buy homes of their own. This hard-headedness, and a general predisposition to 
view even social goods in economic terms, may have made the young participants a 
little more likely than the seniors to see generating wealth as an important purpose 
of residential housing. 
 
In the interviews, discussion focused on the benefits of downsizing for older people 
rather than the benefits of making larger homes available to people with families. 
There was limited acknowledgement that incentivising people to shelter wealth in 
their main residence in order to maximise their pension entitlements could be 
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contributing to housing affordability issues. Only three participants noted that it 
was an inefficient and environmentally unsound use of housing stock for one or two 
retirees to occupy a large, well-located house while families with children were 
pushed into small apartments or out to urban fringes with limited access to 
workplaces and infrastructure. Similarly, only three participants observed that 
bestowing taxpayer-funded welfare benefits on people holding substantial property 
wealth could be seen as inequitable, and inconsistent with the needs-based 




There was surprisingly little commitment to policy reform among participants, 
despite widespread recognition of problems with some of the current policy 
settings. In the survey only one young participant and seven of the seniors claimed 
to identify with conservatism rather than progressivism, but the interview 
discussion suggested greater reluctance to challenge the existing political or 
economic order, including among the young participants. While the young 
participants may have been very socially progressive, they had little interest in 
redistributive policy reform or other substantive economic change. The two were in 
fact intertwined: the young participants’ support for individual freedom, rights and 
autonomy made them acquiescent to an economic system based on neo-liberal 
norms even when they perceived that it produced unfair outcomes. 
 
7.5.1 Support for the status quo 
 
The seniors’ concern with preserving what they had, and protecting it from 
government interference, may have made them less inclined to support changes to 
existing arrangements. However, despite being comfortable with change and 
disruption, and generally having a lower material stake in the existing order, the 
young participants were even less likely than the seniors to seriously question the 
status quo. The young participants’ support for the system did not appear to stem 
from an expectation that they too would one day benefit from generous pensions, 
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tax breaks and opportunities to accumulate wealth through secure jobs and rising 
property prices. While they were mostly university students, none of the young 
participants spoke of aspiring to highly paid careers; they were more likely to talk 
about their hopes for rewarding, meaningful work. They also acknowledged that 
they faced difficulties their predecessors had not that were likely to impinge on 
their economic wellbeing in the future. The futures these young people envisaged 
for themselves did not include stable employment, large family homes, generous 
defined benefit superannuation schemes, early retirement or taxpayer-funded 
pensions.  
 
Rather, the young participants’ lack of interest in policy reform seemed to arise 
from the strength of their adherence to materialist and individual freedom values. 
At the same time as recognising that these values often produced outcomes that 
were unfair, including to themselves, the young participants were not willing to 
renounce their fealty to a system based on individual choice, consumption and 
relatively unfettered markets. Resistance and anger were not concepts with much 
relevance to the young participants; it was as if affecting casual nonchalance was 
more socially acceptable. There also appeared to be a failure of imagination at work 
- the young adults couldn’t imagine a socioeconomic system other than the one 
they saw around them. The seniors were able to recall that different values and 
norms had once been more influential in the Australian social, political and 
economic context, and even to acknowledge that it was their cohort that had 
presided over a substantive value shift. The young participants showed less 
awareness that there were any alternative value orientations that could inform 
political thinking and action. 
 
They also seemed to believe that even if societal problems loomed, with the 
potential to affect others their age, they themselves would be okay. This may have 
been evidence of a class rather than age dynamic in play. The young participants 
were nearly all university students (although not all from middle-class 
backgrounds). Some variation in the political engagement and participation 
patterns of university students and non-students has been observed in the US 
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(Niemi & Klinger 2012), while British research suggests students from middle-class 
backgrounds at elite universities view their futures differently to those from less 
advantaged backgrounds attending lower-status institutions. Working class 
students appear to be more anxious about their personal futures, while privileged 
students are relatively at ease and expect things to turn out fine (see France & 
Roberts 2015, p.225). 
 
The young participants had mostly not yet reached the point where they were 
trying to find full-time employment, purchase a home or raise a family, milestones 
which are associated with increased political engagement (Dalton 2011, p.5). They 
were in the midst of what has been described as ‘the problem of start-up’ - still 
mobile, unsettled and yet to put down roots (Verba & Nie 1972, p.139). A slightly 
older cohort, say, 25-34-year-olds, may have been less sanguine about their 
economic wellbeing. However, it is possible that many educated young people 
today may not ‘settle’ in quite the same way as previous generations. The young 
participants did demonstrate awareness of current threats to their own and others’ 
economic wellbeing, commonly speaking of the difficulties of living independently 
on Youth Allowance, hardship experienced by older siblings or parents, and 
concerns about job availability and insecurity. 
 
Another possibility is that the young participants’ acceptance of the status quo was 
at least partly an exercise in system justification, which can meet people’s 
existential need for security and stability (see chapter 4). However, the young 
participants did not exhibit the change resistance, closed-mindedness, aversion to 
ambiguity and uncertainty or need for order that are often associated with 
conservative and system-justifying orientations. They also tended to be savvier and 
more self-aware than would normally be expected of system-justifiers. 
 
If the young participants were semi-complicit in the maintenance of the status quo, 
they were doing so with a degree of awareness and reflexivity. As has been noted 
by Bessant, Farthing and Watts, failing to act in your own interests does not imply 
suffering from false consciousness (2017, p.40). The young fieldwork participants 
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tended to be highly pragmatic, their comments coloured by matter-of-factness, 
hard-headedness and expediency. None appeared to be labouring under any 
illusions or false hopes about how the world worked or their place in it. Several 
young participants talked about idealism, but in a way that recognised it was in 
short supply among their age cohort and restricted to niche social issues. The 
seniors spoke as if their idealism had been lost; the young participants spoke as if 





The fieldwork generated some insight into the classic chicken-and-egg problem of 
policy and public opinion: does public opinion produce policy or does policy 
produce public opinion? As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the relationship is circular 
and self-reinforcing - habituation of the public to particular policies helps shore up 
support and entrench them further – but the strength of the habituation effect is 
debatable. The results of the fieldwork suggested that existing policies, especially 
when they embody accepted social and cultural norms, do exert some influence on 
what the public thinks. For example, none of the young participants questioned the 
legitimacy or desirability of compulsory superannuation, most likely because it was 
all they had known, but half the seniors were distrustful, partly because compulsory 
superannuation was introduced after they had gotten used to a non-contributory 
retirement income system. Even if people think an existing policy has undesirable 
outcomes, the mere fact of its existence may make them believe it will be difficult 
to change. 
 
7.5.3 Future orientation 
 
The young participants’ general acceptance of present economic realities belied 
their high levels of future orientation. Of the 25 young interviewees, seventeen 
could be characterised as having a strong engagement with the future. These 
participants showed signs of having previously thought about Australia’s trajectory 
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of development and how it might shape times to come. Despite being broadly more 
focused on social rather than economic change, these young participants 
mentioned issues around future economic development, including infrastructure, 
investment, automation, technology, employment, public debt and energy. 
 
Ten of this group spoke of the possible intergenerational impacts of government 
policies and the obligations of people today to future generations. Six recognised 
the policy challenges posed by unknowns and uncertainty, and three thought 
building adaptive capacity was more important than planning. Such considerations 
suggest a degree of sophistication in the way these young adults thought about the 
future and the planning challenges faced by governments. By contrast, the other 
eight young participants appeared to be engaging with future-oriented issues 
primarily for the purposes of the interview and took a more superficial perspective. 
 
Of the 28 senior interviewees, eight could be characterised as having a reasonably 
strong engagement with the future. These seniors discussed their hopes and 
concerns for Australia’s future, although not in as much depth as the future-
oriented young participants. Only two of this group recognised that Government 
policies had intergenerational impacts. The rest of the senior participants did not 
exhibit a strong future orientation. Most of them thought the Government did a 
poor job of planning, but four said things would turn out okay and three said they 
didn’t care how things turned out because they would not be around. Three seniors 
complained that young people seeking immediate gratification were part of the 
reason it was difficult to plan for the future. 
 
One senior commented that thinking about the future was a luxury that only 
became available once scarcity was overcome and one of the young participants 
observed that young people working in short-term, precarious employment were 
not in a position to think too far forward. On the other hand, three young 
participants speculated that significant crisis or hardship could trigger a resetting of 
values by young people. Five seniors only semi-facetiously remarked that a good 
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war might be the making of the younger generation, jolting them out of their 
complacency.  
  
What we need is a war, what we need is a disaster (Participant 40 - Female, 
60). 
 
I think it would be interesting to see how if it was all stripped away, if there 
was a world war or something and we all had to just make do, I think a lot of 
the young people might surprise me by doing it very well (Participant 29 - 
Female, 67). 
 
When reflecting on Australia’s future, the seniors tended to have specific concerns, 
while the young participants spoke more generally and positively about 
opportunities. The young people were more realistic than idealistic, describing 
themselves as hopeful but not irrationally so. The seniors were, on the whole, more 
pessimistic than the young participants. Six of the seniors had attitudes that could 
generally be characterised as optimistic, while 17 of the young participants took an 
approach that could be described as qualified optimism. Notwithstanding their 
worries and recognition of potential problems ahead, an undercurrent of hope for 
the future remained. This may have reflected the young participants’ position as 
relatively privileged citizens of a wealthy society. 
 
I’m not sure how this could go, it could go really well, it could go really 
bad…I’m sitting on the fence, I’m just kind of watching (Participant 44 - 
Female, 22). 
 
I used to be idealistic, I used to think there was such a thing as utopia…but 





7.6 Generational consciousness 
 
The fieldwork explored the degree to which the young participants and seniors had 
a ‘generational consciousness’, or sense of shared experience and solidarity with 
their age peers. As discussed in Chapter 2, this can make it more likely a group will 
take up a common cause or act collectively. It can potentially also exacerbate 
tensions between different age groups or birth cohorts. 
 
7.6.1 Distinctive generations 
 
The survey included two questions about participants’ awareness of ‘generation’ 
and age cohorts, asking whether they thought people born around the same time as 
them could be described as a generation with distinctive characteristics, and 
whether they identified strongly with people around the same age. The results are 
set out in Tables 13 and 14. 
 
Table 13: I am part of a ‘generation’ with distinctive characteristics 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 0 5 4 13 3 
Senior participants (n=30) 0 0 10 13 7 
Total (n=55) 0 5 14 26 10 
% of young participants 0% 20% 16% 52% 12% 
% of senior participants 0% 0% 33% 43% 23% 





Table 14: I identify strongly with people around the same age as me 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 1 3 8 11 2 
Senior participants (n=30) 0 7 14 7 2 
Total (n=55) 1 10 22 18 4 
% of young participants 4% 12% 32% 44% 8% 
% of senior participants 0% 23% 47% 23% 7% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
The results for the first of these questions lent some support to Karl Mannheim’s 
concept of generation, where common conditions and events experienced in youth 
by people born around the same time potentially set them apart from other cohorts 
and leave a lasting imprint (see chapter 2). Two-thirds of participants from each 
group agreed or strongly agreed that they felt part of a generation with distinctive 
characteristics. A fifth of the young group disagreed with this proposition, while 
none of the seniors did (though a third were undecided). Results for the second 
question on identifying strongly with people of a similar age were more ambivalent, 
with significant proportions of each group selecting ‘neither agree nor disagree’. 
Participants who recorded a preference were more likely to agree than disagree 
with the proposition, with agreement among the young group stronger than among 
the seniors.  
 
While two-thirds of participants agreed in the survey that they felt like part of a 
generation with distinctive characteristics, at interview they found it hard to specify 
what these might be. Ten of the young participants resisted generalisations or 
stereotypes about ‘Millennials’, which was not surprising given that ‘individualistic’ 






Diverse everything, like we just want to be individuals (Participant 43 - Male, 
18). 
 
Perhaps pinpointing a group of people who happened to be born within the 
same timeframe is, I don’t know, divisive and not really useful at all 
(Participant 3 - Female, 22). 
 
We’re just lumped together as ‘the Millennials’, one group. Like, I identify 
with people of my age, because I go to university, I talk with people my age 
all the time, we watch the same TV shows, we consume similar media. 
Doesn’t mean I’m the same as them (Participant 10 - Female, 23). 
 
Nine thought young adults’ relationship with technology set them apart from other 
age groups. In a sophisticated piece of sociological analysis, one young participant 
described how social media culture had produced an ‘obscure generation’ taking 
refuge in dark humour and absurdism to keep the real world at a distance. 
 
We’re so quick to make jokes and stuff, like dark humour has taken such a 
rise, like memes about tragedies and that sort of thing, I think it’s because 
we’re so far removed from death and everything’s materialistic…we’ve just 
kind of created this absurdist reality for ourselves (Participant 41 - Female, 
20). 
 
Another nine young participants thought young people were more open-minded, 
tolerant and open to change than older people. Three young participants said young 
adults tended to have a sense of entitlement and higher expectations of the work 
they would be doing, although one disputed the entitlement stereotype and 
another described precarious work conditions as the defining feature of her 
generation. Only two other young participants mentioned forms of economic 




I don’t think we’re as entitled as everyone makes us out to be. Because my 
grandparents’ generation could buy a house by the time they were my age 
and my generation is likely to never own homes (Participant 6 - Female, 23). 
 
Apparently we eat a lot of avocado on toast (Participant 4 - Female, 19). 
 
Many of the 18 seniors who commented on the defining characteristics of the 
contemporary young adult cohort tended to fall back on simplistic and 
unsympathetic stereotypes. Ten seniors characterised young adults as entitled, 
materialistic, greedy, wasteful and unwilling to take responsibility or work hard. Five 
complained that young people lacked values, morality or respect. Four seniors 
thought the young took a narrow and short-term view of the world. Two said young 
adults seemed savvy and practical and perhaps should be given more credit for how 
they handled the challenges they faced. 
 
The seniors also reflected on their own cohort. There was some disapproving 
discussion of people ‘gaming’ the retirement income system, and three senior 
participants noted the Baby Boomers’ reputation for ‘selfishness’. 
 
I’m a Baby Boomer, and apparently we’re selfish! (Participant 5 - Female, 
64). 
  
We’re Baby Boomers and we get blamed for everything (Participant 28 - 
Female, 62). 
 
They say my generation, we sold out, you know, we’ve taken the wealth of 
the country and we got the free education and we’re agreeing to the kids not 
getting it, but I’m not one who does it (Participant 8 - Female, 67). 
 
However, the focus was very much on how external circumstances defined this 
group. This may have partly reflected the senior participants’ own resistance to 
their diverse cohort being subject to labelling and generalisation. Fourteen of the 15 
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seniors who commented on what defined their generation referred to how lucky 
they had been to experience favourable economic circumstances, free education 
and abundant job opportunities. There was a strong sense of the good timing of 
having been born in the late 1940s and 1950s, and acknowledgement that life was 
likely to be harder in some ways for those born later. This came through more 
strongly than would have been expected from prior research, which found that only 
39% of Australians thought Baby Boomers were better off in terms of lifelong 
opportunities than younger generations (38% of all respondents and a full 48% of 
18-29-year-olds thought they were worse off) (Kendig et al. 2015, p.2). 
 
I don’t think the next generation have got it anywhere near as good as we 
had. But again, it’s going to be, some people have got it all, they’ve got the 
best of what’s available, and others have got none of it (Participant 8 - 
Female, 67). 
 
We got the best of everything. Nobody else has had it as good as we had it 
(Participant 24 - Male, 70). 
 
I think us Baby Boomers have had the best of it, just post-war. Full 
employment, universal health care, free university education, lots of jobs, 
and a house was affordable (Participant 37 - Female, 69). 
 
I certainly wouldn’t want to be in this lot now…the kids today seem to have 
everything, but I still feel sorry for them (Participant 5 - Female, 64). 
  
I think we were the lucky generation, yeah, very lucky, yeah (Participant 18 - 
Male, 70). 
 
There was little to no discussion of whether this ‘lucky’ age cohort had any 
responsibilities to succeeding generations, and if so, if they had been discharged. 
Participants were reluctant to reflect, even when prompted, on what this cohort 
had done with its good fortune. Three seniors conceded that older age groups had 
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set a bad example for younger ones in some respects. One senior reluctantly 
acknowledged a creeping awareness among her cohort that their enjoyment of the 
good life may have come at a high price that would be paid by their children and 
grandchildren. 
  
The rest of the tax-paying population is subsidising our lifestyle (Participant 7 
- Male, 69). 
 
We’ve had a good time…we can’t do anything about it now, but we’ve sort of 
like gotta put the screws on you guys cause you can’t do what we did 
(Participant 2 - Male, 65). 
  
 It’s not going to be like it once was (Participant 17 - Female, 24). 
 
Overall, the seniors were more likely to express some sense of shared experience, 
such as historical events and circumstances that had marked them as a group. The 
young participants expressed little solidarity or common cause with their age peers, 
no sense of ‘we’re all in this together’. This difference may have been due to the 
particularly strong cultural identity of the Baby Boomer generation or the fact that 
the young participants were still in the process of developing a ‘generational 
consciousness’. However, it was very much in keeping with the young participants’ 
emphasis on individualism, that they generally saw their age cohort as a diverse 
group of people who had different preferences and would all go their own way. This 
may be ideal for encouraging tolerance and openness, but it bodes less well for the 
chances of collective action on issues affecting young people. 
 
7.6.2 Political socialisation 
 
Interviewees were asked to reflect on factors that had shaped their political values 
and engagement, and in the case of the seniors, how their political thinking had 
changed over time. Three young participants thought other young people might be 
influenced by their upbringing and their parents’ views but excluded themselves 
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from this category. Six young participants said their education had shaped their 
political views and engagement. Not surprisingly given that most of the young 
participants were students, university was seen as a key influence, both in terms of 
the content of academic studies and the campus milieu. Nearly all the young 
participants who were students mentioned how things they had learned or 
experienced at university had affected their views on specific issues. They referred 
regularly to how their education encouraged them to think critically and 
independently. 
 
Ten seniors talked about how family and childhood socialisation had shaped their 
political thinking and engagement, sometimes in quite overpowering ways. None of 
the young participants referred to any deliberate attempts by family members or 
educators to instil particular attitudes or values in them. Family is likely to be in 
decline as a socialising force now that young people tend to be exposed to a range 
of different influences through social media and the broader culture and are more 
likely to be highly educated. Four seniors mentioned the influence of education, 
referring to school and individual teachers rather than university. Seniors tended to 
think that both families and schools should be doing more to instil appropriate 
political values in young people. Some of the young and senior participants 
commented on the influence of peers and the broader culture, although often 
obliquely. 
 
There was no sense from the young participants that they felt or were manipulated 
in any way by political elites, and very little from the seniors. Researchers have 
suggested that political elites are increasingly attempting to shape public opinion to 
suit their own purposes (see Jacobs & Shapiro 2000; Druckman & Jacobs 2015), but 
the participants in this fieldwork tended to be relatively cynical about 
communications emanating from politicians, political parties, lobby groups and the 
mass media. None of the young participants spoke about any form of elite or mass 
media political messaging that had influenced them; those who made relevant 
comments said the form and content of this messaging had very little resonance for 
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them and they just didn’t buy into it. A small number of seniors referred to 
comments by politicians or in the media that had affected their thinking. 
 
The young participants spoke as if they had formed their political personas by 
considering what was important to them personally from a range of cultural values. 
They felt no pressure to adopt any particular values or views. The young 
participants appeared to feel they freely chose to be highly individualistic, 
consumer-oriented and relatively blasé about market failings, rather than being at 
least partly inculcated into a prevailing set of cultural norms. They prided 
themselves on knowing when they were being manipulated, by advertising or social 
media, for example, and seemed to think that this awareness negated any undue 
influence. The young participants had a strong conviction that free choice mattered, 
and they therefore believed that it existed. 
 
7.6.3 Political thinking across the lifecourse 
 
Nearly all the young participants implicitly acknowledged that they were not fully 
formed political beings and remained open to new ideas and the lessons that 
experience would teach them. On the other hand, the seniors appeared to be, and 
to see themselves as, finished products. They had established their values, formed 
their views and were now largely closed off to alternatives. However, this appeared 
to have happened fairly late in life, even post-retirement, for many, with only two 
seniors saying their political thinking had stayed the same since they were young 
adults and 21 reporting significant changes over the years. The political 
development trajectory of both the young and senior participants appeared to 
reflect a combination of age group and period effects more than birth cohort 
effects. This may have been partly a product of the participants having relatively 
high education levels and being more likely to continually revisit and adjust their 
political mindsets. 
 
Nine of the 21 seniors who described change over the years did report that by early 
adulthood they had developed some fundamental values that had stayed with 
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them. What had shifted for them was an overlay of attitudes, opinions and 
behaviours; ways of applying their basic values to real-world situations. Apart from 
favourable economic conditions, the seniors thought the most powerful period 
effects on the development of their political values had been the Vietnam War (late 
1960s to early 1970s) and the Whitlam government (early to mid-1970s). 
 
I think people change as they get older, circumstances change…they say how 
to turn a socialist into a capitalist – give him half a million dollars 
(Participant 33 - Male, 61). 
 
Seven of the seniors reported deeper-level shifts in their political thinking, reflecting 
some resetting of their fundamental values. For three participants, the shift could 
be broadly characterised as being from left to right on the political spectrum; 
several other seniors said that even if they personally had not moved, many of their 
age peers had become more conservative, closed-minded and change-resistant as 
they had aged and accumulated wealth which they wished to preserve. The other 
four reported that they had swung to the left as they aged, influenced by social 
changes, a growing awareness of environmental issues, life experiences and the 
development of a political identity independent of initial socialisation in the family. 
Eight seniors said they had become increasingly politically engaged during 
adulthood; none said they had become less engaged (though disengaged seniors 
would have been much less likely to self-select for participation in the research). For 
some, the catalyst for greater engagement had occurred earlier in life through 
work-related experiences or raising a family; for others, retirement had freed them 
up to take a greater interest in political issues. 
 
The young participants were necessarily more speculative about how their own and 
their peers’ political thinking would change over time. Of the ten who commented 
on this issue, six thought the influence of early political socialisation and 
experiences during the formative years of young adulthood would leave a lasting 
imprint. Two young participants expected a growth in conservatism and narrow-
mindedness as their generation aged. One thought a stronger ideological stance 
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may develop over time and another said economic issues were likely to become 
more salient with age. 
 
I think people’s opinions and policy views will change over a lifetime and I 
think that’s a good thing. I think there should always be some sort of 
renegotiation, I don’t think you should just blatantly stand behind the flag 
you stood behind 40 years ago (Participant 9 - Female, 20). 
 
The young people did not mention any specific historical events that had shaped 
the development of their views. In fact, the seniors were more likely to talk about 
how they had been influenced by significant recent developments such as 
Australia’s refugee policy, the ‘rotating door’ of Australian prime ministers and 
climate-related events. Some of the young participants made brief allusions to the 
Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency (both in 2016), 
but not in ways that suggested these events had galvanised them into thinking 
differently about politics. Rather, these developments were interpreted as 
extensions of what had become the natural order of global democratic capitalism 
and viewed by the young participants with the same vague sense of resignation and 
passive acceptance. 
 
7.6.4 Political engagement by generation 
 
While the fieldwork undertaken here did not set out specifically to explore young 
people’s levels of political engagement, nevertheless disengagement and a 
perceived lack of political efficacy emerged as significant influences on the young 
participants’ views. It was apparent during the conduct of the present research that 
the young adults were not as motivated as the seniors to share their views. It was 
difficult to recruit young participants, even when targeting the pool of students 
taking majors such as Political Science at the University of Adelaide, and they were 
more eager to receive reimbursement for their time than the seniors. The young 
participants were less likely than the seniors to prolong their interviews, seek to 
discuss tangential issues, or provide feedback indicating they had found their 
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participation interesting. They presented as more dispassionate and detached than 
the seniors, even though they were likely to experience a greater personal impact 
from some of the issues discussed (and were not oblivious to this fact). 
 
These findings align with prior work, discussed in Chapter 3, that youth political 
participation, interest and engagement are generally declining. While it may be 
true, as Russell Dalton (2008) and others have argued, that young people prefer 
more individualised and participatory forms of action to voting and partisanship, 
the results of fieldwork undertaken for this thesis suggested they are not a great 
deal more interested in the new modes than they are in traditional forms of 
participation. The young participants were not exactly more complacent or 
apathetic than the seniors, but they seemed to care less about political issues. 
Notably, they were highly conscious of their own disengagement and its 
consequences, but this was not enough to galvanise them into action. 
 
Eleven of the young participants directly addressed levels of youth political 
engagement during the interviews, with three thinking they were relatively high but 
eight disagreeing. The seniors were somewhat more positive, with seven saying the 
young seemed as politically engaged as any other generation and four seeing higher 
levels of disengagement. Perceived low levels of political engagement among the 
young were attributed partly to self-interest or apathy, and partly to systemic 
factors. Three of the young participants acknowledged they really only cared about 
things that affected them directly, but government’s failure to address issues of 
interest to young people or communicate effectively with them was seen as the 
bigger issue. Two of the seniors agreed that government was uninspiring and did 
not ‘speak’ to the young. Two young participants thought experiencing greater 
hardship or a crisis would serve to engage young people more in politics. Two of the 
senior participants suggested that times of plenty depoliticised people. Another 
senior thought simple life experience – working, buying a house, raising children, 
paying taxes, interacting with government agencies - was necessary to develop 




If they’re talking about a particular issue that affects me directly, then 
absolutely, I would want to be more involved, but it also depends on the 
accessibility of the information they’re giving out (Participant 44 - Female, 
22). 
 
I think that there is a high level of apathy among young people towards 
politics…a lot of people just don’t care. They just don’t see how it affects 
them personally (Participant 10 - Female, 23). 
 
The young participants appeared to believe that their relative disengagement was 
rational, in that their individual political participation would be inconsequential. In 
his polemic Against Democracy (2017), political philosopher Jason Brennan argues 
that democracy empowers the (largely politically incompetent) majority at the 
expense of individuals, whose participation or otherwise can make very little 
difference to election or policy outcomes (see also Hardin 2006). The young 
participants here seemed to have a similar view, and therefore did not see the point 
of individual political activity, while their lack of cohort solidarity or sense of 
collective purpose meant they were unlikely to join with peers to take joint action. 
Ironically, these young people tended to approximate Brennan’s profile of the ideal 
political citizen who should be participating - relatively high-information, pragmatic, 
dispassionate and non-ideological. 
 
I know a whole lot of people who…donkey voted because they didn’t feel like 
they were being listened to and they also didn’t feel like their vote had 
enough weight (Participant 51 – Female, 18). 
 
7.7 Differences by age 
 
The fieldwork provided some support for the hypothesis that the policy attitudes 
held by different age cohorts differ systematically, largely because value 
orientations vary with age in ways that matter for political thinking and behaviour. 
The policies considered in the fieldwork affected young adults and seniors very 
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differently, but the broad commonalities in their attitudes, and the reasons they 
gave for their opinions in the interviews, suggested self-interest was rarely a 
dominant determinant. As a relatively educated sample who had self-selected to 
take part in the research, the participants may have been more likely to think 
through issues and recognise complexities than fall back on snap judgements based 
on their own interests. The views of the young and senior participants were more 
likely to diverge where they had absorbed different values or cultural norms rather 
than where their own interests pointed in different directions. 
 
The most significant difference between the young adults and the seniors was that 
the young people adhered strongly to individual autonomy and freedom values 
while the seniors focused much more on individual responsibility and duties to the 
collective. Another key difference was that the young participants were much more 
comfortable with marketisation and neo-liberal norms, even when they were 
personally disadvantaged as a result. The seniors, on the other hand, were generally 
suspicious of market outcomes, although prepared to tolerate them when they 
personally benefitted. 
 
7.7.1 Comparing policy attitudes 
 
There were a small number of policy settings towards which the young participants 
and seniors had quite different attitudes. The young participants were more likely 
than the seniors to disapprove of attaching strict conditions to the receipt of 
Newstart. The survey responses of young and senior participants on the level of 
income support payments were roughly aligned, with two interesting exceptions: 
seniors were more likely to say Newstart and Parenting Payment were too low. This 
difference is surprising given that Newstart and Parenting Payment tend to benefit 
younger members of society and the seniors were more likely than the young 





The young participants were less conscious of cost of living issues than the seniors, 
although they were roughly in alignment with the seniors on other income support 
payments being too low. While the young participants were concerned about 
mutual-obligation style conditions undermining the autonomy of Newstart 
recipients, they seemed less cognisant of the impact extreme economic hardship 
tends to have on people’s choices and self-determination. It is possible that the 
young participants’ general disinclination to expect government to come to the 
rescue, or step in to correct market outcomes, influenced their views on Newstart 
and Parenting Payment, which appear to be more closely related to personal choice 
and temporary conditions than the other income support payments. 
 
The senior participants were notably more likely than the young to be judgemental 
about people’s choices and behaviour, and to fall back on stereotypes about groups 
of income support recipients. Seven of the seniors were particularly disapproving of 
the ‘welfare queen’, who is perceived as making irresponsible choices in relation to 
her fertility (and sexuality) at best and having babies specifically to maximise her 
benefit entitlements at worst. Ten seniors criticised ‘the youth of today’ as lazy, 
greedy, entitled and lacking any sense of responsibility. By contrast, the young 
participants expressed little antipathy towards single parents, the unemployed, 
people of different ages or any other groups. 
 
All but three of 23 young participants who commented in the interviews broadly 
supported Australia’s compulsory superannuation system, while half of the seniors 
who commented were ambivalent or unsupportive. The young participants 
appeared to be habituated to compulsory superannuation, having never known any 
other system. They were also comfortable with superannuation’s reliance on 
investment and market-based outcomes, including an element of risk and 
unpredictability. The seniors, on the other hand, were warier of market outcomes 
and shaken by the rules of retirement income having been changed when they were 




Another significant difference arose in interview responses to the question of 
whether it was acceptable for people to spend their superannuation freely and fall 
back on the pension rather than making an effort to generate a sustainable 
retirement income stream. Sixteen of the 21 young participants who commented, 
but just three of the 24 seniors, took the view that people’s superannuation was 
their own money and they should feel free to spend it however they pleased. The 
young participants were strongly protective of individual choice in this matter, even 
if that choice was irresponsible or shifted costs to others (in this case taxpayers 
funding the Age Pension). The young participants did not interpret compulsory 
superannuation itself as an abrogation of individual choice. This may have been 
because they viewed compulsory superannuation contributions as a sort of bonus 
granted out of employers’ generosity, rather than money that would otherwise be 
passed to employees in the form of higher wages. 
 
The young participants were more tolerant of public debt than the seniors. Around 
half of the young participants, but only around a fifth of the seniors were 
comfortable with the Australian Government continuing to accumulate public debt. 
The seniors’ concern was not for the sake of the younger people who would carry 
the burden of repaying this debt; rather, seniors were simply debt averse. Many 
had an almost automatic reaction that debt was bad and everyone, right up to the 
level of national governments, should live within their means. 
 
The young participants tended to have a higher tolerance for risk, debt and 
profligate spending, all of which have been somewhat normalised at both an 
individual and societal level. They placed little value on thrift and only two young 
participants, compared with seven seniors, looked ahead to the future 
consequences of accumulating debt or allowing government expenditure to blow 
out. Most participants confessed to understanding little about the future 
implications of high levels of public debt. However, five of the young participants 
offered quite sophisticated analyses of the pros and cons, and the benefits of 
investing in infrastructure at a time of low interest rates. None of the participants 
recognised that if the Australian Government was already borrowing to fund 
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recurrent spending, it may not be well-placed to meet the challenges of 
demographic change, especially rising health, aged care and pension costs, and a 
proportionally smaller taxpayer base. Nor did any note that accumulating public 
debt to fund recurrent spending, rather than investing in infrastructure, may involve 
displacing the cost of present consumption to future generations. 
 
7.7.2 Comparing values 
 
The self-reported survey data on preferred values sometimes painted a different 
picture to the revealed data in the interviews. In some ways the survey responses 
may have indicated how participants saw themselves and would like to be seen, 
while the revealed data on values in the interviews showed more how participants 
really thought. For example, the young participants were more likely than the 
seniors to prefer equality over freedom in the survey value pairing, but in the 
interviews young participants placed heavy emphasis on individual freedom and 
autonomy. Seniors were much more likely than the young participants to favour 
small over big government in the survey, but in the interviews the seniors generally 
had higher expectations of what government should do while the young 
participants were more tolerant of unmoderated market outcomes. Some of the 
seniors had contradictory values in this area - they had a strong sense of what they 
wanted government to do for them but were resentful of perceived government 
interference in their affairs. 
 
Young participants and seniors preferred minimising risks over taking risks in the 
survey by similar margins, but the young people’s interview responses tended to 
suggest they were considerably more comfortable with risk than the seniors. 
However, this may have reflected their habituation to risk in modern society rather 
than an actual positive embrace of risk. Around three-quarters of both young and 
senior participants preferred a global rather than local outlook in the survey, but in 
the interviews the young people were more outward-looking and more likely to 
refer to Australia’s place in the global community. The most interesting divergence 
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between age groups was on the question of responsibilities vs rights. All of the 
seniors but less than half of the young group preferred responsibilities. 
 
The significance of the differences in policy attitudes between the young and senior 
participants is discussed in Chapter 8. These differences are contextualised in terms 
of the various influences on attitude formation discussed in Chapter 4. The 
fieldwork found that the underlying values of the young and senior participants 
were a significant factor in the way each group thought about redistributive policy. 
Differences in these value orientations were largely responsible for the differences 
in policy attitudes between the two groups. The extent to which these different 
value orientations might arise from the socio-economic conditions prevailing during 









Society is ... a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in 
all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes 
a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who 
are dead, and those who are to be born.  
 
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) 
 
 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that structural economic and demographic change are 
creating inequality of economic opportunities and life chances between age groups. 
Today’s children and young people are likely to bear a greater lifetime tax burden 
than their grandparents due to the costs of supporting an ageing population and 
mitigating environmental damage caused by past and current consumption. Slowing 
economic and wage growth, fewer good job opportunities and a lack of affordable 
housing are likely to put further pressure on young people over the coming 
decades. However, the Australian Government’s current redistributive policy 
settings do little to smooth out economic inequalities between seniors and young 
people. On the contrary, many existing policies shift greater burdens on to the 
young while enhancing benefits for older people. Examples of these policies include 
higher income support payments for people aged over 65 compared to jobseekers, 
students and single parents and generous tax concessions for superannuants and 
homeowners. An example of the inequality that this situation contributes to is the 
substantially higher poverty rate for Australian children, especially the children of 
single parents, than for other age groups (Phillips & Joseph 2016; Davidson et al. 
2018). 
 
This thesis examined whether policies that contribute to intergenerational 
inequality persist because they align with public opinion. Chapter 3 considered the 
relationship between policy and public opinion, and whether there are age-based 
differences in political attitudes. It found some evidence that public opinion shapes 
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policy, and that young and older people’s attitudes towards education and social 
policy may differ in important ways. This has the potential to significantly affect 
policy outcomes as young people exert less political influence due to making up a 
decreasing proportion of the population, and they tend to have divergent political 
participation patterns. 
 
However, the results of the fieldwork conducted for this thesis suggested that even 
if young people’s views were better reflected in policymaking in Australia, they 
would not necessarily be strong advocates for redistributive policy reform. Both the 
young and senior participants in the fieldwork undertaken for this thesis recognised 
that existing policy settings contributed to inequality, including between age 
groups, but neither group was particularly supportive of alternative policy settings. 
This was unexpected in the case of the young participants but can be better 
understood in terms of the factors shaping policy attitudes outlined in Chapter 4. 
The fieldwork results are consistent with the finding that factors other than self-
interest are significant influences on attitudes towards redistributive policy. 
Underlying value orientations emerged as a key influence and value differences 
appeared to explain some of the attitudinal variation between the two groups. 
While there were many commonalities in attitudes and underlying values between 
the young adult and senior participants, there were also revealing differences that 
suggest age has some relevance as a political cleavage. 
 
8.1 Attitudinal complexity 
 
Both the young adult and senior participants in the fieldwork tended to be highly 
supportive of the Australian welfare state, with most advocating increases to 
income support payments. Participants were, on the whole, highly egalitarian. They 
were suspicious of tax expenditure programs and policy complexity that allowed the 
well-off and well-informed to benefit in ways that were not available to others. 
There were only limited indications of self-interest (in terms of personal material 
benefits) substantially influencing the attitudes of either group, which is in line with 
prior research suggesting that the effects of rational choice and self-interest on 
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political attitudes and choices have been over-stated (see, for example, Sears & 
Funk 1991). Most participants were able to contextualise their views quite well and 
tried to take into account the broader implications of particular policies rather than 
adopting a narrow focus. The fieldwork findings aligned with research discussed in 
section 4.2.2 showing that people’s policy views are often influenced less by what is 
good for them personally and more by the sort of society they would like to live in, 
including considerations of fairness and justice (Kaase & Newton 1995, p.76; 
Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 2002, pp.16-17; Taylor-Gooby 2008 Kumlin 2004, 
pp.37-38, 144; Van Oorschot et al. 2012). 
 
However, the picture was not quite so straightforward as this suggests. Participants 
generally took a fairly conditional view of welfare, with strong support for means-
testing and reasonable support (especially among the seniors) for quite onerous 
mutual obligation requirements. These results align with the literature discussed in 
section 4.1.3 on redistributive policy views in in highly meritocratic societies such as 
Australia. This research finds relatively strong support for making welfare 
conditional; a preoccupation with moral hazard; an emphasis on merit over need as 
a criterion for distribution; and limited support for government intervention to 
regulate market outcomes, including labour market risks (see, for example, Aalberg 
2003, p.47; Larsen 2006, pp.55, 92; Wilson, Meagher & Hermes 2012b, pp.121-22; 
Jensen 2014). Meritocratic citizens tend to view distributive outcomes as products 
of individuals’ effort or talent, rather than systemic factors, the actions of others or 
simple luck. This tendency transcends socioeconomic background; even people 
experiencing economic hardship in meritocratic societies tend to adhere to ‘the 
belief in a just world’ (Lerner 1980), that hard work and individual effort reap 
economic rewards (Kunovich & Slomczynski 2007; Page & Goldstein 2016; Donovan 
2017).  
 
Implicit in this narrative is the idea that those who are well-off deserve what they 
have, while those who are badly off find themselves in this position because they 
are not worthy, or have not demonstrated they are worthy, of their fair share. This 
came through strongly in the fieldwork results. Participants from both age groups 
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tended to see older Australians as having earned the right to economic privileges 
that younger, sometimes needier, people had not. Many of the participants, 
particularly amongst the senior group, appeared to be influenced by a 
‘deservingness heuristic’ (Petersen et al. 2011) and implicit deservingness rankings 
(van Oorschot 2000; 2006; 2008) as discussed in section 4.1.4, with retirees at the 
top of the list of worthy welfare recipients and the unemployed at the bottom. A 
significant proportion of the senior group also considered single parents to be 
irresponsible and undeserving. 
 
Both the young and senior participants accepted without question the right of 
people who had reached a certain age to be released from obligations towards 
society and to claim various welfare, tax and housing benefits, even though they did 
not expect those who were currently young to enjoy the same privileges as seniors. 
The aged, at least for now, were viewed as having a special ‘normative legitimacy’ 
(Pampel & Williamson 1989, p.167) to their claims that was not available to other 
groups which had not (yet) demonstrated that they deserved a share of society’s 
resources. The young people gave the impression that they knew they were not 
supposed to question any benefits enjoyed by older people as it would involve 
transgressing a social norm, but it would also have been anathema to their own 
personal views around individual choice and rights trumping responsibilities.  
 
Most of the young and senior participants thought that structural economic shifts 
were contributing to unemployment but the seniors in particular still saw being out 
of work as a ‘lifestyle choice’ for some. This tempered their support for more 
generous unemployment benefits but was most evident in the degree to which they 
thought benefits should be conditional. There was a view that a signal needed to be 
sent to those reliant on Newstart or Parenting Payment that their need for support 
represented a personal failure and it would not be provided unconditionally. Those 
who had reached retirement age, by contrast, were entitled to unconditional 
support without judgement for as long as necessary. The fieldwork participants 
from the senior group could generally be categorised as the ‘strong reciprocators’ 
described in section 4.1.2: they thought people were entitled to support from 
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society but only if they met particular expectations and ‘pulled their weight’ (see 
Rothstein 1998, p.137; Holmes & Sunstein 1999, pp.176, 207; Kahan 2006; Gintis, 
Bowles & Fehr 2006, p.8).  
 
In line with prior research described in Chapter 4, participants in the fieldwork had 
pluralistic, complex and multi-faceted attitudes towards redistributive policy. They 
balanced multiple considerations when forming their views, rather than basing 
them on a single over-arching principle (see Miller 1992; Swift et al. 1995, p.35; 
Aalberg 2003, pp.42, 197; Reeskens & Van Oorschot 2013). As noted in section 4.2, 
a combination of demand-side factors (values and socio-cultural context) and 
supply-side factors (institutional settings, government policy performances) 
influence policy attitudes (see Rothstein 1998; Mau 2003; Svallfors 2007a, pp.9-13; 
Norris 2011; Svallfors 2012). The fieldwork was designed to primarily investigate 
demand-side factors but it was surprising how infrequently participants talked 
about being influenced by specific institutional factors or government performance 
considerations in the interviews.  
 
The evidence outlined in section 4.2.3 suggests that the relationship between 
institutional factors and political attitudes can be ambiguous and multi-dimensional. 
This is reflected in the inconclusive findings of research investigating whether 
people in what Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) described as liberal welfare regimes, 
such as Australia, are less likely to support extensive redistribution and transfer 
programs (see, for example, Svallfors 1997; Bean & Papadakis 1998; Arts & Gelissen 
2001; Kangas 2003; Taylor-Gooby 2004; Garfinkel et al. 2006; Gelissen 2008; 
Dallinger 2010). To the extent that institutional context was an influence on 
fieldwork participants’ views, it emerged in subtle, nuanced ways rather than being 
explicit, and took the form of habituation instead of any more active engagement 
process. As discussed in section 4.2.4, people tend to adapt their views about what 
is fair to what they see around them and therefore perceive to be possible (Pierson 
1996; Marshall et al. 1999, pp.349-51; Arts & Gelissen 2001, p.288; Gelissen 2001, 
p.498; Austen 2002; Kohli 2011, p.471). The fieldwork participants, both young and 
senior, were generally accepting of the status quo not so much because of the ‘lock-
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in’ or policy feedback effects noted in 4.2.4 (see Pierson 1993, Pierson 1996; Pierson 
2004; Galasso 2006, p.56; Brooks & Manza 2007, p.23), but because they simply 
couldn’t see any alternative. This theme is revisited later in the chapter. 
 
As with other qualitative studies of policy attitudes discussed in section 4.3.10 (see, 
for example, Hochschild 1981; Reeher 1996), fieldwork participants’ attitudes 
included a degree of contradiction and ambivalence, but pattern and structure 
remained detectable. In the interviews, most participants showed signs of being 
torn between different values at times. The most common tension was between 
equality and freedom, which could also be framed as collectivism vs individualism or 
responsibilities vs rights. Young and senior participants were struggling in different 
ways with the question posed by Bellah et al: “Are we responsible only for our own 
good or also for the common good?” (1992, p.81). There was also some tension 
around big vs small government and the extent to which government should 
intervene to regulate market outcomes. At times some participants were not sure 
what to think about particular issues because they sought to accommodate two 
different value orientations which conflicted with each other. 
 
In resolving these tensions, young adult participants were more likely to prioritise 
freedom, individualism and rights. They were also more tolerant of market 
outcomes. Senior participants were more likely to prioritise equality, collectivism 
and responsibilities. They tended to expect more from government. These 
fundamental differences between the age groups underpinned divergences in their 
views on key policies such as compulsory superannuation, the treatment of 
superannuation lump sums, mutual obligation requirements for some categories of 
welfare recipient, the payment levels for Newstart and Parenting Payment and 
public debt. The drawback of the young people’s solution to the conundrum is that 
they are overly reluctant to judge - everything is permitted, there are no wrong 
actions or choices or policies.148 The drawback of the seniors’ solution is that they 
 
148 This echoes Joseph Stiglitz’s view that capitalism and prosperity have produced a “degradation of 
values to the point where everything is acceptable and no one is accountable” (2012, p.xlvii). 
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are overly eager to judge – if someone needs help they are not pulling their weight 
and must need to try harder or make better choices.  
 
Section 4.1.3 noted research by Van Oorschot and Halman (2000) that people may 
attribute conditions such as poverty or welfare reliance to ‘blame’ (individual or 
social) or ‘fate’ (individual or social). The senior participants in the fieldwork 
commonly cited ‘blame’ explanations (both individual and social failure), while the 
young adult participants tended to attribute poor outcomes to social ‘fate’: largely 
external circumstances outside anyone’s control, even that of national 
governments. Economic circumstances were viewed as emergent phenomena 
essentially out of the control of social actors, rather than being created or 
perpetuated to serve specific interests. 
 
8.2 Generational tensions 
 
While the fieldwork did uncover some systematic differences in the political values 
and attitudes of young adults and seniors in Australia, it did not reveal any sign of 
serious generational conflict. As noted in section 3.1.3, intergenerational equity has 
not been a political flashpoint in Australia to quite the same degree as it has been at 
times in the US, UK and Europe, and this was borne out in the fieldwork results. 
Participants were not oblivious to inequality between generations; they just did not 
seem to see it as a major issue. Three quarters of young participants and well over 
half the seniors thought the ground had shifted when it came to economic 
opportunities since the Baby Boomers’ youth in the 1960s and early 1970s; no one 
said things had become easier for young people. The passing of a tipping point, 
beyond which young generations could no longer automatically expect to do better 
than their parents, was widely recognised. 
 
However, despite prompting in the interviews, very few participants from either age 
group engaged with issues around intergenerational inequality and the two age 
groups were not markedly at odds with each other. There was limited recognition of 
the contribution current government policy made to reinforcing young people’s 
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relatively higher exposure to economic precarity and risk and shifting burdens into 
the future. Notwithstanding a few caustic remarks about European river cruising 
and property portfolios from the young, there was more resentment from the 
seniors towards young adults than the other way around, although even the seniors 
who complained about the greed and entitlement of youth conceded that they 
faced some challenges. The young participants tended to have the broadly 
sympathetic, if not quite reverent, view of seniors that underpins the perception of 
them as more deserving of state support and special privileges than other groups. 
 
Participants from both groups took a relatively short-sighted perspective when 
considering current policy settings and few were seriously worried that some 
policies might not be fiscally sustainable. The seniors’ interest in the collective good 
was limited to the here and now; their circle of concern temporally circumscribed 
by their relative indifference to what would come after they themselves were gone. 
Meanwhile, the more future-oriented young participants were reluctant to endorse 
the diminution of individuals’ rights in the name of responsibility to those 
experiencing relative disadvantage now, let alone in the future.  
 
Less than a third of the senior participants could be said to have any degree of 
Zimbardo’s future-oriented time perspective; nor did many show much interest in 
being generative in Erikson’s sense of producing value of some kind for those who 
would outlive them (see section 4.3.11). The seniors were generally not motivated 
to leave material bequests and did not have any feelings of responsibility towards 
young people or future generations; nor did the young participants expect them to. 
There does not appear to be any norm of ‘paying it forward’ or passing something 
on to the next generation, putting at risk the ‘chain of love and concern’ (Passmore 
1974, p.89) connecting the generations over time (see Wade-Benzoni 1999; Wade-
Benzoni 2002). This does not bode well for the public supporting policies which take 





8.3 Acquiescence to the status quo 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the young participants did not exhibit much anger or 
resentment towards the architects or beneficiaries of their acknowledged economic 
disenfranchisement and this evidently made them less likely to resist the existing 
order. The seniors generally appeared angrier than the young participants about 
both government failings and the irresponsibility of individuals. They were more 
willing to criticise their own age peers, as well as younger people (mainly the 
unemployed and single mothers), for taking advantage of the system and failing to 
uphold their side of the social bargain. The young participants presented as more 
pragmatic than passionate, more realist than idealist, in their political thinking. 
 
As discussed in section 4.2.2, anger as a political force requires a target: someone to 
blame for an injustice and responsible for fixing it (see Smith & Ellsworth 1985; 
Smith & Lazarus 1993; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose 1996; Javeline 2003; Carver & 
Harmon-Jones 2009; Seip, Dijk & Rotteveel 2014). Identifying the agents or 
institutions responsible and holding them to account is essential to redressing 
inequality. The young participants in the fieldwork were reluctant to identify 
policymakers or anyone else as accountable for an economic system that 
sometimes produced unfair outcomes. They appeared to see the current politico-
economic configuration as inevitable, and inextricably linked to a global order that 
was out of the control of the people or their national governments. These young 
participants did not envisage any alternatives to the existing system, whereas the 
seniors could remember a time when there seemed to be other possibilities. 
 
The young adults also did not seem to desire any alternative as they were quite 
comfortable with the individualism, lack of accountability and market-oriented 
norms underpinning neo-liberal social and economic policies in Australia. This 
finding aligns with prior research discussed in section 3.3 suggesting that young 
people in countries such as Australia, the US and the UK are unlikely to seek 
structural explanations for disadvantage (Vromen, Loader & Xenos 2015; Scharff 
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2016) and are fully signed-up to the neo-liberal project and its individualist 
imperative (Muller 2006; Alloway & Dalley-Trim 2009; Bessant 2014; Grasso et al. 
2019).  
This relative acquiescence to the existing economic order may not apply across all 
advanced industrial democracies. Young people in countries such as Australia, the 
UK and the US that adopted neo-liberal policies from the 1980s have become 
particularly accustomed to the associated norms. Young Australians have also been 
more insulated from the effects of post-GFC austerity than young people in the UK, 
for example, which may have further moderated the likelihood of resistance to the 
existing order. 
 
It is also possible that young Australians from other social milieux might not think in 
the same way as the young participants in the fieldwork. Middle-class university 
students may think differently about economic issues because they believe 
themselves to be more protected than their less privileged age peers. The young 
participants in the fieldwork appeared to have some sense of being in control of 
their own future lives even while seeing the broader economic situation as 
essentially ungovernable. This ‘two-track’ approach of viewing their own life 
trajectories separately from society’s course echoes the findings of a recent 
qualitative study which found young Australians tended to see their personal 
futures optimistically even as they expressed pessimism about society’s future as a 
whole (Cook 2016, p.526). 
 
It was noted in section 3.3 that the evidence on how age influences policy attitudes 
is inconclusive. The fieldwork findings suggest that age does affect how Australians 
think about social and redistributive policies, but in a nuanced way. In many 
respects the young and senior fieldwork participants had similar views and were 
influenced by the same underlying values. Participants from both age groups 
tended to be strongly in support of welfare spending and social policy. The 
fieldwork findings lent only limited support to the body of evidence (mostly from 
the US and Europe) that suggests older people are less likely than the young to 
support education and benefits for families (see, for example, Poterba 1998; 
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Brunner & Balsdon 2004; Street & Cossman 2006; Grob & Wolter 2007; Svallfors 
2008; Cattaneo & Wolter 2009; Busemeyer, Goerres & Weschle 2009; Wilkoszewski 
2009; Bonoli & Häusermann 2010). Stronger support emerged for previous research 
finding that older citizens are more likely to take a conditional view of who deserves 
welfare support (Van Oorschot 2000, p.40; Van Oorschot 2006, p.34; Larsen 2006, 
p.83; Schofield & Butterworth 2015). 
 
8.4 Value orientations 
 
The young participants in the fieldwork fit the profile of Ronald Inglehart’s 
postmaterialists described in section 4.3.3: educated, politically engaged and raised 
in conditions of relative economic prosperity. However, while they were generally 
more interested in social than economic policy, as both the postmaterialism and 
engaged citizenship paradigms would predict, they retained materialist concerns. 
These were partly associated with their consumerist orientation and partly with 
anxiety about job prospects and their future economic security.149 The young 
participants were not more likely than the seniors to refer to environmental 
concerns, which are associated with higher levels of postmaterialism.150 They made 
almost no references to the activist and elite-challenging political activities Inglehart 
expected of postmaterialists; in fact, as discussed above, the young participants 
tended to acquiesce to the status quo rather than challenging it. 
 
In other respects the young participants adhered strongly to elements of the 
postmaterialist orientation, including a commitment to tolerance and diversity, 
individual freedom and choice, self-expression and self-actualisation, networks of 
human connectedness and a broad sense of social justice. These young adults 
embraced horizontal (non-hierarchical) individualism (Triandis 1995, p.51) and 
 
149 Unemployment and job market limitations are often perceived as more problematic in South 
Australia than other states. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for South Australia was 
5.7% in August 2018, compared to 4.7% for New South Wales and 4.8% for Victoria (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2018c). 
150 Coincidentally, 23 of the 25 young participants made a total of 80 references to environmental 
issues during the interviews and 23 of the 28 seniors also made 80 references. 
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favoured both high freedom and high equality in Milton Rokeach’s binary typology. 
All of the young adult participants could be characterised as falling into the upper 
left quadrant of Figure 5 (see section 4.3.12), which maps several different value 
typologies onto the quadrants created by Shalom Schwartz’s higher order value 
dimensions. That is, the young participants were aligned with a holistic 
postmaterialism and Schwartzian universalism. By contrast, the senior participants 
tended to fall into the upper right quadrant, with a few in the upper left, fewer still 
in the bottom right and one who appeared best aligned with the bottom left. 
 
There are contradictions and tensions in the upper left quadrant, between freedom 
and equality, the individual and the group, the present and the future, the material 
and the immaterial. This may be one reason why the young participants tended to 
be more ambivalent, less definite, about their political views than the seniors. In 
their worldview of ‘relativistic individualism’, anything goes except judging others 
for their choices and the socio-political milieu is less black and white than shades of 
grey. 
 
Despite the ambivalence that characterised the young participants’ views, and the 
contradictions inherent in the positions taken by some seniors, there was structure 
detectable in participants’ political thinking. Aligning participants with quadrants of 
the integrated values framework in Figure 5 helps to elucidate the general patterns 
in their thinking that were revealed in the interviews. The internal coherence of 
their attitude sets may not quite have met Philip Converse’s expectations (see 
sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2), but this related more to participants undertaking 
thoughtful consideration and resisting easy simplification than unsophisticated 
political thinking. 
 
8.5 Support for policy reform 
 
If the attitudes and underlying values of the fieldwork participants are indicative of 
Australians more generally, public support for improving the fairness and 
sustainability of redistributive policy is likely to be limited. Despite the insidiousness 
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of a wealthy nation’s redistributive policies reinforcing rather than ameliorating the 
relative economic disenfranchisement of its children and young adults, this was not 
an issue the fieldwork participants felt particularly strongly about. The senior 
fieldwork participants were relatively sympathetic to the issues faced by young 
people, but several factors mitigated against their active support for change. These 
factors included a relatively short-term outlook, a view that seniors had earned the 
right to benefits in ways that young people had not and a tendency by some to 
associate need with a failure of individual responsibility. 
 
The young participants, themselves actually and potentially disadvantaged by 
existing policy settings, had different reasons for not being vocal advocates for 
change. They tended to take a pragmatic view of the existing economic order, 
recognising that it produced inequality but not holding any agents accountable or 
seeing any possibility of change. The young adults’ prioritisation of individual 
autonomy, their relativistic approach to personal choice and their comfort with 
consumption and market-oriented norms meant they didn’t actively seek any 
alternatives. While the young participants did tend to see themselves as lacking 
scope for efficacious political action, it didn’t seem to bother them greatly. 
Generally speaking, the young adults did not think they could have any influence 
over redistributive policy, they did not want to, and they did not seek to. The young 
participants were not representative of young Australians more broadly, but if 
bright, educated and politically engaged young adults are disinclined to seek 
redistributive policy reform in the interests of fairness and sustainability, it is 
unlikely to stand much chance. 
 
The challenges of structural economic and demographic change in advanced 
industrial democracies experiencing population ageing demand redistributive policy 
responses that are sustainable over the coming decades and spread burdens and 
benefits more evenly across age groups. However, the Australian Government’s 
current tax and welfare policies tend to protect benefits for seniors while leaving 
young people, including children, highly exposed to new economic risks. While a 
few have the safety net of family wealth to fall back on (and elders who are willing 
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to share this wealth), most do not. Current redistributive policies are increasingly 
operating to preserve and augment existing economic privilege, locking out those 
who are not lucky enough to be insiders, usually because mere accident of birth has 
not given them the same economic opportunities. The distribution of benefits and 
burdens across age groups is a striking example of how the new dynamics of 
inequality play out in late capitalism. 
 
If concern about fairness and sustainability into the future are important influences 
on redistributive policy attitudes, there should be support for reform of existing 
policy settings. The influence of self-interest would also lead us to expect young 
people to seek alternative policy approaches. However, the concern of participants 
in the fieldwork undertaken for the thesis for fairness was tempered by other 
influences and young adults showed little evidence of self-interest shaping their 
views. Policy attitudes tended to be shaped by a relativistic focus on individual 
autonomy in the case of young participants, and the importance of personal 
responsibility and deservingness for seniors. 
 
The different value priorities of the young adults and seniors suggest that age is a 
politically relevant category. They also suggest that the economic conditions and 
social norms people become accustomed to during their political socialisation can 
shape their attitudes in important and lasting ways. In the case of Australia’s 
redistributive policy settings, young people and seniors may arrive at the same 
destination, relative acceptance of the status quo, via different routes. The 
fieldwork results suggest that even if young people had more political efficacy and 
influence over policymaking, there would not necessarily be greater support for 
substantive reform of redistributive policy. Questions of fairness across age groups 










NB: This policy information was prepared in late 2016 to inform the development of the data collection instruments. The rates of income 
support payments have increased with indexation since then, and the total costs of some of the policies (notably the CGT exemption, 
superannuation tax concessions and public debt) have increased dramatically. Costs are taken from the Australian Government’s Final Budget 
Income 2014-15 (Commonwealth of Australia 2016a), and from the Australian Government’s Tax Expenditures Statement 2015 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2016b). Costs of tax expenditure programs represent the Government’s estimated foregone revenue. 
 
Policy Program 2015 Cost Description (2016 rates) Primary Beneficiaries Comments 
Age (and Service) 
Pension 
$48b Income support payment. Fortnightly 
payment of up to $798 (plus 
allowances) for a single pensioner.  
Older adults (age-targeted). Eligibility age is 65, 
legislated to increase incrementally to 67 by 
2023. 
Means-tested, but unlike other payments the 
main residence is effectively excluded. 
Recipients are not subject to any other 
eligibility requirements once they have passed 
the eligibility age. 
Disability Support 
Pension (DSP) 
$18b Income support payment. Fortnightly 
payment of up to $798. 
Older adults (age-skewed) because disability 
increases sharply with age (Department of 
Social Services 2013a, p.10). 
Means-tested. Recipients are subject to 





Policy Program 2015 Cost Description (2016 rates) Primary Beneficiaries Comments 
Newstart 
Allowance 
$10b Income support payment. Fortnightly 
payment of up to $529. 
Sometimes perceived as age-skewed towards 
young adults, but the same proportion of 
recipients (28%) are over 50 as under 30 
(Department of Social Services 2013b, p.40). 
This may be partly because under the age of 
22 unemployed young people are placed on 
the less generous Youth Allowance rather 
than Newstart.  
Means-tested. Recipients are subject to job-
search, retraining and mutual obligation 
requirements. Job seekers aged 55+ have a 
different set of requirements in recognition of 
the fact that they may not re-enter the full-
time workforce before becoming Age Pension-
eligible.  
Carer payments $8b Income support payment. Fortnightly 
payment of up to $798 (supplemented 
by the much lower Carer Allowance). 
Somewhat skewed towards older adults. The 
most common basis for eligibility is caring for 
someone who is impaired or frail due to age, 
and 56% of the carers themselves are over 50 
(Department of Social Services 2013b, p.23).  
Carer Payment is means-tested; Carer 
Allowance is not. Recipients are subject to 




$7b Income support payment. Fortnightly 
payment of up to $738 (Parenting 
Payment Single) for sole carers of 
children under 8. 
Families (age-targeted). Means-tested. Recipients are subject to job-




$5b Income support payment. Fortnightly 
payment of up to $237 (or $433 if 
recipients can demonstrate they have 
to move out of the parental home). 
Young adults (age-targeted) - students up to 
age 25 and job seekers up to age 22. 
Means-tested against the recipient’s income 
and assets, and in most cases also their 
parents’. Subject to training/study test for 
students; job-search, retraining and mutual 




Policy Program 2015 Cost Description (2016 rates) Primary Beneficiaries Comments 
Child Care Benefit 
and Rebate 
$7b Payments to assist families with the 
costs of using approved childcare 
services.  
Families (age-targeted). Partly means-tested. Parents are subject to a 
work/training/study test.  
Capital gains tax 
(CGT) exemption 
$54b Tax expenditure. Gains realised on the 
sale of an owner-occupied home are 
exempt from CGT. 
Older adults (age-skewed). The program 
disproportionately benefits older adults as 
they are more likely to be homeowners. 
The enormous cost of this program in foregone 
revenue for the Government is largely 
attributable to housing price increases, 
especially in Sydney and Melbourne. The 




$30b Tax expenditure. A lower rate of tax is 
levied on superannuation savings than 
on other forms of income and saving. 
For example, superannuation 
contributions made from pre-tax 
income are taxed at concessional rates 
and superannuation earnings after 
retirement are untaxed. 
Older adults (age-targeted and age-skewed). 
Older adults are more likely to contribute 
more to super, and some concessions are 
only applicable after retirement. 
This program is intended to encourage 
investment in superannuation over other 
vehicles, theoretically reducing future reliance 





Policy Program 2015 Cost Description (2016 rates) Primary Beneficiaries Comments 
Capital Gains Tax 
(CGT) discount 
$6b Tax expenditure. The tax liability on 
gains realised when investment 
properties are sold is discounted by 
50%. 
Older adults (age-skewed) as they are more 
likely to be investors and to liquidate assets 
(Daley, Wood & Parsonage 2016, pp.9-10). 
This program is intended to maintain incentives 
to save and invest by compensating for the 
erosion of growth through inflation. There is a 
strong economic argument for some discount, 
but 50% is very high and probably affects 
housing affordability by permitting property 
investors to reduce tax (Daley, Wood & 




$5b Tax expenditure. Property investors 
can deduct short-term losses, 
including interest repayments, from 
their taxable income. 
Older adults (age-skewed). The benefits of 
negative gearing tend to be spread across 30-
60-year-olds (it is only of value to those with 
taxable income), but the negative social 
consequences of propping up housing prices 
are disproportionately borne by young adults 
and families (Daley, Wood & Parsonage 2016, 
p.21, 26-27).  
Programs delivering benefits to property 
investors are sometimes justified by the 
argument that they help maintain the supply of 
rental properties but others note that negative 
gearing reduces security of tenancy for renters 
(investors aiming for capital gains are less likely 
to agree to long-term tenancies) (Daley, Wood 
& Parsonage 2016, p.27).  
Tax offsets for 
seniors 
$0.8b Tax expenditure. Seniors liable for 
income tax receive a tax offset and 
don't pay the Medicare levy until 
they reach a higher income threshold 
than younger people. 
Older adults (age-targeted). The rationale for this program is unclear. Daley 
et al. note that it was introduced at a time of 
budget surplus, possibly for electoral reasons 





Policy Program 2015 Cost Description (2016 rates) Primary Beneficiaries Comments 
Public debt $15b in 
interest 
payments 
The Australian Government accrued 
a debt of around $360b between 
2008 and 2015. 
Older adults (age-skewed). Older adults are 
likely to benefit more from partially debt-
funded spending in areas such as pensions and 
health but will not be subject to additional 
taxation to repay the debt at a future date.  
When public debt continues to accrue over a 
number of years, it may be because 
governments are borrowing to fund recurrent 
spending as an alternative to implementing 













FUTURE BENEFITS, FUTURE BURDENS: 
RESEARCH STUDY PARTICIPANTS WANTED 
 
Do you care about Australia’s future? Are you aged 18-24 or 60-70? 
We are looking for people in these age groups to tell us what they think about a 
range of Australian Government policies. Public attitudes are important to 
democracy. We want to know why you think the way you do, and if how old you are 
makes a difference to your views. 
This study hopes to identify how Government policies can be made sustainable into 
the future. 
Participants are invited to spend around 15 minutes completing a survey at home 
and around an hour talking to an interviewer. You will receive a $25 gift voucher to 
reimburse you for your time. 













PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
PROJECT TITLE: Future Benefits, Future Burdens: Age, Values and Policy Attitudes in Australia 
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL NUMBER: H-2017-004 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Professor Lisa Hill  




You are invited to participate in the research project described below. 
What is the project about? 
This study will explore public attitudes towards a number of Commonwealth Government policies 
which benefit some age groups in society substantially more than others, including income support 
payments (such as the Age Pension and Newstart) and tax expenditures (such as superannuation 
tax concessions and capital gains tax exemptions/discounts). Most of these policies involve high 
volumes of spending on people in older age groups, who are increasing as a proportion of the 
population overall, calling into question the future sustainability of the programs (Daley et al. 
2014). The study will involve two participant groups, young adults and seniors, and will compare 
their attitudes towards these policies and explore reasons for any differences. The aim will be to 
generate insights into whether there is any support for policy reform to ensure the fairness and 
future sustainability of the Australian welfare state, and any likely obstacles to such reform. 
 
Reference: Daley, J., Wood, D., Weidmann, B. and Harrison, C. (2014) The Wealth of Generations, Grattan 
Institute, Melbourne, at https://grattan.edu.au/report/the-wealth-of-generations/ (viewed 17 October 
2016). 
Who is undertaking the project? 
This project is being conducted by Veronica Coram. This research will form the basis for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, under the supervision of Professor Lisa Hill. 
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Why am I being invited to participate? 
You are invited to participate as a member of the Australian public who falls into one of the two age 
groups (18-24 or 60-70).  
What will I be asked to do? 
The study involves two phases: 
• Reading some brief background information and completing a survey at home, online or on 
paper. 
• Meeting with the researcher at a local library meeting room for an interview to provide more 
detail about your views.  
 
How much time will the project take? 
The survey is likely to take around 30 minutes and the interview around 60 minutes. Participants will 
receive a $25 gift voucher to reimburse them for their time.  
Are there any risks associated with participating in this project? 
There are no foreseeable risks associated with participating in this project, apart from inconvenience. 
Some of the questions in the survey and interview might require some thought, but the researcher 
is able to help you if would like any clarification. There are no right or wrong answers as we are 
interested in your opinions. 
What are the benefits of the research project? 
There are no significant benefits directly for participants, although you will have an opportunity to 
learn a little more about some important Australian Government policies that may directly affect 
you. It is anticipated that the results of the study will help identify opportunities for policy reform 
that may make some forms of Government spending fairer to all groups in society and more 
sustainable into the future.  
Can I withdraw from the project? 
Participation in this project is completely voluntary. If you agree to participate, you can withdraw 
from the study at any time. If you have already provided information through the survey or interview, 
you can also choose to withdraw this information from the study up to the point where data analysis 
commences.  
What will happen to my information? 
The information we collect from you will be stored confidentially and securely, in password-
protected electronic form and locked filing cabinets for hard copy material. It will be de-identified, 
which means your name and personal information (other than your date of birth) will not be 
attached to your survey or interview responses in our database. The information will be retained 
for five years from completion of the project, as required by usual data management practices. 
Only the research team will have access to the information during and after the project. It will not 
be made available to anyone else. The results of the study will be reported in the research student’s 
PhD thesis, and possibly also in publications such as journal articles or conference papers. No 
individual participants will be identifiable when the results are published. If individual references or 




Who do I contact if I have questions about the project? 
If you have any questions about this project, you can contact one of the researchers: 
• Veronica Coram, PhD Student:  
veronica.coram@adelaide.edu.au, phone 0410 161 823 
• Professor Lisa Hill 
lisa.hill@adelaide.edu.au, phone 8363 4865 
What if I have a complaint or any concerns? 
The study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of 
Adelaide (approval number H-2017-004). If you have questions or problems associated with the 
practical aspects of your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or complaint about 
the project, then you should consult a member of the research team. If you wish to speak with an 
independent person regarding a concern or complaint, the University’s policy on research involving 
human participants, or your rights as a participant, please contact the Human Research Ethics 
Committee’s Secretariat on:  
Phone:  08 8313 6028    Email: hrec@adelaide.edu.au 
Post: Level 4, Rundle Mall Plaza, 50 Rundle Mall, ADELAIDE SA 5000  
Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. You will be informed 
of the outcome. 
 
If I want to participate, what do I do? 
If you would like to participate, please contact Veronica Coram at veronica.coram@adelaide.edu.au 
or phone 0410 161 823. We will then provide you with the survey. We will also ask you what times 













Background information sheet 
 
POLICY ATTITUDES STUDY – BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Redistributive policies transfer money to people in need… 
The Commonwealth Government has many policies which are ‘redistributive’ – their main impact is 
to transfer resources from some groups in society to other groups. Most redistributive policies are 
meant to transfer money from those who have more to those who have less and are therefore in 
need of support.  
Some needy groups receive more than others… 
Income support payments such as the Age Pension, Disability Support Pension, Parenting Payment, 
Newstart Allowance for the unemployed and Youth Allowance are redistributive programs intended 
to provide an income for people who are not currently earning money from work. However, there 
are different rates of payment and different conditions attached to different income support 
payments. 
Redistribution doesn’t always benefit the most needy… 
Some redistributive policies are intended to encourage people to act in ways that are considered 
socially desirable. For example, in order to increase private health insurance membership and 
reduce the costs of public health care, the Government subsidises premiums through the Private 
Health Insurance Rebate. Redistributive policies that come in the form of ‘tax breaks’ (officially 
described as ‘tax expenditures’) are sometimes not very visible and may benefit people who are 
well-off rather than those in need.  
Some age groups benefit more than others… 
The Commonwealth Government’s most costly redistributive policies tend to benefit older age 
groups more than young adults or families with children. As a result of population ageing, the 
policies that benefit older age groups are likely to increase in cost over the next 40 years, at the 
same time as the Government’s revenue from income tax and Australia’s overall economic 
productivity are expected to decrease. This research study will examine whether people think 
current Government policies do a good job of redistributing fairly and in a way that is sustainable 




How redistributive programs currently look… 
The graph below shows some of the Commonwealth Government’s major redistributive policies 
which benefit some age groups significantly more than others (including welfare state programs 
and tax expenditures). The policies are grouped by the age band which benefits most: young adults 
(around 18-30), families with young children, or older adults (around 55+).  
In some cases the age skew is because the policy specifically targets people of a certain age, like 
Youth Allowance and the Age Pension. In other cases, it is due to the design of the policy and the 
characteristics of the different age groups. For example, older adults have significantly higher rates 
of home-ownership than the other groups, so they reap a larger share of the benefits of policies 
such as the capital gains tax exemption for the family home.  
Cost information is drawn from Australian Treasury figures and policy analysis by the Grattan 
Institute in Melbourne, mostly for 2015. Costs for tax expenditures represent revenue the 
Government missed out on, based on people’s behaviour under the current policy. Commonwealth 


































Thank you for undertaking this survey. If you feel you really can’t provide an answer at any 
point, you can skip to the next question. You will have an opportunity to provide more 
information about your views at the interview stage.  
 
Please note that by choosing to proceed with the survey, you are also indicating that you 
have read and understood the participant information provided and you consent to 
participating in this study. Please click on the ‘Next’ button below in order to proceed. 
 
Part A: Income Support Payments 
 
These questions are about the level at which different income support payments are set. 
 
1. The Age Pension is currently set at $798 per fortnight (basic maximum rate for a single 
pensioner). Do you think this rate is too high, too low or about right? 
Much too high / too high / about right / too low / much too low 
 
2. The Disability Support Pension for people unable to work due to impairment is currently 
set at $798 per fortnight (basic maximum rate for a single person). Do you think this rate is 
too high, too low or about right? 
Much too high / too high / about right / too low / much too low 
 
3. The Carer Payment for people providing home-based care for someone who is severely 
impaired or frail is currently set at $798 per fortnight (basic maximum rate for a single 
person). Do you think this rate is too high, too low or about right? 





4. The Parenting Payment Single for people who are sole carers for children under 8 is 
currently set at $738 per fortnight (basic maximum rate). Do you think this rate is too high, 
too low or about right? 
Much too high / too high / about right / too low / much too low 
 
5. The Newstart Allowance for people aged 22-64 who are seeking work is currently set at 
$529 per fortnight (basic maximum rate for a single person). Do you think this rate is too 
high, too low or about right? 
Much too high / too high / about right / too low / much too low 
 
6. Youth Allowance for people aged 16-24 who are seeking work, studying/training or sick 
currently ranges from $237 to $285 per fortnight (basic maximum rate for a single person 
living in the parental home). For people who can prove they have to leave the parental 
home, the payment rises to $433. Do you think these rates are too high, too low or about 
right? 
Much too high / too high / about right / too low / much too low 
 
Part B: Retirement 
 
These questions are about the timing of retirement and how it should be funded. 
 
7. Life expectancy for Australians is currently over 80 for men and over 84 for women. With 
this in mind, which of the following do you think is the most appropriate age for people to 
retire from the paid workforce? 
Under 60 / 60-64 / 65-69 / 70-74 / 75 or over 
 
8. The Age Pension eligibility age is currently 65, but it will increase to 67 from 2023 
(affecting anyone born from 1957) and the Government has previously raised the possibility 
of a further increase to 70 by 2035. Which of the following do you think is the most 
appropriate age for pension eligibility? 
Under 60 / 60-64 / 65-69 / 70-74 / 75 or over 
 
9. The superannuation preservation age (the age at which you can begin to draw on 
superannuation savings) is 55 for people born before 1960, 56 to 59 for people born 
between 1960 and 30 June 1964, and 60 for anyone born thereafter. Which of the following 
do you think is the most appropriate superannuation preservation age? 





10. Do you agree that the primary responsibility for funding retirement (e.g. through private 
savings or superannuation) should rest with individuals? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
Part C: Tax Expenditures 
These questions are about the following tax expenditures (‘tax breaks’): superannuation tax 
concessions, exemption of the family home from capital gains tax, capital gains tax discount, 
tax offsets for seniors and the childcare rebate. 
 
11. Do you agree you were well informed about the above tax expenditures before 
participating in this study? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
12. Do you agree that these tax expenditures should be included when considering policies 
that redistribute resources between different groups in society? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
13. What do you think are acceptable purposes for tax expenditures (tick as many as you 
like)? 
Transfer resources to people who are well-off 
Transfer resources to people who not well-off 
Grant benefits to specific interest groups, industries or organisations 
Promote socially desirable aims 
Influence voting behaviour 
None of the above 
 
14. What purposes do you think the tax expenditures above actually serve (tick as many as 
you like)? 
Transfer resources to people who are well-off 
Transfer resources to people who not well-off 
Grant benefits to specific interest groups, industries or organisations 
Promote socially desirable aims 
Influence voting behaviour 





15. From what you know of the above tax expenditures, do you think any of them are too 
generous (tick as many as you like)? 
Superannuation tax concessions 
Exemption of the family home from capital gains tax 
Capital gains tax discount 
Tax offsets for seniors 
Childcare rebate 
None of the above 
 
16. From what you know of the above tax expenditures, do you think any of them are not 
generous enough (tick as many as you like)? 
Superannuation tax concessions 
Exemption of the family home from capital gains tax 
Capital gains tax discount 
Tax offsets for seniors 
Childcare rebate 
None of the above 
 
Part D: Benefits for Homeowners 
 
These questions are about the benefits in place for people who own or are purchasing a 
home. 
 
17. To qualify for the Age Pension, your income and assets must fall below a certain level. 
However, the home people live in is not included in the assets test. Do you agree that the 
full value of the family home should be exempt from the Age Pension assets test regardless 
of how much the home is worth? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
18. It would be possible to allow for only a certain amount of home value to be exempt from 
the Age Pension assets test - any additional value above that threshold would be included. If 
this was the case, which of the following would be the most appropriate exempt amount? 





19. House prices have increased faster than the median income over the last 30 years, 
which means housing has become less affordable. Do you think any of the following 
Government policies are contributing to this issue (tick as many as you like)? 
Exemption of family home from Age Pension assets test 
Exemption of family home from capital gains tax 
50% capital gains tax discount for property investors 
Negative gearing for property investors 
None of the above 
 
20. Do you agree that housing should be more affordable for people entering the market 
even if this means house prices decrease? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
21. Do you agree that generating wealth is an important purpose of residential housing? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
22. Do you agree that people who have benefited from house price rises have earned their 
gains? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
Part E: Government Debt 
 
These questions are about Government debt. In 2008 the Government had a net budget 
surplus, but by 2015 it had accrued a debt of around $360b and rising, with interest 
repayments nearly $15b per year.  
 
23. Do you agree that it is okay for the Government to continue building up debt? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
24. If the Government wants to stop building up debt, what do you think is the single best 







Part F: Wealth Sharing and the Future 
 
These questions are about sharing the benefits of economic growth fairly over time, and 
how things we do now might affect the future. 
 
25. Many countries have a wealth transfer tax, such as an estate tax (Australia had similar 
taxes at state level until the 1970s). Do you agree that Australia should consider introducing 
an estate tax for a small number of large estates? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
26. If Australia was to reintroduce an estate tax, which of the following is the most 
appropriate minimum total estate value at which it should be applied? 
$3m / $5m / $8m / $10m / $15m 
 
27. Do you agree that the living standards you experience across your lifetime are likely to 
exceed those of your parents? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
28. Do you agree that you are likely to contribute more in taxes to the Government than you 
are likely to receive in benefits across your lifetime? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
29. Do you agree the Government’s current redistributive policies strike the right balance 
between the different age groups of young adults (around 18-30), families with young 
children, and older adults (around 55+)? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
30. Do you agree the Government’s current policies are sustainable over the next 50 years? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
31. Do you agree the Government plans effectively for the future? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
32. Do you agree that people aged 16-25 have enough influence over decisions that will 
impact on the future of Australia? 





33. Would you support any of the following measures to increase the influence of young 
people aged 16-25 over policymaking (tick as many as you like)? 
Arranging for the electoral enrolment of Year 12s through schools 
Granting parents proxy votes for children aged under 18 
Extending the vote to 16- and 17-year-olds 
Establishing a consultative youth forum 
None of the above 
 
Part G: Political Values and Generation 
 
These questions are about the values and ideals that are important to you, and your sense 
of being part of a generation. 
 
34. For the following pair of values, tick the one which you see as most important. 
Freedom / Equality 
Individual responsibility / Collective responsibility 
Hard work / Good luck 
Taking risks / Minimising risks 
Conservative / Progressive 
Big government / Small government 
Short-term / Long-term 
Global outlook / Local outlook 
Public interest / Individual interest 
Responsibilities / Rights 
Being optimistic / Being realistic 
Material goods / Experiences 
Past / Future 
Security / Adventure 
 
35. Do you agree that people born around the same time as you could be described as a 
‘generation’ which has distinctive characteristics? 
Strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree 
 
36. Do you agree that you identify strongly with people around the same age as you? 





Part H: About You and Confidentiality 
These questions are about you. We want to be able to contact you during the data 
collection process and link your survey to your interview responses. We also want to link 
your age group to your responses. After the interview, your name and other personal details 
will no longer be linked to your responses in our database. Please refer to the Participant 
Information Form or talk to the researcher if you have any questions about the 
confidentiality of your personal information or data collected in this study. 
 
What is your name? 
What is your date of birth? 
What is your email address? 
What is your mobile phone number (optional)? 
Do you have any preferences for time or location of your interview? 
 
Thank you for completing the survey and participating in this study. We look forward to 






Preamble: Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this study, and especially 
making time for this interview. I have here the Consent Form you signed and I just wanted 
to double-check that you were still happy for me to audio record our conversation today. 
Audio recording means I don’t need to take such detailed notes, and I can make sure I 
capture your views accurately. I am the only person who will listen to the recording, so that I 
can transcribe it. The recording and the transcription will be retained in a database which 
only my supervisor and I can access. Is this okay with you?  
 
We are going to cover the same topics as the survey, but this time I want a bit more detail 
about your views and the reasons underlying them. I am interested in hearing what you 
really think today – there are no right or wrong answers; all that matters is your view, even 
if it is based on limited knowledge about these complicated issues. I won’t agree or disagree 
with you because what I think is not important during the interview. If you don’t understand 
a question, let me know and there may be a little more information I can provide. Your 
survey and interview data will be linked in a database, along with your age, but no other 
personal details will be linked to your responses. Do you have any questions before we 
start? 
 
Part A: Income support payments 
 
First I’d like to ask you what you think about the different income support payments 
provided by the Australian Government. The payments I am thinking of are the Age Pension, 
Disability Support Pension, Newstart Allowance for jobseekers, Carer Payment, Parenting 
Payment Single and Youth Allowance. 
 
1. In the survey you indicated that you thought XXX payments were about right, XXX were 
too low and XXX were too high. Can you tell me more about why you think this? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Do you think different income support payments should be set at different levels? 
• Do you think some people deserve support more than others? 
• Do you think some people have greater needs than others? 
• Do you think a higher rate of Newstart would act as a disincentive for people to take 
low-wage jobs? 
• Do you think it is reasonable to assume that people aged 18 to 24 are still receiving 




2. Some income support payments have particular conditions attached. For example, people 
on Newstart must show they are applying for jobs and sometimes undertake retraining or 
work-for-the-dole-type programs. Do you think these sorts of conditions are a good idea? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Why or why not? 
• Do you think it is appropriate that some income support payments have conditions 
attached and others don’t? 
• The Government is considering introducing mandatory drug testing for some welfare 
recipients – do you think this is a good idea? 
 
3. How much choice do you think people have over being on income support payments? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Why do you think some people end up unemployed for long periods? 
 
4. Do you think it has become easier or harder for young people to make the transition from 
study to full-time work over the last 40 years or so? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Do you think changes such as automation and the decline of the manufacturing 
sector will mean unemployment increases? 
• (For young adults) Do you feel you have got the right balance of choice/flexibility and 
security/certainty in terms of your options? 
 
Part B: Retirement 
 
Now I would like to know more about your views on how we should fund retirement. These 
questions are about the Age Pension and superannuation. 
 
5. Do you support a universal pension model where everyone over a certain age receives a 
pension or a means-tested safety-net model like Australia’s Age Pension? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Do you think Australia’s Age Pension is based on a fair assessment of need? 
• Do you like the idea in principle of a universal basic income, especially if structural 





6. In the survey you indicated you thought X was an appropriate age for retirement, X for 
pension eligibility and X for accessing superannuation savings. Can you tell me a bit more 
about why you think these ages are appropriate? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• The Government has talked about raising the pension age to 70 – what do you think 
about this? 
• Do you think it is appropriate for the pension and superannuation ages to be 
different? 
• Do you think these age settings encourage people to retire earlier than they 
otherwise might and if so, do you see any problems with this? 
• Do you think these age settings should shift in line with life expectancy increases? 
• Do you think there are any barriers to people working for longer? 
 
7. How important do you think it is for people to have a period of retirement where they are 
no longer working but are still fit and healthy? 
 
• Do you think it is a good thing for people who are retired but still healthy to continue 
to undertake productive activities such as volunteering or caring roles?  
• (For young adults) Do you expect to retire in your 60s or work for longer? 
 
8. Do you support Australia’s compulsory superannuation system in principle? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Why or why not? 
 
9. Do you think people have a responsibility to use their superannuation to fund their living 
costs in retirement or is it okay for people to take their superannuation as a lump sum, 
spend it, and go on the pension? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Why or why not? 
• Do you think there should be tax incentives for people to take at least some of their 
superannuation as an annuity? 
 
Part C: Tax expenditures 
 
These questions are about the following tax expenditures (‘tax breaks’): superannuation tax 
concessions, exemption of the family home from capital gains tax, capital gains tax discount, 
tax offsets for seniors and the childcare rebate. There are many other tax breaks, but these 
are some of the most significant ones. For example, the superannuation tax concessions are 
worth over $30b a year in revenue that the Government would otherwise receive (assuming 
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people didn’t change their behaviour) and the capital gains tax exemption is worth around 
$55b because house prices have been increasing so much.  
 
10. In the survey you indicated that you were/were not well informed about these tax 
expenditures before participating in this study. Do you think the public receives enough 
information about these types of Government programs? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• What other information would be helpful? 
• Did you know how much these programs cost? 
• Did you know who benefits most from these programs? 
 
11. In general, do you think the benefits of these programs are worth the cost to the 
Government in revenue it misses out on? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Are there any of these programs you would like to see expanded or wound back? 
• Do you think that these sort of economic incentive programs are in principle a good 
way of encouraging people to behave in certain ways? 
 
Part D: Benefits for homeowners 
 
The two capital gains tax programs we mentioned in the previous section deliver big 
benefits to people who own property when house prices go up, and there are other 
Government policies that also benefit property owners, including investors. The next set of 
questions are to find out what you think about these policies. 
 
12. In the survey you did/did not indicate that you thought consideration should be given to 
including more expensive homes in the Age Pension assets test. Can you tell me more about 
why you answered in this way? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• What do you think are the advantages/disadvantages of exempting the full value of 
the family home from the Pension assets test? 
• Do you think it is worth having incentives for older people to downsize to smaller 
homes? 
• Are you in favour of reverse-mortgage type schemes which allow people to remain in 




13. In the survey you indicated that you thought X Government policies were contributing to 
housing having become less affordable. Can you tell me more about why you answered in 
this way? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Do you think housing becoming less affordable is a problem? 
• Would you like to see any of the Government policies that benefit property owners 
expanded or wound back? 
• Do you think in principle that it is a good idea for the Government to intervene in 
markets such as the housing market to moderate outcomes? 
• (For young adults) Is it important to you to own a home some day? 
 
Part E: Government debt 
 
The next question is about the Government spending more money than it earns and 
building up a debt. Australia’s public debt has been growing since 2008 and recently 
reached half a trillion dollars, though the Government does have plans to start paying it off. 
 
14. In the survey you indicated that you thought it was/was not okay for the Government to 
continue to accumulate debt. Can you tell me more about why you answered in this way? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Are there any areas where you think the Government could reduce spending? 
• Are there any tax reforms you would like to see, such as adjusting the GST or income 
tax or company tax rates? 
• Do you see any problems that might arise if the Government continues to build up 
debt? 
 
Part F: Wealth sharing and the future 
 
Australia has experienced a strongly growing economy over the last 20 years, and more 
generally since the Second World War. Growth has slowed somewhat more recently, 
especially with the end of the mining boom. The next set of questions is about sharing the 
benefits of economic prosperity, including into the future.  
 
15. Do you think the benefits of economic growth have been spread evenly or fairly across 
all Australians? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Do you think there are any groups in society which have claimed more or less than 
their fair share? 
• In your perception, has inequality increased in Australia over the last 30 or 40 years? 
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• Do you think in good times it’s worth governments putting something away for a 
rainy day, such as through a sovereign wealth fund? 
 
16. In the survey you said you thought/didn’t think Australia should consider introducing a 
wealth transfer tax such as an estate tax. Can you tell me more about why you think that? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• What effects do you think a wealth transfer tax would have? 
 
17. In the survey you said you thought you would be better/worse off than your parents. 
Can you tell me why you answered in this way? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Do you think economic growth will continue to deliver higher living standards for 
Australians over the next few decades? 
• Do you think it is important for material living conditions to continue to improve for 
succeeding generations? 
 
18. Do you think the balance of Government spending across different groups in society is 
about right or are some groups missing out?  
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Are there areas where you would like to see more or less spending? 
• Australia’s population structure is getting older, which means the programs that 
mostly benefit older age groups are going to increase in cost. How would you prefer 
the Government to cover these additional costs? 
 
19. In the survey you indicated you thought the Government’s policies were/weren’t 
sustainable and it does/doesn’t plan effectively for the future. Can you tell me more about 
why you answered this way? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• How important do you think it is for us to consider the future impact of decisions 
made today? 
• Do you think the Government sometimes takes a short-term approach because that 
is what the public wants? 
• Do you think the Government faces any obstacles to taking a longer-term approach? 






20. Would you say you are optimistic about Australia’s future or do you have concerns? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Do you think a lot about the future? 
 
21. Do you think people living today have any obligations towards the future?  
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Is it important to leave a legacy for succeeding generations and if so, what should it 
consist of? 
• Do you feel that older adults have responsibilities towards children and young 
people? 
• Are these responsibilities to their direct descendants or society as a whole? 
 
22. In the survey you did/didn’t indicate that people aged 16-25 have enough influence over 
government and policy in Australia. Can you tell me more about why you answered this 
way? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Do you think young people have a different perspective than older adults? 
• Do you think young people are highly engaged with politics? 
• Would you say the Government does a good job of representing the interests of all 
groups in society? 
 
Part G: Political values and generation 
 
These questions are about your sense of being part of a generation, and your underlying 
values.  
 
23. The survey mentioned a range of different values that people might hold. What are the 
most important values or ideals to you? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Why do you think these values are important to you and where did they come from? 
• (For seniors) Do you think your values have changed over time, and why/why not? 
• (For young adults) Do you expect your values to change as you grow older? 
 
24. You indicated in the survey that you did/didn’t feel part of a distinctive generation. Can 





Possible follow-up prompts: 
• What are the distinctive characteristics of your generation? 
• Do you think other generations have distinctive characteristics? 
• Do you think there is any link between the time someone was born and their 
worldview or values? 
• Do you think there is such a thing as a lucky time to be born? 
 
25. Do you think there has been a rise in materialism or consumer culture in Australia over 
the last few decades? 
 
Possible follow-up prompts: 
• Do you think this rise in consumerism has affected all age groups? 
 
That is the end of the interview. Thank you very much for being so generous with your time 
and sharing your views. Would you like me to send you a short summary of the results of 






Additional survey results 
 
Supplementary survey results not included in Chapter 6 are provided in this Appendix.  
 
Other income support payments (see section 6.1.7) 
 
Table 15: Disability Support Pension level 
 Much too 
low 
Too low About 
right 
Too high Much too 
high 
Young participants (n=25) 3 15 5 1 1 
Senior participants (n=30) 3 18 8 1 0 
Total (n=55) 6 33 13 2 1 
% of young participants 12% 60% 20% 4% 4% 
% of senior participants 10% 60% 27% 3% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 16: Carer Payment level 
 Much too 
low 
Too low About 
right 
Too high Much too 
high 
Young participants (n=25) 1 16 7 0 1 
Senior participants (n=28) 5 17 6 0 0 
Total (n=53) 6 33 13 0 1 
% of young participants 4% 64% 28% 0% 4% 
% of senior participants 18% 61% 21% 0% 0% 





Table 17: Parenting Payment level 
 Much too 
low 
Too low About 
right 
Too high Much too 
high 
Young participants (n=25) 4 11 8 1 1 
Senior participants (n=29) 5 15 8 1 0 
Total (n=54) 9 26 16 2 1 
% of young participants 16% 44% 32% 4% 4% 
% of senior participants 17% 52% 28% 3% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 18: Youth Allowance level 
 Much too 
low 
Too low About 
right 
Too high Much too 
high 
Young participants (n=25) 7 8 10 0 0 
Senior participants (n=29) 9 9 9 2 0 
Total (n=54) 16 17 19 2 0 
% of young participants 28% 32% 40% 0% 0% 
% of senior participants 31% 31% 31% 7% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Retirement age (see section 6.2.1) 
 
Table 19: Most appropriate retirement age 
 Under 60 60-64 65-69 70-74 75 or over 
Young participants (n=25) 0 7 13 5 0 
Senior participants (n=30) 0 6 19 5 0 
Total (n=55) 0 13 32 10 0 
% of young participants 0% 28% 52% 20% 0% 
% of senior participants 0% 20% 63% 17% 0% 





Table 20: Most appropriate age for pension eligibility 
 Under 60 60-64 65-69 70-74 75 or over 
Young participants (n=25) 0 7 14 4 0 
Senior participants (n=30) 0 6 22 2 0 
Total (n=55) 0 13 36 6 0 
% of young participants 0% 28% 56% 16% 0% 
% of senior participants 0% 20% 73% 7% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 21: Most appropriate superannuation preservation age 
 Under 60 60-64 65-69 70-74 75 or over 
Young participants (n=25) 3 16 5 1 0 
Senior participants (n=30) 2 22 4 2 0 
Total (n=55) 5 38 9 3 0 
% of young participants 12% 64% 20% 4% 0% 
% of senior participants 7% 73% 14% 7% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Awareness of tax expenditure programs (see section 6.3.1) 
 
Table 22: I am well-informed about tax expenditure programs 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 2 13 4 6 0 
Senior participants (n=30) 2 6 12 6 4 
Total (n=55) 4 19 16 12 4 
% of young participants 8% 52% 16% 24% 0% 
% of senior participants 7% 20% 40% 20% 13% 





Table 23: Tax expenditure programs should be considered as redistributive policies 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 0 2 4 15 4 
Senior participants (n=30) 1 2 6 15 6 
Total (n=55) 1 4 10 30 13 
% of young participants 0% 8% 16% 60% 16% 
% of senior participants 3% 7% 20% 50% 20% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Purpose of tax expenditure programs (see section 6.3.2) 
 





















2 24 12 20 1 0 
Senior participant 
responses (n=50) 
0 18 9 20 0 3 
Total responses 
(n=109) 
2 42 21 40 1 3 
% of young participant 
responses 
3% 41% 20% 34% 2% 0% 
% of senior participant 
responses 
0% 36% 18% 40% 0% 6% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 


























13 11 22 8 21 0 
Senior participant 
responses (n=75) 
16 9 23 8 19 0 
Total responses 
(n=150) 
29 20 45 16 40 0 
% of young participant 
responses 
17% 15% 29% 11% 28% 0% 
% of senior participant 
responses 
21% 12% 31% 11% 25% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 





Generosity oftax expenditure programs (see section 6.3.3) 
 



















7 5 9 4 1 9 
Senior participant 
responses (n=40) 
10 4 12 2 1 11 
Total responses 
(n=75) 
17 9 21 6 2 20 
% of young 
participant 
responses 
20% 14% 26% 11% 3% 26% 
% of senior 
participant 
responses 
25% 10% 30% 5% 2% 28% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 



























1 3 1 4 12 5 
Senior participant 
responses (n=44) 
6 2 3 9 11 13 
Total responses 
(n=70) 
7 5 4 13 23 18 
% of young 
participant 
responses 
4% 12% 4% 15% 46% 19% 
% of senior 
participant 
responses 
14% 5% 7% 20% 25% 30% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 Participants were invited to select as many responses as they wished. 
 
The role of housing (see section 6.4.1) 
 
Table 28: Housing should be more affordable even if house prices decrease 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 0 0 3 15 7 
Senior participants (n=30) 0 2 5 14 9 
Total (n=55) 0 2 8 29 16 
% of young participants 0% 0% 12% 60% 28% 
% of senior participants 0% 7% 17% 47% 30% 





Table 29: Generating wealth is an important purpose of residential housing 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 3 6 9 7 0 
Senior participants (n=29) 2 11 8 7 1 
Total (n=54) 5 17 17 14 1 
% of young participants 12% 24% 36% 28% 0% 
% of senior participants 7% 38% 28% 24% 3% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 30: People who benefit from house price rises have earned their gains 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 1 2 13 6 3 
Senior participants (n=30) 1 5 17 6 1 
Total (n=55) 2 7 30 12 4 
% of young participants 4% 8% 52% 24% 12% 
% of senior participants 3% 17% 57% 20% 3% 





Housing affordability and policy (see section 6.4.2) 
 
Table 31: Policies contributing to housing affordability issues 















6 5 18 18 1 
Senior participant 
responses (n=64) 
8 7 21 24 4 
Total responses 
(n=112) 
14 12 39 42 5 
% of young 
participant 
responses 
12% 10% 38% 38% 2% 
% of senior 
participant 
responses 
12% 11% 33% 38% 6% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 Participants were invited to select as many responses as they wished. 
 
Wealth transfer tax (see section 6.5) 
 
Table 32: Most appropriate minimum value estate for a tax to be applied 
 $3m $5m $8m $10m $15m 
Young participants (n=23) 12 5 2 4 0 
Senior participants (n=30) 11 10 2 1 6 
Total (n=53) 23 15 4 5 6 
% of young participants 52% 22% 9% 17% 0% 
% of senior participants 37% 33% 7% 3% 20% 





Future growth (see section 6.8.1) 
 
Table 33: My living standards across my lifetime are likely to exceed those of my parents 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 0 8 6 11 0 
Senior participants (n=30) 0 1 4 14 11 
Total (n=55) 0 9 10 25 11 
% of young participants 0% 32% 24% 44% 0% 
% of senior participants 0% 3% 13% 47% 37% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Future planning (see section 6.8.2) 
 
Table 34: The Federal Government’s policies are sustainable over the next 50 years 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 6 13 4 2 0 
Senior participants (n=30) 7 17 4 2 0 
Total (n=55) 13 30 8 4 0 
% of young participants 24% 52% 16% 8% 0% 
% of senior participants 23% 57% 13% 7% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 35: The Federal Government plans effectively for the future 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 7 9 8 1 0 
Senior participants (n=30) 14 11 3 1 1 
Total (n=55) 21 20 11 2 1 
% of young participants 28% 36% 32% 4% 0% 
% of senior participants 47% 37% 10% 3% 3% 





Representation of youth interests (see section 6.10.1) 
 
Table 36: Redistributive policies strike the right balance between age groups 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 1 13 8 3 0 
Senior participants (n=30) 1 13 11 4 1 
Total (n=55) 2 26 19 7 1 
% of young participants 4% 52% 32% 12% 0% 
% of senior participants 3% 43% 37% 13% 3% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 37: I am likely to contribute more in taxes than I receive in benefits across my lifetime 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 0 3 1 18 3 
Senior participants (n=30) 1 1 10 11 7 
Total (n=55) 1 4 11 29 10 
% of young participants 0% 12% 4% 72% 12% 
% of senior participants 3% 3% 33% 37% 23% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 38: 16-25-year-olds have enough influence over future-oriented decision-making 
 Strongly 
disagree 




Young participants (n=25) 8 14 0 2 1 
Senior participants (n=30) 3 12 10 4 1 
Total (n=55) 11 26 10 6 2 
% of young participants 32% 56% 0% 8% 4% 
% of senior participants 10% 40% 33% 13% 3% 
























20 1 13 20 2 
Senior participant 
responses (n=51) 
17 0 10 21 3 
Total responses (n=107) 37 1 23 41 5 
% of young participant 
responses 
36% 2% 23% 36% 4% 
% of senior participant 
responses 
33% 0% 20% 41% 6% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 Participants were invited to select as many responses as they wished. 
 
Value trade-offs (see section 7.1) 
 





Young participants (n=25) 12 13 
Senior participants (n=30) 17 13 
Total (n=55) 29 26 
% of young participants 48% 52% 
% of senior participants 57% 43% 





Table 41: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Hard work Good luck 
Young participants (n=25) 19 6 
Senior participants (n=28) 25 3 
Total (n=53) 44 9 
% of young participants 76% 24% 
% of senior participants 89% 11% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 42: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Taking risks Minimising risks 
Young participants (n=25) 8 17 
Senior participants (n=29) 11 18 
Total (n=54) 19 35 
% of young participants 32% 68% 
% of senior participants 38% 62% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 43: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Conservative Progressive 
Young participants (n=25) 1 24 
Senior participants (n=30) 7 23 
Total (n=55) 8 47 
% of young participants 4% 96% 
% of senior participants 23% 77% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 44: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Short term Long term 
Young participants (n=25) 1 24 
Senior participants (n=30) 1 29 
Total (n=55) 2 53 
% of young participants 4% 96% 
% of senior participants 3% 97% 




Table 45: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Global outlook Local outlook 
Young participants (n=24) 18 6 
Senior participants (n=29) 21 8 
Total (n=54) 39 14 
% of young participants 75% 25% 
% of senior participants 72% 28% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 46: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Public interest Individual interest 
Young participants (n=25) 23 2 
Senior participants (n=30) 30 0 
Total (n=55) 53 2 
% of young participants 92% 8% 
% of senior participants 100% 0% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 47: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Being optimistic Being realistic 
Young participants (n=25) 7 18 
Senior participants (n=30) 7 23 
Total (n=55) 14 41 
% of young participants 28% 72% 
% of senior participants 23% 77% 
 Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 48: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Past Future 
Young participants (n=25) 2 23 
Senior participants (n=26) 1 25 
Total (n=51) 3 48 
% of young participants 8% 92% 
% of senior participants 4% 96% 




Table 49: Which of these two values is most important to you? 
 Security Adventure 
Young participants (n=25) 14 11 
Senior participants (n=29) 20 9 
Total (n=54) 34 20 
% of young participants 56% 44% 
% of senior participants 69% 31% 







Aalberg, T. (2003) Achieving justice: Comparative public opinion on income distribution. Leiden and 
Boston, MA: Brill. 
Abrams, P. (1970) ‘Rites de passage: The conflict of generations in industrial society’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 5(1), 175-190. 
Achen, C.H. and Bartels, L.M. (2016) Democracy for realists: Why elections do not produce responsive 
government. Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Adams, P. and Dominick, G.L. (1997) ‘The old, the young, and the welfare state’, in R.B. Hudson (ed.), 
The future of age-based public policy (pp.104-113). Baltimore, MA: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Alloway, N. and Dalley-Trim, L. (2009) ‘It’s all about I: Gen Ys and neoliberal discourse in new times’, 
Youth Studies Australia, 28(1), 51–56. 
Althaus, S.L. (2006) ‘False starts, dead ends, and new opportunities in public opinion research’, 
Critical Review, 18(1-3), 75-104. 
Alwin, D.F., Cohen, R.L. and Newcomb, T.M. (1991) Political attitudes over the life span: The 
Bennington women after fifty years. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Alwin, D. and McCammon, R.J. (2007) ‘Rethinking generations’, Research in Human Development, 
4(3-4), 219-237.  
Andres, L. and Wyn, J. (2010) The making of a generation: The children of the 1970s in adulthood. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Andreß, H. and Heien, T. (2001) ‘Four worlds of welfare state attitudes? A comparison of Germany, 
Norway, and the United States’, European Sociological Review, 17(4), 337-356. 
Anduiza, E. (2011) ‘Youth turnout in Europe’, in R.J. Dalton (ed.), Engaging youth in politics: Debating 
democracy’s future (pp.83-94). New York: International Debate Education Association. 
Armingeon, K. (2006) ‘Reconciling competing claims of the welfare state clientele: The politics of old 
and new social risk coverage in comparative perspective’, in K. Armingeon and G. Bonoli (eds), The 
politics of post-industrial welfare states: Adapting post-war social policies to new social risks (pp.100-
122). London and New York: Routledge. 
Arnett, J.J. (2013) ‘The evidence for Generation We and against Generation Me’, Emerging 
Adulthood, 1, 5-10. 
Arnold, J.R. (2012) ‘The electoral consequences of voter ignorance’, Electoral Studies, 31, 796-815. 
337 
 
Arrondel, L. and Masson, A. (2006) ‘Altruism, exchange or indirect reciprocity: What do the data on 
family transfers show?’ In S. Kolm and J.M. Ythier (eds), Handbook of the economics of giving, 
altruism and reciprocity, vol. 2 (pp.971-1053). Oxford: Elsevier. 
Arvanitakis, J. and Sidoti, E. (2011) ‘The politics of change: Where to for young people and politics?’ 
In L. Walsh and R. Black (eds), In their own hands: Can young people change Australia? (pp.11-19). 
Camberwell: ACER Press. 
Arts, W. and Gelissen, J. (2001) ‘Welfare states, solidarity and justice principles: Does the type really 
matter?’ Acta Sociologica, 44, 283-299. 
Asher, A., Meyricke, R., Thorp, S. and Wu, S. (2017) ‘Age pensioner decumulation: Responses to 
incentives, uncertainty and family need’, Australian Journal of Management, 42(4), 583-607. 
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (2013) ‘Media release: Let’s have an informed 
debate about the impact of compulsory superannuation on debt and savings’. At 
<http://www.superannuation.asn.au/media/media-releases/2013/asfa-statement-28-august-2013> 
(viewed 8 August 2017).  
Atkinson, A.B. (2015) Inequality: What can be done? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Attfield, R. (2014) Environmental Ethics. Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
Attias-Donfut, C. (2003) ‘Family transfers and cultural transmissions between three generations in 
France’, in V.L. Bengtson and A. Lowenstein (eds), Global aging and challenges to families (pp.214-
250). New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Attias-Donfut, C. and Wolff, F. (2000a) ‘The redistributive effects of generational transfers’, in S. 
Arber and C. Attias-Donfut (eds) The myth of generational conflict: The family and state in ageing 
societies (pp.22-46). London: Routledge. 
Attias-Donfut, C. and Wolff, F. (2000b) ‘Complementarity between private and public transfers’, in S. 
Arber and C. Attias-Donfut (eds) The myth of generational conflict: The family and state in ageing 
societies (pp.47-68). London: Routledge. 
Auerbach, A.J., Kotlikoff, L.J. and Leibfritz, W. (1999) ‘Introduction’, in A.J. Auerbach, L.J. Kotlikoff 
and W. Leibfritz (eds), Generational accounting around the world (pp.1-7). Chicago, IL and London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Austen, S. (2002) ‘An international comparison of attitudes to inequality’, International Journal of 
Social Economics, 3, 218-237. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (1979) ‘3101.0: Australian demographic statistics quarterly, June 
1979’. At 
<https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3101.0Jun%201979?OpenDocument> 
(viewed 28 August 2019). 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2017) ‘Retirement and retirement intentions, Australia, June 2017’. 
At < https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/6238.0> (viewed 15 June 2019). 
338 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2018a) ‘3101.0: Australian demographic statistics, June 2018’. At 
<https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/1CD2B1952AFC5E7ACA257298000F2E76> (viewed 
28 August 2019). 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2018b) ‘3222.0: Population projections, Australia, 2017 (base) – 
2066’. At <https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3222.0> (viewed 28 August 2019). 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2018c) ‘Labour force, Australia, August 2018’. At 
<http://abs.gov.au/Employment-and-Unemployment> (viewed 20 September 2018). 
Australian Government. (2015) ReThink: Tax discussion paper. At 
<http://bettertax.gov.au/publications/discussion-paper/> (viewed 4 January 2017). 
Australian Government. (2019) Budget Paper No.1: Budget strategy and outlook 2019-20. At 
https://www.budget.gov.au/2019-20/content/bp1/index.htm (viewed 22 December 2019). 
Australian Government (2020) ‘My Aged Care: Income and assets assessment for aged care homes’. 
At https://www.myagedcare.gov.au/income-and-assets-assessment-aged-care-homes (viewed 21 
February 2020). 
Australian Human Rights Commission (2015) National prevalence survey of age discrimination in the 
workplace. At <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/age-
discrimination/publications/national-prevalence-survey-age-discrimination-workplace> (viewed 15 
July 2017).  
Australian Youth Affairs Coalition (2013) Australia’s youth matters: Young people talk about what’s 
important to them. At <http://www.ayac.org.au/ayac-reports.html> (viewed 20 July 2016).  
Bardi, A. and Goodwin, R. (2011) ‘The dual route to value change: Individual processes and cultural 
moderators’, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 42(2), 271-287. 
Bardi, A., Lee, J.A., Hofmann-Towfigh, N. and Soutar, G. (2009) ‘The structure of intraindividual value 
change’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(5), 913-929. 
Barr, N. (2001) The welfare state as piggy bank: Information, risk, uncertainty, and the role of the 
state. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Barr, N. (2012) Economics of the welfare state. 5th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Barret-Howard, E. and Tyler, T.R. (1986) ‘Procedural justice as a criterion in allocation decisions’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50(2), 296-304. 
Barry, B. (1977) ‘Justice between generations’, in P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds) Law, morality and 
society: Essays in honour of H.L.A. Hart (pp.268-284). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 




Barry, B. (1999) ‘Sustainability and intergenerational justice’, in A.P. Dobson (ed.) Fairness and 
futurity: Essays in environmental sustainability and social justice (pp.93-117). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Bartels, L.M. (2005) ‘Homer gets a tax cut: Inequality and public policy in the American mind’, 
Perspectives on Politics, 3(1), 15-31. 
Bartels, L.M. (2012) Unequal democracy: The political economy of the new gilded age. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Bartels, L.M. and Jackman, S. (2014). ‘A generational model of political learning’, Electoral Studies, 
33, 7-18. 
Bauman, Z. (2001) The individualized society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
BBC News (2016) ‘US life expectancy declines for first time in 20 years’. At 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38247385> (viewed 23 August 2018). 
Beadle, S. (2011) ‘The changing nature of civic engagement’, in S. Beadle, R. Holdsworth and J. Wyn 
(eds) For we are young and….? Young people in a time of uncertainty (pp.196-213). Carlton, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 
Bean, C. (2012) ‘Are we keeping the bastards honest? Perceptions of corruption, integrity and 
influence on politics’, in J. Pietsch and H. Aarons (eds) Australia: Identity, fear and governance in the 
21st century (pp.95-106). Canberra, Australian National University E Press. 
Bean, C. and Papadakis, E. (1998) ‘A comparison of mass attitudes towards the welfare state in 
different institutional regimes, 1985-1990’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 10(3), 
211-236.  
Beck, U. (1999) World risk society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002) Individualization: Institutionalized individualism and its social 
and political consequences. London: Sage Publications. 
Becker, L.C. (1986) Reciprocity. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Beckerman, W. and Pasek, J. (2001) Justice, posterity and the environment: Environmental ethics for 
a new millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bellah, R.N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W.M., Swidler, A. and Tipton, S.M. (1992). The Good Society. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Benevolent Society (2017) The drivers of ageism. At 
<http://www.everyagecounts.org.au/ageism_research> (viewed 2 October 2017). 
Bengtson, V. (2001) ‘Beyond the nuclear family: The increasing importance of multigenerational 
bonds’, Journal of Marriage and Family, 63(1), 1-16. 
340 
 
Bengtson, V., Furlong, M. and Laufer, R. (1974) ‘Time, aging and the continuity of social structure: 
Themes and issues in generational analysis’, Journal of Social Issues, 30(2), 1-30. 
Bengtson, V.L., Lowenstein, A., Putney, N.M. and Gans, D. (2003) ‘Global aging and challenges to 
families’, in V.L. Bengtson and A. Lowenstein (eds), Global aging and challenges to families (pp.1-24). 
New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Bengtson, V.L. and Roberts, R.E.L. (1991) ‘Intergenerational solidarity in aging families: An example 
of formal theory construction’, Journal of Marriage and Family, 53(4), 856-870. 
Bernard, M.M., Maio, G.R. and Olson, J.M. (2003a) ‘Effects of introspection about reasons for values: 
Extending research on values-as-truisms’, Social Cognition, 21(1), 1–25. 
Bernard, M.M., Maio, G.R. and Olson, J.M. (2003b) ‘The vulnerability of values to attack: 
Innoculation of values and value-relevant attitudes’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
29(1), 63–75. 
Bernheim, B. D., A. Schleifer, and L. F. Summers (1985) ‘The strategic bequest motive’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 93, 1045–1076. 
Bessant, J. (2004) ‘Mixed messages: Youth participation and democratic practice’, Australian Journal 
of Political Science, 39(2), 387-404. 
Bessant, J. (2008) ‘Age and equity: A case for an intergenerational charter’, Journal of Australian 
Studies, 32(3), 361-373. 
Bessant, J. (2014) Democracy bytes: New media and new politics and generational change. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bessant, J.C., Emslie, M. and Watts, R. (2011) ‘Accounting for future generations: Intergenerational 
equity in Australia’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 70(2), 143-155. 
Bessant, J., Farthing, R. and Watts, R. (2017) The precarious generation: A political economy of young 
people. London and New York, Routledge. 
Biggs, S. and Lowenstein, A. (2011) Generational intelligence: A critical approach to age relations. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Birnbacher, D. (2006) ‘Responsibility for future generations: Scope and limits’, in J.C. Tremmel (ed.), 
Handbook of Intergenerational Justice (pp.23-38). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar. 
Blaikie, A. (1999) Ageing and popular culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Blais, A. (2007) ‘Turnout in elections’, in R.J. Dalton and H. Klingemann (eds), The Oxford handbook 
of political behaviour (pp.621-635). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Blekesaune, M. and Quadagno, J. (2003) ‘Public attitudes toward welfare state policies: A 
comparative analysis of 24 nations’, European Sociological Review, 19(5), 415-427. 
341 
 
Bloom, D.E. and Williamson, J. (1998) ‘Demographic transitions and economic miracles in emerging 
Asia’, World Bank Economic Review, 12, 419-455. 
Bloom, D.E., Canning, D. and Sevilla, J. (2003) The demographic dividend: A new perspective on the 
economic consequences of population change. California, RAND. 
Boeri, T., Börsch-Supan, A. and Tabellini, G. (2001) ‘Would you like to shrink the welfare state? A 
survey of European citizens’, Economic Policy, 16(32), 7-50. 
Bonoli, G. (2000) ‘Public attitudes to social protection and political economy traditions in Western 
Europe’, European Societies, 2(4), 431-452. 
Bonoli, G. (2006) ‘New social risks and the politics of post-industrial social policies’, in K. Armingeon 
and G. Bonoli (eds), The politics of post-industrial welfare states: Adapting post-war social policies to 
new social risks (pp.3-26). London and New York: Routledge. 
Bonoli, G. and Häusermann, S. (2010) ‘Who wants what from the welfare state? Socio-structural 
cleavages in distributional politics: Evidence from swiss referendum votes’, in J.C. Tremmel (ed.), 
Young generation under pressure? The financial situation and the ‘rush hour’ of the cohorts 1970-
1985 in a generational comparison (pp.187-205). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. 
Borowski, A. and Olsberg, D. (2007) ‘Retirement income policy for a long-lived society’, in A. 
Borowski, S. Encel and E. Ozanne (eds), Longevity and social change in Australia (pp.189-218). 
Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. 
Borre, O. and Goldsmith, M. (1995) ‘The scope of government’, in O. Borre and E. Scarbrough (eds), 
The scope of government (pp.1-22). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (2002) ‘The inheritance of inequality’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
16(3), 3-30. 
Boyd, J.N. and Zimbardo, P.G. (1997) ‘Constructing time after death: The transcendental future time 
perspective’, Time and Society, 6(1), 35-54.  
Bradbury, B. (2010) Asset rich but income poor: Australian housing wealth and retirement in an 
international context, Social Policy Research Paper No.41, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. At 
<https://www.dss.gov.au/about-the-department/publications-articles/research-publications/social-
policy-research-paper-series/number-41-asset-rich-but-income-poor-australian-housing-wealth-and-
retirement> (viewed 1 July 2016). 
Bradbury, B. and Mendolia, S. (2012) Living Standards after retirement: Perceptions and expenditure 
patterns, Sydney, Social Policy Research Centre, University of NSW. At 
<https://melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/assets/documents/hilda-bibliography/other-




Bray, J.R. and Gray, M. (2016) Ageing and money: Public opinion on pensions, inheritance, financial 
wellbeing in retirement and caring for older Australians, ANU Centre for Social Research and 
Methods Research School of Social Sciences, Report No. 20. At 
<http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/politicsir.anu.edu.au/files/ANUPoll-ageing-money-feb-
2016.pdf> (viewed 10 January 2019). 
Brennan, J. (2017). Against democracy. Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Bright, G., Pugh, C. and Clarke, M. (2018). ‘Youth work, agonistic democracy and transgressive 
enjoyment in England’, in S. Pickard and J. Bessant (eds), Young people re-generating politics in times 
of crises (pp.315-332). Palgrave MacMillan, ebook at DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58250-4. 
Bristow, J. (2016) The sociology of generations: New directions and challenges. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Brooks, C. (2012) ‘Framing theory, welfare attitudes, and the United States case’, in S. Svallfors (ed.), 
Contested welfare states: Welfare attitudes in Europe and beyond (pp.193-221). Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
Brooks, C. and Manza, J. (2006) ‘Social policy responsiveness in developed democracies’, American 
Sociological Review, 71, 474-494. 
Brooks, C. and Manza, J. (2007). Why welfare states persist: The importance of public opinion in 
democracies. Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Brown, P., Lauder, H. and Ashton, D. (2011) The global auction: The broken promises of education, 
jobs and incomes. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Brown-Iannuzzi, J.L., Lundberg, K.B. and McKee, S. (2017) ‘The politics of socioeconomic status: How 
socioeconomic status may influence political attitudes and engagement’, Current Opinion in 
Psychology, 18, 11-14. 
Brunner, E. and Balsdon, E. (2004) ‘Intergenerational conflict and the political economy of school 
spending’, Journal of Urban Economics, 56, 369-388. 
Bullock, H.E. (2017) ‘Social class and policy preferences: Implications for economic inequality and 
interclass relations’, Current Opinion in Psychology, 18, 141-146. 
Burke, T., Stone, W. and Ralston, L. (2014) Generational change in home purchase opportunity in 
Australia, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Final Report No.232, Melbourne. At 
<http://www.ahuri.edu.au/publications/projects/51002> (viewed 30 June 2016). 
Burstein, P. (2014) American public opinion, advocacy, and policy in congress: What the public wants 
and what it gets. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Busemeyer, M.R., Goerres, A. and Weschle, S. (2009) ‘Attitudes towards redistributive spending in 
an era of demographic ageing: The rival pressures from age and income in 14 OECD countries’, 
Journal of European Social Policy, 19(3), 195-212. 
343 
 
Business Council of Australia (2013) Action plan for enduring prosperity. At 
<http://www.bca.com.au/publications/action-plan-for-enduring-prosperity-full-report> (viewed 30 
May 2015). 
Bytheway, B. (2005) ‘Ageism and age categorization’, Journal of Social Issues, 61(2), 361-374. 
Callahan, D. (1987) Setting limits: Medical goals in an aging society. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Cameron, S. and McAllister, I. (2018) ‘Australian Election Study interactive data’. At 
<http://www.australianelectionstudy.org> (viewed 10 July 2018). 
Cameron, S. and McAllister, I. (2019a) The 2019 Australian Federal Election: Results from the 
Australian Election Study, Australian National University. At <https://australianelectionstudy.org/> 
(viewed 31 December 2019). 
Cameron, S. and McAllister, I. (2019b) Trends in Australian Political Opinion: Results from the 
Australian Election Study 1987-2019, Australian National University. At 
<https://australianelectionstudy.org/> (viewed 31 December 2019). 
Campbell, A.L. (2003a) How policies make citizens: Senior political activism and the American welfare 
state. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Campbell, A.L. (2003b) ‘Participatory reactions to policy threats: Senior citizens and the defense of 
Social Security and Medicare’, Political Behavior, 25(1), 29-49. 
Campbell, J.L. (2002) ‘Ideas, politics and public policy’, Annual Review of Sociology, 28, 21-38. 
Campbell, S. and Withers, H. (2017) Australian productivity trends and the effect of structural 
change, Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra. At <https://treasury.gov.au/publication/p2017-
t213722c> (viewed 16 July 2019). 
Caricati, L. (2017) ‘Testing the status-legitimacy hypothesis: A multilevel modeling approach to the 
perception of legitimacy in income distribution in 36 nations’, Journal of Social Psychology, 157(5), 
532-540. 
Carling, R. (2015) Right or rort? Dissecting Australia's tax concessions, Centre for Independent 
Studies. At <https://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2015/07/rr2.pdf> (viewed 15 July 2019). 
Carmines, E.G. and D'Amico, N.J. (2015) ‘The new look in political ideology research’, Annual Review 
of Political Science, 18, 205-216. 
Carmines, E.G. and Layman, G.C. (1997) ‘Value priorities, partisanship and electoral choice: The 
negelected case of the United States’, Political Behaviour, 19: 283-316. 
Carney, T. (2015) ‘Conditional income transfers and choice in social services: Just more conditions 
and more markets?’ In G. Meagher and S. Goodwin (eds), Markets, rights and power in Australian 
social policy (pp.341-366). Sydney: Sydney University Press. 
Carver, C.S. and Harmon-Jones, E. (2009) ‘Anger is an approach-related affect: Evidence and 
implications’, Psychological Bulletin, 135, 183-204. 
344 
 
Cassells, R., Duncan, A., Mavisakalyan, A., Phillimore, J., Seymour, R. and Tarverdi, Y. (2018) Future of 
work in Australia: Preparing for tomorrow’s world, Focus on the States Series, No. 6/18, Perth, 
Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre. At <http://bcec.edu.au/publications/future-work-australia-
preparing-tomorrows-world> (viewed 20 April 2018). 
Cattaneo, M.A. and Wolter, S.C. (2009) ‘Are the elderly a threat to educational expenditures?’ 
European Journal of Political Economy, 25, 225-236. 
CEDA (2018) Community pulse 2018: The economic disconnect, Committee for Economic 
Development of Australia: Melbourne. At <https://ceda.com.au/Research-and-policy/All-CEDA-
research/Research-catalogue/Community-pulse-2018-the-economic-disconnect/Community-pulse-
2018-interactives> (viewed 16 July 2019). 
CEPAR (2018a) Retirement income in Australia: Part I – Overview, ARC Centre of Excellence in 
Population Ageing Research, Sydney. At <http://cepar.edu.au/resources-videos/research-briefs>  
(viewed 22 December 2018). 
CEPAR (2018b) Retirement income in Australia: Part II – Public support, ARC Centre of Excellence in 
Population Ageing Research, Sydney. At <http://cepar.edu.au/resources-videos/research-briefs>  
(viewed 22 December 2018). 
CEPAR (2018c) Retirement income in Australia: Part III – Private resources, ARC Centre of Excellence 
in Population Ageing Research, Sydney, At <http://cepar.edu.au/resources-videos/research-briefs>  
(viewed 22 December 2018). 
Chakrabortty, A. (2019) ‘The hounding of Greta Thunberg is proof that the right has run out of ideas’, 
The Guardian, 1 May 2019. At <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/01/greta-
thunberg-right-environmental-activist-attacks> (viewed 28 May 2019). 
Chauvel, L. (2009) ‘Comparing welfare regime changes: Living standards and the unequal life chances 
of different birth cohorts’, Intergenerational Justice Review, 9(2), 61-66. 
Chauvel, L. and Smits, F. (2015) ‘The endless Baby Boomer generation: Cohort differences in 
participation in political discussions in nine European countries in the period 1976-2008’, European 
Societies, 17(2), 242-278. 
Cho, S.W. and Sane, R. (2013) ‘Means-tested age pensions and homeownership: Is there a link?’ 
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 17(6), 1281-1310. 
Chomik, R. and Piggott, J. (2012) Long-term fiscal projections and the Australian retirement income 
system, ARC Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research, Working Paper 2012/15. At 
<http://www.cepar.edu.au/media/96212/working_paper_version_-_updated_1st_oct_2012.pdf> 
(viewed 7 October 2016). 
Chong, D. and Druckman, J.N. (2010) ‘Dynamic public opinion: Communication effects over time’, 
American Political Science Review, 104(4), 663–680. 
345 
 
Chou, M. (2017) ‘Disengaged: Young people and political disengagement in Anglo-American 
democracies, in M. Chou, J. Gagnon, C. Hartung and L.J. Pruitt, Young people, citizenship and political 
participation: Combating civic deficit? (pp.1-30). London: Rowman and Littlefield International Ltd. 
Chudacoff, H.P. (1989) How old are you? Age consciousness in American culture, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Churchill, B., Denny, L. and Jackson, N. (2014) ‘Thank God you’re here: The coming generation and 
their role in future-proofing Australia from the challenges of population ageing’, Australian Journal 
of Social Issues, 49(3), 373-392. 
Clarke, Harold D., Kornberg, A., McIntyre, C., Bauer-Kaase, P. and Kaase, M. (1999) ‘The effect of 
economic priorities on the measurement of value change: New experimental evidence’, The 
American Political Science Review, 93(3), 637-647. 
Coates, B. (2018) ‘Housing tax reform: what difference will it make?’ Presentation to the NSW 
Affordable Housing Conference, Wednesday 27 June 2018, Sydney. At 
<https://grattan.edu.au/presentations/housing-tax-reform-what-difference-will-it-make-2/> (viewed 
11 June 2019). 
Coates, B., Mackey, W. and Cowgill, M. (2020) No free lunch: Higher superannuation means lower 
wages, Melbourne: Grattan Institute. At <https://grattan.edu.au/report/no-free-lunch> (viewed 2 
March 2020). 
Cobb-Clark, D.A. (2008) ‘Leaving home: What economics has to say about the living arrangements of 
young Australians’, Australian Economics Review, 41(2), 160-176. 
Cole, A. (2015) Estate and inheritance taxes around the world, Tax Foundation, Washington D.C. At 
<https://taxfoundation.org/estate-and-inheritance-taxes-around-world> (viewed 11 June 2019). 
Commonwealth of Australia (2015) 2015 intergenerational report: Australia in 2055, Canberra. At 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/2015-Intergenerational-
Report> (viewed 30 April 2016). 
Commonwealth of Australia (2016a) Final budget income 2014-15., Canberra. At 
<http://www.budget.gov.au/2014-15/content/fbo/html/index.htm> (viewed 4 December 2016). 
Commonwealth of Australia (2016b) Tax expenditures statement 2015, Canberra. At 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2016/TES-2015> (viewed 4 
December 2016). 
Conifer, D. (2018). ‘Centrelink call wait times grow, with some clients waiting an hour on hold’, ABC 
News, 23 January 2018. At <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-23/centrelink-call-wait-times-
balloon/9351450> (viewed 30 November 2018). 
Connidis, I.A. and McMullin, J.A. (2002) ‘Sociological ambivalence and family ties: A critical 
perspective’, Journal of Marriage and Family, 64, 558-567. 
346 
 
Conover, P.J. and Searing, D.D. (2002) ‘Expanding the envelope: Citizenship, contextual 
methodologies, and comparative political psychology’, in J.H. Kuklinski (ed.), Thinking about political 
psychology (pp.89-114). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Converse, P.E. (1964) ‘The nature of belief systems in mass publics’, in D.E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and 
discontent (pp.206-261). New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 
Cook, J. (2016) ‘Young adults’ hopes for the long-term future: From reenchantment with technology 
to faith in humanity’, Journal of Youth Studies, 19(4), 517-532. 
Coombs, G. and Dollery, B. (2004a) ‘The ageing of Australia: Fiscal sustainability, intergenerational 
equity and inter-temporal fiscal balance’, Australian Journal of Social Issues, 39(4), 459-470. 
Coombs, G. and Dollery, B. (2004b) ‘Intergenerational fiscal balance in Australia: Should we use fiscal 
sustainability or intergenerational equity? Economic Papers, 23(3), 286-299. 
Cornelis, I., Van Hiel, A., Roets, A. and Kossowska, M. (2009) ‘Age differences in conservatism: 
Evidence on the mediating effects of personality and cognitive style’, Journal of Personality, 77(1), 
51-88. 
Corsten, M. (1999) ‘The time of generations’, Time and Society, 8(2-3), 249-272. 
COTA NSW (2017) 50+ report 2016 - Twin currencies: How people in NSW spend their time and 
money as they age. At <http://www.cotansw.com.au/council-on-the-ageing-nsw-news-and-events-
details/50-report-2016-twin-currencies-how-people-in-nsw-spend-their-time-and-money-as-they-
age> (viewed 3 October 2017). 
Cowan, S. (2016) The myths of the generational bargain, Research Report 10, Centre for 
Independent Studies, St Leonards, New South Wales. At 
<http://www.cis.org.au/publications/research-reports/the-myths-of-the-generational-bargain> 
(viewed 23 August 2018). 
Cowen, T. (2011) The great stagnation: How America ate all the low-hanging fruit of modern history, 
got sick, and will (eventually) feel better. New York: Dutton. 
Cowen, T. (2013) Average is over: Powering America beyond the age of the great stagnation. New 
York: Dutton. 
Crandall, C.S. and Beasley, R.K. (2001) ‘A perceptual theory of legitimacy: Politics, prejudice, social 
institutions, and moral value’, in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), The psychology of legitimacy: Emerging 
perspectives on ideology, justice, and intergroup relations (pp.77-102). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P. (2006) ‘Wealth transfer taxation: A survey of the theoretical literature’, 
in S. Kolm and J.M. Ythier (eds), Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity 
(pp.1107-1134). Oxford: Elsevier. 
Creswell, J.W. (2014) Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches. 4th 
ed., Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
347 
 
Crouch, M. and McKenzie, H. (2006) ‘The logic of small samples in interview-based qualitative 
research’, Social Science Information, 45(4), 483-499. 
Cuddy, A.J.C. and Fiske, S.T. (2002) ‘Doddering but dear: Process, content and function in 
stereotyping of older persons’, in T.D. Nelson (ed.), Ageism: Stereotyping and prejudice against older 
persons (pp.3-26). Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press. 
Cuervo, H. and Wyn, J. (2016) ‘An unspoken crisis: The ‘scarring effects’ of the complex nexus 
between education and work on two generations of young Australians’, International Journal of 
Lifelong Education, 35(2), 122-135. 
Cusack, T., Iversen, T. and Rehm, P. (2006) ‘Risks at work: The demand and supply sides of 
government redistribution’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(3), 365-389. 
Daatland, S.O., Slagsvold, B. and Lima, I.A. (2009) ‘Population ageing, intergenerational solidarity and 
the family-welfare state balance: A comparative exploration’, in How generations and gender shape 
demographic change: Towards policies based on better knowledge (pp.127-138), United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe. At <http://www.unece.org/pau/pub/ggp_conference_2009.html> 
(viewed 30 June 2016). 
Daley, J., Coates, B. and Wiltshire, T. (2018) Housing affordability: Re-imagining the Australian 
dream, Melbourne: Grattan Institute. At <https://grattan.edu.au/report/housing-affordability-re-
imagining-the-australian-dream> (viewed 14 April 2018). 
Daley, J., Coates, B., Wiltshire, T., Emslie, O., Nolan, J. and Chen, T. (2018) Money in retirement: More 
than enough, Melbourne: Grattan Institute. At <https://grattan.edu.au/report/money-in-
retirement> (viewed 8 November 2018). 
Daley, J., Coates, B., Wood, D. and Parsonage, H. (2015) Superannuation tax targeting, Melbourne: 
Grattan Institute. At <https://grattan.edu.au/report/super-tax-targeting> (viewed 17 October 2016). 
Daley, J., Coates, B., Young, W. and Parsonage, H. (2016) Age of entitlement: Age-based tax breaks, 
Melbourne: Grattan Institute. At <https://grattan.edu.au/report/age-of-entitlement> (viewed 21 
November 2016). 
Daley, J. and Wood, D. (2015) Fiscal challenges for Australia, Melbourne: Grattan Institute. At 
<https://grattan.edu.au/report/fiscal-challenges-for-australia> (viewed 17 October 2016). 
Daley, J., Wood, D. and Parsonage, H. (2016) Hot property: Negative gearing and capital gains tax 
reform, Melbourne: Grattan Institute. At <http://grattan.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/872-
Hot-Property.pdf> (viewed 21 November 2016). 
Daley, J., Wood, D., Weidmann, B. and Harrison, C. (2014) The wealth of generations, Melbourne: 
Grattan Institute. Att <https://grattan.edu.au/report/the-wealth-of-generations> (viewed 17 
October 2016). 
Dallinger, U. (2010) ‘Public support for redistribution: What explains cross-national differences?’ 
Journal of European Social Policy, 20(4), 333-349. 
348 
 
Dalton, R.J. (2008) The good citizen: How the young are reshaping American politics. Washington 
D.C: CQ Press. 
Dalton, R.J. (2011) ‘Introduction: The debates over youth participation’, in R.J. Dalton (ed.), Engaging 
youth in politics: Debating democracy’s future (pp.1-14). New York: International Debate Education 
Association. 
Dalton, R.J. (2014) Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial 
democracies. 6th ed, California: CQ Press. 
Damon, W. (2011) ‘To not fade away: Restoring civil identity among the young’ in R.J. Dalton (ed.), 
Engaging youth in politics: Debating democracy’s future (pp.16-35). New York: International Debate 
Education Association. 
Daniels, N. (1988) Am I my parents’ keeper? An essay on justice between the young and the old. New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Das, S. (2015) A banquet of consequences: Have we consumed our own future? Australia: Penguin. 
Davidson, P., Saunders, P., Bradbury, B. and Wong, M. (2018) Poverty in Australia, 2018, 
ACOSS/UNSW Poverty and Inequality Partnership Report No. 2, Sydney: ACOSS. At 
<https://www.acoss.org.au/poverty/> (viewed 20 December 2018). 
Davis, D.W. and Davenport, C. (1999) ‘Assessing the validity of the postmaterialism index’, American 
Political Science Review, 93(3): 649-664. 
Davis, D.W., Dowley, K.M. and Silver, B.D. (1999) ‘Postmaterialism in world societies: Is it really a 
value dimension?’ American Journal of Political Science, 43(3): 935-962. 
Davis, M. (2014) ‘Neoliberalism, the culture wars and public policy’, in C. Miller and L. Orchard (eds), 
Australian public policy: Progressive ideas in the neoliberal ascendency (pp.27-42). Bristol: Policy 
Press. 
De Beauvoir, S. (1972) Old age. Great Britain: André Deutsch and Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
De Graaf, N.D. and Evans, G. (1996) ‘Why are the young more postmaterialist? A cross-national 
analysis of individual and contextual influences on postmaterial values’, Comparative Political 
Studies, 28(4), 608-635. 
Department of Human Services (2018) ‘Benefits of a pensioner concession card’. At 
<https://www.humanservices.gov.au/individuals/enablers/benefits-pensioner-concession-
card/39031> (viewed 9 November 2018). 
Department of Social Services (2013a) Characteristics of disability support pension recipients, 
Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. At 
<https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/01_2014/dsp_characteristics_report_2013_




Department of Social Services (2013b) Income support customers: A statistical overview 2012, 
Statistical Paper No.11, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. At 
<https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/01_2014/sp11_pdf_na.pdf> (viewed 23 
March 2017).  
Deutsch, M. (1985) Distributive justice: A social-psychological perspective. New Haven, CT and 
London: Yale University Press. 
Dierksmeier, C. (2006) ‘John Rawls on the rights of future generations’, in J.C. Tremmel (ed.), 
Handbook of intergenerational justice (pp.72-85). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar. 
Disney, R. (1996) Can we afford to grow older? A perspective on the economics of aging. Cambridge, 
MA and London: MIT Press. 
Donovan, F. (2017) ‘Living class in a ‘meritocratic’ Australia: The burdens of class and choice on 
young people's end-of-school transitions’, Journal of Sociology: 1-16. 
Donow, H.S. (1994) ‘The two faces of age and the resolution of generational conflict’, Gerontologist, 
34(1), 73-78. 
Dowding, K. and Martin, A. (2017) Policy agendas in Australia. Palgrave Macmillan (e-book, viewed 
23 October 2017). 
Druckman, J.N. and Jacobs, L.R. (2015) Who governs? Presidents, public opinion, and manipulation. 
Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Duffy, D.N. (2017) ‘Time to look in/at anger: Considerations on the position and policing of young 
people’s anger’, Journal of Youth Studies, 20(1), 1-15. 
Dufty-Jones, R. and Rogers, D. (2015) ‘Housing in Australia: A new century, in R. Dufty-Jones and D. 
Rogers (eds), Housing in 21st century Australia: People, practices and policies (pp.1-18). Surrey and 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing. 
Dworkin, R. (2000) Sovereign virtue: The theory and practice of equality. Cambridge, MA and London: 
Harvard University Press. 
Easterlin, R.A. (1980) Birth and fortune: The impact of numbers on personal welfare. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Easterlin, R.A. and Crimmins, E.M. (1991) ‘Private materialism, personal self-fulfillment, family life, 
and public interest: The nature, effects, and causes of recent changes in the values of American 
youth’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 55, 499-533. 
Easterlin, R.A., Schaeffer, C.M. and Macunovich, D.J. (1993) ‘Will the Baby Boomers be less well-off 
than their parents? Income, wealth, and family circumstances over the life cycle in the United 




Edlund, J. (2007) ‘Class conflicts and institutional feedback effects in liberal and social democratic 
welfare regimes: Attitudes toward state redistribution and welfare policy in six western countries’, in 
S. Svallfors (ed.), The political sociology of the welfare state (pp.30-79). Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Edlund, J. (2009) ‘Attitudes towards state-organized welfare in twenty-two societies: A question of 
convergence?’ In M. Haller, R. Jowell and T.W. Smith (eds), The international social survey program 
1984-2009: Charting the globe (pp.125-146). London and New York: Routledge. 
Edmunds, J. and Turner, B.S. (2005) ‘Global generations: Social change in the twentieth century’, 
British Journal of Sociology, 56(4), 559-577. 
Edwards, K. (2009) ‘Disenfranchised not ‘deficient’: How the (neoliberal) state disenfranchises young 
people’, Australian Journal of Social Issues, 44(1), 23-37. 
Elias, N. (2000, originally published 1939) The civilizing process, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. 
Ellis, L. (2017) ‘Where is the growth going to come from?’ Stan Kelly Lecture, Melbourne, Reserve 
Bank of Australia. At < https://rba.gov.au/speeches/2017/sp-ag-2017-11-15.html> (viewed 14 June 
2019). 
Elster, J. (1983) Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Elster, J. (1989) Solomonic judgements: Studies in the limitations of rationality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Emmenegger, P., Häusermann, S., Palier, B. and Seeleib-Kaiser, M. (2012a) ‘How we grow unequal’, 
in P. Emmenegger, S. Häusermann, B. Palier and M. Seeleib-Kaiser (eds), The age of dualization: The 
changing face of inequality in deindustrializing societies (pp.3-26). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Emmenegger, P., Häusermann, S., Palier, B. and Seeleib-Kaiser, M. (2012b) ‘How rich countries cope 
with deindustrialization’, in P. Emmenegger, S. Häusermann, B. Palier and M. Seeleib-Kaiser (eds), 
The age of dualization: The changing face of inequality in deindustrializing societies (pp.304-320). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Emmott, B. (2017) The fate of the West: The battle to save the world’s most successful political idea, 
London: Profile Books. 
 
Erkulwater, J.L. (2012) ‘Political participation over the life cycle’, in K.L Schlozman, S. Verba and H.E. 
Brady (eds), The unheavenly chorus: Unequal political voice and the broken promise of American 
democracy (pp.199-231). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Erikson, E.H. (1963) Childhood and society. 2nd ed, New York: Norton. 
Erikson, R.S., MacKuen, M.B. and Stimson, J.A. (2002) The macro polity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ermisch, J. (1988) ‘Fortunes of birth: The impact of generation size on the relative earnings of young 
men’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 35, 266-282. 
351 
 
Eslake, S. (2017) No place like home: The impact of declining home ownership on retirement, 
Melbourne: Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees. At 
<http://www.aist.asn.au/media/20734/AIST_Housing%20affordability%20and%20retirement%20inc
omes_FINAL%2021032017.pdf> (viewed 24 March 2017). 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) Social foundations of post-industrial economies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (2002) ‘A child-centred social investment strategy’, in G. Esping-Andersen (with 
D. Gallie, A. Hemerijck and J. Myles), Why we need a new welfare state (pp.26-67). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Esping-Andersen, G. and Sarasa, S. (2002) ‘The generational conflict reconsidered’, Journal of 
European Social Policy, 12(1), 5-21. 
Eyerman, R. and Turner, B.S. (1998) ‘Outline of a theory of generations’, European Journal of Social 
Theory, 1(1), 91-106. 
Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2006) ‘The economics of strong reciprocity’, in H. Gintis, S. Bowles and 
R. Boyd (eds), Moral sentiments and material interests: The foundations of cooperation in economic 
life (pp.151-191). Boston, MA: MIT Press. 
Feldman, S. (1988) ‘Structure and consistency in public opinion: The role of core beliefs and values’, 
American Journal of Political Science, 32(2), 416-440. 
Feldman, S. and Steenbergen, M.R. (2001) ‘The humanitarian foundation of public support for social 
welfare’, American Journal of Political Science, 45(3), 658-677. 
Feldman, S. and Zaller, J. (1992) ‘The political culture of ambivalence: Ideological responses to the 
welfare state’, American Journal of Political Science 36(1), 268-307. 
Fernández, J.J. (2012) ‘Population ageing, the elderly, and the generosity of standard and minimum 
pensions’, in P. Vanhuysse and A. Goerres (eds), Ageing populations in post-industrial democracies: 
Comparative studies of policies and politics (pp.145-177). London and New York: Routledge. 
Fineman, M.A. (2004) The autonomy myth: A theory of dependency. New York and London: The New 
Press. 
Fischer, R. and Poortinga, Y. (2012) ‘Are cultural values the same as the values of individuals? An 
examination of similarities in personal, social and cultural value structures’, International Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Management, 12(2), 157-170. 
Foner, A. (2000) ‘Age integration or age conflict as society ages?’ Gerontologist, 40(3), 272-276. 
Forma, P. (1999) ‘Welfare state opinions among citizens, MP-candidates and elites: Evidence from 
Finland’, in S. Svallfors and P. Taylor-Gooby (eds), The end of the welfare state? Responses to state 
retrenchment (pp.87-105). London and New York: Routledge. 
352 
 
Forsé, M. (2009) ‘Macro-inequalities and micro-justice’, in M. Haller, R. Jowell and T.W. Smith (eds), 
The International Social Survey Program 1984-2009: Charting the globe (pp.91-105). London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Foundation for Young Australians (2016) Renewing Australia’s promise: Report card 2016, 
Melbourne: Foundation for Young Australians. At <https://www.fya.org.au/our-research> (viewed 6 
October 2016). 
Fournier, S. and Richins, M.L. (1991) ‘Some theoretical and popular notions concerning materialism’, 
Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 6: 403-414. 
France, A. and Roberts, S. (2015) ‘The problem of social generations: A critique of the new emerging 
orthodoxy in youth studies’, Journal of Youth Studies, 18(2), 215-230. 
Frank, T. (2004) What’s the matter with Kansas? How conservatives won the heart of America. New 
York: Picador. 
Frank, R.H. (2016) Success and luck: Good fortune and the myth of meritocracy. Princeton, NJ and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Friedman, B.M. (2006) The moral consequences of economic growth. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Friesen, A. and Hibbing, M.V. (2016) ‘The effect of personal economic values on economic policy 
preferences’, Social Science Quarterly, 97(2), 325-337. 
Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J.A. (1992). Choosing justice: An experimental approach to ethical 
theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Furlong, A. and Cartmel, F. (2007) Young people and social change: New perspectives. 2nd ed, 
Berkshire: Open University Press. 
Funk, C.L. (2000) ‘The dual influence of self-interest and societal interest in public opinion’, Political 
Research Quarterly, 53(1), 37-62. 
Galasso, V. (2006) The political future of social security in aging societies. Cambridge, MA and 
London: MIT Press. 
Gardiner, S.M. (2011) A perfect moral storm: The ethical tragedy of climate change. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Garfinkel, I., Rainwater, L. and Smeeding, T.M. (2006) ‘A re-examination of welfare states and 
inequality in rich nations: How in-kind transfers and indirect taxes change the story’, Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, 25(4), 897-919. 
Garnaut, R. (2013). Dog days: Australia after the boom. Collingwood, Victoria: Redback. 
Gaspart, F. and Gosseries, A. (2007) ‘Are generational savings unjust?’ Politics, Philosophy and 
Economics, 6, 193-217. 
353 
 
Gelfand, M., Raver, J.L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L.M., Lun, J., Lim, B.C., Duan, L., Almaliach, A., Ang, S., 
Arnadottir, J., Aycan, Z., Boehnke, K., Boski, P., Cabecinhas, R., Chan, D., Chhokar, J., D'Amato, A., 
Ferrer, M., Fischlmayr, I.C., Fischer, R., Fülöp, M., Georgas, J., Kashima, E.S., Kashima, Y., Kim, K., 
Lempereur, A., Marquez, P., Othman, R., Overlaet, B., Panagiotopoulou, P., Peltzer, K., Perez-
Florizno, L.R., Ponomarenko, L., Realo, A., Schei, V., Schmitt, M., Smith, P.B., Soomro, N., Szabo, E., 
Taveesin, N., Toyama, M., Van De Vliert, E., Vohra, N., Ward, C. & Yamaguchi, S. (2011) ‘Differences 
between tight and loose cultures: A 33-nation study’, Science, 332 (6033), 1100-1104. 
Gelissen, J. (2000) ‘Popular support for institutionalised solidarity: A comparison between European 
welfare states’ International Journal of Social Welfare, 9, 285-300. 
Gelissen, J. (2001) ‘Old-age pensions: Individual or collective responsibility? An investigation of 
public opinion across European welfare states’, European Societies, 3(4), 495-523. 
Gelissen, J. (2008) ‘European scope-of-government beliefs: The impact of individual, regional and 
national characteristics’, in W. Van Oorschot, M. Opielka and B. Pfau-Effinger (eds), Culture and 
welfare state: Values and social policy in comparative perspective (pp.247-267). Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar. 
Giarrusso, R., Silverstein, M., Gans, D. and Bengtson, V.L. (2005) ‘Ageing parents and adult children: 
New perspectives on intergenerational relationships’, in M.L. Johnson (ed.), The Cambridge 
handbook of age and ageing (pp.413-421). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Giddens, A. (1991) Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Gilens, M. (2012) Affluence and influence: Economic inequality and political power in America. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gilleard, C. and Higgs, P. (2002) ‘The Third Age: Class cohort or generation?’ Ageing and Society, 22, 
369-382. 
Gilleard, C. and Higgs, P. (2005) Contexts of ageing: Class, cohort and community. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Gingrich, J. (2014) ‘Structuring the vote: Welfare institutions and value-based vote choices’, in S. 
Kumlin and I. Stadelmann-Steffen (eds), How welfare states shape the democratic public: Policy 
feedback, participation, voting, and attitudes (pp.93-112). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar. 
Gintis, H., Bowles, S. and Fehr, E. (2006) ‘Moral sentiments and material interests: Origins, evidence, 
and consequences’, in H. Gintis, S. Bowles and R. Boyd (eds), Moral sentiments and material 
interests: The foundations of cooperation in economic life (pp.3-39). Boston: MIT Press. 
Giugni, M. and Grasso, M.T. (2016) ‘How civil society actors responded to the economic crisis: The 
interaction of material deprivation and perceptions of political opportunity structures’, Politics & 
Policy, 44(3), 447-472. 
354 
 
Goerres, A. (2008) ‘Reforming the welfare state in times of grey majorities: The myth of an 
opposition between younger and older voters’, German Policy Studies 4(2), 131-156. 
Goerres, A. and Tepe, M. (2010) ‘Age-based self-interest, intergenerational solidarity and the welfare 
state: A comparative analysis of older people’s attitudes towards public childcare in 12 OECD 
countries’, European Journal of Political Research, 49, 818-851. 
Goerres, A. and Tepe, M. (2012) ‘The family and the welfare state: The impact of public provision for 
families on young people’s demand for public childcare across 21 nations’, in P. Vanhuysse and A. 
Goerres (eds), Ageing populations in post-industrial democracies: Comparative studies of policies and 
politics (pp.178-205). London and New York: Routledge. 
Goodin, R.E. (1985) Protecting the vulnerable: A reanalysis of our social responsibilities. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Goodin, R.E. (1996) ‘Institutions and their design’, in R.E. Goodin (ed.), The theory of institutional 
design (pp.1-53). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Goodin, R.E. (1998) ‘Social welfare as a collective social responsibility’, in D. Schmidtz and R.E. 
Goodin (eds), Social welfare and individual responsibility (pp.97-195). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Goodin, R.E. (1999) ‘Treating likes alike, intergenerationally and internationally’, Policy Sciences 32, 
189-206. 
Goot, M. (2013) ‘Studying the Australian voter: Questions, methods, answers’, Australian Journal of 
Political Science, 48(3), 366-378. 
Goren, P. (2001) ‘Core principles and policy reasoning in mass publics: A test of two theories’, British 
Journal of Political Science, 31(1), 159-177. 
Goren, P. (2004) ‘Political sophistication and policy reasoning: A reconsideration’, American Journal 
of Political Science, 48(3), 462-478. 
Goren, P. (2005) ‘Party identification and core political values’, American Journal of Political Science, 
49(4), 881-896. 
Gosseries, A. (2001) ‘What do we owe the next generations(s)?’ Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 
35(1), 293-354. 
Gosseries, A. (2008) ‘On future generations’ future rights’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 16(4), 446-
474. 
Gouveia, V.V., Vione, K.C., Milfont, T.L. and Fischer, R. (2015) ‘Patterns of value change during the 
life span: Some evidence from a functional approach to values’, Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 41(9), 1276-1290. 
Grasso, M.T. (2014) ‘Age, period and cohort analysis in a comparative context: Political generations 
and political participation repertoires in Western Europe’, Electoral Studies, 33, 63-76. 
355 
 
Grasso, M. (2018) ‘Young people’s political participation in Europe in times of crisis’, in S. Pickard and 
J. Bessant (eds), Young people re-generating politics in times of crises (pp.179-196). Palgrave 
MacMillan, ebook at DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58250-4. 
Grasso, M., Farrall, S., Gray, E., Hay, C. and Jennings, W. (2019) ‘Thatcher’s children, Blair’s babies, 
political socialization and trickle-down value change: An age, period and cohort analysis’, British 
Journal of Political Science, 49(1), 17-36. 
Grasso, M.T. and Giugni, M. (2016a) ‘Do issues matter? Anti-austerity protests’ composition, values, 
and action repertoires compared’, Protest, Social Movements and Global Democracy Since 2011: 
New Perspectives Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 39, 31-58. 
Grasso, M.T. and Giugni, M. (2016b) ‘Protest participation and economic crisis: The conditioning role 
of political opportunities’, European Journal of Political Research, 55(4), 663-680. 
Green, R.M. (1981) ‘Intergenerational distributive justice and environmental responsibility’, in E. 
Partridge (ed.), Responsibilities to future generations (pp.91-101). New York: Prometheus Books. 
Grenier, A.M. (2007) ‘Crossing age and generational boundaries: Exploring intergenerational 
research encounters’, Journal of Social Issues, 63(4), 713-727. 
Grob, U. and Wolter, S.C. (2007) ‘Demographic change and public education spending: A conflict 
between young and old?’ Education Economics, 15, 277-292. 
Grover, S.C. (2011) Young people’s human rights and the politics of voting age. Dordrecht, 
Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer. 
Guest, G., MacQueen, K.M. and Namey, E.E. (2012) Applied thematic analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA., 
Sage. 
Guest, R. and McDonald, I. (2003) ‘How much support will the taxpayer provide for us when we are 
old?’ Economic Papers, 22(1), 1-12. 
Gulbrandsen, L. and Langsether, A. (2000) ‘Wealth distribution between generations: A source of 
conflict or cohesion?’ In S. Arber and C. Attias-Donfut (eds), The myth of generational conflict: The 
family and state in ageing societies (pp.69-87). London: Routledge. 
Hacker, J.S., Rehm, P. and Schlesinger, M. (2013) ‘The insecure American: Economic experiences, 
financial worries, and policy attitudes’, Perspectives on Politics, 11(1), 23-49. 
Hadler, M. (2005) ‘Why do people accept different income ratios? A multi-level comparison of thirty 
countries’, Acta Sociologica, 48(2), 131-154. 
Hagestad, G.O. and Uhlenberg, P. (2005) ‘The social separation of old and young: A root of ageism’, 
Journal of Social Issues, 61(2), 343-360. 
Hamilton, M. (2014) ‘The ‘New Social Contract’ and the individualisation of risk in policy’, Journal of 
Risk Research, 17(4), 453-467. 
356 
 
Hamilton, M. and Hamilton, C. (2006) Baby Boomers and retirement: Dreams, fears and anxieties, 
Discussion Paper no.89, The Australia Institute, Sydney. At <http://www.tai.org.au/node/1285> 
(viewed 15 June 2016). 
Handler, J.F. and Hasenfeld, Y. (2006). Blame welfare, ignore poverty and inequality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hardin, R. (2006) ‘Ignorant democracy’, Critical Review, 18(1-3), 179-195. 
Harding, J.F. and Sibley, C.G. (2013) ‘The palliative function of system justification: Concurrent 
benefits versus longer-term costs to wellbeing’, Social Indicators Research, 113(1), 401-418. 
Harris, M. (2017) Kids These Days: The Making of Millennials. New York, Back Bay Books. 
Harris, A., Wyn, J. and Younes, S. (2010) ‘Beyond apathetic or activist youth: Ordinary young people 
and contemporary forms of participation’, Young, 18(1), 9-32. 
Hasenfeld, Y. and Rafferty, J.E. (1989) ‘The determinants of public attitudes toward the welfare 
state’, Social Forces, 67(4), 1027-1048. 
Heazle, M. (2010) Uncertainty in policy making: Values and evidence in complex decisions. London 
and Washington D.C: Earthscan. 
Heclo, H. (1988) ‘Generational politics’, in J.L. Palmer, T. Smeeding and B.B. Torrey (eds), The 
vulnerable (pp.381-411). Washington D.C: Urban Institute Press. 
Hellevik, O. (1993) ‘Postmaterialism as a dimension of cultural change’, International Journal of 
Public Opinion Research, 5(3), 211-233. 
Hellevik, O. (2002) ‘Age differences in value orientation – Life cycle or cohort effects?’ International 
Journal of Public Opinion Research, 14(3), 290-310. 
Henderson, V. L. (2008) ‘Is there hope for anger? The politics of spatializing and (re)producing and 
emotion’, Emotion, Space and Society, 1, 28-37. 
Hendlin, Y.H. (2014) ‘The threshold problem in intergenerational justice’, Ethics and the 
Environment, 19(2), 1-38. 
Henrique-Gomes, L. (2019) ‘Coalition committed to ‘brutal’ plan to dock welfare for non-payment of 
fines’, The Guardian Australia, 7 July 2019. At < https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2019/jul/07/government-committed-to-brutal-plan-to-dock-welfare-for-non-payment-of-
fines> (viewed 11 July 2019). 
Henry, K. (2010) Australia’s future tax system: Final report, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. At 
<http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=html/pubs_reports.htm> (viewed 22 
May 2017). 
Hermant, N. (2016) ‘Disability Support Pension: Successful claims plummeting after government rule 
change’, ABC News, 24 June 2016. At <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-24/rule-change-leads-
to-plunge-in-disability-pension-claims/7538070> (viewed 23 March 2017). 
357 
 
Hill, L. (2011) ‘Increasing turnout using compulsory voting’, Politics, 31(1), 27-36. 
Hill, L. and Rutledge-Prior, S. (2016) ‘Young people and intentional informal voting in Australia’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science, 51(3), 400-417. 
Hinton, T. (2018) Paying the price of welfare reform: The experiences of Anglicare staff and clients in 
interacting with Centrelink, Tasmania: Anglicare, at 
<http://www.anglicare.asn.au/home/2018/06/25/landmark-report-shows-centrelink-automation-is-
failing-the-vulnerable> (viewed 20 December 2018). 
Hitlin, S. and Piliavin, J.A. (2004) ‘Values: Reviving a dormant concept’, Annual Review of Sociology, 
30, 359-393. 
Hochschild, J.L. (1981) What’s fair? American beliefs about distributive justice. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Hochschild, J.L. (1995) Facing up to the American dream: Race, class, and the soul of the nation. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hodgkin, S. (2014) ‘Intergenerational solidarity: An investigation of attitudes towards the 
responsibility for formal and informal elder care in Australia’, Health Sociology Review, 23(1), 53-64. 
Hofstede, G. (2001) Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and 
organizations across nations. 2nd ed, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Holmes, S. and Sunstein, C. (1999) The cost of rights: Why liberty depends on taxes. New York and 
London: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Holstein, M. (1997) ‘Ethics and public policy: A normative defense of age-based entitlements’, in R.B. 
Hudson (ed.), The future of age-based public policy (pp.25-35). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Holstein, J.A. and Gubrium, J.F. (2016) ‘Narrative practice and the active interview’, in D. Silverman 
(ed.), Qualitative Research (pp.67-82). 4th ed, London: Sage. 
Hood, A. and Joyce, R. (2013) The economic circumstances of cohorts born between the 1940s and 
the 1970s, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies. At <https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7007> 
(viewed 10 June 2016). 
Hooghe, M. and Oser, J. (2015) ‘The rise of engaged citizenship: The evolution of citizenship norms 
among adolescents in 21 countries between 1999 and 2009’, International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology, 56(1), 29-52. 
Howard, C. (1997) The hidden welfare state: Tax expenditures and social policy in the United States, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 




HSBC Holdings (2017) Beyond the bricks: The meaning of home. At <https://www.hsbc.com/news-
and-insight/media-resources/media-releases/2017/generation-buy> (viewed 20 October 2018). 
Hubin, D.C. (1976) ‘Justice between generations’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6, 70-83. 
Huckfeldt, R., Johnson, P.E. and Sprague, J. (2005) ‘Individuals, dyads, and networks: Autoregressive 
patterns of political influence’, in A.S. Zuckerman (ed.), The social logic of politics: Personal networks 
as contexts for political behaviour (pp.21-48). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Huddy, L., Jones, J. M. and Chard, R. E. (2001) ‘Compassionate politics: Support for old-age programs 
among the non-elderly’, Political Psychology, 22(3), 443-471. 
Hudson, R.B. (1997) ‘The history and place of age-based public policy’, in R.B. Hudson (ed.), The 
future of age-based public policy (pp.1-22). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Hulse, K. and Burke, T. (2015) ‘Private rental housing in Australia: Political inertia and market 
change’, in R. Dufty-Jones and D. Rogers (eds), Housing in 21st century Australia: People, practices 
and policies (pp. 139-152). Surrey, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing. 
Humpage, L. (2015) Policy change, public attitudes and social citizenship: Does neo-liberalism 
matter? Bristol: Policy Press at the University of Bristol. 
Inglehart, R. (1990) Culture shift in advanced industrial societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Inglehart, R. (1997) Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 
43 societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Inglehart, R. (2007) ‘Postmaterialist values and the shift from survival to self-expression values’, in 
R.J. Dalton and H. Klingemann (eds), The Oxford handbook of political behaviour (pp. 223-239). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Inglehart, R. and Baker, W.E. (2000) ‘Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of 
traditional values’, American Sociological Review, 65: 19-51. 
Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human 
development sequence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ingles, D. and Stewart, M. (2017) ‘Reforming Australia's superannuation tax system and the Age 
Pension to improve work and savings incentives’, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, 4(3), 417-436. 
Ipsos and MLC (2015) Australia today: A look at lifestyle, financial security and retirement in 
Australia part 2. At <https://www.mlc.com.au/personal/retirement/australia-today> (viewed 6 
October 2016). 
Ipsos MORI (2014) Ipsos MORI global trends survey. At <http://www.ipsosglobaltrends.com> 
(viewed 17 October 2016). 




Jackson, N., Walter, M., Felmingham, B. and Spinaze, A. (2006) ‘Will older workers change their 
retirement plans in line with government thinking?’ Australian Bulletin of Labour, 32(4), 315-344. 
Jacobs, L.R. and Shapiro, R.Y. (2000) Politicians don’t pander: Political manipulation and the loss of 
democratic responsiveness. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Jacoby, W.G. (2006) ‘Value choices and American public opinion’, American Journal of Political 
Science, 50(3), 706-723. 
Jæger, M.M. (2006a) ‘What makes people support public responsibility for welfare provision: Self-
interest or political ideology? A longitudinal approach’, Acta Sociologica, 49, 321-338. 
Jæger, M.M. (2006b) ‘Welfare regimes and attitudes towards redistribution: The regime hypothesis 
revisited’, European Sociological Review, 22(2), 157-170. 
Jæger, M.M. (2013) ‘The effect of macroeconomic and social conditions on the demand for 
redistribution: A pseudo panel approach’, Journal of European Social Policy, 23(2), 149-163. 
Javeline, D. (2003) ‘The role of blame in collective action: Evidence from Russia’, American Political 
Science Review, 97(1), 107-121. 
Jennings, M.K. (2002) ‘Generation units and the student protest movement in the US: An intra- and 
intergenerational analysis’, Political Psychology, 23(2), 303-324. 
Jennings, M.K. (2007) ‘Political socialization’, in R.J. Dalton and H. Klingemann (eds), The Oxford 
handbook of political behaviour (pp.29-44). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jensen, C. (2014) The right and the welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Johnson, L.E. (2003) ‘Future generations and contemporary ethics’, Environmental Values, 12(4), 
471-487. 
Johnson, M.L. (2005) ‘The social construction of old age as a problem’, in M.L. Johnson (ed.), The 
Cambridge handbook of age and ageing (pp.563-571). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jordan, J. (2013) ‘Policy feedback and support for the welfare state’, Journal of European Social 
Policy, 23(2), 134-148. 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2018) UK poverty 2018, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. At 
<https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/uk-poverty-2018> (viewed 20 December 2018). 
Jost, J.T. (2017) ‘Working class conservatism: A system justification perspective’, Current Opinion in 
Psychology, 18, 73-78. 
Jost, J.T., Banaji, M.R. and Nosek, B.A. (2004) ‘A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated 





Jost, J.T., Burgess, D. and Mosso, C.O. (2001) ‘Conflicts of legitimation among self, group, and 
system: The integrative potential of system justification theory’, in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), The 
psychology of legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice, and intergroup relations 
(pp.363-388). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jost, J.T., Federico, C.M. and Napier, J.L. (2009) ‘Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and 
elective affinities’, Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 307-337. 
Jost, J.T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A.W. and Sulloway, F.J. (2003) ‘Political conservatism as motivated 
social cognition’, Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339-375. 
Jost, J. and Hunyady, O. (2003) ‘The psychology of system justification and the palliative function of 
ideology’, European Review of Social Psychology, 13(1), 111-153. 
Jost, J. T., Nosek, B. A., and Gosling, S. D. (2008) ‘Ideology: Its resurgence in social, personality, and 
political psychology’, Perspectives on Psychological Sciences, 3(2), 126-136. 
Judd, B., Liu, E., Easthope, H., Davy, L. and Bridge, C. (2014) Downsizing amongst older Australians, 
AHURI Final Report No. 214, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited, Melbourne. 
At <https://www.ahuri.edu.au/research/final-reports/214> (viewed 15 July 2019). 
Kaase, M. and Newton, K. (1995) Beliefs in government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kahan, D.M. (2006) ‘The logic of reciprocity: Trust, collective action and law’, in H. Gintis, S. Bowles 
and R. Boyd (eds), Moral sentiments and material interests: The foundations of cooperation in 
economic life (pp.339-378). Boston, MA: MIT Press. 
Kangas, O.E. (1997) ‘Self-interest and the common good: The impact of norms, selfishness and 
context in social policy opinions’, Journal of Socioeconomics, 26(5), 475-494. 
Kangas, O.E. (2003) ‘The grasshopper and the ants: Popular opinions of just distribution in Australia 
and Finland’, Journal of Socioeconomics, 31, 721-743. 
Karvonen, S., Young, R., West, P. and Rahkonen, O. (2012) ‘Value orientations among late modern 
youth – a cross-cultural study’, Journal of Youth Studies, 15(1), 33-52. 
Kasser, T. (2011) ‘Cultural values and the well-being of future generations: A cross-national study’, 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 42(2), 206-215. 
Katz, R., Daatland, S.O., Lowenstein, A., Bazo, M.T., Ancizu, I., Herlofson, K., Mehlhausen-Hassoen, D. 
and Prilutzky, D. (2003) ‘Family norms and preferences in intergenerational relations: A comparative 
perspective’, in V.L. Bengtson and A. Lowenstein (eds), Global aging and challenges to families 
(pp.305-326). New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Keele, L., and Wolak, J. (2006) ‘Value conflict and volatility in party identification’, British Journal of 




Kehoe, J. and Mather, J. (2019) ‘Retirement income review to tackle super ‘sacred cows’, The 
Australian Financial Review, 27 September 2019. At <https://www.afr.com/policy/tax-and-
super/retirement-income-review-to-tackle-super-tax-breaks-20190927-p52vf5> (accessed 31 
December 2019). 
Kelley, J. and Evans, M.D.R. (2009) ‘Economic development reduces tolerance for inequality: A 
comparative analysis of thirty nations’ in M. Haller, R. Jowell and T.W. Smith (eds), The International 
Social Survey Program 1984-2009: Charting the globe (pp.49-71). London and New York: Routledge. 
Kelly, J. and Donegan, P. (2015) City limits: Why Australia’s cities are broken and how we can fix 
them. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 
Kelly, J-F., Hunter, J., Harrison, C. and Donegan, P. (2013) Renovating housing policy, Melbourne: 
Grattan Institute. At <https://grattan.edu.au/report/renovating-housing-policy> (viewed 17 October 
2016). 
Kelly, N.J. and Enns, P.K. (2010) ‘Inequality and the dynamics of public opinion: The self-reinforcing 
link between economic inequality and mass preferences’ American Journal of Political Science, 54(4), 
855-870. 
Kelly Research (2012) Household savings and retirement: Where has all my superannuation gone? 
Report prepared for CPA Australia. At 
<https://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/~/media/corporate/allfiles/document/professional-
resources/superannuation/household-savings-retirement.pdf?la=en> (viewed 6 October 2016). 
Kelly, S. and Harding, A. (2006) ‘Don’t rely on the old folks’ money: Inheritance patterns in Australia’, 
Elder Law Review, 4, article 5. 
Kendig, H., O’Loughlin, K., Hussain, R., Heese, K. and Cannon, L. (2015) Attitudes to intergenerational 
equity: Baseline findings from the Attitudes to Ageing in Australia (AAA) study, Working Paper 
2015/33, ARC Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research (CEPAR). At 
<https://www.cepar.edu.au/publications/working-papers/attitudes-intergenerational-equity-
baseline-findings-attitudes-ageing-australia-aaa-study> (viewed 11 June 2019). 
Kiesa, A., Orlowski, A.P., Levine, P., Both, D., Kirby, E.H., Lopez, M.H. and Marcelo, K.B. (2011) 
‘Millennials are involved locally with others but are ambivalent about formal politics’, in R.J. Dalton 
(ed.), Engaging youth in politics: Debating democracy’s future (pp.132-146). New York: International 
Debate Education Association. 
Kiesler, C.A. (1971) The psychology of commitment: Experiments linking behavior to belief. San Diego, 
CA: Academic Press. 
Kinder, D.R. (2006) ‘Belief systems today’, Critical Review, 18(1-3), 197-216. 
Kindermann, F., Mayr, L. and Sachs, D. (2018) ‘Inheritance taxation and wealth effects on the labor 
supply of heirs’. At < https://voxeu.org/article/inheritance-taxation-and-wealth-effects-labour-
supply-heirs> (viewed 11 June 2019). 
362 
 
Kingson, E.R. and Williamson, J.B. (1993) ‘The generational equity debate: A progressive framing of a 
conservative issue’, Journal of Aging and Social Policy, 5, 31-53. 
Kitschelt, H. and Rehm, P. (2006) ‘New social risks and political preferences’, in K. Armingeon and G. 
Bonoli (eds), The politics of post-industrial welfare states: Adapting post-war social policies to new 
social risks (pp.52-82). London and New York: Routledge. 
Kluegel, J.R. and Matěju, P. (1995) ‘Egalitarian vs inegalitarian principles of distributive justice’ in J.R. 
Kluegel, D.S. Mason and B. Wegener (eds), Social justice and political change: Public opinion in 
capitalist and post-communist states (pp.209-238). Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. 
Kluegel, J.R. and Miyano, M. (1995) ‘Justice beliefs and support for the welfare state in advanced 
capitalism’, in J.R. Kluegel, D.S. Mason and B. Wegener (eds), Social justice and political change: 
Public opinion in capitalist and post-communist states (pp.81-105). Berlin and New York: Walter de 
Gruyter. 
Kluegel, J.R., Csepeli, G., Kolosi, T., Örkény, A. and Neményi, M. (1995) ‘Accounting for the rich and 
the poor: Existential justice in comparative perspective’, in J.R. Kluegel, D.S. Mason and B. Wegener 
(eds), Social justice and political change: Public opinion in capitalist and post-communist states 
(pp.179-207). Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. 
Kohli, M. (1999) ‘Private and public transfers between generations: Linking the family and the state’, 
European Societies, 1(1), 81-104. 
Kohli, M. (2007) ‘The institutionalisation of the lifecourse: Looking back to look ahead’, Research in 
Human Development, 4(3-4), 253-271. 
Kohli, M. (2009) ‘Age groups and generations: Lines of conflict and potential for integration’, 
Intergenerational Justice Review, 9(2), 66-71. 
Kohli, M. (2011) ‘Aging and justice’, in R.H. Binstock, L.K. George, S.J. Cutler, J. Hendricks and J.H. 
Schulz (eds), Handbook of aging and the social sciences (pp.456-478). 6th ed, Burlington, MA: 
Academic Press. 
Konty M.A. and Dunham, C.C. (1997) ‘Differences in value and attitude change over the lifecourse’, 
Sociological Spectrum 17(2), 177-197. 
Korpi, W. and Palme, J. (1998) ‘The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality: Welfare 
state institutions, inequality, and poverty in the Western countries’, American Sociological Review, 
63(5), 661-687. 
Kotlikoff, L.J. (1998) ‘How to conduct fiscal policy in the long-term’, in M. Corak (ed.), Government 
finances and generational equity (pp.127-131). Ottawa: Statistics Canada. 
Kotlikoff, L. (2013) Assessing fiscal sustainability, Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center, George Mason 




Kotlikoff, L.J. and Burns, S. (2005) The coming generational storm: What you need to know about 
America’s economic future. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kotlikoff, L.J. and Leibfritz, W. (1999) ‘An international comparison of generational accounts’, in A.J. 
Auerbach, L.J. Kotlikoff and W. Leibfritz (eds), Generational accounting around the world (pp.73-
101). Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Kudrna, G., Tran, C. and Woodland, A. (2015) ‘The dynamic fiscal effects of demographic shift: The 
case of Australia’, Economic Modelling, 50, 105-122. 
Kudrna, G. (2016) ‘Economy-wide effects of means-tested pensions: The case of Australia’, Journal of 
the Economics of Ageing, 7, 17-29. 
Kuklinski, J.H. and Peyton, B. (2007) ‘Belief systems and political decision making’, in R.J. Dalton and 
H. Klingemann (eds), The Oxford handbook of political behaviour (pp.45-64). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kuklinski, J.H., Quirk, P.J., Jerit, J., Schwieder, D. and Rich, R.F. (2000) ‘Misinformation and the 
currency of democratic citizenship’, Journal of Politics, 62(3): 790-816. 
Kulin, J. and Svallfors, S. (2013) ‘Class, values, and attitudes towards redistribution: A European 
comparison’, European Sociological Review, 29(2), 155-167. 
Kumlin, S. (2004) The personal and the political: How personal welfare state experiences affect 
political trust and ideology. New York and Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kumlin, S. (2006) ‘Learning from politics? The causal interplay between government performance 
and political ideology’, Journal of Public Policy, 26(2), 89-114. 
Kumlin, S. (2007a) ‘Overloaded or undermined? European welfare states in the face of performance 
dissatisfaction’, in S. Svallfors (ed.), The political sociology of the welfare state (pp. 80-116). Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Kumlin, S. (2007b) ‘The welfare state: Values, policy preferences, and performance evaluations’, in 
R.J. Dalton and H. Klingemann (eds), The Oxford handbook of political behaviour (pp.362-382). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kumlin, S. (2014a) ‘Policy feedback in political context: Unemployment benefits, election campaigns, 
and democratic satisfaction’, in S. Kumlin and I. Stadelmann-Steffen (eds), How welfare states shape 
the democratic public: Policy feedback, participation, voting, and attitudes (pp.181-197). 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Kumlin, S. (2014b) ‘Informed performance evaluation of the welfare state? Experimental and real-
world findings’, in S. Kumlin and I. Stadelmann-Steffen (eds), How welfare states shape the 
democratic public: Policy feedback, participation, voting, and attitudes (pp.289-307). Cheltenham, 
UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Kumlin, S. and Rothstein, B. (2005) ‘Making and breaking social capital: The impact of welfare state 
institutions’, Comparative Political Studies, 38(4), 339-365. 
364 
 
Kunovich, S. and Slomczynski, K.M. (2007) ‘Systems of distribution and a sense of equity: A multilevel 
analysis of meritocratic attitudes in post-industrial societies’, European Sociological Review, 23(5), 
649-663. 
Laferrère, A. and Wolff, F. (2006) ‘Microeconomic models of family transfers’, in S. Kolm and J.M. 
Ythier (eds), Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity (pp.889-969). Oxford: 
Elsevier. 
Lakoff, G. (2009) The political mind: A cognitive scientist’s guide to your brain and its politics, New 
York: Penguin. 
Lane, R.E. (1962) Political ideology: Why the American common man believes what he does. New 
York: Free Press of Glencoe. 
Lane, R.E. (1986) ‘Market justice, political justice’, American Political Science Review, 80, 383-402. 
Lapinski, J.S., Riemann, C.R., Shapiro, R.Y., Stevens, M.F. and Jacobs, L.R. (1998) ‘Welfare state 
regimes and subjective well-being: A cross-national study’, International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research, 10: 2-24. 
Larsen, C.A. (2006) The institutional logic of welfare attitudes: How welfare regimes influence public 
support. Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VA: Ashgate. 
Laslett, P. (1989) A fresh map of life: The emergence of the Third Age. London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson. 
Lau, R. R. and Heldman, C. (2009) ‘Self-interest, symbolic attitudes, and support for public policy: A 
multilevel analysis’, Political Psychology, 30, 513-537. 
Leach, R., Phillipson, C., Biggs, S. and Money, A. (2013) ‘Baby Boomers, consumption and social 
change: The bridging generation?’ International Review of Sociology, 23(1), 104-122. 
Lee, R. and Mason, A. (2011) ‘Lifecycles, support systems, and generational flows: Patterns and 
change’, in R. Lee and A. Mason (eds.), Population aging and the generational economy: A global 
perspective (pp. 79-106). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Lerner, M.J. (1980) The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York and London: Plenum 
Press. 
Levine, J. (2005) ‘Choosing alone? The social network basis of modern political choice’, in A.S. 
Zuckerman (ed.), The social logic of politics: Personal networks as contexts for political behaviour 
(pp.132-151). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Lewin-Epstein, N., Kaplan, A. and Levanon, A. (2003) ‘Distributive justice and attitudes toward the 
welfare state’, Social Justice Research, 16, 1-27. 
Lewis, C. (2007) ‘The Howard government: The extent to which public attitudes influenced 
Australia’s federal policy mix’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66(1), 83-95. 
365 
 
Lindh, T., Malmberg, B. and Palme, J. (2005) ‘Generations at war or sustainable social policy in ageing 
societies?’ Journal of Political Philosophy, 13(4), 470-489. 
Linos, K. and West, M. (2003) ‘Self-interest, social beliefs, and attitudes to redistribution: Re-
addressing the issue of cross-national variation’, European Sociological Review, 19(4), 393-409. 
Litwak, E., Silverstein, M., Bengtson, V.L. and Hirst, Y.W. (2003) ‘Theories about families, 
organizations and social supports’, in V.L. Bengtson and A. Lowenstein (eds), Global aging and 
challenges to families (pp.27-53). New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Logan, J.R. and Spitze, G.D. (1995) ‘Self-interest and altruism in intergenerational relations’, 
Demography, 32(3), 353-364. 
Luescher, K. and Pillemer, K. (1998) ‘Intergenerational ambivalence: A new approach to the study of 
parent-child relations in later life’, Journal of Marriage and the Family, 60(2), 413-425. 
Lupia, A. (2006) ‘How elitism undermines the study of voter competence’, Critical Review, 18(1-3), 
217-232. 
Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M.D. (1998) The democratic dilemma: Can citizens learn what they need to 
know? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Luskin, R.C. (2002a) ‘Political psychology, political behavior, and politics: Questions of aggregation, 
causal distance, and taste’, in J.H. Kuklinski (ed.), Thinking about political psychology (pp.217-250). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Luskin, R.C. (2002b) ‘From denial to extenuation (and finally beyond): Political sophistication and 
citizen performance’, in J.H. Kuklinski (ed.), Thinking about political psychology (pp.281-305). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Luttig, M. (2013) ‘The structure of inequality and Americans' attitudes towards redistribution’, Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 77(3), 811-821. 
Lyman, P. (2004) ‘The domestication of anger: The use and abuse of anger in politics’, European 
Journal of Social Theory, 7(2), 133-147. 
Lynch, J. (2006) Age in the welfare state: The origins of social spending on pensioners, workers, and 
children. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Macintosh, R. (1998) ‘Global attitude measurement: An assessment of the World Values Survey 
Postmaterialism Scale’, American Sociological Review, 63(3): 452-464. 
MacKuen, M. (2002) ‘Political psychology and the micro-macro gap in politics’, in J.H. Kuklinski (ed.), 
Thinking about political psychology (pp.306-338). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Maio, G.R. and Olson, J.M. (1998) ‘Values as truisms: Evidence and implications’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74(2), 294-311. 
Mannheim, K. (1952, originally published 1928) ‘The problem of generations’, in P. Kecskemeti (ed.), 
Karl Mannheim: Essays (pp.276-322). London: Routledge. 
366 
 
Manning, N. (2012) ‘The relational self and the political engagements of young adults’, Journal of 
Sociology, 50(4), 486-500. 
Marcus, G.E. (2002) The sentimental citizen: emotion in democratic politics. University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania University Press. 
Margalit, A. (1996) The decent society. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. 
Margalit, Y. (2013) ‘Explaining social policy preferences: Evidence from the Great Recession’, 
American Political Science Review, 107(1), 80-103. 
Marks, G.N. (1997) ‘The formation of materialist and postmaterialist values’, Social Science Research, 
26, 52-68. 
Marmor, T., Cook, F.L. and Scher, S. (1999) ‘Social security and the politics of generational conflict’, 
in J.B. Williamson, D.M. Watts-Roy and E.R. Kingson (eds), The generational equity debate (pp.185-
203). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Marris, P. (1996) The politics of uncertainty: Attachment in private and public life. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Marshall, G., Swift, A., Routh, D. and Burgoyne, C. (1999) ‘What is and what ought to be: Popular 
beliefs about distributive justice in thirteen countries’, European Sociological Review, 15(4), 349-367. 
Martin, A. (2012a) ‘Political participation among the young in Australia: Testing Dalton’s good citizen 
thesis’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 47(2), 211-226. 
Martin, A. (2012b) Young people and politics: Political engagement in the Anglo-American 
democracies. London and New York: Routledge. 
Mason, A. and Lee, R. (2011) ‘Population aging and the generational economy: Key findings’, in R. 
Lee and A. Mason (eds), Population aging and the generational economy: A global perspective (pp.3-
31). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Mason, A., Lee, R., Tung, A., Lai, M. and Miller, T. (2009) ‘Population aging and intergenerational 
transfers: Introducing age into national accounts’, in D.A. Wise (ed.), Developments in the economics 
of aging (pp.89-124). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Matheson, G. and Wearing, M. (1999) ‘Within and without: Labour force status and political views in 
four welfare states’, in S. Svallfors and P. Taylor-Gooby (eds), The end of the welfare state? 
Responses to state retrenchment (pp.135-160). London and New York: Routledge. 
Mathis, K. (2011) ‘Future generations in John Rawls’ theory of justice’, in K. Mathis (ed.), Efficiency, 
sustainability, and justice to future generations (pp.97-112). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Mau, S. (2003) The moral economy of welfare states: Britain and Germany compared. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Mau, S. (2004) ‘Welfare regimes and the norms of social exchange’, Current Sociology, 52, 53-74. 
367 
 
McAdams, D.P., Hart, H.M. and Maruna, S. (1998) ‘The anatomy of generativity’, in D. McAdams and 
E. de St Aubin (eds), Generativity and adult development: How and why we care for the next 
generation (pp.7-43). Washington D.C: American Psychological Association. 
McAdams, D.P. and Logan, R.L. (2004) ‘What is generativity?’ In E. de St Aubin, D.P. McAdams and T. 
Kim (eds), The generative society: Caring for future generations (pp.15-31). Washington D.C: 
American Psychological Association. 
McAllister, I. (2011) The Australian voter: 50 years of change. Sydney: University of New South Wales 
Press. 
McCarty, N., Poole, K.T. and Rosenthal, H. (2006) Polarized America: The dance of ideology and 
unequal riches. Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press. 
McCombs, M. (1999) ‘Personal involvement with issues on the public agenda’, International Journal 
of Public Opinion Research, 11(2), 152-168. 
McDonald, I. (2005) ‘Intergenerational equity’, Agenda, 12(1), 3-18. 
McKinnon, C. (2012) Climate change and future justice: Precaution, compensation, and triage’, 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Meagher, G. and Wilson, S. (2008) ‘Richer, but more unequal: Perceptions of inequality in Australia 
1987-2005’, Journal of Australian Political Economy, 61, 220-243. 
Merette, M. (1998) ‘The effects of debt reduction on intergenerational equity and growth’, in M. 
Corak (ed.), Government finances and generational equity (pp.87-106). Ottawa: Statistics Canada. 
Mettler, S. (2011) The submerged state: How invisible government policies undermine American 
democracy. Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Micklethwait, J. and Wooldridge, A. (2014) The fourth revolution: The global race to reinvent the 
state. New York: Penguin Press. 
Miller, C. and Orchard, L. (2014) ‘Towards a new progressive policy agenda’ in C. Miller and L. 
Orchard (eds), Australian public policy: Progressive ideas in the neoliberal ascendency (pp.3-25). 
Bristol: Policy Press. 
Miller, D. (1992) ‘Distributive justice: What the people think’, Ethics, 102, 555-593. 
Miller, D.T. (1999) ‘The norm of self-interest’, American Psychologist 54(12), 1053-1060. 
Miller, D.T. and Ratner, R.K. (1998) ‘The disparity between the actual and assumed power of self-
interest’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(1), 53-62. 
Millward, C. and Brooke, L. (2007) ‘Should we work longer? Public expectations about older workers 
and retirement’ in D. Denemark, G. Meagher, S. Wilson, M. Western and T. Phillips (eds), Australian 




Minifie, J., Chisholm, C. and Percival, L. (2017) Stagnation nation? Australian investment in a low-
growth world, Melbourne: Grattan Institute. At <https://grattan.edu.au/report/stagnation-nation/> 
(viewed 15 July 2017). 
Mirowsky, J. and Ross, C.E. (1999) ‘Economic hardship across the lifecourse’, American Sociological 
Review, 64(4), 548-569. 
Mischke, M. (2014) Public attitudes towards family policies in Europe: Linking institutional context 
and public opinion. Wiesbaden: Springer. 
Moody, H.R. (2007) ‘Aging, generational opposition, and the future of the family’, in R.A. Pruchno 
and M. Smyer (eds), Challenges of an aging society: Ethical dilemmas, political issues (pp.175-189). 
Baltimore, MA: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Morris, A. and Wilson, S. (2014) ‘Struggling on the Newstart unemployment benefit in Australia’, 
Economic and Labour Relations Review 25(2), 202-221. 
Morrison, D. (2017) ‘The impact of tax regulation on housing’, in Committee for Economic 
Development of Australia (CEDA), Housing Australia (pp.95-104), Melbourne. At 
<http://www.ceda.com.au/Research-and-policy/All-CEDA-research/Research-catalogue/Housing-
Australia> (viewed 25 September 2017). 
Morselli, D. (2013) ‘The olive tree effect: Future time perspective when the future is uncertain’, 
Culture and Psychology, 19(3), 305-322. 
Mughan, A. (2007) ‘Economic insecurity and welfare policy preferences: A micro-level analysis’, 
Comparative Politics, 39(3), 293-310. 
Mullan, P. (2000) The imaginary time bomb: Why an ageing population is not a social problem. 
London and New York: I.B. Tauris. 
Muller, D. (2006) Fearless and flexible: The views of Gen Y, report prepared for the Dusseldorf Skills 
Forum, NSW. At < http://www.dsf.org.au/fearless.php> (viewed 30 May 2019). 
Mulligan, C. and Salai-Martin, X. (2003) Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the 
electorate, NBER Working Paper 9691, Cambridge, MA. At <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9691> 
(viewed 20 August 2016). 
Murphy, B. (1998) ‘The impacts of changing tax/transfer systems on the ‘lifetime’ distribution of net 
taxes: 1984-1995’, in Corak, M. (ed.), Government finances and generational equity (pp.57-71). 
Ottawa: Statistics Canada. 
Murphy, K., Knaus, C. and Evershed, N. (2019) ‘It felt like a big tide: How the death tax lie infected 
Australia’s election campaign’ The Guardian Australia, 8 June 2019. At 
<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jun/08/it-felt-like-a-big-tide-how-the-death-
tax-lie-infected-australias-election-campaign> (viewed 11 June 2019). 
369 
 
Myles, J. (2002) ‘A new social contract for the elderly?’ In G. Esping-Andersen (with D. Gallie, A. 
Hemerijck and J. Myles), Why we need a new welfare state (pp.130-172). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Nagel, T. (1991) Equality and partiality. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Napier, J.L. and Jost, J.T. (2008) ‘The ‘anti-democratic personality’ revisited: A cross-national 
investigation of working class authoritarianism’, Journal of Social Issues, 64(3), 595-617. 
National Center for Children in Poverty (2018) ‘Basic facts about low-income children’. At 
<http://nccp.org/publications/pub_1194.html> (viewed 20 December 2018). 
National Commission of Audit (2014) Towards responsible government: The report of the national 
commission of audit, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. At <https://www.ncoa.gov.au/> 
(viewed 4 October 2016). 
Naumann, E., Buss, C. and Bähr, J. (2016) ‘How unemployment experience affects support for the 
welfare state: a real panel approach’, European Sociological Review, 32(1), 81-92. 
Niemi, R.G. and Klinger, J.D. (2012) ‘The development of political attitudes and behaviour among 
young adults’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 47(1), 31-54. 
Norris, P. (2011) Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
NSW Government (2016) NSW intergenerational report 2016: Future state NSW 2056, Sydney. At 
<http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/intergenerational-report> (viewed 30 June 2016). 
Nussbaum, M. (2016) Anger and forgiveness: Resentment, generosity, justice. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
O’Dwyer, L. (2001) ‘The impact of housing inheritance on the distribution of wealth in Australia’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science, 36(1), 83-100. 
OECD (2015) In it together: Why less inequality benefits all, Paris: OECD Publishing. At 
<http://www.oecd.org/social/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all-9789264235120-
en.htm> (viewed 30 June 2016). 
Offe, C. (1996) ‘Designing institutions in East European transitions, in R.E. Goodin (ed.), The theory of 
institutional design (pp.199-226). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Offer, A. (2006) The challenge of affluence: Self-control and well-being in the United States and 
Britain since 1950. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Office for National Statistics (2018) Changing trends in mortality: An international comparison: 2000 
to 2016, Great Britain. At 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/lifeexpectan




Olsberg, D. and Winters, M. (2005) Ageing in place: Intergenerational and intrafamilial housing 
transfers and shifts in later life, AHURI Final Report No.88, Melbourne: Australian Housing and Urban 
Research Institute Ltd. At <http://www.ahuri.edu.au/research/final-reports/88> (viewed 25 July 
2016). 
Ong, R. (2017) ‘Housing futures in Australia: An intergenerational perspective’, in Committee for 
Economic Development of Australia (CEDA), Housing Australia (pp. 79-94), Melbourne. At 
<http://www.ceda.com.au/Research-and-policy/All-CEDA-research/Research-catalogue/Housing-
Australia> (viewed 25 September 2017). 
Oreopoulos, P. and Vaillancourt, F. (1998) ‘Applying generational accounting to Canada: Findings and 
fallacies’, in M. Corak (ed.), Government finances and generational equity (pp.7-19). Ottawa: 
Statistics Canada. 
Oreopoulos, P., Von Wachter, T. and Heisz, A. (2012) ‘The short- and long-term career effects of 
graduating in a recession’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(1), 1-29. 
Orton, M. and Rowlingson, K. (2007) Public attitudes to economic inequality, York: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. At <https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/public-attitudes-economic-inequality> (viewed 7 
January 2017). 
Osberg, L. (1998) ‘Meaning and measurement in intergenerational equity’, in M. Corak. (ed.), 
Government finances and generational equity (pp.131-139). Ottawa: Statistics Canada. 
 
Oskarson, M. (2007) ‘Social risk, policy dissatisfaction, and political alienation’, in S. Svallfors (ed.), 
The political sociology of the welfare state (pp.117-148). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Ost, D. (2004) ‘Politics as the mobilization of anger: Emotions in movements and in power’, European 
Journal of Social Theory, 7(2), 229–244. 
Ostrom, E. (2006) ‘Policies that crowd out reciprocity and collective action’, in H. Gintis, S. Bowles 
and R. Boyd (eds), Moral sentiments and material interests: The foundations of cooperation in 
economic life (pp. 253-275). Boston, MA: MIT Press. 
Owens, L.A. and Pedulla, D.S. (2014) ‘Material welfare and changing political preferences: The case 
of support for redistributive social policies’, Social Forces, 92(3), 1087-1113. 
Page, B.I. and Shapiro, R.Y. (1983) ‘Effects of public opinion on policy’, American Political Science 
Review, 77(1), 175-190. 
Page, E.A. (2006) Climate change, justice and future generations. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, 
MA: Edward Elgar. 
Page, E. (2008) ‘Three problems of intergenerational justice’, Intergenerational Justice Review, 1, 9-
12. 
Page, L. and Goldstein, D.G. (2016) ‘Subjective beliefs about the income distribution and preferences 
for redistribution’, Social Choice and Welfare, 47(1), 26-61. 
371 
 
Pampel, F.C. (1994) ‘Population aging, class context, and age inequality in public spending’, American 
Journal of Sociology, 100(1), 153-195. 
Pampel, F.C. and Williamson, J.B. (1989) Age, class, politics, and the welfare state. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Papadakis, E. (1992) ‘Public opinion, public policy and the welfare state’, Political Studies, 40, 21-37. 
Papadakis, E. and Bean, C. (1993) ‘Popular support for the welfare state: A comparison between 
institutional regimes’, Journal of Public Policy, 13(3), 227-254. 
Parfit, D. (1982) ‘Future generations: Further problems’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11(2), 113-
172. 
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Parfit, D. (2002) ‘Equality or priority’, in M. Clayton and A. Williams (eds), The ideal of equality (pp. 
81-125). Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Parliamentary Budget Office (2019) Australia’s ageing population: Understanding the fiscal impacts 
over the next decade, Commonwealth of Australia. At 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_O
ffice/Publications/Research_reports/Australias_ageing_population_-
_Understanding_the_fiscal_impacts_over_the_next_decade> (viewed 11 July 2019). 
Partridge, E. (1981a) ‘Introduction’, in E. Partridge (ed.), Responsibilities to future generations (pp.1-
16). New York: Prometheus Books. 
Partridge, E. (1981b) ‘Why care about the future?’ In E. Partridge (ed.), Responsibilities to future 
generations (pp.203-220). New York: Prometheus Books. 
Partridge, E. (2008) ‘Just provision for the future’, Intergenerational Justice Review, 1, 4-8. 
Passmore, J. (1974) Man’s responsibility for nature: Ecological problems and Western traditions. 
London: Duckworth. 
Petersen, M.B., Slothuus, R., Stubager, R. and Togeby, L. (2011) ‘Deservingness versus values in 
public opinion on welfare: The automaticity of the deservingness heuristic’, European Journal of 
Political Research, 50, 24-52. 
Petersen, M.B., Sznycer, D., Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (2012) ‘Who deserves help? Evolutionary 
psychology, social emotions, and public opinion about welfare’, Political Psychology, 33(3), 395-418. 
Peterson, P.G. (1999) Gray dawn: How the coming age wave will transform America – and the world. 
New York: Times Books. 
Peterson, B.E. (2004) ‘Guarding the next generation: The politics of generativity’, in The generative 
society: Caring for future generations (pp.195-209). In E. de St Aubin, D.P. McAdams and T. Kim 
(eds), Washington, D.C: American Psychological Association. 
372 
 
Pfau-Effinger, B. (2005) ‘Culture and welfare state policies: Reflections on a complex interrelation’, 
Journal of Social Policy, 34(1), 3-20. 
Phillips, B. and Joseph, C. (2016) Income trends for selected single parent families, Canberra: 
Australian National University Centre for Social Research and Methods. At 
<http://rsss.anu.edu.au/news/income-trends-selected-single-parent-families> (viewed 11 April 
2017). 
Phillips, B., Webster, R. and Gray, M. (2018) Optimal policy modelling: A microsimulation 
methodology for setting the Australian tax and transfer system, Canberra: Australian National 
University Centre for Social Research and Methods. At 
<http://csrm.cass.anu.edu.au/research/publications/optimal-policy-modelling-microsimulation-
methodology-setting-australian-tax> (viewed 19 December 2018). 
Pickard, S. and Bessant, J. (2018) ‘Introduction’ in S. Pickard and J. Bessant (eds), Young people re-
generating politics in times of crises (pp.1-16). Palgrave MacMillan, ebook at DOI 10.1007/978-3-
319-58250-4. 
Pickett, K. and Wilkinson, R. (2010) The spirit level: Why greater equality makes societies stronger. 
New York: Bloomsbury Press. 
Picketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Pierson, P. (1993) ‘When effect becomes cause: Policy feedback and political change’, World Politics, 
45(4), 595-628. 
Pierson, P. (1996) ‘The new politics of the welfare state’, World Politics, 48(2), 143-179. 
Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Pilcher, J. (1995) Age and generation in modern Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pillemer, K.  and Luescher, K. (2004) ‘Introduction: Ambivalence in parent-child relations in later life’, 
in K. Pillemer and K. Luescher (eds), Intergenerational ambivalences: New perspectives on parent-
child relations in later life (pp.1-19). Oxford: Elsevier. 
Piurko, Y., Schwartz, S.H. and Davidov, E. (2011) ‘Basic personal values and the meaning of left-right 
political orientations in 20 countries’, Political Psychology, 32(4), 537-561. 
Pixley, J. (2007) ‘How do Australians feel about financial investment?’ In D. Denemark, G. Meagher, 
S. Wilson, M. Western and T. Phillips (eds), Australian social attitudes 2: Citizenship, work and 
aspirations (pp.286-304). Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. 
Poterba, J.M. (1997) ‘Demographic structure and the political economy of public education’, Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Management, 16, 48-66. 
Poterba, J.M. (1998) ‘Demographic change, intergenerational linkages, and public education’, The 
American Economic Review, 88, 315-320. 
373 
 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L.M., and Malle, B.F. (1994) ‘Social dominance orientation: A 
personality variable predicting social and political attitudes’, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 67(4), 741-763. 
Preston, S.H. (1984) ‘Children and the elderly: Divergent paths for America’s dependents’, 
Demography, 21(4), 435-457. 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2013) Protecting prosperity: Why we need to talk about tax, Sydney. At 
<http://www.pwc.com.au/tax/assets/protecting-prosperity-22jul13.pdf> (viewed 17 October 2016). 
Price Waterhouse Coopers UK (2012) How will the wealth of the Baby Bust generation compare with 
that of the Baby Boomers? At <http://www.pwc.co.uk/services/economics-policy/insights/how-will-
the-wealth-of-the-baby-bust-generation-compare-with-that-of-the-baby-boomers.html> (viewed 17 
October 2016). 
Prior, M. (2010) ‘You’ve either got it or you don’t? The stability of political interest over the life 
cycle’, Journal of Politics, 72 (3), 747-766. 
Productivity Commission (2013) An ageing Australia: Preparing for the future, Commission Research 
Paper, Canberra. At <http://www.pc.gov.au/research/completed/ageing-australia> (viewed 1 July 
2016). 
Productivity Commission (2015) Housing decisions of older Australians, Commission Research Paper, 
Canberra. At <https://www.pc.gov.au/research/completed/housing-decisions-older-australians> 
(viewed 15 July 2019). 
Pruitt, L.J. (2017) ‘Different ways, different domains: The everyday politics of young people’, in M. 
Chou, J. Gagnon, C. Hartung and L.J. Pruitt, Young people, citizenship and political participation: 
Combating civic deficit? (pp.77-103). London: Rowman and Littlefield International Ltd. 
Purhonen, S. (2016) ‘Generations on paper: Bourdieu and the critique of Generationalism’, Social 
Science Information, 55(1), 94-114. 
Putnam, R.D. (2000) Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: 
Touchstone. 
Quadagno, J. (1996) ‘Social security and the myth of the entitlement crisis’, Gerontologist, 36, 391-
399. 
Qvortrop, J. (1990) ‘A voice for children in statistical and social accounting: A plea for children’s right 
to be heard’, in A. James and A. Prout (eds), Constructing and reconstructing childhood (pp.85-106). 
London: Falmer Press. 
Rahn, W.M. and Transue, J.E. (1998) ‘Social trust and value change: The decline of social capital in 
American youth, 1976-1995’, Political Psychology, 19(3), 545-565. 
Rasinski, K. (1987) ‘What's fair is fair…or is it? Value differences underlying public views about social 
justice’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 201-211. 
374 
 
Ratner, R.K. and Miller, D.T. (2001) ‘The norm of self-interest and its effects on social action’, Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(1), 5-16. 
Rawls, J. (1971) A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Reeher, G. (1996) Narratives of justice: Legislators’ beliefs about distributive fairness. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Rees-Jones, I., Hyde, M., Victor, C.R., Wiggins, R.D., Gilleard, C. and Higgs, P. (2008) Ageing in a 
consumer society: From passive to active consumption in Britain. Bristol, UK: Polity Press. 
Reeskens, T. and Vandecasteele, L. (2017) ‘Hard times and European youth: The effect of economic 
insecurity on human values, social attitudes and well-being’, International Journal of Psychology, 
52(1), 19-27. 
Reeskens, T. and van Oorschot, W. (2013) ‘Equity, equality, or need? A study of popular preferences 
for welfare redistribution principles across 24 European countries’, Journal of European Public Policy, 
20(8), 1174-1195. 
Rekker, R. (2016) ‘The lasting impact of adolescence on left-right identification: Cohort replacement 
and intracohort change in associations with issue attitudes’, Electoral Studies, 44, 120-131. 
Rhodebeck, L.A. (1993) ‘The politics of greed: Political preferences among the elderly’, The Journal of 
Politics, 55(2), 342-364. 
Roberts, K. (2012) ‘The end of the long Baby-Boomer generation’, Journal of Youth Studies, 15(4), 
479-497. 
Rohan, M.J. (2000) ‘A rose by any name? The values construct’, Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 4(3), 255-277. 
Rokeach, M. (1973) The nature of human values. New York: The Free Press. 
Rolston, H. (1981) ‘The river of life: Past, present, and future’, in E. Partridge (ed.), Responsibilities to 
future generations (pp.123-137). New York: Prometheus Books. 
Roosma, F., Gelissen, J. and van Oorschot, W. (2013) ‘The multidimensionality of welfare state 
attitudes: A European cross-national study’, Social Indicators Research, 113, 235-255. 
Roseman, I.J., Antoniou, A.A. and Jose, P.E. (1996) ‘Appraisal determinants of emotions: Constructing 
a more accurate and comprehensive theory’, Cognition and Emotion, 10, 241-277. 
Rothstein, B. (1998) Just institutions matter: The moral and political logic of the universal welfare 
state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rudolph, C.W. and Zacher, H. (2017) ‘Considering generations from a lifespan developmental 
perspective’, Work, Aging and Retirement, 3(2), 113-129. 
Ryder, N.B. (1965) ‘The cohort as a concept in the study of social change’, American Sociological 
Review, 30(6), 843-861. 
375 
 
Sabbagh, C. and Vanhuysse, P. (2006) ‘Exploring attitudes towards the welfare state: Students’ views 
in eight democracies’, Journal of Social Policy, 35, 607-628. 
Sasaki, T. (2004) ‘Generativity and the politics of intergenerational fairness’, in E. de St Aubin, D.P. 
McAdams and T. Kim (eds), The generative society: Caring for future generations (pp.211-219). 
Washington, D.C: American Psychological Association. 
Saunders, P. (2011) Down and out: Poverty and exclusion in Australia. Bristol, UK: The Policy Press. 
Saunders, P. and Wong, M. (2013) ‘Examining Australian attitudes to inequality and redistribution’, 
Journal of Australian Political Economy, 71, 51-75. 
Scanlon, T.M. (2002) ‘The diversity of objections to inequality’, in M. Clayton and A. Williams (eds), 
The ideal of equality (pp.41-59). Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Scarrow, S.E. (2007) ‘Political activism and party members’, in R.J. Dalton and H. Klingemann (eds), 
The Oxford handbook of political behavior (pp.636-654). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Scharff, C. (2016) ‘The psychic life of neoliberalism: Mapping the contours of entrepreneurial 
subjectivity’, Theory, Culture and Society, 33(6), 107-112. 
Schieber, S.J. (2011) ‘Aging populations, pension operations, potential economic disappointment, 
and its allocation’, in J.B. Shoven (ed.), Demography and the economy (pp.293-331). Chicago, IL and 
London: University of Chicago Press. 
Schleutker, E. (2014) ‘Fertility, family policy and welfare regimes’, Comparative Population Studies, 
39(1), 123-156. 
Schmidtz, D. (1998) ‘Taking responsibility’, in D. Schmidtz and R.E. Goodin (eds), Social welfare and 
individual responsibility (pp.1-96). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schneider, J. (1999) The increasing financial dependency of young people on their parents, Discussion 
Paper No.96, Social Policy Research Centre. Sydney: University of NSW. 
Schofield, T.P and Butterworth, P. (2015) ‘Patterns of welfare attitudes in the Australian population’, 
PLoS ONE, 10(11). 
Schrag, F. (1975) ‘The child’s status in the democratic state’, Political Theory, 3(4), pp.341-357. 
Schuman, H. and Corning, A. (2012) ‘Generational memory and the critical period: Evidence for 
national and world events’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(1), 1-31. 
Schuman, H. and Rodgers, W.L. (2004) ‘Cohorts, chronology and collective memories’, Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 68(2), 217-254. 
Schwander, H. and Häusermann, S. (2013) ‘Who is in and who is out? A risk-based conceptualization 
of insiders and outsiders’, Journal of European Social Policy, 23(3), 248–269.  
Schwartz, S.H. (1994) ‘Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values?’ 
Journal of Social Issues, 50(4), 19-45. 
376 
 
Schwartz, S.H. (2005) ‘Robustness and fruitfulness of a theory of universals in individual values’, in A. 
Tamayo and J.B. Porto (eds), Valores e Comportamento nas Organizaç Atoes [Values and Behavior in 
Organizations] (pp. 56-95). Vozes, Brazil: Petrópolis. At 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272160108_Robustness_and_Fruitfulness_of_a_Theory
_of_Universals_in_Individual_Values> (viewed 4 November 2011). 
Schwartz, S.H., Caprara, G.V. and Vecchione, M. (2010) ‘Basic personal values, core political values, 
and voting: A longitudinal analysis’, Political Psychology, 31(3), 421-452. 
Schwartz, S.H., Caprara, G.V., Vecchione, M., Bain, P., Bianchi, G., Caprara, M.G., Cieciuch, J., 
Kirmanoglu, H., Baslevent, C., Lönnqvist, J., Mamali, C., Manzi, J., Pavlopoulos, V., Posnaova, T., 
Schoen, H., Silvester, J., Tabernero, C., Torres, C., Verkasalo, M., Vondráková, E., Welzel, C. and 
Zaleski, Z. (2014) ‘Basic personal values underlie and give coherence to political values: A cross 
national study in 15 countries’, Political Behavior, 36(4), 899-930. 
Schwartz, S. and Sagie, G. (2000) ‘Value consensus and importance: A cross-national study.’, Journal 
of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31(4), 465-497. 
Schwartz, S.H., Vecchione, M., Fischer, R., Ramos, A., Demirutku, K., Dirilen-Gumus, O., Cieciuch, J., 
Davidov, E., Beierlein, C., Verkasalo, M., Lönnqvist, J. and Konty, M. (2012) ‘Refining the theory of 
basic individual values’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(4), 663-688. 
Schweder, R.A. (2016) ‘The soft side of hard data in the study of cultural values’, in M.C. Hay (ed.), 
Methods that matter: Integrating mixed methods for more effective social science research (pp.81-
105). Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 
Scott, J.C. (1990) Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts. New Haven, CT and 
London: Yale University Press. 
Sears, D.O. and Funk, C.L. (1991) ‘The role of self-interest in social and political attitudes’, Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology, 24, 1-91. 
Sears, D.O. and Funk, C.L. (1999) ‘Evidence of the long-term persistence of adults’ political 
predispositions’, Journal of Politics, 61(1), 1-28.  
Sears, D.O. and Valentino, N.A. (1997) ‘Politics matters: Political events as catalysts for preadult 
socialization’, American Political Science Review, 91(1), 45-65. 
Seip, E., Dijk, W. and Rotteveel, M. (2014) ‘Anger motivates costly punishment of unfair behavior’, 
Motivation and Emotion, 38(4), 578-588. 
Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee (2014) Bridging our growing divide: The extent of 
income inequality in Australia, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. At 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Income_
Inequality/Report> (viewed 17 October 2016). 
Seshamani, M. and Gray, A. (2004) ‘A longitudinal study of the effects of age and time to death on 
hospital costs’, Journal of Health Economics, 23(2), 217-235. 
377 
 
Shafer, B.E. and Spady, R.H. (2014) The American political landscape. Cambridge, MA and London: 
Harvard University Press. 
Sheleff, L.S. (1981) Generations apart: Adult hostility to youth. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Sheppard, J., Gray, M. and Phillips, B. (2017) Attitudes to housing affordability: Pressures, problems 
and solutions. ANU Poll 24, Canberra: Australian Data Archive, The Australian National University. 
Shoven, J.B. and Goda, G.S. (2011) ‘Adjusting government policies for age inflation’, in J.B. Shoven 
(ed.), Demography and the economy (pp.143-168). Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Sieger Derr, T. (1981) ‘The obligation to the future’, in E. Partridge (ed.), Responsibilities to future 
generations (pp.37-44). New York: Prometheus Books. 
Siegers, P. and Kuntz, A. (2012) ‘Congruence and performance of value concepts in social research’, 
Survey Research Methods, 6(1), 13-24. 
Silverstein, M. and Bengtson, V.L. (1997) ‘Intergenerational solidarity and the structure of adult 
child-parent relationships in American families’, American Journal of Sociology, 103(2): 429-460. 
Silverstein, M. and Parrott, T.M. (1997) ‘Attitudes toward public support of the elderly: Does early 
involvement with grandparents moderate generational tensions?’ Research on Aging, 19, 108-132. 
Silverstein, M., Parrott, T.M., Angelelli, J.J. and Cook, F.L. (2000) ‘Solidarity and tension between age 
groups in the United States: Challenge for an aging America in the 21st century’, International Journal 
of Social Welfare, 9, 270-284. 
Silverstein, M., Angelelli, J.J. and Parrott, T.M. (2001) ‘Changing attitudes toward aging policy in the 
United States during the 1980s and 1990s: A cohort analysis’, Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences, 
56B(1), S36-S43. 
Sinn, H.W. and Uebelmesser, S. (2002) ‘Pensions and the path to gerontocracy in Germany’, 
European Journal of Political Economy, 19, 153-158. 
Smeeding, T. and Sullivan, D. (1998) ‘Generations and the distribution of economic well-being’, The 
American Economic Review, 88(2), 254-258. 
Smith, C.A. and Ellsworth, P.C. (1985) ‘Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 813-838. 
Smith, C. A. and Lazarus, R. S. (1993) ‘Appraisal components, corerelational themes, and the 
emotions’, Cognition and Emotion, 7, 233-269. 
Smith, K. (2011) Discounting, risk and uncertainty in economic appraisals of climate change policy: 
Comparing nordhaus, Garnaut and Stern, Garnaut Climate Change Review Update 2011. At 
<http://www.garnautreview.org.au/update-2011/commissioned-work/discounting-risk-uncertainty-
ecomonic-appraisals-climate-change-policy.html> (viewed 25 September 2016). 
378 
 
Smith, T.W. (2000) Public support for governmental benefits for the elderly across countries and time, 
National Opinion Research Center (report prepared for OECD), University of Chicago. At 
<http://www.oecd.org/els/public-pensions/2535827.pdf> (viewed 15 July 2016). 
Sniderman, P.M. and Levendusky, M.S. (2007) ‘An institutional theory of political choice’, in R.J. 
Dalton and H. Klingemann (eds), The Oxford handbook of political behaviour (pp.437-456). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Soroka, S.N. and Wlezien, C. (2010) Degrees of democracy: Politics, public opinion, and policy. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Soss, J. (1999) ‘Lessons of welfare: Policy design, political learning, and political action’, American 
Political Science Review, 93(2), 363-380. 
 
South, S.J. (1991) ‘Age structure and public expenditures on children’, Social Science Quarterly, 72, 
661-675. 
 
Spies-Butcher, B. (2014a) ‘Welfare reform’, in C. Miller and L. Orchard (eds), Australian public policy: 
Progressive ideas in the neoliberal ascendency (pp. 81-96). Bristol, UK: Policy Press. 
 
Spies-Butcher, B. (2014b) ‘Marketisation and the dual welfare state: Neoliberalism and inequality in 
Australia’, Economic and Labour Relations Review, 25(2), 185-201. 
Spies-Butcher, B. and Stebbing, A. (2011) ‘Population ageing and tax reform in a dual welfare state’, 
Economic and Labour Relations Review, 22(3), 45-64. 
Spies-Butcher, B. and Stebbing, A. (2016) ‘Climate change and the welfare state? Exploring 
Australian attitudes to climate and social policy’, Journal of Sociology, 52(4), 741-758. 
Staerklé, C., Likki, T. and Scheidegger, R. (2012) ‘A normative approach to welfare attitudes’, in S. 
Svallfors (ed.), Contested welfare states: Welfare attitudes in Europe and beyond (pp.81-118). 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Standing, G. (2011) The precariat: The new dangerous class. London and New York: Bloomsbury. 
Stanford, J. (2017) The consequences of wage suppression for Australia’s superannuation system, 
Canberra: Australia Institute Centre for Future Work. At 
<http://www.futurework.org.au/wage_suppression_a_time_bomb_in_superannuation_system> 
(viewed 12 October 2017). 
Stebbing, A. (2015) ‘The devil’s in the detail: The hidden costs of private retirement incomes policy’, 
in G. Meagher and S. Goodwin (eds), Markets, rights and power in Australian social policy (pp.115-
151). Sydney: Sydney University Press. 
Stebbing, A. and Spies-Butcher, B. (2010) ‘Universal welfare by other means? Social tax expenditures 
and the Australian dual welfare state’, Journal of Social Policy, 39, 585-606. 
Stebbing, A. and Spies-Butcher, B. (2016) ‘The decline of a homeowning society? Asset-based 
welfare, retirement and intergenerational equity in Australia’, Housing Studies, 31(2), 190-207. 
379 
 
Steuerle, E., McKernan, S., Ratcliffe, C. and Zhang, S. (2013) Lost generations? Wealth building 
among young Americans, Washington D.C: Urban Institute. At 
<http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412766-lostgenerations-wealth-building-among-young-
americans.pdf> (viewed 1 July 2016). 
Stiglitz, J. (2012) The price of inequality. London: Penguin Books. 
Stilwell, F. and Jordan, K. (2007) Who gets what? Analysing economic inequality in Australia. 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 
Stimson, J.A. (2004) Tides of consent: How public opinion shapes American politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Stjernø, S. (2008) ‘Social democratic values in the European welfare states’, in W. Van Oorschot, M. 
Opielka and B. Pfau-Effinger. (eds), Culture and welfare state: Values and social policy in comparative 
perspective. (pp.50-70). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Stoker, G., Evans, M. and Halupka, M. (2018) Trust and democracy in Australia: Democratic decline 
and renewal, Canberra: Democracy 2025. At 
<https://www.democracy2025.gov.au/documents/Democracy2025-report1.pdf> (viewed 16 
December 2018). 
Stoker, G., Li, J., Halupka, M. and Evans, M. (2017) ‘Complacent young citizens or cross-generational 
solidarity? An analysis of Australian attitudes to democratic politics’, Australian Journal of Political 
Science, 52(2), 218-235. 
Stolle, D. (2007) ‘Social capital’, in R.J. Dalton and H. Klingemann (eds), The Oxford handbook of 
political behaviour (pp.655-674). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Street, D. and Cossman, J.S. (2006) ‘Greatest generation or greedy geezers? Social spending 
preferences and the elderly’, Social Problems, 53(1), 75-96. 
Süssmuth, B. and von Weizsäcker, R.K. (2006) ‘Institutional determinants of public debt: A political 
economy perspective’, in J.C. Tremmel (ed.), Handbook of intergenerational justice (pp.170-184). 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Svallfors, S. (1997) ‘Worlds of welfare and attitudes to redistribution: A comparison of eight Western 
nations’, European Sociological Review, 13(3), 283-304. 
Svallfors, S. (2007a) ‘Introduction’, in S. Svallfors (ed.), The political sociology of the welfare state 
(pp.1-29). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Svallfors, S. (2007b) ‘Class and attitudes to market inequality: A comparison of Sweden, Britain, 
Germany and the United States’, in Svallfors, S. (ed.), The political sociology of the welfare state 
(pp.189-222). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Svallfors, S. (2007c) ‘Conclusion: The past and future of political sociology’, in S. Svallfors (ed.), The 
political sociology of the welfare state (pp.258-280). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
380 
 
Svallfors, S. (2008) ‘The generational contract in Sweden: Age-specific attitudes to age-related 
policies’, Policy and Politics, 36(3), 381-396. 
Svallfors, S. (2010) ‘Policy feedback, generational replacement and attitudes to state intervention: 
Eastern and Western Germany, 1990-2006’, European Political Science Review, 2(1), 119-135. 
Svallfors, S. (2012) ‘Welfare states and welfare attitudes’, in S. Svallfors (ed.), Contested welfare 
states: Welfare attitudes in Europe and beyond (pp.1-24). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Svallfors, S., Kulin, J. and Schnabel, A. (2012) ‘Age, class, and attitudes toward government 
responsibilities’, in S. Svallfors (ed.), Contested welfare states: Welfare attitudes in Europe and 
beyond (pp.158-192). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Swedlow, B. and Wyckoff, M.L. (2009) ‘Value preferences and ideological structuring of attitudes in 
American public opinion’, American Politics Research, 37(6), 1048-1087. 
Swift, A., Marshall, G., Burgoyne, C. and Routh, D. (1995) ‘Distributive justice: Does it matter what 
the people think?’ In J.R. Kluegel, D.S. Mason and B. Wegener (eds), Social justice and political 
change: Public opinion in capitalist and post-communist states (pp.15-47). Berlin and New York: 
Walter de Gruyter. 
Takatoshi, I. (2004) ‘Generativity as social responsibility: The role of generations in societal 
continuity and change’, in E. de St Aubin, D.P. McAdams and T. Kim (eds), The generative society: 
Caring for future generations (pp.83-95). Washington D.C: American Psychological Association. 
Tapper, A., Fenna, A. and Phillimore, J. (2013) ‘Age bias in the Australian welfare state’, Agenda, 
20(1), 5-20. 
Tapper, A., Fenna, A. and Phillimore, J. (2014) ‘The treatment of families in the Australian welfare 
state 1984-2010’, Australian Journal of Social Issues, 49(2), 109-126. 
Tapper, A., Fenna, A. and Phillimore, J. (2015) ‘Middle-class welfare and vertical redistribution in 
Australia: A fiscal incidence analysis’, Australian Economic Review, 48(3), 258-272. 
Taylor, E., Saunders, C. and Toomse-Smith, M. (2017) Social and political attitudes of people on low 
incomes, London: NatCen Social Research. At <http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39207/social-
and-political-attitudes-of-people-on-low-incomes-2017-full-report.pdf> (viewed 24 September 
2018). 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004) ‘Open markets and welfare values: Welfare values, inequality and social 
change in the silver age of the welfare state’, European Societies, 6(1), 29-48. 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2005) Attitudes to social justice, London: Institute for Public Policy Research. At 
<http://www.ippr.org/publications/attitudes-to-social-justice> (viewed 6 January 2017). 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2008) ‘Choice and values: Individualised rational action and social goals’, Journal of 
Social Policy, 37(2), 167-185. 
Taylor-Gooby, P., Hastie, C. and Bromley, C. (2003) ‘Querulous citizens: Welfare knowledge and the 
limits to welfare reform’, Social Policy and Administration, 37(1), 1-20. 
381 
 
Tepe, M. and Vanhuysse, P. (2009) ‘Are aging OECD welfare states on the path to gerontocracy?’ 
Journal of Public Policy, 29, 1-28. 
Thomassen, J. (2007) ‘Democratic values’, in R.J. Dalton and H. Klingemann (eds), The Oxford 
handbook of political behaviour (pp.418-434). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Thompson, J. (2003a) Obligations to the elderly and generational equity, Working Paper 2003/2, 
Centre of Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Melbourne. At 
<http://www.cappe.edu.au/docs/working-papers/Thompson4.pdf> (viewed 30 May 2016). 
Thompson, J. (2003b) Intergenerational equity: Issues of principle in the allocation of social resources 
between this generation and the next, Research Paper No.7 (2002-3), Department of Parliamentary 
Library, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. At 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/2002-03/03rp07.pdf> (viewed 30 May 2016). 
Thompson, J. (2009) Intergenerational justice: Rights and responsibilities in an intergenerational 
polity. New York: Routledge. 
Thompson, S. (2006) ‘Anger and the struggle for justice’, in S. Clarke, P. Hoggett and S. Thompson 
(eds), Emotion, politics and society (pp.123-144). Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Thomson, D. (1991) Selfish generations? The ageing of New Zealand’s welfare state. Wellington, 
New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books. 
Tilley, J. and Evans, G. (2014) ‘Ageing and generational effects on vote choice: Combining cross-
sectional and panel data to estimate APC effects’, Electoral Studies, 33, 19-27. 
Timonen, V., Conlon, C., Scharf, T. and Carney, G. (2013) ‘Family, state, class and solidarity: Re-
conceptualising intergenerational solidarity through the grounded theory approach’, European 
Journal of Ageing, 10(3), 171-179. 
Tomlinson, M.R. (2012) ‘Gen Y and housing inheritance in Australia’, Urban Policy and Research, 
30(3), 327-337. 
Tony, E. and Matheson, G. (2000) ‘Australian attitudes to unemployment and unemployed people’, 
Australian Journal of Social Issues, 35(3), 181-202. 
Tranter, B. (2015) ‘The impact of political context on the measurement of postmaterial values’, 
Political Science Review 93, 665-677. 
Tranter, B. and Western, M. (2003) ‘Postmaterial values and age: The case of Australia’, Australian 
Journal of Political Science, 38(2), 239-257. 
Tranter, B. and Western, M. (2010) ‘Overstating value change: Question ordering in the postmaterial 
values index’, European Sociological Review, 26(5), 571-583. 
Tremmel, J.C. (2006) ‘Establishing intergenerational justice in national constitutions’, in J.C. Tremmel 




Tremmel, J.C. (2009) A theory of intergenerational justice. London: Earthscan. 
Tremmel, J., Mason, A., Dimitrijoski, I. and Godli, P.H. (2015) ‘Introduction: Youth quotas – mapping 
the field’, in J. Tremmel, A. Mason, P.H. Godli and I. Dimitrijoski (eds) Youth quotas and other 
efficient forms of youth participation in ageing societies (pp.1-5). Switzerland: Springer International 
Publishing. 
Triandis, H.C. (1995) Individualism and collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Turner, B.S. (1998) ‘Ageing and generational conflicts: A reply to Sarah Irwin’, British Journal of 
Sociology, 49(2), 299-304. 
Twenge, J.M. (2006) Generation Me: Why today’s young Americans are more confident, assertive, 
entitled - and more miserable than ever before. New York: Free Press. 
Twenge, J.M., Campbell, W.K. and Freeman, E.C. (2012) ‘Generational differences in young adults’ 
life goals, concern for others, and civic orientation, 1966-2009’, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 102(5), 1045-1062. 
Van den Broek, A. (1999) ‘Does differential cohort socialization matter? The impact of cohort 
replacement and the presence of intergenerational differences in the Netherlands’, Political 
Psychology, 20(3), 501-523. 
Van der Toorn, J., Feinberg, M., Jost, J.T., Kay, A.C., Tyler, T.R., Willer, R. and Wilmuth, C. (2015) ‘A 
sense of powerlessness fosters system justification: Implications for the legitimation of authority, 
hierarchy, and government’, Political Psychology, 36(1), 93-110. 
Van Deth, J.W. and Scarbrough, E. (1995) ‘The concept of values’, in J.W. Van Deth and E. Scarbrough 
(eds), The impact of values (pp.21-47). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Van Oorschot, W. (2000) ‘Who should get what and why? On deservingness criteria and the 
conditionality of solidarity among the public’, Policy and Politics, 28(1), 33-48. 
Van Oorschot, W. (2006) ‘Making the difference in social Europe: Deservingness perceptions among 
citizens of European welfare states’, Journal of European Social Policy, 16(1), 23-42. 
Van Oorschot, W. (2008) ‘Popular deservingness perceptions and conditionality of solidarity in 
Europe’, in W. Van Oorschot, M. Opielka and B. Pfau-Effinger (eds), Culture and welfare state: Values 
and social policy in comparative perspective (pp.268-288). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Van Oorschot, W. and Halman, L. (2000) ‘Blame or fate, individual or social?’ European Societies, 
2(1), 1-28. 
Van Oorschot, W. and Meuleman, B. (2014) ‘Popular deservingness of the unemployed in the 
context of welfare state policies, economic conditions and cultural climate’, in S. Kumlin and I. 
Stadelmann-Steffen (eds), How welfare states shape the democratic public: Policy feedback, 




Van Oorschot, W., Reeskens, T. and Meuleman, B. (2012) ‘Popular perceptions of welfare state 
consequences: A multilevel, cross-national analysis of 25 European countries’, Journal of European 
Social Policy, 22(2), 181-197. 
Van Parijs, P. (1998) ‘The disenfranchisement of the elderly and other attempts to secure 
intergenerational justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27(4), 292-333. 
Vecchione, M., Caprara, G.V., Dentale, F. and Schwartz, S.H. (2013) ‘Voting and values: Reciprocal 
effects over time’, Political Psychology, 34(4), 465-485. 
Vecchione, M., Schwartz, S., Alessandri, G., Döring, A.K., Castellani, V. and Caprara, M.G. (2016) 
‘Stability and change of basic personal values in early adulthood: An 8-year longitudinal study’, 
Journal of Research in Personality, 63, 111-122. 
Verba, S. and Nie, N.H. (1972) Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality. New 
York: Harper and Row. 
Vromen, A., Loader, B.D. and Xenos, M.A. (2015) ‘Beyond lifestyle politics in a time of crisis? 
Comparing young peoples’ issue agendas and views on inequality’, Policy Studies, 36(6), 532-549. 
Vromen, A., Xenos, M. and Loader, B. (2015) ‘Young people, social media and connective action: 
From organisational maintenance to everyday political talk’, Journal of Youth Studies, 18(1), 80–100. 
Wade-Benzoni, K.A. (1999) ‘Thinking about the future: An intergenerational perspective on the 
conflict and compatibility between economic and environmental interests’, American Behavioral 
Scientist, 42(8), 1393–1405. 
Wade-Benzoni, K.A. (2002) ‘A golden rule over time: Reciprocity in intergenerational allocation 
decisions’, Academy of Management Journal, 45(5), 1011-1028. 
Wade-Benzoni, K.A. (2006) ‘Legacies, immortality, and the future: The psychology of 
intergenerational altruism’, in A.E. Tenbrunsel (ed.), Research on managing groups and teams: Ethics 
in groups (Volume 8) (pp.247-270). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing. 
Wade-Benzoni, K.A. (2008) ‘Maple trees and weeping willows: The role of time, uncertainty, and 
affinity in intergenerational decisions’, Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 1(3), 220-
245. 
Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Hernandez, M., Medvec, V. and Messick, D. (2008) ‘In fairness to future 
generations: The role of egocentrism, uncertainty, power, and stewardship in judgments of 
intergenerational allocations’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 233-245. 
Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Sondak, H. and Galinsky, A.D. (2010) ‘Leaving a legacy: Intergenerational 
allocations of benefits and burdens’, Business Ethics Quarterly, 20(1), 7-34. 
Wade-Benzoni, K.A. and Tost, L. (2009) ‘The egoism and altruism of intergenerational behaviour’, 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13(2), 165-193. 
384 
 
Walsh, L. and Black, R. (2018) ‘Off the radar democracy: Young people’s alternative acts of 
citizenship in Australia’, in S. Pickard and J. Bessant (eds), Young people re-generating politics in 
times of crises (pp.217-232). Palgrave MacMillan, ebook at DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58250-4. 
Ward, R.A. (2001) ‘Linkages between family and societal-level intergenerational attitudes’, Research 
on Aging, 23 (2), 179-208. 
Wattenberg, M.P. (2016) Is Voting for Young People? 4th ed., New York and Abingdon, Oxford: 
Routledge. 
Wawro, G.J. (2006) ‘The rationalizing public?’ Critical Review, 18(1-3), 279-296. 
Weaver, K.R. (1986) ‘The politics of blame avoidance’, Journal of Public Policy, 6(4), 371-398. 
Wegener, B. and Liebig, S. (1995) ‘Dominant ideologies and the variation of distributive justice 
norms: A comparison of East and West Germany, and the United States’, in J.R. Kluegel, D.S. Mason 
and B. Wegener (eds), Social justice and political change: Public opinion in capitalist and post-
communist states (pp.239-259). Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. 
Weiss, E.B. (1988) In fairness to future generations: International law, common patrimony, and 
intergenerational equity. Tokyo: United Nations University and New York: Transnational Publishers. 
Welzel, C. (2007) ‘Individual modernity’, in R.J. Dalton and H. Klingemann (eds), The Oxford 
handbook of political behaviour (pp.185-205). Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Welzel, C. (2010) ‘How selfish are self-expression values? A civicness test’, Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 41(2), 152-174. 
Westen, D. (2008) The political brain: The role of emotion in deciding the fate of the nation. New 
York: Public Affairs. 
Whiteford, P. (2018) ‘Intergenerational inequality’, in How unequal? Insights on inequality (pp. 92-
109), Melbourne: Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA). At 
<http://www.ceda.com.au/Research-and-policy/All-CEDA-research/Research-catalogue/How-
unequal-Insights-on-inequality> (viewed 28 June 2018). 
Wierenga, A. and Ratnam, S. (2011) ‘Young people and the future’, in S. Beadle, R. Holdsworth and J. 
Wyn (eds), For we are young and….? Young people in a time of uncertainty (pp.214-228). Carlton, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 
Wilensky, H.L. (2002) Rich democracies: Political economy, public policy, and performance. Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 
Wilkoszewski, H. (2008) ‘Demographic pressure and attitudes towards public intergenerational 
transfers in Germany – how much room left for reforms?’ In J. Tremmel (ed.), Demographic change 
and intergenerational justice: The implementation of long-term thinking in the political decision-
making process (pp.175-205). Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
385 
 
Wilkoszewski, H. (2009) ‘Age trajectories of social policy preferences: How demographic change 
influences intergenerational relations’, paper prepared for the IUSSP Meeting 2009. At 
<http://iussp2009.princeton.edu/papers/92493> (viewed 15 July 2016). 
Willetts, D. (2010) The pinch: How the Baby Boomers took their children’s future – and why they 
should give it back. London: Atlantic Books. 
Williams, A. and Nussbaum, J.F. (2001) Intergenerational communication across the life span. 
Mahwah, NJ and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Williamson, J. and Rhodes, A. (2011) ‘A critical assessment of generational accounting and its 
contribution to the generational equity debate’, International Journal of Ageing and Later Life, 6(1), 
33-57. 
Williamson, J.B. and Watts-Roy, D.M. (1999) ‘Framing the generational equity debate’, in J.B. 
Williamson, D.M. Watts-Roy and E.R. Kingson (eds), The generational equity debate (pp.3-37). New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Wilson, M.S. (2005) ‘A social-value analysis of postmaterialism’, Journal of Social Psychology, 145, 
209-224. 
Wilson, S. (2006) ‘Not my taxes! Explaining tax resistance and its implications for Australia's welfare 
state’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 41(4), 517-535. 
Wilson, S. and Meagher, G. (2007) ‘Howard’s welfare state: How popular is the new social policy 
agenda?’ In D. Denemark, G. Meagher, S. Wilson, M. Western and T. Phillips (eds), Australian social 
attitudes 2: Citizenship, work and aspirations (pp.262-285). Sydney: University of New South Wales 
Press. 
Wilson, S., Meagher, G. and Hermes, K. (2012a) ‘The social division of welfare knowledge: Policy 
stratification and perceptions of welfare reform in Australia’, Policy and Politics, 40(3), 323-346. 
Wilson, S., Meagher, G. and Hermes, K. (2012b) ‘A new role for government? Trends in social policy 
preferences since the mid-1980s’, in J. Pietsch and H. Aarons (eds), Australia: Identity, fear and 
governance in the 21st century (pp.107-131). Canberra: Australian National University E Press. 
Wilson, S., Spies-Butcher, B. and Stebbing, A. (2009) ‘Targets and taxes: Explaining the welfare 
orientations of the Australian public’, Social Policy and Administration, 43(5), 508-525. 
Winter, S. and Mouritzen, P.E. (2001) ‘Why people want something for nothing: The role of 
asymmetrical illusions’, European Journal of Political Research, 39(1), 109-143. 
Wissenburg, M.L.J. (2011) ‘Parenting and intergenerational justice: Why collective obligations 
towards future generations take second place to individual responsibility’, Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics, 24(6), 557-573. 
Wittmann, M. (2017) Felt time: The science of how we experience time. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Wlezien, C. (2004) ‘Patterns of representation: Dynamics of public preferences and policy’, Journal of 
Politics, 66(1), 1-24. 
386 
 
Wlezien, C. and Soroka, S.N. (2007) ‘The relationship between public opinion and policy’, in R.J. 
Dalton and H. Klingemann (eds), The Oxford handbook of political behaviour (pp.799-817). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Wohl, R. (1979) The generation of 1914. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Wolfe, M.W. (2008) ‘The shadows of future generations’, Duke Law Journal, 57(6), 1897-1932. 
Wolfson, M.C., Rowe, G., Lin, X. and Gribble, S.F. (1998) ‘Historical generational accounting with 
heterogeneous populations’, in M. Corak (ed) Government finances and generational equity (pp.107-
125). Ottawa: Statistics Canada. 
Wood, D., Griffiths, K. and Emslie, O. (2019) Generation gap: Ensuring a fair go for younger 
Australians, Melbourne, Grattan Institute. At <https://grattan.edu.au/report/generation-gap/> 
(viewed 10 September 2019). 
Woodman, D. and Wyn, J. (2011) ‘Youth research in a changing world’, in S. Beadle, R. Holdsworth 
and J. Wyn (eds), For we are young and….? Young people in a time of uncertainty (pp.5-28). Carlton, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 
Woodman, D. and Wyn, J. (2015) Youth and generation: Rethinking change and inequality in the lives 
of young people. London: Sage. 
Wright, R. (1991) ‘Cohort size and earnings in Great Britain’, Journal of Population Economics, 4, 295-
305. 
Wright, S. and Koslowski, M. (2019) ‘Voter turnout at record low after young people disengage’, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 2019. At <https://www.smh.com.au/federal-election-2019/voter-
turnout-at-record-low-after-young-people-disengage-20190530-p51sol.html> (viewed 1 June 2019). 
Wyn, J., Cahill, H., Woodman, D., Cuervo, H., Chesters, J., Cook, J. and Reade, J. (2017) Gen Y on Gen 
Y, Youth Research Centre, University of Melbourne. At 
<https://education.unimelb.edu.au/yrc/publications> (viewed 4 September 2018). 
Wyn, J. and Woodman, D. (2006) ‘Generation, youth and social change in Australia’, Journal of Youth 
Studies 9(5), 495-514. 
Yates, J. (2017) ‘Overview: Housing Australia’, in Committee for Economic Development of Australia 
(CEDA), Housing Australia (pp. 15-34), Melbourne. At <http://www.ceda.com.au/Research-and-
policy/All-CEDA-research/Research-catalogue/Housing-Australia> (viewed 25 September 2017). 
Yates, J. and Bradbury, B. (2010) ‘Home ownership as a (crumbling) fourth pillar of social insurance in 
Australia’, Journal of Housing and Built Environment, 25(2), 193-211. 
Yzerbyt, V. and Rogier, A. (2001) ‘Blame it on the group: Entitativity, subjective essentialism, and 
social attribution’, in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), The psychology of legitimacy: Emerging 




Zaidi, A., Gasior, K. and Manchin, R. (2012) ‘Population aging and intergenerational solidarity: 
International policy frameworks and European public opinion’, Journal of Intergenerational 
Relationships, 10(3), 214-227. 
Zaller, J.R. (1992) The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Zelditch, M. (2001) ‘Theories of Legitimacy’, in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), The psychology of 
legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice, and intergroup relations (pp.33-53). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Zimbardo, P.G. and Boyd, J.N. (1999) ‘Putting time in perspective: A valid, reliable individual-
differences metric’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(6), 1271-1288. 
Zimbardo, P.G. and Boyd, J.N. (2008) The time paradox: The new psychology of time that will change 
your life. New York: Free Press. 
Zuckerman, A.S. (2005) ‘Returning to the social logic of political behavior’, in A.S. Zuckerman (ed.), 
The social logic of politics: Personal networks as contexts for political behaviour (pp.3-20). 
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Zukin, C., Keeter, S., Andolina, M., Jenkins, K. and Delli Carpini, M.X. (2006) A new engagement? 
Political participation, civic life, and the changing American citizen. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
